Malaysia as an “Other” in Indonesian popular discourse

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=riac20
Download by: [Australian Catholic University] Date: 28 September 2017, At: 22:57
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies
ISSN: 1464-9373 (Print) 1469-8447 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/riac20
Malaysia as an “Other” in Indonesian popular
discourse
Farabi Fakih
To cite this article: Farabi Fakih (2017) Malaysia as an “Other” in Indonesian popular discourse,
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 18:3, 376-390, DOI: 10.1080/14649373.2017.1354687
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2017.1354687
Published online: 25 Sep 2017.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 3
View related articles
View Crossmark data

Malaysia as an “Other” in Indonesian popular discourse
Farabi FAKIH
Department of History, Faculty of Cultural Science, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta,
Indonesia
ABSTRACT
This article reads contemporary popular publications in Indonesia on the topic
of Indonesian–Malaysian relations. It looks at how Indonesia perceives Malaysia
and the function of that perception in relation to Indonesian national identity.
The article also looks at how Indonesian perceptions of Malaysia were discussed
during the revolutionary period by reading the speeches held at the
constitutional meeting (BPUPKI) and the Konfrontasi period, reading the
speeches written by Sukarno and the letter of Pan-Malay leader exiled in
Indonesia, Ibrahim Yaacob. The article then compares the ideas espoused by
Sukarno, Yaacob and others in the past and the arguments presented in the
present day concerning Malaysia. A preliminary conclusion is reached that
geopolitical anxiety and not kinship is a more important factor in how
contemporary Indonesia sees Malaysia.
KEYWORDS
Indonesia; Malaysia; Other;
perception; popular
Introduction
The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has been characterized by a deep, contradictory
feelings of kinship and enemy, friends and foe (Chinyong-Liow 2004). This tension according to
some is the result of the development of kinship nationalism that entwined the two nation-states
within perceived expectations that are often not met by both sides. Another explanation is rooted
in the Cold War tension and how the actions of leaders from both sides aggravated feelings of mis-
trust and hatred in the 1960s, during a time when both nations were coming into being. That the rise
of nationalism and what it meant to be Malaysian or Indonesian occurred at a time of Cold War
tension was cemented and remained prevalent today. This dichotomy of kin and foe still has a strong
imprint in today’s relationship. Indonesian nationalists often took to the road in front of the Malay-
sian embassy to voice their frustrations with their perceived “little brother.” A reading of online for-
ums or comment sections that involved both countries are often littered with accusations and attacks
that are nationalist in nature. It seems common in Indonesia to casually dislike Malaysia. Yet during
the early twentieth century, many of the nationalists in both Indonesia and Malaysia entertained the
idea that both were of the same nation. The Pan-Malay or Pan-Indonesia movement and books that
were active in the minds of people such as Muhammad Yamin, Ibrahim Yaacob, Burhanuddin Al-
Helmy and president Sukarno himself showed the strength of this feeling of kinship. Going even
further back, to the beginning of Malay/Indonesian nationalism that developed at the al-Azhar Uni-
versity in Cairo and within the inter-insular networks of printing houses in Singapore and Batavia
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Farabi Fakih farabi.fakih@gmail.com Banjarsari rt05/rw12, Sukoharjo, Ngaglik, Sleman, 55581 Daerah Istimewa
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
INTER-ASIA CULTURAL STUDIES, 2017
VOL. 18, NO. 3, 376–390
https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2017.1354687
Downloadedby[AustralianCatholicUniversity]at22:5728September2017

(Soh 2012, 1–40; Chinyong-Liow 2004, 54–76), what interests us here is the fact that such feelings
have become embedded in the thoughts of millions of Indonesians.
This article will attempt to explore the vernacular expressions related to Malaysia from the
wider Indonesian civil society in the present day. We do this by reading popular books that
have been published about Indonesia and Malaysia relations. We focus on vernacular expression
of support and dissent and try to analyze these expressions in the context of Indonesian nation-
alism and the function of the Malay “Other.” While no doubt both Indonesia and Malaysia have
developed an amicable relationship and strengthened economic and political ties since their rocky
past during the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) period (1963–1966), it is also important to realize
just how significant is the continued tension from the wider Indonesian civil society of the
idea of Malaysia. We believe that by reading these books, we could get an understanding of
how some parts of the population understand Malaysia’s “function” within Indonesian national-
ism. At a time of a global rise of right-wing nationalism in the West and other places, understand-
ing cultural and kinship nationalism is pertinent as it may rear its ugly head in the early decades
of the twenty-first century.
We begin first by discussing the idea of Pan Indonesia from the viewpoints of Malay nationalists
such as Burhanuddin Al Helmy and Ibrahim Yaacob and contrasting that with the ideas espoused by
people such as Muhammad Yamin, Mohammad Hatta and President Sukarno. This is to locate the
differing development in the context of the Cold War and Third World movement. How Indone-
sians perceive Malaysia should, in our opinion, be located in this formative period in which growing
theories, conspiratorial or not, on the global order arose as a vernacular discourse shared by many
people. Although Indonesia’s relationship with Malaysia significantly improved after Konfrontasi,
with growing economic integration between both countries, the question remains whether these
remnants of anti-global thoughts of the 1920s and 1930s along with the Cold War discourse still
affect the current vernacular discourse on Malaysia today.
Roots of difference: idea of nation
The Malay Peninsula has always occupied a special place in the Indonesian imagination of the out-
side. The reason for this is its liminal position within the Indonesian imagination. It is neither out-
side nor inside, but harbors a unique place open for interpretation and conflictual claims. During the
colonial period, Malaya was colloquially called as Malakka by the Dutch or Indo population. In fact,
Mohammad Hatta used the term Malakka in his speech at the BPUPKI, which voted not to include it
as part of independent Indonesia. The word Malakka itself evoked something older in the Dutch his-
torical memory. Yet, perusing the Dutch-language newspaper published in the colony, there was a
sense that the colonial Indies society saw the Straits Settlements as a colonial equal, a friendly neighbor
whose major forms of interaction, aside from economics, seem to be expressed in football matches or
other sporting events.
While the Indies colonial society saw British Malaya in friendly terms, the Indonesian nationalists
saw Malaya a natural extension of Indonesia. This natural inclination to see the Malays as a natural
part of the Indonesian people was expressed earlier within the growing nationalist sentiment that
grew out of the Al Azhar university’s Malay student unions, which saw students from both colonies
interacting and resulted in the exposure of students from Malaysia to Indonesian nationalism (Laffan
2004; Chinyong-Liow 2004, 54–56). Indonesian nationalism, thus took on a life of its own in British
Malaya. This nationalism developed within an area in which the British Free Trade policy resulted in
the large immigration of Chinese and Indians living in the cities of the Straits Settlements.
INTER-ASIA CULTURAL STUDIES 377

Reading the works of Burhanuddin Al Helmy, one of the founders of the Partai Islam Se-Malaysia
(PAS), his idea of Malay nationalism is rooted in the belief in the presence of a Malay civilization and
race that was unique. “There is no certainty that point to Malay ancestry as Mongolian or Aryan or
Dravidian” (Jaffar 1980, 69). Instead, the Malay race had developed for thousands of years creating
its unique civilizational capability, developing a literary civilization rather than a material one. Yet
this racial position becomes problematic when contextualized in the universalist discourse of Islam.
The idea of Malay nationalism, as he saw it, had significant philosophical obstacles. “The major
obstacle for our ‘Malay nationalism’ lies in two things, first the problem of ‘perkauman’ and second
the misunderstanding of ‘asabiyyah’” (Jaffar 1980, 97). Assabiyah, which was popularized by the
Arab sociologist Ibn Khaldun was group solidarity, which was akin to nationalism or an in-group
solidarity that excludes the out-groups. This was an idea frowned upon in the Universalist view
of Islam. Al Helmy said that “They [meaning Muslims] understood assabiyah as ‘nationality’ and
thus according to them, there is no nationality in Islam” (Jaffar 1980, 97). He tried to distance
the idea of nationality based on the notion of assabiyah in order to legitimate its existence in the
face of Islamic values.
What Helmy tries to do is to argue for the existence of Malay nationalism based on a social con-
struct that hadn’t exist prior to the twentieth century as a political identification mechanism, at least
in the Malay world: the idea of the race. It was something in between the locality of the Adat and the
universality of Islam. Interestingly, in the Indonesian case, this question was never fully and ade-
quately answered. For instance, going back to the discussion in the BPUPKI on the extent of the
national territory of Indonesia, Muhammad Yamin argued that the reason why Papua should be
included as part of the territory of Indonesia lays in the scientific notion that it was part of the Aus-
tronesian race. Mohammad Hatta, in his rebuke, said the following:
Papua, as was said yesterday by Mr. Moh. Yamin, according to the latest ethnological research is part of
the Indonesian people. Perhaps the research is true, but I cannot fully accept it because if we look at it
from a scientific manner – and I am very much determined by science – then it always starts with doubt
and disbelief. If there is evidence, strong and unquestionable evidence that says that the Papuans are part
of our nation and that these evidence are real, then I could truly accept it. (Bahar, Sinaga, and Kusuma
2012, 122)
In fact, Mohammad Hatta argued that the merit for considering the territorial extent of Indonesia
should not be based on racial notion, but on practical reasons by considering the current geopolitical
constellations and the reactions of nations such as the US and Britain in regard to Indonesia’s claim
to the Straits Settlements. He also argued that dabbling in pseudoscience is not the way to go forward
and that it was necessary to maintain a critical faculty in relation to such a nebulous question as racial
connections. He criticized the discussion as potentially being misconstrued as imperial ambition on
the part of Indonesia.
Rather, the BPUPKI discussion on the issue of territory was dominated with geopolitical consider-
ations. The Malay Peninsula was thus framed in both the assumptions of ethnic or racial kinship but
also in connection to a geopolitical framing in which Indonesia felt particularly vulnerable. The
BPUPKI discussed the philosophical, territorial and constitutional basis of the independent Indone-
sian state, yet its position in a hostile world often times colored the discussions. This was particularly
pertinent perhaps because of the fact that Indonesian independence depended on the willingness of a
failing Japanese war effort and that there was a chance that Indonesian national leadership could be
considered as Japanese collaborators, instead of legitimate leaders of the Indonesian nation-state
(Legge 1972, 149–180). In this geopolitical state, Malaya holds a unique position. Muzakkir in the
378 F. FAKIH

BPUPKI said that “The Malay lands is the greatest pistol aimed at Indonesian lands and so if the
Peninsula is taken by another country, then the strength of the Indonesian republic cannot be per-
fect” (Bahar, Sinaga, and Kusuma 2012, 114). The importance of Malaya as a geopolitical threat was
thus something that was shared by many Indonesian political leaders.
This dichotomy of Malaya as both kin and a geopolitical threat is central in understanding the Indo-
nesian view of its closest northern neighbor. This would be highlighted during Sukarno’s Guided
Democracy period when he implemented his Revolusi as part of his effort to change the world in
accordance to the sacred mission that was, for him, a logical culmination of the Indonesian revolution.
It also showed that although race and kinship is an important part of the discussion during the
BPUPKI and afterwards, it was always trumped by real geopolitical considerations. Thus, although
the meeting concluded with including the Malay Peninsula and Northern Kalimantan as part of the
country, when Indonesia proclaimed independence and later on obtained its “sovereignty,” it was
quite clear that the nationalist was quite comfortable in acknowledging that Indonesian territory
was a continuation of the Netherlands’ Indies territory. In fact, during the height of Konfrontasi,
Sukarno in one of his speeches denying the accusation as an expansionist said,
Since the start of the National Movement, since our call for an Independent Indonesia, it is clear that we
wanted to create a free country with the territory between Sabang and Merauke, a territory that was once
called the Netherlands Indies. (Sukarno 1964a, 6)
Sukarno may have forgotten his speeches in the BPUPKI that called for the integration of Malaya
with Indonesia, but it is quite clear that Indonesian political interest remains the ultimate determiner
of Malaysian policy in Indonesia. In order to understand better this ambivalent dichotomy regarding
Malaysia within the Indonesian discourse on identity, it may be worthwhile to look at the ideas of
Ibrahim Yaacob, a man that embodied this ambivalence, especially during the height of Cold War
tension in Indonesia.
Ibrahim Yaacob and the Sukarnian image of Malaysia
Perhaps more than most, Ibrahim Yaacob represents the clearest and most succinct case of the idea
of Malaysia within a Sukarnian context. Leaving Malaya days after meeting Sukarno and Moham-
mad Hatta in Taiping on their way back to Jakarta from their historic meeting with Marshall Ter-
auchi in Dalat, Yaacob pressed on them to include Malaya in the future independent Indonesian
nation state. He was there during the BPUPKI meeting, when Yamin interrupted Sukarno’s defense
of Malaya’s inclusion into Indonesia after Mohammad Hatta’s restrained and rational reasoning for
leaving it out, saying “Those Malay youths are waiting outside” (Bahar, Sinaga, and Kusuma 2012,
125). Living in Indonesia for half his life, participating in the revolutionary war and eventually being
buried at the Hero’s Cemetery in Kalibata, Jakarta, Yaacob was the embodiment of the liminal possi-
bility of the Malay–Indonesian debate.
During the height of the Konfrontasi, Yaacob published a Memorandum on the Malay Nation
Confederacy, discussing the various possibilities of future Malay nationhood, which included Indo-
nesia, Malaya and the Philippines. Pan-Malay or Pan-Indonesian nationalism was a nationalism
based on the specific idea of the Malay race. Malayan nationalism that was championed by the
UMNO-AMC-NIC coalition was a betrayal of the idea of the Malay race, because it championed
the idea of creating a multicultural identity based on the colonial experience of the three main
races of Malaya. In Indonesian nationalism, Yaacob, Burhanuddin Helmy and others saw the possi-
bility of forging a true, racially based Malay nationalism and nation-state. Thus, Malay nationalism

was an obvious expression of race and identity politics. Yet, Yaacob was also the prototype Sukar-
noist, a man true to Sukarnian revolutionary ideals, who saw himself as embodying an activist
moral position that rivaled liberal enlightenment and Communism, as part of a logical conclusion
of the movement against colonialism and imperialism.
This Sukarnian world view is inherently ambivalent. On the one hand, it championed an anti-glo-
balization, anti-liberal stance that had been the dominant political thought during the 1930s with the
rise of Fascism and Communism in various parts of the world. Thus, it was based on a notion of local
identity politics, which were often voiced by Yaacob and others as being racially based. It cham-
pioned isolationism through the application of the vague Sukarnian ideals of berdikari, which in
some ways were similar to other isolationist ideologies developing during that period, for instance
the Juche ideology of North Korea. On the other hand, it was a universalist doctrine, which divided
the world into the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) and the New Emerging Forces (NEFO). Sukar-
no’s effort to create the Pyongyang–Beijing–Hanoi–Jakarta Axis, the holding of the GANEFO
(Games of the New Emerging Forces) and the effort to create a rival to the UN in the form of the
CONEFO (Conference of the New Emerging Forces), point to the rather ambitious effort to provide
an alternative to Liberal Imperialism. Thus, quite radically different from isolationism, Sukarnian
ideology was supportive of an active foreign policy to bring about his idea of Revolution (Revolusi)
on a wider, transnational stage.
This Sukarnian context of Cold War rivalry provides the basis to view the rise of Malaysia (and
Singapore) as a threat to the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state. Thus, the idea of Malaysia was
imbued with geopolitical significance as an almost existential threat to the nation-state.
Yaacob reiterated several points in his memo written during the Konfontasi:
That Malaysia was a feudal creation that has the potential of pulling Indonesia apart.
That Malaysia was pro-Western and will become the economic, political and defence centre of capitalism
in the region to suppress and conduct subversive action on Indonesia.
That the presence of foreign soldiers in Malaya is a direct existential threat to Indonesia’s independence.
That Malaya is the centre for Western economic activity and thus threatens the economic development
of Indonesia.
That Malaysia may in the future be used to foment conflict within Indonesia (diadu-domba). (“Laporan
tentang Malaya” n.d.)
This viewpoint thus saw the creation of Malaysia as a cooperation between what Yaacob called the
cosmopolitans of Malaya – i.e. the Chinese and Indian population who did not view the Peninsula as
a homeland but a node in the wider capitalist, liberal and global world, and the feudal elements of the
Malay aristocracy – and British capitalism, which sought to find a way to safeguard its investment
and position in the region (“Laporan tentang Malaya” n.d.). Although this seems like a classic Sukar-
nian viewpoint, Sukarno’s universalist idea was often expressed in terms of support of local Chinese
population in Indonesia. In fact, this universalist idea meant that Sukarno did not see Indonesian
nationalism strictly in racial or ethnic terms.
In fact, when discussing the Malaysian problem in his various speeches on the issue, Sukarno saw
a clear difference between the Indonesian people and the people of Malaya, Singapore and Northern
Kalimantan.
We are not against the Malaya people – to you Malaya people listen up –, we the Indonesian nation are
not against the people of Malaya, no! We are not against the people of Singapore, we are not against the
380 F. FAKIH

people of Brunei, we are not against the people of Sabah, not at all. What we are against, what we want to
destroy, brothers, is neo-colonialism, imperialism that place burden on the shoulders of the people of
Malaya, Singapore, Serawak, Brunei and Sabah. (Sukarno 1964a, 8)
Instead of identifying with the Malay race on a kinship level, Sukarno in fact incited the Chinese
population to revolt against the Malaysian government and called Malaysia as trying to control
the Chinese population. Malaysia is
thus an effort to suppress the Chinese people. This is thus an over vote effort – over vote meaning to
suppress the vote – of the Chinese. I hope that the Chinese brothers in Singapore understand this,
that “Malaysia” is created in order to suppress their vote with that of the Malay vote. (Sukarno
1964b, 10)
No doubt, this might show Sukarno’s desperation in dealing with Malaysia, yet it is quite obvious
that racial or kinship consideration is minimal in his overall grand scheme of the world. This will-
ingness to shy away, although not fully, from a national or racial reading is important because in
Sukarno’s hesitance in regard to this stance is a common theme in Indonesian politics as a mechan-
ism to allow multiple groups to participate in the nationalist discourse without having a common
understanding of what that means.
On a similar level, Sukarno’s attitude toward Islam also echoed similar feelings of ambivalence as
that of ethnicity. Bachtiar Djamily in his biography of Ibrahim Yaacob pointed out what he thought
was Yaacob’s idea concerning Islam in the context of the Indonesian revolution (Djamily 1985).
It is the colonialists that have created a rift and affected the nationalists, with their own religious con-
viction and in proper terms, from the Muslim community a pure ideology has arose that fight for the
rights and freedom from the colonialists in the name of Islam, for the Muslim population, so that it
could in the future create an Islamic state for all the Malay … From this point we view the background
to the rise of the various isms aside from nationalism, such as socialism and communism, which in the
later period, is contrasted with that of Islamism. (Djamily 1985, 55)
And further, Djamily explained that:
The rebellion of 1926 is known generally as a communist rebellion against the Dutch colonialists, but for
many historians it is seen as a rebellion by the people against the Dutch colonialists, in which both the
religious and Adat leaders played a role and the communists portray themselves as head of the rebellion,
while in fact it was their fault that the rebellion failed and as a result the colonialists had an easier time to
squash the rebellion … The rebellion against the colonialist of 1926 cannot be said to be the rebellion of the
Indonesian people against their Dutch colonialists but as a rebellion of the Malay against both the Dutch
and British colonizers (Djamily 1985, 192).
In his reinterpretation of the Indonesian nationalist movement, the culprit of the divide between
nationalism and Islam is rooted in both colonial machination and the rise of western based isms;
communism, socialism, etc. Communism was a western ruse in order to take the glory of the revolu-
tion from the hands of the people, who were ostensibly Muslims. This idea of the reduction of Islam
from being a universal, revolutionary power in lieu of communism was something that Djamily must
have considered Yaacob to have shared.
Djamily had a history that mirrored Yaacob’s personal history in opposite form. He was born in
Batusangkar, West Sumatra in 1929, joining the Indonesian army during the Revolutionary War and
leaving for Malaya in 1948 during the communist insurgency period. No doubt some of his personal
ideas colored his writing on the biography of Yaacob, but Islam certainly played a role that was much
more significant in comparison to the more secular Sukarno as well as many other Indonesian
nationalists. Writing in 1985, in a sense his revisionist history of Indonesian nationalism was

ahead of the curve of the kinds of revisionist history writings that exploded onto the post-Suharto
Indonesian scene.
The difficulty of placing Islam and Indonesian nationalism is something that was shared by both
Yaacob and Helmy. In Yaacob’s or perhaps Djamily’s case, it was important to strengthen the notion
that Indonesian nationalism, especially the one that was exported to the Malay Peninsula – in this
case with the help of the Nationalist Communist Tan Malaka – was something that was not in con-
tradiction with Islam. Instead, Sukarno himself did not share this Islamist idea. His revolution was,
in his eye, universal but for logical and scientific reasons. It is traced not from Islam, but from both
the Enlightenment and the Communist revolution, he reiterated that it was an improvement from
both revolutions. Being a universalist, Sukarno did not see race or nationalism, especially that of
the Malay nationalism as being particularly significant. He was equally close to the Chinese people
as he was the Malay. Yet, aside from being universalist, there was a strong strain of wariness of the
outside world in Sukarno’s ideology. As we saw earlier during the BPUPKI meetings of 1945, geo-
politics was a significant component in the discussion on Indonesia’s territorial and national phil-
osophy. Pan-Indonesianism was something that was entertained if it did not interfere with more
practical geopolitical issues.
More important was the Sukarnian position of Indonesia as a platform for enabling the creation of
a new world order. This was something that was not shared by the Pan-Malays. Their more modest
proposal was based on the need to create racial or ethnic nationalism. Indonesian nationalism devel-
oped within this ambivalent attitude concerning race, which would later on allow it to slowly expand
the idea of the Indonesian as inclusive and multicultural. This continued in Malaysia, where race-
based politics became entrenched in the political landscape of the country. Al Helmy once
denounced the idea of Malayan nationalism that was multicultural in nature and favored Malay
nationalism, something that he found a kindred spirit in the idea of Indonesian nationalism. Ironi-
cally, Indonesian nationalism has developed to include a more inclusive civic identity program in
comparison with Malaysian identity politics.
Post-Suharto resurgence: neo-Sukarnoism and the position of Malaysia in the
national discourse
The collapse of the New Order regime has resulted in the loss of the hegemonic position of its his-
torical interpretation of Indonesia and its position in the world. This has resulted in the resurgence of
revisionist historiographies, for instance in the rise of Islamist revisionism that wants to put Muslim
as a categorical identity marker in the front seat of Indonesian history (Fakih et al. 2015, 347–363).
More important in our case is the resurgence of Sukarnian ideas of suspicion of the threatening out-
side world, a world dominated by a Western dominated order. This anti-global tendency is often
voiced by more leftist elements who have defined globalization and liberalization as threatening
Indonesian sovereignty. This belief in a dangerous and hostile foreign environment has a long,
path-dependent history rooted in Indonesia’s struggle for independence and its initial difficult
years during President Sukarno’s reign during the Middle of the Cold War. The perception that
Indonesia was surrounded on all sides by enemies ready to attack the nation seems to represent a
strong component in the mythology of Indonesian nationalism. This feeling of isolation and vulner-
ability is the result of the perceived hostile action that its neighbors showed during the turbulent
period when Sukarno tried to define a more assertive role for the nation in global affairs.
The Indonesian–Malaysian relationship entered into a new period of turbulence that has echoes
with the periods of the 1950s and early 1960s after a long period of amicable peace during the New
382 F. FAKIH

Order. A diplomatic spat concerning border territorial possessions and Indonesia’s perceived loss
of ownership of the Sipadan and Ligitan islands following a ruling of the International Court of
Justice in December 2002 shocked many Indonesian who perceived it as Malaysian insolence
and treachery. The row reached a crescendo in 2009 and 2010 with the highly publicized domestic
abuse and divorce case of an Indonesian socialite against her Malaysian prince husband. The mar-
ital discord was treated almost symbolically by the media to portray the victimization of Indonesia
against a Malaysia that currently had the upper hand. The cultural ownership row initially over the
depiction of a Balinese dance in a tourism advertisement that was commissioned not by the Malay-
sian government but by an international corporation nevertheless entered into the fray of Indone-
sia’s highly charged media and even more electrical social media posts (Chong 2012; Clark and
Pietsch 2014, 20). Perusing the posts of social media or other public sites on the internet where
Indonesian and Malaysian came into contact saw an explosion of hatred and vitriol thrown at
each other.
Yet, outside of the internet, the response from both nations differed. In Malaysia, there was
general bemusement and annoyance that did not generally erupt into anything significant, despite
the digital vitriol of some Malaysian citizens on the web. Yet, in Indonesia, the protests against
Malaysia erupted into the streets and from the mouths of Indonesian officials and citizens. Dem-
onstrations were held in front of the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta and some organizations started
collecting names of volunteers for an expeditionary force that would be sent to crush Malaysia.
The media cheered on the rise of this excessive display of nationalism. Malaysian authorities
had eventually even issued travel warnings as vigilante groups promised to “sweep” Malaysians
from Indonesian streets. Malaysia blamed this excessive expression of anti-Malaysian sentiments
on the media flaming the fire. 2009 was also an election year in which President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono won his second term in office. The election was particularly nasty against Yudhoyo-
no’s Vice Presidential choice, Dr. Budiono, an economist who was perceived by many to be a neo-
liberal lackey. This perception of weakness against foreign intervention may have been a strong
contributing factor underlying the intensity of the Anti-Malaysia sentiments.
Responding to the interest in Indonesia–Malaysia relations, a number of popular publications
appeared on the market since the later 2000s that exploited the anti-Malaysia sentiments that had
taken hold of the popular discourse. Most of the books were published in Java, quite a number in
Yogyakarta and were often badly written and researched. One particular publisher was based in a
shop in Yogyakarta’s Malioboro shopping street and appears to have published these books purely
to make money without having a deeper ideological goal. In the early period of Reformasi, Yogya-
karta hosted a thriving independent publishing scene that operated in an almost wild west fashion.
This was initially stoked as a result of the freedom to read and publish previously banned books and
literature. While some publishing houses succeeded in finding a respectable footing, most went
under the churn and eddies of the city’s free market publication world. Many publishers found foot-
ing in certain popular books that spouted pseudoscience and types of conspiracy theories, in particu-
lar those related to Indonesia – books on Indonesia as the origin of Atlantis or Indonesia as the final
resting place of Adolf Hitler. No doubt, the credibility of these types of books was seen to be suspect
by many, especially those within academia, yet it is also clear that they were read by some of the pub-
lic. The laissez-faire nature of Indonesia’s publication sector meant that books published by dubious
publishing houses catered to the market and thus the discourses offered in the books oftentimes mir-
rored what had already been present in the wider societal discourse. As such, perusing these books
represented an opportunity to understand how Malaysia functioned as an “other” in the current
Indonesian discourse.

In general, there are two differing responses to Indonesia’s Malaysian question. The first was a
positive response identifying similar kinship traits, in particular, Islam as a marker to strengthen
communication and cooperation. The second was a negative response in line with Sukarnian
ideas. These popular publications oftentimes slipped into the domain of conspiracy theory; conjuring
geopolitical narratives that supported categorization of nations and peoples as threats, as a means to
define one’s political identity. Yet, what kinds of theories did people wrote about Malaysia and how
did these affect the political identities of these particular groups?
Malaysia as kin: Islam as a unifying factor
Efforts to rekindle positive ties with Malaysia started quite soon after Malaysian independence in
1957. In 1959, a Treaty of Friendship was signed in Jakarta by both countries in order to establish
cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia. This culminated in the 1962 agreement to the creation
of a unified spelling system for both the Bahasa Indonesia and Malaysia. This was not implemented
as a result of Konfrontasi, but after the fall of Sukarno such cooperation resumed resulting in the
formation of the Language Council of Brunei Indonesia and Malaysia (MBIM, latter MABBIM)
in 1972. Aside from the relationship between the UMNO and New Order elites, there had also
been contact with other groups in society, in particular contacts between Malaysia and particular
regions in Indonesia, especially with Riau, a province with the strongest identification of kinship
with the Malaysians. For instance, a dialogue was held amongst Malay entrepreneurs hailing from
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei in Pekanbaru in 1994.
The dialogues in 1988 and the 1990s were held at the Ministerial level and were attended by some
of the most high-ranking individuals and future leaders of the state, including the current Prime
Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, then as Minister of Youth and Sports, along with the Golkar
politician Akbar Tanjung. The Dialog Pemuda Indonesia Malaysia held during the 1980s and 1990s
was meant to synchronize the views of both Indonesian and Malaysian political elites on the need to
cooperate in the context of ASEAN and in the context of a globalizing and industrializing region. It
was held under the premise that continued good will, cooperation and shared management of each
other’s role and expectations require regular meet-ups amongst both nation’s future elites. In his
speech in the 1990 dialogue, Tun Razak explained that, aside from cultural and historical “perspec-
tives” for continuing cooperation, there was also a security issue. “Malaysia is forward defense for Indo-
nesia and Indonesia is real defense for Malaysia” (Dialog Pemuda Indonesia-Malaysia 1990, 9, the
emphasis in original). L. B. Moerdani, the then-Indonesian Minister of Defence pointed out the impor-
tance of managing both nation’s expectations. “The historical experiences of both nations have shown
that this special relationship cannot be taken as something for granted” (Dialog Pemuda Indonesia-
Malaysia 1990, 36). Thus, amongst the elites of the period, there was a notion that the peace and accord
between the two countries were fragile and that conflict could erupt again in the future. There was a
notion that both elites of the country have to manage their relationship in order to support an amicable
relationship based on a rationalist readings of the regional tendency of which both countries are a part.
There is also a shared belief that the Konfrontasi period was a historical mistake that had to be rectified,
and a shared historiography on the matter. In the discussion on history in many of the speeches,
Sukarno was practically never mentioned. Yet, the specter of his radicalism seem to hang in the air
as a warning for possible future conflict.
In the post-Suharto period, many of the efforts continued. The Golkar Party, for instance, con-
tinued to have multilevel meet-ups with their Malaysian counterparts. In 2000, a proceedings was
published for the colloquium held in Kuala Lumpur on language and intellectual thought in
384 F. FAKIH

Indonesia and Malaysia, held by the Malaysian Council for Language and Culture (Dewan Bahasa
dan Budaya). The concept of Alam Melayu (the Malay World) as a concept that unified Indonesia
and Malaysia within a common cultural area was pushed especially by Riau scholars in Indonesia.
In 2003, the Riau University Press published a book on the Malay world in a period in which
Sumatran Malays were becoming more assertive as Java became less dominant in a decentralized
Indonesia and the Malaysian/Singaporean connection becomes more important as source of
growth. In 2011, a conference was held by the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and Universitas
Pasundan in Bandung with the theme on Sunda Islam and the Malay world (Melayu Nusantara),
with speakers from Malaysia and Bandung discussing on the importance of kinship and the Isla-
mic religion as a unifying factor in a common search for the core cultural values of the two groups
(Jusuf Eddy, Dadang Bainur, and Hawe Setiawan 2011). Similar to the overtures with Riau uni-
versities, the Bandung case highlights the fragmented nature of Indonesia’s response toward
Malaysia; instead of having an Indonesian–Malaysian meet up, it was held in connection with reli-
gious similarities.
The intellectual development of the concept of Malay civilization (Tamaddun Melayu) can be
seen in the books published on this theme by various universities there. The Islamic College in
Pekanbaru (UIN Pekanbaru) aimed to be a center of excellence for Southeast Asian Islamic regional
and Malay civilization studies. The development of Malay civilization studies follows on the heels of
Malay universities that have had journals (Tamadun Melayu) and books published for decades. In
Malaysia, the development of such concepts was related to its racialized identity politics and the
race-based nature of its political identity building. Indonesia’s civic nationalism frowned upon
such “fragmentary” intellectual pursuit because it threatened the unity of the nation. Nation-build-
ing in Indonesia was state-controlled and managed a unified identity through a policy of absence,
instead of building a truly multicultural and plural narrative. Social discourse was monitored and
any discussion that frays into what was termed as SARA (suku, agama and ras or ethnicity, religion
and race) was deemed hazardous to the cohesion of society, especially in the 1990s when a series of
communal conflicts arose that threatened national cohesion (Bertrand 2004). The collapse of the
New Order allowed for the rise of regional ethnic, religious and race-based discourse to arise.
Ellya Roza’s History of Malay Civilization (Sejarah Tamadun Melayu), for instance, is a historical
tome that forgets the Indonesian element in the story (Roza 2016). This was something that might
have been seen by the New Order apparatchiks as subversive, but has become more common in
today’s democratic Indonesia. It also shows the limitation of the appeal of Malay civilization
and its inherently ethnic character; mostly to Malay-ethnic dominated areas such as Riau and
Archipelagic Riau Provinces.
The idea of Islam as a unifier is something that is shared by many Indonesians and Malaysians. A
writer on the Indonesian Islamist website eramuslim.com cited Dr Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud from the
Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu. The writer claimed Dr Mahmud’s reason for the discord
between Indonesia and Malaysia was a result of a Western scheme started by Sir Thomas Stamford
Raffles who managed the area for British imperialism. He claimed that Raffles’ strategy was two-
pronged. First, he would allow immigration from outside the Malay area in order to create a multi-
cultural, instead of a Malay, dominated area. Secondly, he made sure that kings in the Malay terri-
tories, which included Sumatra, Java and Borneo, would be cut off from their Arab religious advisors
so that Islamic advice would be eliminated from local courts (“Mengapa Malaysia” 2011). This kind
of sentiment is sometimes echoed by popular Indonesian history books; for instance, Syarafuddin
Usman and Iswanita Din wrote that the reasons for Indonesia’s military wariness for the Malaysia
project in the 1960s were racially charged.

Like Sukarno, the military leadership of Indonesia initially thought that creation of the Malaysian Fed-
eration was a product of British neocolonialism. The army was afraid that uniting Singapore and Malaya
would result in the domination of the federation by the Chinese. If that happens, then the federation
becomes a means for Beijing to influence the area. (Usman and Din 2009)
These sentiments mirrored anxiety toward the outside world, a position that still influences Indone-
sian thought about Malaysia, something that had been voiced far earlier in Indonesia’s history, as
Sukarno’s BPUPKI speech above showed.
Malaysia as threat: the foreign vessel
Usman and Din’s account of the fear of the Indonesian army regarding the Malaysian federation as a
Chinese proxy is inherent in the fear that is exhibited by many Indonesians who have shared a Sukar-
nian sentiment of Indonesia’s relation with the outside world. This fear of outside interference is an
important core component of Indonesian national myth. The idea of the revolution as Indonesia
fighting against a superior force helped by the West and its global control brings up the image of
the Indonesian fighter, wearing tattered civilian uniforms and carrying makeshift bamboo spears,
ready to give his or her life to the motherland. This is iconic and provoking. Again, Sukarno’s “revo-
lution” in the late 1950s and 1960s, when Indonesia defied British and American machinations, yell-
ing at Washington to “go to hell with your aid,” leaving the United Nations and trying to create a new
world order, reveals the fear Sukarno had with outside intervention. Indonesian national identity was
shaped by its international relationship during the Cold War, and the spirit of berdikari or self-suf-
ficiency was the noble aim of the Sukarnian revolution.
In the post-Suharto period, the idea has transmogrified into an ambivalent attitude toward the
outside world, with a strong anti-globalization component that is espoused by both leftist and Mus-
lim thinkers in the country. Yet, unlike Sukarno’s positive effort to make the world anew, the current
imagination is decidedly less positive. Anti-globalization and anti-neoliberalism has traditionally
been the preserves of Indonesia’s leftist intellectuals, but include Muslim ones as well, for instance
Amien Rais, a high up in the Muhammadiyah Muslim church, the biggest modernist Muslim organ-
ization in the country (Amien Rais 2008). These anti-global narratives see Indonesia as a victim of
the machinations of the global order and point to neocolonial exploits such as investments by Amer-
ican mining giants as proof.
In a 2009 book entitled Malaysia Membungkam Indonesia, a writer by the name of Wibowo,
defined the anti-globalization movements that have risen, particularly since the 2008 world financial
crisis, as Neo-Sukarnoism and grouped them with the Chavista movement and other leftist Latin
American movements heralding from the same global anxiety. It is here that Malaysia and Singapore
were seen to be particularly important components in the effort to destroy Indonesia. His oddly
placed sub-title, which reads, “Is Israel and Singapore involved?”, points to the old Sukarnian
trope of seeing Malaysian creation as part of the effort of the OLDEFO to perpetuate neocolonialism
and Western imperialism.
Now and in front of the Indonesian nation’s nose, Malaysia neocolonialist wants to destroy the unity of
the Muslim population of Indonesia. Through neocolonialist Malaysia, American Jewish groups wants
to see the Republic of Indonesia destroyed into pieces just like the Soviet Union Communist world power
so that it can conquer Indonesian territory one by one. (Wibowo 2009, 125)
The publisher of the above book written by Wibowo, also published a book entitled Perjanjian
Malaysia Yahudi, written by Mircea Windham, a probable pseudonym. This book extrapolates
386 F. FAKIH

further Wibowo’s discussion. In a weird discussion on Malay origins, Windham imagined the possi-
bility for a Malay connection with the Jews.
The Malays are obviously not Jews, but they may have fraternal ties with the Jews. Is it possible that they
have a special relationship despite the fact that Malaysian are overwhelmingly Muslim that are against
Zionism and is also hated by the Zionists? Or is it possible that Malaysia is created by the hidden hands
of the Jews? (Windham 2010, 10)
The evidence for Malaysia as a Jewish puppet is flimsy to non-existent at best, yet no doubt the
assumption for “foreign control” of the elites of the country is something that is shared by elements
in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Windham discusses British involvement in both the independence
of Malaysia and Israel and the flurry of “scandals” involving Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad
and the lobbying firm APCO that surfaced during his reign and which were attacked in Malaysia as
proof of the PM’s relationship with the Zionists. Sentiments against the Indonesian elites were
especially fraught in 2009 and 2010 as a result of the presidential election. Several books on Budiono,
for instance, talked about how he is a lackey to the global order and that the Yudhoyono presidency
was put in place to support the neoliberal colonization of Indonesia (Yuwono 2009).
The uniqueness of Malaysia, in this regard, is amply demonstrated by the popular books
above. Malaysia is a vessel into which various narratives of anxieties were poured into for dom-
estic consumption. Malaysia was both a Chinese, Western and Zionist threat, a proxy into which
these nefarious forces would operate against the interest of the Indonesian people or of
Nusantara Muslim or any other local or regional identities. These fears continue with the idea
of Malaysia as a geopolitical threat, as used by people such as Sukarno and Ibrahim Yaacob
in the 1940s and 1960s.
National anxieties against globalization have a long history and, in fact, one might argue that
the rise of nationalism was in part related to the effects of globalization. Yet, it is clear that the
relationship of nations with the “outside” world is varied in accordance with the paths that each
nation developed in its historical trajectory. Malaysia’s multiculturalism was based on race and
religious groups that migrated there as a result of its position as a global or regional hub, and its
economy was built on these global and regional connections, while Indonesia developed in a
more closed off environment, and its center, Java, was an agricultural-based society with a
long traditional idea of self-sufficiency. The Dutch East Indies closed off Java and much of
the Outer Islands until the end of the nineteenth century and they supported the creation of
Adat identities and legal structures that mythologized traditional ethnic identities. The Indone-
sian national identity was shaped by Adat romanticism and supported the creation of a national
civic identity with a new and modern Indonesian identity (Bourchier 2015, 25–34). Yet, it is cur-
ious that none of the popular discourses that see Malaysia as a geopolitical threat delves into the
question of race and kinship; seeing Malaysia as a foreign nation that functions as proxy to global
powers. According to Zainuddin Jafar, a researcher from a think tank center, it was important for
Indonesians to leave behind the outdated notion of Malaysia as kin or brother to the Indonesian
people, as Malaysia’s successful economy and diplomatic strategy has made it a competitor not
brother to the Indonesians (Purwoko 2010). Various blogposts also opined the idea that the
Malaysian kinship with Indonesia is not true (Hacky 2013; Forum 2013). One blogpost pointed
out that the Austronesian category was a linguistic category not a racial one and thus the pre-
sumed kinship must be called into question. Entitled “Malaysia as kin nation? No way!” the com-
ment section had many people trying to defend the idea of serumpun and some pointed out that
language was a central component of kinship (Yari 2007).

While people such as Muhammad Yamin and Burhanuddin al-Helmy could ponder upon a
shared racial identity in the far past, this is less relevant to the discussions that have occurred in
the Reformasi period. This may perhaps be related to the success of the Indonesian state’s effort
to shape a civic-based national identity that tries to do away with sensitive ethnic and religious iden-
tities. As we’ve seen, the idea of a shared “racial” or “ethnic” commonality is open to the reception of
Malay ethnic groups such as those in Riau, while a shared Islamic heritage has also been, so far, lim-
ited to particular ethnic groups that have strongly identified their ethnic identity with their religious
identity, for instance, that of the Sundanese. This may change in the future as Islamic piety gain
adherents amongst a wider and new Muslim middle class.
Conclusion
Can a reading of several popular books published in Indonesia during the post-Suharto period truly
tell us anything about the Indonesian perception of Malaysia? Judging from the books consulted
above, it seems that the idea of Malaysia from their perspective is less determined by kinship
ideas than by the perception of national weakness against the outside world. Even in books published
to explore these aspects, for instance, the Sunda Islam, Melayu Nusantara proceedings, there is no
effort to rethink the Sundanese’s relationship with Indonesian nationalism, and, in fact, Indonesian
Islam is seen as supporting a more inclusive, plural and democratic society. Only amongst the Malay-
sian speeches in the conference were there discussions on Malay identity. In the more anti-Malaysian
books, there is little discussion on kinship and the Malaysian position is seen through the lens of
geopolitics instead of anything based on shared political identity. This is something that had pre-
cedent in Sukarno’s speeches during the Konfrontasi era, which saw the problems in relation to
Indonesian anxiety toward the Western-dominated global order. Although it would require
more comprehensive research, including in-depth analyses of popular discourse in social media,
our tentative view is that Indonesia’s feeling of geopolitical weakness as a result of the collapse
of the New Order and the perceived Malaysian encroachment in the 2000s, as being more signifi-
cant in Indonesia’s understanding of the relationship with its northern neighbor than feelings of
racial kinship.
Notes on contributor
Farabi Fakih is a lecturer at the History Department, Universitas Gadjah Mada. His main research interests is
on urban history, the history of the Indonesian state and the intellectual history of Indonesia.
References
Amien Rais. 2008. Agenda Mendesak Bangsa: Selamatkan Indonesia! [The Nation’s Pressing Agenda: Save
Indonesia!]. Bandung: PT Mizan Publika.
Bahar, Saafroedin, Nannie Hudawati Sinaga, and Ananda B. Kusuma. 2012. Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik
Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) [Minutes Meetings of the Committee for
Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence]. Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara.
Bertrand, Jacques. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Bourchier, David. 2015. Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia. The Ideology of the Family State. London: Routledge.
Chinyong-Liow, Joseph. 2004. The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations. One Kin, Two Nations. London:
RoutledgeCurzon.
388 F. FAKIH

Chong, Jinn Winn. 2012. ““Mine, Yours or Ours?”: The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural
Heritage.” Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 27 (1): 1–53.
Clark, Marshall, and Juliet Pietsch. 2014. Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour
Migration, Vol. 37. London: Routledge.
Dialog Pemuda Indonesia-Malaysia II. 1990. Cisarua-Bogor, Indonesia, January 17–19. Jakarta: Menteri
Negara Pemuda dan Olahraga.
Djamily, Bachtiar. 1985. Ibrahim Yaacob. Pahlawan Nusantara [Ibrahim Yaacob. A Hero of Nusantara]. Kuala
Lumpur: Pustaka Budiman.
Fakih, Farabi, Yudi Latif, Budhy Munawar-Rachman, and Amien Rais. 2015. “Reading Ideology in Indonesia
Today.” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde [Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of
Southeast Asia] 171 (2/3): 347–363.
Forum. 2013. Kaskus. https://www.kaskus.co.id/thread/51babe796212436a5900000e/yahudi-tidak-suka-
indonesia-dan-malaysia-bersatu.
Hacky, Fardelyn. 2013. “ASEAN: Benarkah kita serumpun?” [ASEAN: Are We Really Allied?] http://www.
fardelynhacky.com/2013/08/asean-benarkah-kita-serumpun.html.
Jaffar, Kamaruddin. 1980. Burhanuddin Al Helmy: Politik Melayu dan Islam [Burhanuddin Al Helmy: The
Politics of Malay and Islam]. Kuala Lumpur: Terbitan.
Jusuf Eddy, Dadang Bainur, and Hawe Setiawan, eds. 2011. Prosiding. Sunda Islam-Melayu Nusantara.
Reaktualisasi Nilai-nilai Budaya Dua Bangsa Serumpun [Proceedings. Sunda Islam-Malay Archipelago.
The Implementation of Cultural Values of Two Allied Nations]. Bandung: Universitas Pasundan Press.
Laffan, Michael. 2004. “An Indonesian Community in Cairo: Continuity and Change in a Cosmopolitan Islamic
Millieu.” Indonesia 77: 1–26.
“Laporan tentang Malaya. Lampiran B: Pernjataan Kesatuan Melayu Merdeka” [A Report about Malaya.
Appendix B: Statement of Malay Unity Independence]. n.d. Indonesian National Archives (ANRI).
Archives Kabinet Presiden [Presidential Cabinet], inventory number 580.
Legge, John D. 1972. Sukarno: A Political Biography. London: The Penguin Press.
“Mengapa Malaysia Memusuhi Indonesia?” [Why is Malaysia against Indonesia?] 2011. eramuslim.com.
https://www.eramuslim.com/konsultasi/konspirasi/mengapa-malaysia-memusuhi-indonesia.htm#.
WVRx8GiGMRl.
Purwoko, Krisman. 2010. “Peneliti anggap Malaysia bukan serumpun lagi” [Researchers Consider Malaysia
Not a Brother Again] Republika.co.id. http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/10/
08/31/132645-peneliti-anggap-malaysia-bukan-saudara-serumpun-lagi.
Roza, Ellya. 2016. Sejarah Tamadun Melayu [History of Malay Civilization]. Yogyakarta: Aswaja Pressindo.
Soh, Byungkuk. 2012. Ideology and Shaping of Malaysia: A Socio-intellectual History. Depok: UI Press.
Sukarno. 1964a. Bersiap-sedialah Menerima Tugas untuk Menjelamatkan RI dan untuk Mengganjang
“Malaysia.” [Be Prepared to Receive the Duty to Save the Republic of Indonesia and to Crush “Malaysia”].
Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara.
Sukarno. 1964b. Madju Terus Pantang Mundur – Sampai “Malaysia” Hantjur Lebur! Amanat Presiden
Sukarno pada pembnukaan penggemblengan Kader Revolusi Angkatan “Dwikora” pada tgl. 31 Agustus
1964 [Move Forward no Turning Back – Until “Malaysia” is Destroyed! The Address of President
Sukarno in the Opening Training of the Revolutionary Cadres of the “Dwikora” Generation on 31st
August 1964]. Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara.
Usman, Syafaruddin, and Isnawita Din. 2009. Ancaman negeri jiran: Dari “Ganyang Malaysia” sampai konflik
Ambalat [The Threat of the Neighbor Country: From “Ganyang Malaysia” Till the Ambalat Conflict].
Jakarta: PT Buku Kita.
Wibowo, M. 2009. Malaysia membungkam Indonesia [Malaysia Silences Indonesia]. Yogyakarta: Pustaka
Solomon.
Windham, Mircea. 2010. Perjanjian rahasia Malaysia-Yahudi [The Secret Agreement between Malaysia and the
Jews]. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Solomon.
Yari, N. K. 2007. “Malaysia bangsa serumpun? Nggak Lah Yaw!” Spektrum Pemikiranku. https://spektrumku.
wordpress.com/2007/12/12/malaysia-bangsa-serumpun-nggak-lah-yaw-p/.
Yuwono, Ismantoro Dwi. 2009. Budiono dan Neoliberalisme [Budiono and Neoliberalism]. Jakarta: Bio
Pustaka.

Special terms
perkauman communalism
Revolusi Revolution
berdikari self-sufficiency
serumpun brotherhood
Reformasi reformation
Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu Institute of Malay World and Civilization
Melayu Nusantara Malay archipelago
Alam Melayu the Malay World
390 F. FAKIH

Malaysia as an “Other” in Indonesian popular discourse

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Malaysia as an “Other” in Indonesian popular discourse

Similar to Malaysia as an “Other” in Indonesian popular discourse (14)

More from UniversitasGadjahMada

More from UniversitasGadjahMada (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Malaysia as an “Other” in Indonesian popular discourse