Elsadek, Sara. Diplomacy research paper

The Approach of Chinese Foreign
Policy in Military Diplomacy: Spratly
Island Disputes Case
ABSTRACT
Analysisof Chineseforeignpolicytheoretical
implicationsof the past,currentforeignpolicyin
regardto SpratlyIslandsDisputes,and
International responses.
Sara Elsadek
MIT, International University in Geneva
Professor Robin Ramcharan,Foreign Policy,
International University in Geneva, E-mail:
rramcharan@iun.ch, February 10, 2016

Nations’ first and foremost priority throughout history have been to secure their own
sovereignty and independence. The ways in which they acquire, fight for, achieve, and protect
this sovereignty is embedded in their foreign policies, which have matured and modernized over
the centuries. Foreign policy practices govern the way by which a country conducts itself in an
international setting with its national interests and its counterparts in mind. The principle of the
right of sovereignty has been at the top of countries’ agendas since the Treaty of Westphalia was
signed in 1648. This treaty defined the principles of sovereignty and has set the framework for
sovereign nation-states to this day. However, how nation-states protect this sovereignty with
regard to their customized foreign policy varies among nations and stems from different
theoretical orientations. Since the beginning of time, military force has been included in a
nation’s foreign policy with the intent to secure national interests by the means of force if
necessary. The idea of using such force stems from a realist point of view, however, it can
coincide with a liberalist point of view in that military diplomacy, or using indirect coercive
tactics, can also suffice to secure national interests. A country that exemplifies both of these
theories in their foreign policy is China, especially in regard to their military operations and use
of coercion to achieve their national goals. These theories have been put into practice by China’s
military throughout the years in the region of the resource rich South China Sea. In recent years,
the disputes taking place involving the vital Spratly Islands have amplified, gaining international
attention. Countries have suggested that international military intervention needs to take place to
stabilize the area before the disputes turn into a physical battle between South-Asia nations. The
ultimate question is, what kind of foreign policy is being used by the Chinese in their military
diplomacy in regard to the Spratly Island Disputes? In the past decade, China’s President has
taken an audacious turn in regard to his foreign policy. Can this audacious and militarily-minded

framework of his foreign policy be balanced with cooperation with other states? There have been
many works published on this topic with controversial views as to how China deploys its foreign
policy, on the legitimacy of China’s territorial takeover in the Spratly Islands, and the
international responses. This essay will analyze those area with reference to Chinese history as
well.
A brief introduction to the methodology used in this analysis must be presented which
will take into account the historical and present day implications. The international relations
study of realism in regard to what role military coercion plays in Chinese Diplomacy, especially
in regard to the Spratly Island Disputes, will be used. To counteract this methodology of realism,
the liberalist approach will also be analyzed to depict how it plays a role in Chinese foreign
policy as well and as a possible diplomatic solution. The foreign policy of China is somewhat of
a hybrid between the two theories.
I. Key points in China’s History of Foreign Policy and the respective orientations
China’s foreign policy was much different in the past than the one they deploy now in the
21st century. The orientation of Chinese foreign policy can be tracked back 2,000 years ago when
the Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu, promoted realist values and practices to secure China’s
identity and territory at a time of war. Sun Tzu argued that moral reasoning was not very useful
to the state rulers of the day, faced with armed and dangerous neighbors. 1 This is a attribute of
realism since the theory does not take into account the ideologies, religions or other cultural
factors2 with which states may justify their actions. He advised rulers to use force to showcase
1 Tzu, Sun, The Art of War: Translated by Samuel B. Griffith (1963) onlineat:
http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/1.1/Sun%20Tzu.pdf (lastaccessed January 25,2016)
2 Goldstein,J., Pevehouse, J., (2013),International Relations Brief,6th edition.[e-book] Pearson.Availableat:

their power in order to protect their own interests. States behave in a certain way for the ultimate
goal of achieving their self-interests in a rational manner, a fundamental rational of realism.
However, Sun Tzu did not always promote violence. In his book, “The Art of War”, he also
suggest using soft power as a means to manipulate and coerce the opponent without the use of
physical force to achieve the ultimate outcome. This is also a realist trait, being that realism does
not always believe in using military power, only when it is necessary. The country has been
through major transformations in many aspects but the more recent transfigurations are to be
addressed.
A. 20th-21st Century Theories
China was in the midst of social revolutions in the mid-nineties and emphasized making
alliances with like-minded communist states. China articulated five principles in their foreign
policy in 1954 when China, with a communist government, was trying to reach out to the non-
communist countries of Asia to form friendly ties with their bordering neighbors. The Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that China bases their peaceful foreign policy on are: mutual
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 3 China’s political,
economic, and diplomatic design based off of these principles is a slightly different approach
than that of the Western world’s liberal practices that were heavily being pushed upon Eastern
nations at the time in being that China sees that all states are sovereign and that they have the
right to run their own system as they see fit. China believes that no state has the right to interfere
https://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip_us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205972152.pdf (last
accessed January 25,2016)
3 Nathan, A., J., Principles of China’s Foreign Policy: Asia for Educators,Columbia University. (2009) onlineat:
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm(lastaccessed January 30,2016)

with the rights of another in any circumstance-an extreme opposite of the Western world’s view.
For a current and relevant example of this non-interference policy, China has deployed the use of
their veto several times in the United Nations Security Council to prevent military intervention in
sovereign states experiencing a humanitarian crises. According to the MLM Revolutionary Study
Group, China, in their socialist framework, had to constantly defend themselves from political
isolation, economic strangulation and military attack4 in the second half of the 20th century. In
this time, The Chinese Communist leader, Mao Zedong, presented the Three Worlds Theory
which stated that international relations consisted of three geoeconomical worlds: first world
consisting of superpowers, including the United States and the Soviet Union; the second world of
lesser powers; and the third world of exploited nations.5 Zedong’s successor, Deng Xiaoping,
concluded that China was part of the third world. This separation is what gave motivation and
reasoning for China to strongly oppose expansionism by the first world powers, particularly the
United States, and molded their foreign policy framework with emphasis on Marxism and
militarization to combat imperialism and neocolonialism.6 After the WWII and the eventual
dismembering of socialist and communist states, China adopted a new strategy of opening their
once strict, closed-off socialist country to the west which was defined as the strategy of
normalization of relations with over 100 countries that resulted in its admission to the UN in
October, 1971.7 China started to integrate themselves more in world affairs with the liberalist
4 MLM Revolutionary Study Group in the U.S., Chinese Foreign Policy during the Maoist Era and its Lessons for
Today. (January 2007) onlineat: https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/cpc-policy.pdf (lastaccessed
January 25, 2016)
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs,the People's Republic of China, Chairman Mao Zedong's Theory on the Division of the
Three World and the Strategy of Forming an Alliance Against an opponent. (2014) onlineat:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18008.shtml (lastaccessed
January 25, 2016)
6 MLM Revolutionary Study Group in the U.S., Chinese Foreign Policy during the Maoist Era and its Lessons for
Today. (January 2007) onlineat: https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/cpc-policy.pdf (lastaccessed
January 25, 2016)
7 Ibid.

approach in mind that was well described by Richard Cobden, stating that, “international trade
‘unites’ states, in which states became ‘equally anxious for the prosperity and happiness of
both”.8 However, even throughout this period, China was able to remain a socialist country
throughout their revolutionary transformations while maintaining an internationalist orientation.
Since 1980, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued the strategy of
independent foreign policy of peace.9 The integral aspirations of this foreign policy are: to
preserve China’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and also to create a
favorable international environment in accordance with China’s reformation of modernization
along with their dialect of a promoting a “harmonious world”. The current status of China’s
foreign policy in the 21st century begins in this context with the inauguration of current President
Xi Jinping, whom came into office at a potentially historic time for China in terms of its re-
emergence as a global power. President Xi Jinping’s common use of the theme: “the great
resurgence of the Chinese nation”, or more officially referred to as the “Chinese Dream”, have
raised initial questions pertaining to how the progressive president will gauge the priority of
political talks and how he would alter China’s foreign policy that has been in practice for
decades. The question was raised by authors Kai and Huiyun, “Given China’s ‘assertive turn’ of
diplomacy since 2009, a more concrete question is that of whether or not Xi will maintain this
assertive orientation or steer China’s foreign policy in a more cooperative direction.”10 To
8 Kosandi,M. Conflicts in the South China Sea and China-ASEAN Economic Interdependence: A Challenge to
Cooperation. ASEAN-Canada Research Partnership WorkingPaper Series WorkingPaper No. 7 (April 2014) onlineat
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/NTS/resources/db/uploadedfiles/Meidi%20Kosandi%20-
%20Conflict%20in%20the%20SCS%20Challenge%20to%20Cooperation.pdf (lastaccessed February 5,2016)
9 Center for Strategic and International Studies,what are the main tenets of china’s foreign policy?:Chinese
BalanceSheet (date unavailable) onlineat: http://csis.org/files/publication/091019_china-bal_26-Chinese-Foreign-
Policy.pdf (lastaccessed January 30,2016)
10 Huiyun, F. and Kai,H, Xi Jinping’s Operational Code Beliefs and China’s Foreign Policy: Chinese Journal of
International Politics (2013) onlineat: http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/3/209.full (lastaccessed January
29, 2016)

examine this speculation, some background needs to be presented along with historical
implications to analyze Chinese diplomacy and the Spratly Islands Disputes themselves.
B. China’s Current Status
China has been transforming itself from an isolated and autonomous society into a modern
economic powerhouse with a global agenda to secure its own national interest (realist
perspective) while also maintaining diplomatic relationships with its allies abroad and starting to
engage in multilateral cooperation (liberalist perspective). In order for China to keep up with the
rapidly globalized and interdependent world, Chinese foreign policy has become more active,
pragmatic, and flexible in the past few decades. The Center for Strategic and International
Studies introduces China’s Balance Sheet, which conceptually lies out China’s foreign policy
initiatives along with their respective implications. China uses the term “Harmonious World”, as
previously mentioned, to describe its current foreign policy strategy. The term was first publicly
introduced by Hu Jintao at the World Summit and 60th General Assembly of the United Nations
in 2005. While the exact meaning and policy implications of “harmonious world” is undefined,
the slogan is meant to demonstrate China’s commitment to global peace and stability, and to the
goal of a more just and equitable international system. 11In the opinions of many scholars and
experts in the field of International Relations, or more specifically, in regard to foreign policy
analysis of China, is it quite appropriate to question if Xi Jinping will strictly follow his assertive
take on China’s foreign policy within his presidency or take a more cooperative approach to
international integration.
11 Center for Strategic and International Studies,what are the main tenets of china’s foreign pol icy?:Chinese
BalanceSheet (date unavailable) onlineat: http://csis.org/files/publication/091019_china-bal_26-Chinese-Foreign-
Policy.pdf (lastaccessed January 30,2016)

II. The Case of the Spratly Islands and Military Presence
Through the current territorial acquisitions taking place in the South China Sea, or more
specifically, the Spratly Islands, one can argue that China’s foreign policy is weighing heavily on
the role of military strength, intimidation, and overall presence in strategic and disputed regional
areas. China has been building artificial islands and building upon small atolls in the area to
establish their physical presence. The military defense on the Spratly Islands and the imminent
threat of force contradicts key principles of China’s Peaceful Coexistence model in regard to
their peaceful rise/peaceful development. However, China gives claim to these areas with certain
controversial justifications.
A. History of the Spratly Islands and China’s Justifications of Territorial Claims
The rocky territory of the South China Sea was once regarded as a useless, dangerous place
to stay away from. 12 China’s justification for taking over these islands lies within their history
dating back to the Xia Dynasty, 21st-16th century B.C., when they claimed their people were
present on these islands.13 China claims that they have detailed maps depicting the area, ancient
coins found in the area, and also the islands were featured in many of their historic writings of
the period. Furthermore, China’s historical interpretation of its sovereign rights of claiming all of
the islands in the archipelago of Spratly ignore current international law. China have been
continuously defending their claims by using the "nine-dash line", first drawn up by the
Nationalist government of China in 1949, which goes beyond the provisions of international law
12 Ambassador Freeman, C.W., Diplomacy on the Rocks: China and Other Claimants in the South China Sea:
Remarks at a Seminar of the Watson Institute for International Studies,Brown University (2016) onlineat:
http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/speeches/china-and-other-claimants-south-china-sea?print(last
accessed February 5, 2016)
13 Ibid.

in that China is claiming the entirety of the South China Sea. China is not helping its territorial
claim of being legitimate under this basis because for almost seven decades, they have refused to
completely clearly define on what maritime jurisdiction it is claiming with its nine-dash line. 14
More interest arose by many surrounding nations to explore the possibility of natural resources in
the area in 1982 when the United Nations conferred rights to exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
on habitable island. The EEZ gives nations the legality and sovereign rights of conducting
maritime activities, including maritime exploration of resources and the establishment and use of
artificial islands, installations and structures, 200 nautical miles from their coastline. 15 With this
law in mind, The Spratly Islands do not fall into China’s EEZ, but rather into The Philippines’s
EEZ. 16 Another issue that needs to be clearly defined is what actually constitutes as an island.
According to Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an island is,
“a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. Rocks
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf.”17 The accessibility to obtain these resources became
possible through technological advances and the justification given by China came from a realist
point of view as a means to secure their economic interests through the possession of these
islands. In their history, the Spratly Islands have been claimed by The United Kingdom in 1877,
with the annexation of two of the islands; by France in 1933, claiming them as a part of French
Indochina; then by Japan in 1938; and then came the occurrence of multiple states claiming the
14 Austin, G. China’s Lawful Position on the South China Sea: The Diplomat(January 2015) onlineat:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-lawful-position-on-the-south-china-sea/ (lastaccessed February 5,2016)
15 United Nations, UNCLOS (1994) PartV. Article66. Onlineat:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm (lastaccessed February 7,2016)
16 Mortensgaard, L.A., The Spratly Islands Dispute – A Discourse Analysis: E-International Relations Students.( July
2015) onlineat: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/19/the-spratly-islands-dispute-a-discourse-analysis/ (lastaccessed
February 2, 2016)
17 United Nations, UNCLOS (1994) pg. 66, Article121. Onlineat:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (lastaccessed February 7,2016)

islands, just as we are currently still experiencing today. Many states have tried to integrate the
principle of sovereignty for the justifiable claim to these islands by placing settlers there.
Currently, three of the claimant states, Vietnam, the ROC and the PRC, base their claims on
historical ‘facts’ while the three other states, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia, refer mainly
to international law and conventions when justifying their claims. 18
B. The importance of the Spratly Islands and how the United States is responding
The area of the South China Sea suffers from extremely complicated governance in the
area due to the vital shipping lanes that include high volumes of goods that travel through the
area each day. It is estimated that $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea
annually19 and the ongoing disputes in the area could disrupt this commerce and alter the whole
trading scheme. China wishes to acquire the crucial Spratly Islands for a few key reasons: they
claim the islands will act as a trading post to help get their goods to the west but moreover, the
islands sit atop a substantial amount of oil and gas deposits. With the rapid growth of their
population, infrastructure, and business in China, there has been a realization that China cannot
meet demand growth for oil with their domestic energy sources. The Chinese government is
looking for new sources or locations to secure energy, such as the oil and gas rich Spratly
Islands. There are 5 billion tons of proven and unproven petroleum reserves in this area
according to the United States Geological Index.20 This is the main reason China wishes to
obtain these disputed areas and is currently doing so by building energy extraction
18Mortensgaard,L.A., The Spratly Islands Dispute – A Discourse Analysis: E-International Relations Students.( July
February 2, 2016)
19 Glaser,B.S., Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Council on Foreign Relations (April 2012) onlineat:
http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883 (lastaccessed February 5,2016)
20 Guoqiang, L., China Sea Oil and Gas resources: China Instituteof International Studies (2015) onlineat:
http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-05/11/content_7894391_2.htm (lastaccessed February 5, 2016)

infrastructure, but more controversially, they are building up their military presence in the area to
reinforce their claims. To support this, the statistics show that China has demanded for an
increase in military spending of 10.1 per cent in 2015, $145 billion, 21 which can also aid in
bolstering an image of self-confidence and that they have the ability to defend national interests.
There have been confirmations that China is in fact building military outposts in the South China
Sea, including three military-length airstrips on the islands.22 The government’s justification for
doing so is to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary or Chinese
national interests are undermined. This justification epitomizes a realist sense of foreign policy
because realists assume that the world is anarchic and made up of sovereign states that have
national interests that they must protect through mechanisms of self-help.23 However, China
states that over the past two decades, Chinese foreign policy has been to promote an image of
China being a cautious and pragmatic power inclined to adopt “soft power” and responsible
behavior as the best means to accrue regional and global influence.24 In this essence, China could
rightfully state that they are acting in a liberalist sense in that this theory provides the possibility
of abolishing war and conflict through trade, diplomatic ties, and through intergovernmental
organizations25, such as the WTO that China joined in 2001 and ASEAN Plus Three agreement
21 Gady, F., Confirmed: China’s Defense Budget Will Rise10.1%in 2015:The Diplomat(March 2015) onlineat:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/confirmed-chinas-defense-budget-will-rise-10-1-in-2015/ (lastaccessed
February 5, 2016)
22 Phillips,T, South China Sea: Beijing 'not frightened to fight a war' after US move: The Guardian (October 2015)
onlineat: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/28/china-not-frightened-fight-war-south-china-sea-uss-
lassen (lastaccessed February 6, 2016)
February 2, 2016)
24 Rigby, R. and Tow, W., 2011. China’s Pragmatic Security Policy: The Middle- Power Factor: The China Journal,
[Jstor] No.65, pgs. 157-178.Availablethrough Jstor at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25790562?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (lastaccessed February 5,2016)
February 2, 2016)

signed in 2002. To comment on the international reaction, a professor from the Geneva Graduate
School of Governance, Mr. Osvaldo R. Agatiello, argued that, “The US views these territorial
takeovers as aggressive but China assures that they are a means to expand their sphere of
influence to place products and compete with the west.”26 The fear from the US is that China will
use these islands as military bases to assert control over navigation in the South China Sea. The
US has the option to use diplomacy to isolate China but the distance and geography make that
suggestion difficult to enact. Recent threats were given by the Chinese to US surveillance
aircrafts and ships that were deployed to this area. However, according to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the US, along with other countries, can insist upon freedom
of navigation in international waters.27 Since the United States’ new foreign policy initiative
known as “The Pivot to Asia” which began in 2010, the determination has been to curtail, or in
other words, contain the rise of China's power along its periphery. 28 However, the intention of
the United States should be to lessen military tensions between the nations of the South Pacific,
and essentially between China and the United States to assure diplomatic relations, but by no
means to keep tensions stagnant or even escalate them. Author Kai and Huiyun advised that,
“Other states, especially the United States, need to review and revise their foreign policy on
China should they have adopted, or intend to adopt, a containment policy towards the PRC,
because although a rising China may not be a threat, an angry China indeed will be.”29 However,
26 Agatiello,Osvaldo,R. “The TPP and balanceof Power”. Interview by Author. October, 2015
27 Mirski,S., The Trans -Pacific Partnership: China, Ameri ca and the Bal ance of Power: The Nati onal
Interest (Jul y 2015) online at: http://nati onalinterest.org/feature/the-trans-pacific-partnership-
chi na-america-the-balance-13264 (last accessed January 25, 2016)
29 Huiyun, F. and Kai,H, Xi Jinping’s Operational Code Beliefs and China’s Foreign Policy: Chinese Journal of
International Politics (2013) onlineat: http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/3/209.full (lastaccessed January
29, 2016)

the mentalities of China and other South Asian nations need to be accepting of US engagement
rather than containment by not assuming that the United States has ulterior motives in their
diplomacy and peace keeping presence in the South China Sea. Ambassador Chas W. Freeman,
Jr. articulates that, “China and its neighbors should see and use American power as backing for
peaceful efforts to resolve their disputes, not as an excuse for deferring or avoiding settlement of
their differences.”30 The United States signed a U.S-ASEAN strategic partnership pact and is
currently working closely with the countries in their efforts to intervene more forcefully in the
South China Sea through freedom of navigation operations.
III. Attempt to solve the disputes through ASEAN Multilateral Negotiations
ASEAN countries have been concerned about China’s illegal claims to the Spratly Islands
since the association’s formation in 1967, but even more so recently with the rapid militarization
of the islands by China. Many ASEAN countries are disputing over the territorial sovereignty of
the area while laying claim to the Spratly Islands, such as Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and
Vietnam. However, all these countries have attempted to justify their claims based on their
coastlines and the provisions of UNCLOS, unlike China. China has had a significant role in the
ASEAN Plus Three agreement ever since they fulfilled a crucial economic stabilizing role after
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1996/1997, so the ASEAN countries wish to keep close ties with
them. While ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms have proven successful regrading many
regional disagreements, the South China Sea dispute, with specific regard to China’s
militarization of the Spratly Islands, have left the regional bloc severely divided. The ASEAN

countries are now accepting diplomatic advice and allowing for aerial surveillance by the United
States in the area to gather information as to what China is doing on the islands. Author David
Martin Jones states that, “Evaluating ASEAN’s role in managing the problem in the South China
Seas reveals that far from addressing this evolving conflict over international rights of free
passage on the high seas, its weak multilateral approach only further stirs already troubled
waters.”31 ASEAN and China entered into a free trade agreement in 2002, on the basis of
benefitting from regional free trade but also to build solid, concrete and peaceful diplomatic
relations with one another. In recent years, this has not been the atmosphere in the South China
Sea. In 1994, ASEAN implemented the ASEAN Regional Forum to manage and attempt to
constrain China’s regional aspirations by deploying collective diplomacy. However, China has
thus far abused the forum by using it as a means to advance its own national interest since the
forum showcases weak multilateral discourse. Albeit China’s attendance at the ASEAN Regional
Forum meetings, the country still adamantly disapproves any multilateral means to settle the
dispute or the code of conduct proposed by ASEAN. In order to further defend its’ claims and to
bolster an intimidation factor in the area, realist China has threatened to use military force
against ASEAN countries to protect its national interests. However, in 2002, liberalist China
signed a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which
renounced the use of force and strived to build an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.32 To this
extent, liberalists believe that cooperation or policy convergence should serve the best interest of
states because there are incentives for cooperation and costs for defection, including crisis and
31 Jones, M. D, Can ASEAN ever solvethe South China Seas disputethrough multilateral dialogue?:The Telegraph
(November 2015) onlineat: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12012915/Can-Asean-ever-
solve-the-South-China-Seas-dispute-through-multilateral-dialogue.html (lastaccessed February 7,2016)
32 Ibid.

losing the opportunity to gain the benefit.33 Onlookers hoped that China has welcomed the fact
that cooperation was in their best economic interest and entailed many benefits. However, this
‘soft-power’ action was only a public relations ploy to encompass ASEAN countries into
China’s sphere of influence while at the same time avoiding United States intervention. So what
is being done now to curtail, or at least wane the threats of military force by China? China’s
uneasy neighbors are finding more dependable ways to defend their interests in the South China
Sea. The Philippines has recently signed new strategic treaties with Vietnam and Australia and
has even taken the matter to an international tribunal in the Netherlands. Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would provide the Philippines and Vietnam with naval patrol
vessels.34 In regard to the assurance of security provided by the United States, they have
promised to provide military equipment to Manila while Vietnam has also been strengthening
ties with Tokyo and Washington.35 ASEAN members are lobbying for talks about the proposed
code of conduct to resume in early 2016 to force China into making concessions, or be exposed
as the main obstacle to progress.
IV. Conclusion
Continuous efforts to resolve the disputes over territorial sovereignty of the South China Sea
need to hold strong while gaining international momentum and support. The legality of
33 Kosandi,M. Conflicts in the South China Sea and China-ASEAN Economic Interdependence: A Challenge to
Cooperation. ASEAN-Canada Research Partnership WorkingPaper Series WorkingPaper No. 7 (April 2014) online
at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-
pubs/NTS/resources/db/uploadedfiles/Meidi%20Kosandi%2%20Conflict%20in%20the%20SCS%20Challenge%200C
ooperation.pdf (lastaccessed February 5,2016)
34 Jones, M. D, Can ASEAN ever solvethe South China Seas disputethrough multilateral dialogue?:The Telegraph
(November 2015) onlineat: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12012915/Can-Asean-ever-
solve-the-South-China-Seas-dispute-through-multilateral-dialogue.html (lastaccessed February 7,2016)
35 Moss,T. Asian Nations Look Beyond ASEAN to Solve South China Sea Disputes:The Wall Street Journal
(November 2015) onlineat: http://www.wsj.com/articles/asian-nations-look-beyond-asean-to-solve-south-china-
sea-disputes-1448171986 (lastaccessed February 7,2016)

conducting military operations and the rightful jurisdiction over the waters in the South China
Sea need to be resolved because the stability of this area plays such a vital role in global
commerce, economics, and overall diplomacy. The United States has considered encouraging
concerned South-Asian countries to take the case to the International Court of Justice or the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but China’s non-compliance holds strong. With the
current multilateral bodies at play, there are multiple avenues to aid in the compromise between
disputing countries, but a realist China has upheld their claims to the Spratly Islands. The
international community of peace-keeping actors need to take into consideration China’s foreign
policy theories and practices of the past along with their current evolving stance on foreign
policy matters to assess how to deal with the situation. Their hybrid approach of current foreign
policy is a culmination of a realist and liberal approaches which makes it difficult to calculate
their next move. The conjecture between China’s decision to enter into diplomatic negotiations
or instead to build up of military presence in the area to secure their national interests still
remains.

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