Evidence for supporting a health workforce for all in Sierra Leone - ReBUILD HRH research

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Presentations given at a meeting of policy makers and implementers in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to present ReBUILD findings and discuss priorities and challenges for supporting an effective health workforce for all communities.

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  • Design from Maria
    Implementation
    Mention that presentation is based on IDI, Secondary data report and follow up interviews during the EVD outbreak
  • Found that substantial HR reforms were triggered by the FHCI
    Effects include:
    substantial increases in numbers and pay (particularly for higher cadres);
    reported reduction in absenteeism and attrition;
    an increase (at least for some areas, where data is available) in outputs per health worker.


    Overall staff numbers tripled from 3,017 in 2005 to 9,482 in 2010. However, some key cadres were still very limited in terms of absolute numbers. Medical officers increased from 62 in 2005 to 100 in 2011, which is still very few for the whole country (50% of established posts). There has been a large increase in SECHNs (from 274 in 2005 to 1372 in 2011), but much less so for registered nurses (who only grew from 227 to 271 over the same period). Midwives actually dropped over the period, from 70 in 2005 to 47 in 2011).

    Analysis of payroll monitoring data showed a significant drop from baseline of 12.5% in December 2010, when the Staff Sanction Framework was implemented, down to 1.1% in February 2014 (Figure 6) (Wurie and Witter, 2014). However, two caveats remain for the analysis: the absence of baseline data prior to the FHCI or the framework’s introduction, and the need to continue with spot-checks to ensure that the reported data is robust.


  • Health partners also have helped improve the sustainability of the FHCI by providing equipment/logistics (e.g. motor bikes for health facilities in hard to reach areas) to reach patients quickly and also help develop the infrastructure of health facilities.

    Recording keeping has improved in the post FHCI period, as required for the PBF assessments of health facilities. In understaffed health facilities, dealing with the increase patient numbers and fulfilling record keeping requirements is an additional burden or constraint.
  • Limited human resources means health workers are over stretched, especially in the provinces, work very long hours and have to be available 24 hours. This sometimes leads to complications with care as some health facilities cannot cope effectively with the number of patients coming through.

    On the other hand, some health workers also expressed concerns about the sustainability of the FHCI in general and also about the effectiveness of the current drug supply system.
  • Another issue raised by the health workers was that those working in big cities, e.g., Kenema, are not considered to be working in rural areas. An example was given of a health worker from Freetown posted to Kenema and classified as not eligible to receive RAA; however this individual has family home to support in Freetown in addition to supporting himself at his posted location, on the same salary as other health workers, who only have one home to support.

    PBF
    For instance from the 60% some health facilities can give TBAs incentives to motivate them and help increase institutional deliveries and also pay porters and cleaners to help maintain cleanliness in the health facilities
    It also serves as an effective means of enforcing discipline in the workplace, with regards to punctuality and dress code, free of political interference.
  • Underlying issue of incentives being paid on time
    elevated problems from a managerial point of view as they had to manage a demotivated health work force
  • Talk about a few relevant ones and how they contributed to the slow EVD response
  • Predominately reported by female health workers
  • The transition to working in rural areas is not smooth; accommodation is lacking and in some cases good schools to continue with their children’s education are not available.
  • The communities have also assisted some health workers by providing food, for instance, or assisting in securing accommodation for health workers posted to locations away from their normal place of abode

    training acquired was shared on a knowledge sharing platform across all cadres. For those working in hard to reach areas, the in-charges ensured that any training they acquired was passed on to the rest of the team.
  • Evidence for supporting a health workforce for all in Sierra Leone - ReBUILD HRH research

    1. 1. ReBUILD’s human resources for health research Meeting 28th January 2016 Hill Valley Hotel, Freetown Evidence for supporting a health workforce for all in Sierra Leone College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences
    2. 2. Morning sessions  Welcome and opening remarks  Presentations:  Introduction and overview of ReBUILD and its HRH research  Evolution of HRH policies  Organisational statements Tea break  Presentations of ReBUILD research  Experiences of incentive policies for health workers  Remuneration structure of primary healthcare workers  Summary of policy recommendations
    3. 3. ReBUILD is a 6 year £6million research project funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) Research on health worker policies, incentives and retention in post-conflict countries: overview of ReBUILD’s work in Sierra Leone Sophie Witter on behalf of ReBUILD team Funded by
    4. 4. Key starting points Post conflict is a neglected area of health system research Opportunity to set health systems in a pro-poor direction Focus on HRH and health financing but also on health system/state building links Choice of focal countries enable distance and close up view of post conflict Decisions made early post-conflict can steer the long term development of the health system
    5. 5. Background  Importance of decisions made or not made in post- conflict period in resetting health sector  Health workforce as crucial component in sector reconstruction  No research on this topic in SL prior to ReBUILD  Field work conducted 2012-14  Analysis extended to cover Ebola crisis
    6. 6. Aims and research questions To understand the evolution of incentives for health workers post-conflict and their effects on HRH and the health sector Health systems How have HR policies and practices evolved in the shift away from conflict? What influenced the trajectory? What have been the reform objectives and mechanisms? Health workers How the incentive environment has evolved and its effects on health workers? What lessons can be learned (on design, implementation, and suitability to context) of different incentives, especially for post-conflict areas?
    7. 7. Summary of research tools Research tools Cambodia Sierra Leone Uganda Zimbabwe 1. Stakeholder mapping √ √ 2. Document review √ √ √ √ 3. Key informant interviews √ 33 √ 23 main project 19 Ebola phase √ 25 √ 14 4. Life histories/ in-depth interviews with HWs √ 24 √ 23 main project 24 Ebola phase 39 Affiliate project √ 26 √ 34 5. Quantitative analysis of routine HR data √ √ √ 6. Survey of health workers √ 310 266 PHWs (affiliate) √ 227 Witter, S., Chirwa, Y., Namakula, J., Samai, M., So, S. (2012) Understanding health worker incentives in post-conflict settings: study protocol. ReBuild consortium. http://www.rebuildconsortium.com/media/1209/rebuild-research-protocol-summary-health-worker-incentives.pdf
    8. 8. Research sites  Western Area (Urban/Rural)  Kenema (Eastern Region)  Bonthe (Southern Region)  Koinadugu (Northern Region)  Also affiliate project in Bo, Kenema and Moyamba
    9. 9. Research outputs Online reports available on the ReBUILD website:  Stakeholder mapping report  The development of HRH policy in Sierra Leone, 2002-2012 – a document review  Serving through and after conflict: in depth interview report  Health Workers incentive: survey report, Sierra Leone  The development of HRH policy in Sierra Leone, 2002-2012 – report on key informant interviews FHCI  Staffing the public health sector in Sierra Leone, 2005‐11: findings from routine data analysis’  The Free Health Care Initiative: how has it affected health workers in Sierra Leone Peer reviewed publications:  Wurie, H., Samai, M., Witter, S. (2016) Retention of health workers in rural and urban Sierra Leone: findings from life histories. Human Resources for Health journal  Bertone, M. and Witter, S. (2015) An exploration of the political economy dynamics shaping health worker incentives in three districts in Sierra Leone. Social Science and Medicine, volume 141, pp56-63.  Witter, S., Wurie, H. And Bertone, M. (2015) The Free Health Care Initiative: how has it affected health workers in Sierra Leone? Health Policy and Planning journal, 1-9  Bertone, M., Samai, M., Edem-Hotah, J. and Witter, S. (2014) A window of opportunity for reform in post-conflict settings? The case of Human Resources for Health policies in Sierra Leone, 2002- 2012. Conflict and Health, 8:11.
    10. 10. Overview of day  Evolution of HRH policies  Short organisational statements  Impact of incentive policies on staff, and what motivates/demotivates them  Understanding the complex remuneration structure of primary health staff  Overview of research recommendations  Current priorities and debates for reform within the D- HRH and HRH WG and evidence needs  Panel discussion and way forward
    11. 11. ReBUILD is a 6 year £6million research project funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) Windows of opportunities Lessons learned on policy-making from post-conflict Sierra Leone (2002-2012) Maria Bertone London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & ReBUILD maria.bertone@lshtm.ac.uk Funded by
    12. 12. Documentary review (n=76) Interviews with key informants at central level (n=23) Research tools Longitudinal study to explore the HRH policy making trajectory in post- conflict Sierra Leone 2002-2012 Case study Research questions 1. How have HRH policies evolved in the shift away from conflict? 2. What influenced the trajectory? What are the drivers of policy making? What defines the timing and the political space for reform? 3. What lessons can be learned? Research questions and methods Half-day stakeholder meeting (23 participants)
    13. 13. Three phases of HRH policy-making 2009 2010 201220112006 2007 2008 First phase: early development of HRH policies Second phase: launch of FHCI and related HRH policies Third phase: post-FHCI policy- making 2002-2009 2009-2010 2011-2012
    14. 14. First phase: 2002-2009  ‘Fire-fighting’ phase: many players (NGOs) and limited control by the MoHS; broad HRH policies developed but limited ability to implement them; limited data “After the war, it was complete chaos. The NGOs came and went […]. They employed the nurses directly, without even consulting the Ministry. […] But this was a war. We had to bend backwards in the Ministry” (SM – MoHS).  Official documents highlight challenges and describe potential solutions, while they rarely propose actual implementation plans  Fluid and uncertain policy context The HRH Development Plan 2004–2008 states that “a certain flexibility will be allowed in the proposed activities, given the current level of uncertainty regarding the exact nature of the reforms” (p.80 – italics added).
    15. 15. Second phase: 2009 - 2010  Strengthening and reforming phase: FHCI triggered series of sectoral and HRH changes  Improved coordination (HRH working group) and specific TA for the design of necessary HRH reforms  Several-fold increase of HWs salaries (2010)  Introduction of a Staff Sanction Framework to reduce absenteeism (2010-11)  Payroll cleaning (2010) – 850 ghost HWs were removed (~12% of total), 1,000 new HWs added  Fast-track recruitment at district level (2010)  As the implementation of reforms became more coherent and operational, budgeted plans and expenditure frameworks begun to appear.  Substantial donors’ funding to sustain these reforms (DfID and GF)
    16. 16. Third phase: 2011-2012  Reforms discussed during FHCI preparation are introduced :  Implementation of a Performance-Based Financing scheme in PHUs (2011)  Introduction of a rural allowances for health workers in remote posts (2011)  Performance contracts introduced for Ministers, Permanent Secretary and Directors (2011-12)  New HRH Policy and HRH Strategic Plan (2012)  Official documents which give ex-post shape to the reforms and changes that had already taken place at operational level  Pace of change slowing after 2012: less momentum and many implementation challenges
    17. 17. Policy drivers and enablers  Introduction of the FHCI “I believe, for the past 10 years, that free health care was a big turning point, because before gradually everything was coming up. The free health care was big turning point to accelerate the improvement” (KII – donor).  High-level political pressure and leadership.  Development partners’ funding, but also consensus to back the initiative by all major players  Donor support allowed for high level of ad hoc TA which enabled changes to be operationalised.  Sense of need for change
    18. 18. Issues and remaining challenges  Urgency in the design and not enough time to discuss all possible options  Preference for one off strategies and short term policies  Focus on the design, and less attention to implementation  Sustainability of the reform in the long run, when technical and financial support will diminish  Reforms based on short-lived political pressure  Health system remained fragile
    19. 19. Lessons learned  Windows of opportunity for reform do not ‘automatically’ open after conflict or crisis  They are more likely to occur given some features of the context:  Strong and sustained political leadership and clear strategic orientations  Aligned external support  Coordination between actors is key.
    20. 20. Lessons learned (2)  Attention to avoid challenges of post-FHCI policy making  Careful design and assessment of all options  Engage and plan long-term and include long-term reforms (e.g. training)  Pay attention to implementation issues  Ensure regular M&E of reforms and flexible adaptation if needed  Sustain momentum for reform after the initial period
    21. 21. This presentation is based on the paper: Bertone MP, Samai M, Edem-Hotah J and Witter S (2014), A window of opportunity for reform in post-conflict settings? The case of Human Resources for Health policies in Sierra Leone, 2002-2012. Conflict and Health, 8: 11. Available at http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/8/1/11 www.rebuildconsortium.com
    22. 22. Haja Ramatulai Wurie Research Officer ReBUILD/College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences – Sierra Leone Experiences of incentive policies and challenges for retention and motivation of health workers, post- conflict and during EVD Funded by
    23. 23. Structure  Health worker experiences – incentive policies  FHCI  Salary uplift  RAA  PBF  Risk allowance during EVD  Motivating and demotivating factors (urban vs rural; male vs female)  Post conflict  During EVD  Coping strategies  Outstanding HRH challenges  Lessons learnt for the post EVD reconstruction phase 24
    24. 24. Effect of FHCI HRH reforms Staff sanction framework - Rates of reported unauthorised absenteeism, Sierra Leone health workers, 2011-14 -1% 4% 9% 14% Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 Unauthorised Absenteeism 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Healthprofessionalper 1000inthepopulation Medical and nursing staff per population, Sierra Leone Medical staff Nursing staff For more information, see: for Health policies in Sierra Leone, 2002-2012. Conflict and Health, 8:11. Witter, S., Wurie, H. And Bertone, M. (2015) The Free Health Care Initiative: how has it affected health workers in Sierra Leone? Health Policy and Planning journal, 1-9
    25. 25. Experiences and perception of incentive policies – FHCI (positive effects) Health worker  Increased motivation  Improved quality of service given  Increased training (mostly donor support) ‘ Health system  Improvements in the health facilities  Increased service utilisation ‘For the health facilities, people are now making use of the facilities even the maternal beds compared to before’ (Female, Bonthe, IDI-1)  Increased institutional deliveries ‘with this free health we have laws, that no women should deliver with TBA. […] now if you deliver any pregnant woman at home you are going to be fined’(Female, Koinadugu, IDI-10)
    26. 26. Experiences and perception of incentive policies – FHCI (negative effects)  Increased workload ‘[…] the work is strenuous, before this time people were not coming because of finance but now after removing users fees people are coming 24hours’ (Male, Koinadugu, IDI-11) ‘…. we had problems already …and now we have enormous amount of patients coming, lack of adequate supplies, drugs are short, materials are not there and then these patients come and the old challenges I have already mentioned are still in place and then the burden more burden has been added to us’ (Male, Koinadugu, IDI-12)
    27. 27. Salary uplift  The salary uplift was a motivating factor for all the health workers and changed the way they work in a positive way.  However, there were different perceptions about the salary increase, with an underlying theme of it being a positive step that was long overdue but not commensurate with the role health workers play ‘Like I said earlier even with the last salary increment what they are paying us is not enough to take care of our families, care for your children, provide feeding for them; like what I am receiving is just barely enough to take care of my family so thinking about having accommodation, medical bills, transportation, paying fees for my children’ (Male, Kenema, IDI-5)  There are some disparities among the different cadres of staff, with nurses thinking that doctors have benefitted more from it.
    28. 28. Experiences and perception of incentive policies post FHCI RAA  Good initiative  Focused on the job without any distractions from being involved in seconds jobs to augment their income  However, a number of concerns were raised by health workers about the RAA, mainly about the irregularity of the payments  ‘That was one policy I was really happy about […] But these monies are not forthcoming and this has started discouraging staff posted in remote areas’ (Male, Bonthe, IDI-2) PBF  Raised awareness amongst health workers that they have to give improved quality of service to service users over quantity of service users treated  Improvement in the health facilities  It has also had a positive impact on record keeping in health facilities a measuring target in the PBF assessment.  However it was also described as not forthcoming  ‘That was also a good motivation to encourage people to work hard since the harder you work, they more money you get. But again this is not forthcoming..’ (Male, Bonthe, IDI-2)
    29. 29. Experiences and perception of incentive policies during EVD Positive  Reported as valuable; it meant extra income, which helped them cope financially with the increased cost of living during the outbreak  Motivated some health workers to work; on the other hand some reported that they would have worked regardless  From a health facility manager’s point of view it motivated HWs to come back to work including the volunteers not on payroll Negative  Not paid on time, which resulted in back log and ultimately demotivating for health workers  Described as ‘pittance’ and not commensurate with the risks involved  Challenges with the verification process  Payment on a mobile phone platform also created challenges  Took HWs away from the health facilities to collect payment  Some HWs did not own a mobile phone  Poor mobile phone service coverage in remote areas
    30. 30. Overall perception of career post FHCI- satisfaction Motivating factors  Being effective in their role ‘Before this time maternal death was on the rampage, but over the past 2 years we’ve had none, we refer in time and we manage cases that are at our level the one that we cannot manage we refer them appropriately’.(Male, Koinadugu, IDI- 11)  Community Service ‘…. well what I like most is when I see a patient walking in the hospital and going back with a smile and saying thank you going back home so I really love that and I appreciate that very much’ (Female, Koinadugu, IDI-9)  Financial incentives ‘I want to have a decent salary that will enable me to plan the lives of my children so that they too can be in the position to be of use to their communities in the future.’ (Male, Kenema, IDI-4
    31. 31. Overall perception of career - satisfaction  Improved working conditions  Training opportunities  Religion
    32. 32. Motivating factors during the EVD  Being of service was also captured as a motivational factor to work during the EVD outbreak.  A volunteer reported being motivated to work in an Ebola treatment centre, in the hope of being absorbed onto payroll  HWs felt that they needed to control the spread of the disease in the district “We just had to control this, otherwise if it spreads our district and we don’t control it, it will spill over and a lot of health workers will get involved” (IDI Bonthe, nurse, female) 33
    33. 33. Demotivating factors – pre and during EVD outbreak Demotivating factors Working conditions Poor Management Limited training opportunities and lack of career progression Limited financial incentives and benefits Political interference Relationship with community Separation from family Security (job and personal) Tensions in the workplace Poor retention of staff Long working hours Recruitment of staff Challenges in rural postings Pre-existing challenges faced by the health sector that effected the EVD response Poor working conditions Lack of IPC measures in place Health workers ill-equipped to deal with EVD/ health workers not trained Lack of enablers Low levels of motivation with health workers Relationships with the community Mal distribution of the health workforce Retention challenges
    34. 34. Working Conditions - Urban vs rural  Out of the 17 respondents that reported poor working conditions as a demotivating factor, 11 were currently in rural postings. Rural Urban ‘….. and also where we were having the clinic was a community building. It was not conducive for the work, the building was infested with rats, […]and we were all living in that building […]Water was not available […] For all the 5years I was there, I spent in that dilapidated building; it’s heavily infested with rats and lots of things. (Male, Kenema, IDI-4) ‘…..yes as we said sometimes we need materials that we cannot get, materials yes drugs and supplies or regular things that will make the working environment convenient for us so that we will be able to practice all what we are supposed to do; like space is not adequate here’ (Female, Western Area, IDI-20) ‘The terrain, the road network because if you don’t have road worthy vehicle you cannot move […] and the work load is so high because you have to visited all PHUs’. (Female, Koinadugu, IDI-8) ‘…. the condition of the hospital was a little bit better but there was still challenges [...] you have to ensure that each and every patient receive appropriate care, by then there were shortfalls for the hospital administration …[….]….. these challenges you know and that actually made work a little bit difficult to us’(Male, Western Area, IDI-18)
    35. 35. Poor management  Professional relationships emerged as a demotivating factor  Health workers felt that they should be involved in the decision making processes that governed the management of the health facilities. ‘…and the councils yes they provide the funds but I think they should listen to us the professionals instead of the support staff…[…]..Well its seems as if the professionals are left behind, while those who went for administrative coursesare at the top of the ladder whilst we are down so that one is not encouraging; it is demotivating for us as professionals’ (Female, Kenema, IDI- 9) 36
    36. 36. Limited training opportunities and lack of career progression – Urban vs rural  10 out of the 13 respondents that reported ‘limited training opportunities and lack of career progression’ where in rural postings ‘…. I don’t have opportunity […] whenever there is an opportunity, to go for further course, we are not remembered. Everything is staying in Freetown. […]If there is any provision it lies in Freetown and they forget about us..[..] And we are here. Are we not part of the nurses, are we not part of you people? Please try and think of us’ (Female, Bonthe, IDI-1) ‘ firstly in any profession you expect to grow.[…]you expect that government should help to build your capacity [...]since we came out [as in graduated] I don’t think government has given us anything to help us to motivate us in terms of building our capacity (Male, Koinadugu, IDI-12) …. we are not much motivated you know like capacity building, I mean, I know scholarships comes in this ministry they don’t look for the right people to give you know, and even when you try by your own way to go and study they say we won’t give study leave, I mean these are like demotivating things..’ (Male, Western Area), IDI-21
    37. 37. Political interference – urban vs rural  More urban respondents (5 out of 8) reported this as a demotivating factor ‘Well now when a nurse goes out the way, you want to discipline that nurse, you get order from above, whether you like it or not; order from above; interference, seniors are not allowed to do their work, the chain of command is lacking, there is no stand of control.’(Female, Kenema, IDI-9) ‘From superiors either professional like the doctors or even the permanent secretaries, they interfere. I mean somebody who knows nothing about health care; they tell you what to do […]And they are still doing it’ (Female, Western Area, IDI-23) ‘….even if you are doing the right thing you try to correct them you try to bring them to what you want and they think that is not correct …[..]… phone calls, complimentary cards, letters of threat and queries will come over to you and so some of us think about that before taking actions that is why there are times when some people are let loose’ (Female, Western Area, IDI-14) ‘Some people may have misbehaved in the work place but because they are connected they will go with the promotion they gave them you just see them promoted and you don’t know how and you have been working hard.’ (Female, Western Area, IDI-18)
    38. 38. Challenges specific to rural postings  Specific constraints on the job, such as  difficult terrain and bad roads  poor communication  delayed allowances or no allowances  separation from their families.  Posting policy states that duration of rural postings should be two years.  However, there are health workers who have negated the rural posting process due to political interference.  others who have defaulted from their rural postings without any disciplinary action.  Demotivating factor for those that stay in post. 39
    39. 39. Coping strategies Post Conflict  Religion, patriotism and improvising have served as coping mechanisms  The donor community has also been helpful in providing incentives for those not on payroll  Community hospitality During EVD  Training and the availability of PPE made the health workers more confident  Being extra vigilant  Religion  Peer support  Overall highlights the lack of structured psychosocial support systems 40
    40. 40. Outstanding challenges for HRH  Recruitment and deployment of staff  Geographical imbalance in the spread  HRH management challenges at central level  No HRH unit at district level  No HRIS system in place  Ongoing payroll management issues  Issues with sustainability and intuitional memory  Incentives  Financial vs non-financial  Continued irregularities in payment of allowances
    41. 41. Post Ebola reconstruction phase: lessons  Health system should be rebuilt using evidence based findings  Coordination of efforts between development partners and key stake holders  National ownership
    42. 42. ReBUILD is a 6 year £6million research project funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) How much do HWs earn from different sources? Drivers and consequences of the remuneration structure of primary HWs Maria Bertone London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & ReBUILD maria.bertone@lshtm.ac.uk Funded by
    43. 43. Context and research questions  Post-FHCI reforms to improve and align incentive package for HWs  Salary increase  PBF scheme with individual bonuses  Remote allowance for those in rural posts.  Still limited evidence on HWs actual earnings  Formal allowances (incl. PBF), but also informal incomes • How much do primary HWs earn? • Income drivers at individual, facility and district level: who earns which income and who earns more? • What are HWs perspectives and views on their incomes? • How do HWs use their incomes?
    44. 44. Methods and sample
    45. 45. Methods and sample (1)  Survey of 266 primary HWs in 198 randomly selected PHUs in Bo, Kenema and Moyamba  CHOs, CHAs & nurses (SRNs+SECHNs), MCH Aides  in-charge or highest in rank  1 or 2 HWs per facility  39 in-depth interview with a sub-sample of HWs
    46. 46. Methods and sample (2) Cross-sectional survey Share of user fees Salary Remote Allowance PBF (individual bonus) Salary supplementations / top-ups Per diems / DSA Non-health income-generating activities Longitudinal logbook Gifts and payments from patients Sale of drugs and items w/in facility Private practice
    47. 47. Gender Age Type of facility Location District male female CHC CHP MCHP urban rural Bo Kenema Moyamba Total CHO 22 8 41.4 29 0 1 9 21 18 6 6 30 73% 27% 97% - 3% 30% 70% 60% 20% 20% CHA+Nurse 32 44 40.8 39 32 5 24 52 23 33 20 76 42% 58% 51% 42% 7% 32% 68% 30% 44% 26% MCH Aide 0 160 40.9 26 46 88 34 126 55 51 54 160 - 100% 16% 29% 55% 21% 79% 34% 32% 34% Total 54 212 41 94 78 94 67 199 96 90 80 266 20% 80% 35% 30% 35% 25% 75% 36% 34% 30% Methods and sample (3)
    48. 48. Implementation of HRH reforms “They [MoHS at central level] don’t even communicate with us. We are dealing with the staff here, we know the staff movement. [...] But they say that they have the data there. But sometimes they pay staff that are not even in remote areas” (KII – DHMT) “I mean, [PBF] is good in theory, but when it comes nine months later, I think it defeats the whole purpose” (KII – DHTM). “I heard many, many health workers, PHU staff, and DMOs talk about performance-based financing. I've never heard anyone mention this remote area allowance”(KII – NGO). “The real key issue is that with all of these policies and all of these strategies, none of them have been properly operationalised and none of them have stayed around. Like, in 2002, there was a free health care policy announced [...] and then it just didn’t happen. So free health care is announced again in 2010, and it’s like, OK, it’s happening, but is that going to slowly start to fall apart? If PBF is announced, it’s like, oh it comes and then it stops, you know.” (KII – NGO). Remote allowance: 5%-8% of income of all HWs (Dec. 2012)  delayed and then stopped from Jan. 2013 Performance Based Financing: 11% of income of HWs (Sept. 2013)  payments received more than one year later than services are performed HWs incomes and income drivers
    49. 49. 60% 55% 63% 9% 9% 11% 19% 21% 15% 5% 7% 5% 3% 5% 2% 1,338,779 Le. 1,003,715 Le. 701,744 Le. HWs incomes
    50. 50. Who receives each income, and earns more? (1)  15% of the sample was not on payroll  Interviews show that those trained or re-trained after 2010 were not paid the correct amount or received no salary at all  In-charges were more likely to receive:  Salary (coef. 2.429 p.***)  PBF bonus (coef. 1.342 p.***)  Gifts from patients (coef. 1.005 p. **)  and to carry out non-health activities (coef. 0.927 p. *)  In-charges had  higher PBF income (coef. 0.332 p**)  and higher overall income (coef. 0.529 p.***)
    51. 51. Who receives each income, and earns more? (2)  Younger HWs were  less likely to get a salary (coef. -1.580 p.*)  more likely to carry out non-health activities (coef. 0.700 p.**)  HWs in urban areas were  more likely to receive a salary (coef. 1.343 p.*)  less likely to receive DSA and gifts from patients (coef.-1.151 p.***; coef.-0.761 p.**)  No difference in total income between rural and urban  No unfair advantage for those in urban areas  but also no specific incentives for those in remote posts (as it was envisaged in the incentive design)
    52. 52. Who receives each income, and earns more? (3)  HWs in Kenema were more likely to  receive PBF bonuses  carry out non-health activities, compared to those in Bo and Moyamba  Amount of income: District salary PBF DSA Total income Kenema 491,276 102,392 207,722 849,903 Bo 516,984 57,112 134,132 786,986 Moyamba 484,913 92,985 109,966 719,854
    53. 53. HRH practices at district level  Presence of NGOs (legacy of post-conflict context)  Number and type of NGOs, and coverage of PHUs  NGOs agendas and health priorities (e.g. humanitarian vs. development, specific disease/service focus vs. broader HSS, etc.)  Dynamics between NGOs and DHMTs  Varying will, capacity and need to collaborate with DHMT  Multilateral coordination vs. bilateral meetings (or none)  Substantial asymmetry of power  Re-orientation of local health priorities  difference in HRH practices, which has an impact that extends all the way to individual incomes.
    54. 54. HWs views on their incomes
    55. 55. HWs views on their incomes  Income fragmentation as an issue  Importance of non-financial features of incomes:  Ease of access (cash vs. bank)  Fairness and transparency  Entitlement vs. windfall  Delays in payment  Transparency in sharing practices  HWs said that they “manage” “Well, if I gather everything together at the same time it helps [i.e. my income is enough], but the money does not come together, it comes in little bits. So what I have at the moment, I manage with it. I have no other way to do it” (CHA/nurse in Kenema). “I have to manage my life with it [my income]” (MCH Aide in Moyamba) “Well, it is not easy. You have to manage yourself” (CHA/nurse in Moyamba)
    56. 56. HWs use of their incomes  HWs took advantage of the different financial and non-financial features of their incomes  spend different incomes differently  Salary  High and regular (“earmarked”) expenditures  Received through bank account and not readily available  Subject to family pressures  DSAs, non-health activities, in-kind gifts from patients/communities  Personal subsistence while in post+ emergency expenditures  Readily available  Unknown to family (“hidden”)  DSAs and gifts shared with co-workers, especially in MCHPs  PBF bonus  Substantial amount which can be re-invested in non-health activities (e.g. business such as buying palm oil, etc.)
    57. 57. Background Lessons & Recommendations
    58. 58. Lessons & Recommendations (1)  Improve management of official payments  Salary payroll  Remote allowance  PBF bonuses  Strengthen routine information system  Decentralize HRH management  Streamline and clarify allowances  Improve transparency and regularity of payments  Improve incentive packages for HWs  Gather information on the entire remuneration of HWs, including informal incomes, and include them in harmonization efforts (e.g. DSA)  Reflect on the HWs perspective and uses of their incomes  Incomes are not fully ‘fungible’
    59. 59. Lessons & Recommendations (2)  Sustain the long-term implementation of reforms beyond the initial TA, through structural and institutional changes.  Empower DHMTs  Increased financial and human resources, better skills and capacity  Widened decision-spaces  Realistic and contextualized planning, budgeting and reporting under DHMT lead  Allow for open sharing of external agendas and budgets  District ‘basket funds’?  Reflect on post-crisis legacies  Who does what and where? For how long? How is this going to influence the system?
    60. 60. This presentation is based on the papers: Bertone MP, Witter S (2015), An exploration of the political economy dynamics shaping health worker incentives in three districts in Sierra Leone. Social Science and Medicine, 141: 56-63. Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953615300447 Bertone MP, Lagarde M, Sources, determinants and utilization of health workers’ revenues: evidence from Sierra Leone. Under review. Bertone MP, Lagarde M, Witter S, Performance-Based Financing in the context of the complex remuneration of health workers: findings from a mixed-method study in rural Sierra Leone. Under review. www.rebuildconsortium.com
    61. 61. Acknowledgements  Thanks to the key informants and the health workers who participated in this study  to the enumerators’ team in Sierra Leone: Abdulrahman, Alimu, Christiana, Fatmata, Edrissa, James, John, Michael, Precious, Sajallieu and Mr Bah, and to David and Salim at the NGO Solthis for logistic support  to Dr Mylene Lagarde and Prof. Sophie Witter for supervision and insights  to the Fondation AEDES for supporting my PhD and ReBUILD Consortium for funding fieldwork activities www.fondation-aedes.org F O N D A T I O N
    62. 62. Overview of recommendations arising from research Funded by
    63. 63. Overarching recommendations from research (some now in progress….)  The ReBUILD research emphasises the need to develop a coherent overall package (financial and non-financial), focussing on implementation and follow-through, with good alignment of government and partners.  Capacity for effective human resource management at MoHS and District Health Management Team level is needed to reduce dependence on external technical support  Donors need to engage long term – building institutional capacity to carry forward stronger systems  Also to sustain the momentum for reform and financing of increased HR commitments  Need to address priority shortages of staff, also proving them with key inputs needed to deliver care (equipment, drugs etc.)
    64. 64. Overarching recommendations (2)  The recruitment process for health workers is too centralised, allowing local managers no role in staff selection and performance management. The Health Service Commission should address this.  Decentralisation of the process might also reduce the time which is currently taken to engage new staff, something which causes demotivation and attrition.  A full package of measures should be introduced to address the rural/urban divide for health staff, beyond the currently erratic RAA to include:  specific tours of duty (e.g. 2 years), which are respected;  preferential training access for those working in rural areas; and  provision of housing to facilities (especially for female staff)  more local training and recruitment  For all human resource for health (HRH) functions, a well functioning routine HR information system is critical. This has been planned for some years but not delivered.
    65. 65. Revising the remuneration package  The PBF scheme should be reformed so that payments are regular, paid on time, and transparent.  It was clear that as well as the financial top-up, health workers appreciated getting feedback on their work in the form of an appraisal system, and a way of providing this in a supportive way should be built into the PBF process.  Especially important for staff who are not on payroll and community agents  The remote area allowance should be reviewed and reintroduced to establish the additional costs of living and working in rural areas. It is not just a motivation scheme but also needs to cover the extra costs which health workers face.  Communication – let staff know what is happening with it!  Greater involvement in its design would also ensure that health workers understand how it is meant to operate.
    66. 66. Remuneration (2)  Payroll management needs improving to reduce delays in getting on payroll.  Volunteers are coming back in (as per pre-FHCI)  Systemic problems in paying financial top-ups should be addressed. The risk allowance during the Ebola outbreak and response was the most recent example of an allowance which was not received reliably by health staff, causing frustration and demotivation.  NGOs’ activities to support health workers should be better aligned and coordination should be reinforced.  this will avoid disparities between cadres and districts, such as, for example, differences in the level of DSA payments and in the support provided to services related to PBF (which in turn increases PBF bonuses in some districts).
    67. 67. Remuneration (3) NGO and donors’ exit strategies and the removal of incentives post-Ebola should be coordinated and managed in order to avoid demotivation, and further exacerbate the mal-distribution of the health workforce, with remote and hard to reach areas being at a disadvantage.  Including hand-over and capacity building to enable systems to be managed longer term
    68. 68. Strengthening career pathways  Routes into the medical profession for local students should be encouraged as it is likely that these staff, especially if mid-level, will more easily be retained in rural areas.  The development of a career structure with options for progression in pay and responsibility for CHOs should be developed (e.g. through the Scheme of Service which is currently being developed for Health Workers in Sierra Leone).  Direct entry into midwifery training should be considered to address severe shortfalls in this cadre.
    69. 69. Continuing professional development  Staff report improved training opportunities since the FHCI; however, concerns about skill levels need also to be taken seriously. This is an area where systematic evidence is lacking.  Regional disparities in access to training should be addressed, reversing the bias, so that those serving in rural areas have higher chances of training  Given the additional domestic responsibilities of women, supportive measures should be put in place to support them in accessing and taking up training opportunities  Meaningful CPD activities should be linked in as mandatory to career progression, based on individual and facility needs
    70. 70. Thank you On behalf of ReBUILD consortium  Institute for International Health and Development (IIHD), Queen Margaret University, UK  Liverpool school of Tropical Medicine (UK)  College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences (CoMAHS), Sierra Leone  Biomedical Training and Research Institute (BRTI), Zimbabwe  Makerere University School of Public Health (MUSPH), Uganda  Cambodia Development Research Institute (CDRI) www.rebuildconsortium.com 71
    71. 71. Thanks also to all the ReBUILD team in Sierra Leone  Dr Joseph Edem-Hotah  Dr Mohamed Samai  Professor Sophie Witter  Dr Joanna Raven  Dr Haja Ramatulai Wurie  Maria Paola Bertone  Mr Rogers Amara  Margaret Mannah  Yatta Kosia  Mr Amara Katta 72
    72. 72. Afternoon session Chair: Dr SAS Kargbo Mr Emile Koroma (MOHS)  Current priorities and debates for reform within the D-HRH and HRH WG and evidence needs Discussion and panel session  The way forward – evidence needs and use to support a health workforce for all
    73. 73. The Way Forward: Discussion and panel session  What are the HRH evidence needs in Sierra Leone today?  How can these best be generated, communicated and used in support of a health workforce for all?
    74. 74. Thank you Evidence for supporting a health workforce for all in Sierra Leone College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences

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