(UNCLASSIFIED) (UNCLASSIFIED) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES402-22-04 3 Feb 2021 (U) WHAT INSIGHTS ARE DERIVED FROM OPERATION ANACONDA IN REGARDS TO THE NCO COMMON CORE COMPENTENCY (NCOCCC) OF OPERATIONS? (U) (MLC 402-22-04) The NCOCCC of Operations is a combination of operational skill sets that, when mastered by senior leaders can save lives and ensure effective unified action. Some of its key tenets include: Large-scale combat operations; understanding operational and mission variables; resolving complex, ill-structured problems with the use of Mission Command; and understanding how to integrate the different branches of the military into successful joint operations (Department of the Army [DA], 2020). This final principle of conducting joint operations becomes increasingly important as contemporary conflicts continue to venture further into the realm of multi-domain warfare (Marr, 2018). In order to execute such a complex task, Joint Force Commanders (JFC) must “integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations” through the use of seven Joint Functions (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2017, p. III-1). One of these functions, Command and Control, is how the JFC directs the forces toward accomplishment of the mission, and its essential task is to “Communicate and ensure the flow of information across the staff and joint force” (JCS, 2017, p. III-2). This task is critical to the creation of a shared understanding, which allows the separate branches to work seamlessly together toward a common goal. The absence of this unifying component hinders missions and increases casualties. In Operation ANACONDA, JFC Major General (MG) Hagenbeck failed to create such a shared understanding with his subordinate Air Force assets, which contributed to increasing the amount of casualties his forces incurred. Although the warning order was published on 6 January, MG Hagenbeck did not notify the Combined Force Air Component Commander of Operation ANACONDA until 23 February, just days before the operation began (Fleri et al., 2003). The insights gained from this case study are failure to ensure the flow of information across the joint force, caused downstream effects in planning and preparation that led to diminished air support during the initial stages of the operation. As noted by Lambeth (2005) in his comprehensive analysis, “because so little air support had been requested…coalition troops entered the fight virtually unprotected by any preparatory and suppressive fire” (pp. 204-205). Operation Anaconda provides a clear case of how proficiency in the realm of Operations can result in fewer U.S. casualties. Kenneth P. Mullan/MLC 20-008 [email protected] APPROVED BY: MSG Trevor Petsch mailto:[email protected] jasonhenderson Text Box EXSUMs follow the format outlined in HQDA Policy Notice 25-52 (as cited in TRADOC Regulation 1-11) with the following exceptions. Summary paragraph not to exceed 1 page. Use APA in-line citation form ...

1. (UNCLASSIFIED)
(UNCLASSIFIED)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ES402-22-04
3 Feb 2021
(U) WHAT INSIGHTS ARE DERIVED FROM OPERATION
ANACONDA IN REGARDS
TO THE NCO COMMON CORE COMPENTENCY (NCOCCC)
OF OPERATIONS?
(U) (MLC 402-22-04)
The NCOCCC of Operations is a combination of operational
skill sets that, when
mastered by senior leaders can save lives and ensure effective
unified action. Some of
its key tenets include: Large-scale combat operations;
understanding operational and
mission variables; resolving complex, ill-structured problems
with the use of Mission
Command; and understanding how to integrate the different
branches of the military into
successful joint operations (Department of the Army [DA],
2020). This final principle of
conducting joint operations becomes increasingly important as
contemporary conflicts
continue to venture further into the realm of multi-domain
warfare (Marr, 2018). In order
to execute such a complex task, Joint Force Commanders (JFC)
must “integrate,

2. synchronize, and direct joint operations” through the use of
seven Joint Functions (Joint
Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2017, p. III-1). One of these functions,
Command and Control, is
how the JFC directs the forces toward accomplishment of the
mission, and its essential
task is to “Communicate and ensure the flow of information
across the staff and joint
force” (JCS, 2017, p. III-2). This task is critical to the creation
of a shared understanding,
which allows the separate branches to work seamlessly together
toward a common goal.
The absence of this unifying component hinders missions and
increases casualties. In
Operation ANACONDA, JFC Major General (MG) Hagenbeck
failed to create such a
shared understanding with his subordinate Air Force assets,
which contributed to
increasing the amount of casualties his forces incurred.
Although the warning order was
published on 6 January, MG Hagenbeck did not notify the
Combined Force Air
Component Commander of Operation ANACONDA until 23
February, just days before
the operation began (Fleri et al., 2003). The insights gained
from this case study are
failure to ensure the flow of information across the joint force,
caused downstream
effects in planning and preparation that led to diminished air
support during the initial
stages of the operation. As noted by Lambeth (2005) in his
comprehensive analysis,
“because so little air support had been requested…coalition
troops entered the fight
virtually unprotected by any preparatory and suppressive fire”
(pp. 204-205). Operation

3. Anaconda provides a clear case of how proficiency in the realm
of Operations can result
in fewer U.S. casualties.
Kenneth P. Mullan/MLC 20-008
[email protected]
APPROVED BY: MSG Trevor Petsch
mailto:[email protected]
jasonhenderson
Text Box
EXSUMs follow the format outlined in HQDA Policy Notice 25-
52 (as cited in TRADOC Regulation 1-11) with the following
exceptions. Summary paragraph not to exceed 1 page. Use APA
in-line citation format instead of footnotes.
jasonhenderson
Highlight
jasonhenderson
Highlight
jasonhenderson
Highlight
jasonhenderson
Highlight
jasonhenderson
Highlight
jasonhenderson
Text Box
Summary and Answer: Summarize key facts and answer
question by stating, The insights gained from this case study

4. are...
jasonhenderson
Text Box
Example: Give BRIEF synopsis of the case study events with a
STRONG tie back to the NCO C3 pieces. Only information
critical to bridging the NCO C3 to the case study summary and
answer should be here.
jasonhenderson
Text Box
Transition statement: You need to provide a link between the
NCO C3 and the failure/success of the case study in regards to
the NCO C3 you are using.
jasonhenderson
Text Box
Explain: Explain the parts and pieces of the NCO C3 that apply
to the case study. If they have nothing to do with the case study,
they don't need to be here.
jasonhenderson
Text Box
Describe: Describe the overall concept of the NCO C3.
jasonhenderson
Text Box
The signature lines should be centered and aligned
jasonhenderson
Text Box
(UNCLASSIFIED) can appear as a header and footer or typed in
above the title EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
jasonhenderson

5. Text Box
Do not change the topic from, "WHAT INSIGHTS ARE
DERIVED FROM THE X CASE STUDY IN REGARDS TO
THE NCO C3 OF X". This is the question that must be
answered in the EXSUM.
(UNCLASSIFIED)
(UNCLASSIFIED)
References
Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hulkill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003).
Operation Anaconda case
study. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.
Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2020). The
Noncommissioned Officer Guide
(TC 7-22.7).
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). Joint Operations (JP 3-0).
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0c
h1.pdf?ver=2018
-11-27-160457-910
Lambeth, B.S. (2005). Air power against terror: America’s
conduct of Operation
Enduring Freedom.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg166centaf.13?seq=1
Marr, S. (2018). Stability in Multi-Domain Battle. U.S. Army
Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute.
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0c

6. h1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0c
h1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg166centaf.13?seq=1
jasonhenderson
Text Box
References: References keep single space but formatted and
cited in APA for practice. No need to bold heading, EXSUMs
do not use bold.
Pr. 23(9)-3AProblem 23(9)-3AName: 0Section: # N-box
Incorrects due to blanks COUNTIF(B15:AT24," ")27Score:
0%# N-box +B-box corrects COUNTIF(B15:AT24," ")0Key
Code: [Key code here]Total SUM(AD13:AD15)Instructions
27Answers are entered in the cells with gray
backgrounds.Percentage =(AD16-AD13-AD14)/AD16Cells with
non-gray backgrounds are protected and cannot be edited.0%An
asterisk (*) will appear to the right of an incorrect entry in the
income statement and above or below Notes:elements in the
equations. The essay answer will not be graded.If number-entry
box is blank (this would be an incorrect answer for N-boxes),
error check returns two spaces, " "If number-entry or blank-
entry box is incorrect, returns "*"1.The Crunchy Granola
CompanyIf number-entry or blank-entry box is correct, returns
single space, " "Divisional Income StatementsAccounts
ReceivableUse data verification to set data entry to whole
number >= 0, and use drop-downs for lables and names, so that
students can't enter a space in a box and have it counted as
correct.For the Year Ended June 30, 20Y7Accounts
PayableConditional formatting might be used but wasn't here, to
hide some of the error check return symbols. If A1 = "~*", then
font = red, if something else, then font = background
color.SnackRetailCereal
CakeBakeriesDivisionDivisionDivisionSalesCost of goods

7. soldGross profitOperating expensesIncome from
operations2.Return on Investment (ROI)=Profit Margin x
Investment TurnoverReturn on Investment (ROI) =Income from
OperationsxSalesSalesInvested AssetsCereal Division:ROI=x=
cpence: An answer will appear here when all numbers are
entered in the formula.Snack Cake Division:ROI=x=
cpence: An answer will appear here when all numbers are
entered in the formula.Retail Bakeries Division:ROI=x=
cpence: An answer will appear here when all numbers are
entered in the formula.
cpence: An answer will appear here when all numbers are
entered in the formula.3.[Key essay answer here]
SolProblem 23(9)-3AName:
Solution
Section: Score: ONInstructions
Answers are entered in the cells with gray backgrounds.Cells
with non-gray backgrounds are protected and cannot be
edited.An asterisk (*) will appear to the right of an incorrect
entry in the income statement and above or below elements in
the equations. The essay answer will not be graded.1.The
Crunchy Granola CompanyDivisional Income StatementsFor the
Year Ended June 30, 20Y7SnackRetailCereal
CakeBakeriesDivisionDivisionDivisionSales$ 25,000,000$
8,000,000$ 9,750,000Cost of goods

8. sold16,670,0005,575,0006,795,000Gross profit$ 8,330,000$
2,425,000$ 2,955,000Operating
expenses7,330,0001,945,0002,272,500Income from operations$
1,000,000$ 480,000$ 682,5002.Return (ROI) on Investment
=Profit Margin x Investment TurnoverReturn (ROI) on
Investment =Income from OperationsxSalesSalesInvested
AssetsCereal Division:ROI=$1,000,000x$25,000,000=10.0%
cpence: An answer will appear here when all numbers are
entered in the formula.$ 25,000,000$10,000,000Snack Cake
Division:ROI=$480,000x$8,000,000=12.0%
cpence: An answer will appear here when all numbers are
entered in the formula.$8,000,000$4,000,000Retail Bakeries
Division:ROI=$682,500x$9,750,000=10.5%
cpence: An answer will appear here when all numbers are
entered in the formula.
cpence: An answer will appear here when all numbers are
entered in the formula.$9,750,000$6,500,0003.Per dollar of
invested assets, the Snack Cake Division is the most profitable
of the three divisions. Assuming that the rates of return on
investments do not change in the future, an expansion of the
Snack Cake Division will return 12 cents (12%) on each dollar

9. of invested assets, while the Cereal and Retail Bakery divisions
will return only 10 cents (10%) and 10.5 cents (10.5%),
respectively. Thus, when faced with limited funds for
expansion, management should consider an expansion of the
Snack Cake Division first.
A CASE STUDY IN MISSION COMMAND
26 INFANTRY 26 INFANTRY January-March
2014January-March 2014
CPT THOMAS E. MEYER
THE LEADERSHIP IMPERATIVE:
As we transition from more than a decade of war to garrison
training, we must identify and implement mission command
(MC) into our fi ghting formations
and training management in order to respond to a complex
and evolving security threat. Through grounded experiences
at the tactical level and academic study of organizational
leadership theory, I seek to connect academic theory to Army
doctrine and show the successes of MC in practice through

10. a case study of the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment,
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault). The following issues discussed are from the point
of view and perspective of an individual who has served
under multiple chains of command in the positions of platoon
leader, company executive offi cer, and company commander
between May 2010 and April 2013.
Hypothetical Vignette
Afghanistan, Regional Command-South — As the
battalion conducts air assault operations behind insurgent
improvised explosive device (IED) belts, leaders are faced
with an ambiguous and evolving operational environment
(OE). The commanders of two companies within the battalion
execute simultaneous operations, controlling their platoon
leaders and maneuvering their units at the order of the
battalion commander. A synchronized battalion operation
combining assets from air assault capabilities to air-to-ground
integration (AGI) is ongoing as companies push south of the
primary insurgent IED belts and defensive zones, all driven by
detailed command. The company conducting the battalion’s
decisive operation pushes south and clears through enemy
disruption zones, able to fi nd, fi x, and fi nish the enemy.

11. These
two company commanders now face the exploitation phase
of their operation but are “off the page” — moving beyond the
initial contact and explicit direction provided by the battalion
operations order. Instead of understanding commander’s
intent, seizing the initiative, and exploiting the initiative
(which leads to assessment and dissemination of gathered
intelligence), these company commanders are hindered by the
micromanagement of the command and control philosophy
that results in detailed command.
The battalion ceases operations, and the companies strong-
point their locations so these two company commanders
can meet with the battalion commander and S3 operations
offi cer. While company leadership is unable to perceive and
execute the next step, platoon leaders are stifl ed and, as
micromanaged cogs in the wheel, move with their respective
company commanders back to the battalion command post
(CP) to receive further detailed guidance. At the battalion CP,
platoon leaders gather around imagery of the OE as the S3
and battalion commander brief the scheme of maneuver for
this unexpected phase of the operation. As the S3 describes
the scheme down to platoon movement techniques, company
commanders stand behind their platoon leaders observing
the concept of the operation in “receive mode” as they

12. conceptualize the directed concept.
Following the brief, company commanders and platoon
leaders move back to their individual locations and prepare
to exploit their gains. This process gave the enemy 12 hours
to consolidate and reorganize. Following the battalion-
directed scheme of maneuver, the platoon leaders depart
in the early morning hours
and face an enemy, previously
broken, in prepared defensive
positions protected by various
IEDs. Meanwhile, company
commanders act as radio
operators, relaying information
to battalion while awaiting further
guidance to maneuver their
elements. The lack of MC in this
situation created a unit devoid of
shared understanding. In failing
to know the expanded purpose of
the operation, the commanders’
ability to seize the initiative
was limited, which allowed the
insurgent force to consolidate

13. forces, plan a counteroffensive,
and emplace IEDs forward of
coalition forces.
“Leadership is […] infl uencing
Soldiers with A Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry
Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st
Airborne Division, execute a deliberate attack of an enemy
objective during a training exercise.
Photos by 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division
Public Affairs Offi ce