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The Russian Federation
Bureau of Humanitarian Emergencies
Raquel Maynes
12 May 2015
• How can institutions cope with an increase in migration due to long-term phenomena
like climate change? Will we need new organizations to address these issues, or can our existing
organizations adapt themselves to address climate refugees?
• How should the international community respond to large-scale refugee situations that
spill over into neighboring countries?
I. Introduction
While climate change and its environmental effects have been the subject of intense
debate for decades, a rise in focus and discussion over climate change and its humanitarian
effects have been apparent within the international community in recent years. According to the
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the effects of climate change will have a direct
impact on weather patterns, melting polar ice caps, heightened spread of human diseases, and the
increased rate of floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes on a global scale (IPCC 2011). These
changes are deeply problematic for a number of reasons, but especially because ten percent of
the world’s population currently lives on coastal lands and hundreds of millions of people rely on
melting snow and glaciers to supply water for irrigation (Moberg 2009). Evidence released by
the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report also projects a major depletion in crop yields and
livestock production as land becomes less abundant due to heat stress, droughts, and rising sea
levels (IPCC 2011). According to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, this shift in
affluence has the potential to cause an upsurge in the cost of food and energy, which could
ultimately lead to the deepening of social inequalities and political conflict on the domestic level
(2009). This shift could also impact a state’s development process and destabilize governments
which could cause forced migration (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2011).
Additionally, more intense storms and increased sea levels could introduce major threats to
infrastructure and coastal ecosystems as shoreline erosion and coastal flooding begin to transpire,

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forcing people settled on coastlines to relocate to safer areas (IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
2013).
Walter Kālin, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Human
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, defined five climate change-related circumstances that
could theoretically influence population displacement. He attributed this potential to variables
caused by hydro-meteorological disasters, the sequestration of zones by the government,
environmental degradation, political conflict, and the case of sinking Pacific island states
(UNHCR 2009). According to Norman Myers, a professor at Oxford University, the continuance
of changing rainfall regimes and increasing global temperatures as a result of climate change will
displace as many as 200 million people by 2050 (Myers 2005).
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established by the
United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1950 as an international agency assigned to
protect refugees worldwide (UNHCR 2009). Out of the 36 million people that the UNHCR
recorded in 2009 as having been displaced by natural disasters, 20 million were caused by
climate change-related problems (UNHCR 2009). Experts suggest that this number will continue
to grow as environmental degradation worsens and climate change continues to enhance
competition for resources such as water, food, and arable land (Boncour, Morton & Laczko
2008). The increase in weather-related disasters, in addition to the rise in global temperatures,
has forced millions of people to abandon their homes and ultimately their livelihoods as
environmental conditions have become inhospitable to habitation. By addressing the impact of
climate change on the increasing prevalence of internally displaced persons and refugees, Russia
hopes to further expand the reach of the humanitarian services which are currently being led by
the UNHCR.

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At this point in time, “refugee status” is recognized by the Convention as a person with a
well-founded fear of persecution (Boano & Morris 2008). This particular formality creates a very
serious challenge to the protection of those displaced by climate change-related reasons, as many
argue that ‘nature’ or ‘environment’ cannot be acknowledged as a legitimate source of
‘persecution’. Thus, in order to initiate the process of enhancing protection for the millions of
people who have been displaced by environmental disasters, a category excluded from
international law, a petition must be served to the UNHCR for a definition expansion of “refugee
status” in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
II. Background
Russia:
Migration policies
At 17,000,000 square miles, the Russian Federation is the largest country in the world.
Because of its size, Russia shares a land border with fourteen countries, and therefore, it requires
450 official border crossing points (Heleniak 2002). When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991,
Russia faced the difficult task of managing its reconstructed borders during a time in which more
than 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves living in lands no longer considered Russian
territory (Heleniak 2002). Of these 25 million, 11 million resided in Ukraine, 6 million in
Kazakhstan, and 1.7 million in the Baltic regions (Toshchenko 1994).
During the Soviet period, the government incentivized ethnic Russians to move to
various parts of the Soviet Union through programs such as the Virgin Lands Campaign, which
encouraged Russians to move to Kazakhstan in an effort to expand the Soviet Union’s depleting
agricultural production (McCauley 1976). The implementation of glasnost and perestroika in the
late-1980s was equally important, which exemplified a sharp break from former Soviet migration

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policies by suddenly providing a more stable emphasis on the freedom of movement (Curtis,
1996). Nevertheless, immigration was still considered a minor priority to the Government of the
Union in terms of both policy making and organizational focus. Asylum-seekers did not consider
the Soviet Union, prior to its collapse, a desirable destination for relocation because of the state’s
incapacity to stabilize the populations which had recently settled in areas defined by harsh
climate and living conditions (Curtis 1996). As decolonization and nation-state building began to
emerge in the Post-Soviet world, however, millions of ethnic Russians, who were once
considered to be a part of an elite group, became the ethnic minority within the former Soviet
republics. This, in turn, prompted an unconventional level of migration into Russia’s borders and
a whole new range of ethnic conflict (Mukomel 2013).
Since 1989, over two million people have returned to Russia, with the largest percentage
coming from Tajikistan (Nahaylo 1994). The scope of migration from Tajikistan was particularly
extensive as a result of a civil war which erupted in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet
Union (Nahaylo 1994). Kyrgyzstan experienced the second largest of Russian emigration after
the state initiated a shift to a market economy, which resulted in economic problems for a
majority of Russians who worked there in agriculture (Bandey & Rather 2013). The desire to
escape ethnic, economic, and military conflict, accompanied by a yearning to return to their
cultural birthplace which was entering a period of economic prosperity were key incentives for
many ethnic Russians to leave their post-Soviet territories.
By virtue of the magnitude of the migrational flow, the issue of population movement
became an intensely debated topic in Russia during the early post-Soviet years. In the absence of
legislative framework to guide its procedures or policy decisions, Russia was ill prepared to
handle the influx of mainly ethnic Russian immigrants at such a large scale. The consequences of

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Russia’s remissness were reflected in many ways through the citizens’ behavior, and more
specifically, their display of resentment towards both the government and the arriving migrants
(Heleniak 2002). For instance, nationalist political groups who were angered by the Russian
government’s failure to provide supplementary resources to the communities that were becoming
the leading recipients’ of immigrants often began to engage in serious criminal activity against
the state, as well as the “strangers” who now lived among them (Heleniak 2002).
In response to this humanitarian crisis, Russia initiated the adoption of a national refugee
legislation which ultimately positioned the Russian Federation as the first post-Soviet state to
implement refugee protection laws (Pilkington, 1998). The Russian Federation instituted the
Federal Migration Service (FMS) by presidential decree on 14 June 1992 as a central state body
of the Russian Federation intended to develop and implement policies concerning refugees and
forced migrants (Pilkington, 2002). The FMS therefore became responsible for overseeing the
migrational flows and registration of returnees.
Russia’s display of a more liberal approach within the context of its newly defined
territory advanced to an even greater degree after it ratified the central instruments of
international refugee protection, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol on 12 November 1992 (Shevel 2011). This international cooperation then led to the
adoption of an important apparatus for domestic migration policy, the Law on Refugees and the
Law on Involuntary Migrants. The Law on Refugees and the Law on Involuntary Migrants
intended to mitigate the mass influx of refugees even further in Russia’s post-Soviet climate
(Shevel 2011). The defining feature of the legislation, which passed in February 1993, was its
establishment of a decisive distinction regarding entering migrants on the basis of citizenship
(Flynn & Pilkington 1999). According to the provisions, “refugee” status would be given to any

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non-Russian citizen who has been forced to flee their home due to fear of persecution or any
threat of violence (Shevel 2011). Similarly, the “forced migrant” status became recognized under
this law as any Russian citizen who has been forced to flee as a result of similar pressures and
fears pertaining to persecution and the threat of violence (Shevel 2011). Russia’s establishment
of “forced migrant” and “refugee” status exemplified the state’s developing foreign policy goals
which were aimed at embracing its role as the successor of the Soviet Union and acting as the
benefactor to the former republics.
Local governments in many regions of the Russian Federation, however, took conflicting
approaches to the federal policies and this reduced the effective capacity of the FMS program
tremendously. An unwillingness to adhere to the federal government’s existing migration plan
was most strongly observed in Moscow and the Southern federal district of Russia where a
profound number of migrants chose to resettle (Voronina, 2006). The inconsistency in the
application of the law at the regional level was demonstrated primarily through local authorities’
decisions to adopt their own legislative policies on the registration of migrants (Voronina 2006).
The objective of many local governments was to prevent migration to their region, and this aim
was often achieved through a refusal to allow migrants the opportunity to register as a refugee or
forced migrant and, additionally, the opportunity to purchase housing (Voronina 2006). And so,
despite the federal government’s efforts, an effective institutionalized migrational framework
was not achieved through the creation of the Federal Migration Service.
Climate Change Doctrine
The profound effects of climate change have been observed in a significant number of
ways within Russia’s borders, and experts suggest that these hazardous phenomena will continue
to develop at a relatively rapid pace (Davydova 2014). By virtue of the fact that more than two-

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thirds of Russia’s ecosystem and populations of more than a hundred thousand exist on frozen
ground, or permafrost, the international community acknowledges that Russia is vulnerable to
the extreme weather conditions and climate-linked disasters that have transpired and will
continue to grow as a consequence of climate change (Anisimov & Reneva 2006) (IIASA 2011).
The consequences of Russia’s melting permafrost, although vast, are most strongly associated
with the potentially negative effects the thawing could have on oil and gas pipeline
infrastructure, railways, roads, and housing infrastructure (Patterson 2015). Despite it being
industrially well developed, the prospect of damaged oil and gas pipeline infrastructures
represents a critical point of concern for Northern Russia as such an occurrence could lead to
major economic and environmental hazards, including oil spills (Anisimov & Reneva 2006).
Yet, in addition to Russia’s geographical difficulties, the country has become
predisposed to the hazards of climate change as a result of its extensive exploitation of
greenhouse gases, which has ultimately positioned the country as a major fossil fuel emitter in
the global community (Anderson, Bows-Larkin & Sharmina 2013). Specifically, Russia was the
fourth-largest emitter in the world in 2012, producing 1,802 megatons of carbon dioxide, and in
2013, Russia’s CO2 emissions increased to two billion tons (Cappiello 2014) (Roston 2014).
This high level of energy emissions comes mainly as a result of Russia’s energy-heavy industries
and is supplemented by its physical size and large population (McKinsey & Company 2009).
Current changes particularly important to Russia include a steady rise in earth’s
temperature, floods, the melting and disappearance of ice caps, and a rise in sea levels
(Davydova 2014). Based on climate change reports, the average temperature in Russia rose by
1.5 degrees in the last thirty-five years, while the average temperature across the world rose by
0.8 degrees (RT 2012). Scientists have agreed that climatic variability is not only an indication of

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Russia’s unique vulnerability to the global climate crisis, but that the changes are also a warning
with respect to the rapid rate at which these changes are occurring (Ford & Furgal 2009). The
mean annual rainfall for the majority of Russia increased 13 percent, but in the country’s Far
East territory this increase was as much as 20 percent (Davydova 2014). The Far East region
experienced a loss of 1.4 billion USD as a result of the flooding that ensued (Davydova 2014). In
Russia’s second largest city, St. Petersburg, 63 floods occurred between 1979 and 2008
(Davydova 2014). The city, which has a population of about five million residents, is recognized
as being particularly at risk to the threat of rising sea levels, as the city was built on the flood
plain of the River Neva at the extreme eastern end of the Gulf of Finland (Ricklefs 2002).
Although Russia’s physical level of vulnerability to climate change remains certain, of
considerable importance are the ways in which climatic variability serves Russia’s economic
interests, as well. Curbing the effects of global warming has often been a point of contention
between Russia and the international community given the humanitarian implications which
would inevitably come as a result of rising sea levels and damaged ecosystems. But by virtue of
Russia’s status as being the coldest country in the world, the prospect of experiencing an
increased frequency in moderate weather does not incite total concern. Siberia, which represents
the majority of Russia’s territory, experiences an annual average of -5° C (Korepin 2011). The
extreme frigity of Siberia’s environment has major implications in terms of agricultural
production rates. For instance, glacial conditions preventing Siberian residents from working,
which means 33 percent of possible working time is reduced by cold weather per year (Korepin
2011). Global warming could also serve Russia’s economic interests by significantly reducing
heating costs, increasing crop production, and initiating the development of the Northern Sea
Route (Oberthür & Pallemaerts 2010).

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Nevertheless, the Russian Federation made a sharp break from its traditional discourse
concerning climate change after President Medvedev announced in 2009 that Russia would adopt
a Climate Change Doctrine (Bellona 2009). The governing frameworks, which the Climate
Change Doctrine has put forward, include the development of economic plans which will support
the implementation of adaptation and GHG mitigation measures, an increase in scientific
research concerning climate change, and a promise to cooperate in international plans which will
function to achieve the same goal (IEPD 2009). One key development that resulted from this
policy included President Medvedev’s pledge in 2009 to cut Russia’s GHG emissions by at least
50 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 (Korppoo & Vatansever 2012). In 2010, Russia’s carbon
emissions stood at 34.2 percent below their 1990 levels (Korppoo & Vatansever 2012).
Russia’s modified approach to climate change policy can be attributed to different
societal and international factors. Recent polls indicate that approximately 48 percent of
Russians recognize climate change as a threat to their agricultural production and attribute its
progression to human activity (EBRD 2011). In light of this statistic, the increased public
awareness most likely played a contributing role, at least to some degree, in Russian policy
makers’ decisions to adjust their discussion about the issue of climate change.
The urgency and pressure for climate change reform was also likely reinforced as a result
of Russia’s membership in multilateral organizations. This pressure was especially present in the
Group of Twenty, or G20, a leading international agency focused on economic cooperation and
decision-making (G20 2009). Concern for the emerging effects of climate change on developed
and developing states was prominently highlighted in the preamble of the G20 Pittsburgh
Summit, and a commitment to promoting the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies was established as
one of the summit’s primary objectives (G20 2009). By virtue of Russia’s membership in the

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organization and dedication to the G20’s goals, the institution’s plan to address the problem of
climate change was likely influential in President Medvedev’s decision to engage in this
discussion as well.
While the establishment of the Climate Change Doctrine was significant with respect to
Russia’s reformed approach to the topic, the Doctrine’s implementation was mostly
unsuccessful. For instance, out of the four policies the Doctrine put forth and assured would
receive “maximum effort” in terms of government planning to mitigate the progression of
climate change, only two have been given modest attention. These two policies, which were
focused on increasing an energy efficient economy with fewer market imbalances, have yet to
facilitate any real changes within the state (Anderson, Bows-Larkin, Sharmina 2013). Therefore
the only substantial function of the document was its announcement to the international
community that Russian leaders’ recognize the reality and threat of climate change.
Climate Action Plan
Russia’s second main climate policy decree, the Climate Action Plan of 2011, focused on
the method of adaptation rather than mitigation as a solution to the negative impact of climate
change (Anderson, Bows-Larkin & Sharmina 2013). The plan suggests that Russia’s Ministry of
Natural Resources will be responsible with implementing goals aimed at preparing various
economic, industrial, and governmental sectors for the impending threats of climate change from
2011 to 2020 (Anderson, Bows-Larkin & Sharmina 2013). For instance, according to an article
published by Bellona (2011), the Ministry of Transport in Russia has taken action to develop
measures which intend to cut down CO2 emissions from civil aviation by 2015 and from
commercial sea and river transport by 2020.

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Although the document rhetorically illustrates a slightly more promising scheme with the
discussion of reducing the effects of climate change on important socio-economic spheres such
as public health, forests, infrastructure, and agriculture, critics have identified a number of
drawbacks within the Climate Action Plan document (Anderson, Bows-Larkin & Sharmina
2013). In fact, a number of gaps have been exposed, pointing out in particular the absence of a
measurable goal within the plan’s framework, accompanied by the document’s failure to mention
sources of financial or professional support in its efforts to achieve this durable adaptive solution
(Bellona 2011). The general consensus of the Climate Action Plan of 2011 is exceptionally
similar to that of the Climate Change Doctrine, in that it indicates Russia’s attempt to move
towards productive direction, but that it fails to deliver any concrete answers or solutions to the
problem of climate change.
Conclusion
Given Russia’s desire to embody the role of a benefactor for both its regional and
international community, it is highly probable that Russia would choose to pioneer this effort
aimed at accepting climate refugees. Furthermore, promoting this policy would allow the
Russian Federation to take a proactive role against the looming threat of climate change, but in a
way that would not require the reduction of GHG emissions, since this type of policy would hurt
Russia’s national interests.
Regional:
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Soviet republics founded the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and

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Uzbekistan (NTI 2007). The objective of the CIS, as stated by its Charter, is to facilitate
development and collaboration among the states, which are extremely heterogeneous
economically and culturally, in a manner that will sustain and respect the sovereignty of its
members (NTI 2007). In an effort to confront the issue of refugees and forced migrants after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established the Geneva
Regional Conference on Refugees, Displaced Persons, Migration and Asylum Issues in the CIS,
held in 1996 (Druke 2006). This conference established the Programme of Action, which created
a regional setting for discussion and analysis of the problems concerning migrants and their
access to new territories and adequate reception facilities, similar to the function of the 1951
Convention (UNHCR 1998). The construction of this program was beneficial to the UNHCR and
its partners because the program allowed them to address the challenges of migration and the
acquisition of resources needed to mitigate the process of assimilation on a state-by-state basis.
The Programme was divided into two sections: the Declarations and the Principles
(UNHCR 1998). The Declaration portion of the Programme was designed to explain the
underlying causes behind the massive wave of involuntary population movements in many of the
CIS countries (CIS Conference on Refugees 1996). The Programme attributes many of these
causes to circumstances of social and economic insecurity, violence, violations of human rights,
and ecological disasters, and it goes on to warn governments about the adverse effects which
unmanaged population movements can have on both the security of the state and the
international community as a whole (CIS Conference on Refugees 1996). Furthermore, the
Principles section outlines the CIS countries’ commitment to upholding integral international
standards relating to human rights (CIS Conference on Refugees 1996). According to the

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conference, these civil liberties would include freedom of movement, the rights of refugees and
IDPs to receive protection in accordance with international law, and the right to have a
nationality (CIS Conference on Refugees 1996). In keeping with the central rule of sovereignty,
the CIS countries acknowledged their primary responsibility to implement the Programme of
Action and to manifest these principles unwaveringly throughout their domestic policies (CIS
Conference on Refugees 1996).
The institutional framework of the Programme of Action encouraged the creation of
many more comprehensive capacity-building programs (Druke 2006). After a decade of
cooperation among the CIS members, however, inconsistencies in terms of implementation of
legal protection used to address problems such as discrimination, humanitarian services, and
documentation for refugees still remained certain (Druke 2006). Undoubtedly, members of the
CIS had displayed significant progress in their attempts to develop legislative frameworks used
to address issues of involuntary migration. But inefficient implementation of asylum systems
remained present throughout most CIS countries, and this prevented a substantial number of
immigrants from having access to places of refuge (Druke 2006). The inadequacies of the
Programme have been attributed to multiple factors, but the most critical point to mention was
the fact that that not all CIS countries were signatories of the 1951 Convention, indicating the
absence of a comprehensive framework to ensure the legal protection of refugees in CIS
countries (Druke 2006). This discrepancy was exacerbated by inefficient donor funding which
was essential to CIS countries’ development and resilience capacity against social and economic
pressures (UNHCR 1998). Furthermore, the fact that refugee and migration issues were not
always a top priority on CIS countries’ political agendas also placed a significant amount of
constraint on the Programme’s effectiveness and hindered capacity-building among member

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states immensely (UNHCR 2008). At this point in time, there are over 2.7 million forced
migrants in the states of the Commonwealth (Druke 2006).
The Aral Sea Crisis
The Aral Sea, formerly a part of the Soviet Union, is located in Central Asia between the
Southern part of Kazakhstan and Northern Uzbekistan (Meer, Small & Upshur 2001). In an
effort to promote agricultural production, particularly cotton, the Soviet Union established an
irrigation program in the Aral Sea Basin during the 1950s. This program would ultimately
transform the prosperous inland sea, which stretched across 26,000 square miles, into an
inhospitable desert that now holds merely one-tenth of its original size (Meer, Small & Upshur
2001). As a result of this program and other contributing factors, millions of people living in and
around this area have suffered from the adverse effects of desiccation for decades (Meer, Small
& Upshur 2001). Specifically, the region has experienced tremendous strife as a result of the
rapidly declining sea levels, which in 2005, had dropped by 23 meters since the 1950s (Meer,
Small & Upshur 2001). This, in turn, has resulted in a steep rise in salinity levels for both the
sea and soil, and almost a total disappearance of fish stock (Meer, Small & Upshur 2001).
Desertification and salinization have been primary quandaries in the region, as well, with
roughly six million hectares of arable land destroyed by the rapid degradation of land and natural
resources (Meer, Small & Upshur 2001). The gradual depletion of land and fish stocks marred a
substantial portion of the populations’ livelihoods and significantly hindered their access to clean
drinking water which eventually initiated a public health crisis (Eurasianet 2012). Water borne
infectious diseases and a sudden outbreak of tuberculosis ensued as the land became covered by
salt and pesticides, and in response, mass waves of migration began to take place by the tens and
thousands (Eurasianet 2012).

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The Aral Sea desiccation period has been exacerbated significantly by the slow-onset
effects of climate change. The consequences of increasing temperatures, which rose by four
degrees Celsius from 1960 to 2000, have had direct implications on the populations who live in
the area (Meer, Small & Upshur 2001). In addition to triggering increasing water evaporation,
the most severe consequences of these climate patterns have been significant crop losses in
agricultural plants and grasslands, which in turn, have had negative effects on cattle breeding
(Columbia). In regards to future temperature changes, scientists have predicted for the increase
to continue in the region with temperatures rising by 1.75 to 2.25 degrees Celsius on average by
2050 (Columbia). Furthermore, scientists suggest that precipitation periods will increase by five
to twenty percent on average by 2050 (Columbia).
Karakalpakstan, a part of Uzbekistan, has arguably been the most effected republic in
Central Asia. As the second leading cotton exporter in the world, Uzbekistan relies heavily on
the vital nutrients in the soil as they function to nourish the crops used to produce cotton (Wilson
2002). But as lands continue to dry with increasing periods of drought and fresh water becomes
more and more inaccessible, cotton production faces a tremendous degree of limitation (Wilson
2002). Furthermore, public health in Karakalpakstan has suffered immensely due to high rates of
pesticides used in the area, coupled with the high levels of salt in the populations’ drinking water
and virtually no public access to health care (Wilson 2002) As a result of the populations’
primary economic reliance on agriculture which continues to be devastated by negative climate
trends, Karakalpaks are deeply impoverished and estimates suggest that roughly 50,000 to
200,000 Karakalpaks have migrated to Kazakhstan in search of employment (Naumann 2012).
The rapid desiccation of the Aral Sea basin has also led to dramatic disputes over water
allocation among the five central Asian states (Naumann 2012). Although primarily driven by

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demands for greater water supply, conflicts among the states have also been exacerbated by
national concerns over economic development, ethnic tensions, and population growth
(Naumann 2012). This conflict, in turn, has severely hindered the prospect of developing a
durable, regional solution to perpetually mishandled natural resources in Central Asia (Naumann
2012). Expanding the 1951 Convention’s definition of “refugee status” to include populations
displaced by environmental disasters would be critical to the security of these Central Asian
states, and would also serve to initiate the development of regional capacity-building strategies,
as conflict over national interests would likely diminish.
International:
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
The Russian Federation became a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees (hereafter the Convention) in February 1993 and its 1967 Protocol which will be
discussed in the following section (UN Russia 2007). This particular Convention remains the
most widely ratified treaty concerning refugees, as governments appear to be in overall
consensus about the international challenges that occur as a result of forced migration. For this
reason, the Convention continues to serve as the basis for the UNHCR protection activities
(Goodwin-Gill, 2013).The United Nations sanctioned the Refugee Convention in 1951 as an
apparatus intended to mitigate the displacement of Europeans who were forced to migrate as a
result of their conflictual relations with their home countries after World War II (Goodwin-Gill
2013). The basis upon which the Convention established its definition regarding the
qualifications needed to receive refugee status is extremely important because, in doing so, the
Convention permanently restricted the situations which would be considered legitimate for
causing involuntary migration. The foundation of principles the 1951 Convention put forth
included concepts which were created to protect the integrity and security of refugees from

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threats of refoulement, discrimination, punishment for entering another country illegally, and
other life-threatening circumstances (Feller 2001). Since its inception, the 1951 Convention has
remained an important guiding framework in the protection of refugees and has consequently
assisted in the protection of millions of people (1951 Convention; UNHCR 2011). In 2001, State
parties issued a Declaration reaffirming their commitment to the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol (1951 Convention; UNHCR 2011). There are currently 147 States Parties to one or both
of these international instruments (1951 Convention; UNHCR 2011).
Shifting international conditions and a progressive rise in cases of decolonization,
political instability, violent conflicts and human rights violations, however, exposed the
limitations of the 1951 Convention and emphasized the need to expand the scope of its legal
protection and applicability within the context of the evolving world (Humphrey & Nash 1988).
The 1967 Protocol was, therefore, established on the basis of adapting to the evolving world, and
it achieved this goal by removing the geographical and time limits which were formerly built
into the composition of the 1951 Convention (1951 Convention; UNHCR 2011). This definition
expansion was critical to assisting millions of people in their efforts to resettle, and given this
degree of significance, it is important that this willingness to adapt to changing refugee situations
remain a principle in the framework of the Convention’s practices.
Despite the success the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol achieved to establish a
legal, political and ethical framework for the treatment of refugees, little was done to improve
the policy standard for those who sought refuge as a result of climate-related disasters. This
negligence is problematic because forced migration for climate change-related reasons has begun
to surpass forced migration from conventional pressures such as population increase,
urbanization, and political repression (Zetter 2012). The UNHCR supported this contention,

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stating that out of the 36 million people who were displaced by natural disasters in 2009, about
20 million of those were due to climate change-related events (Durkova, Gromilova, Kiss &
Plaku 2012). Comparatively, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change discussed in its
First Assessment Report the likelihood that climate change would have a direct impact on human
migration. According to the report’s projection, 150 million people will be displaced by
environmental changes like desertification, increasing water stress, floods, and storms by 2050
(Chowdhury & Shamsuddoha 2009).
By expanding its mandate in 1972, the UNHCR significantly extended its humanitarian
assistance to internally displaced persons, a category of people who did not fall under the
mandate of the 1951 Convention (Phuong 2004). Between 1971 and 1991 the organization
became involved in more than a dozen operations that were intended to provide relief and
protection for the internally displaced, such as its program in Bangladesh to ease religious
violence, all of which aggregated the UNHCR’s role as a unique provider of humanitarian
services for the international community (Phuong 2004). Today, the UNHCR is responsible for
guiding international action aimed at protecting refugee rights, as well as resolving global
refugee-related problems which often come as a result of the process of resettlement.
Climate change has been a critical point of contention for the UNHCR, and since the
1990s, has shaped the focus of its objectives immensely (UNHCR 2013). According to the
organization, 22 million people were displaced in 2013 by climate-related disasters, and the
UN’s science advisory board predicts that this number will continue to increase in the coming
years (UNHCR 2013). The UNHCR suggests that the most dangerous consequence of climate
change will likely be its effect on the availability of natural resources, such as water, which will
have a direct impact on a state’s food security (UNHCR 2011). In order to reduce the detrimental

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reach of climate change, the UNHCR has focused a substantial amount of its attention towards
the improvement of the environment by implementing programs and initiatives aimed at teaching
refugees valuable skills in environmental management, as well as vital agricultural practices
(UNHCR, Refugee Operations and Environmental Management 2012).
According to the UNHCR’s ‘Foresight’ Report (2014), migration from climate change
will likely occur on an internal-state level, which is why the organization places a great deal of
emphasis on each state’s responsibility. In order to protect the rights and interests of internally
displaced persons, the UNHCR stresses that states must establish adaptation plans that
incorporate solutions to the issue of internal population movement in order to avoid humanitarian
crisis, slum growth, and halted development (Riera 2013).
The UNHCR has met many challenges in its quest to implement an internationally agreed
upon solution to the problem of climate refugees. According to the International Bar
Association, the UNHCR’s biggest obstacle stems from the fact that the term ‘climate refugee’ is
not a legally approved classification of people under international law, in addition to the lack of
global consensus about how climate-related displacement should be treated (Glahn 2013). As a
result, the UNHCR cannot enforce through any type of legal framework, convention, or protocol
(Glahn 2013).
International Human Rights Regime
The international human rights regime operates as an official observer of state behavior
in order to improve and enforce human rights standards worldwide (Council on Foreign
Relations 2013). Recognized on 10 December 1948 as the International Bill of Rights, the
regime is comprised of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCPR), the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Economic,

20. 20
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (CFR 2013). The ICCPR and the ICESCR, adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1966, serve as key international human rights treaties which effectively
require countries that have ratified the treaty to uphold the basic human rights listed in the
UDHR (CFR 2013). The regime’s institutions include the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
(Council on Foreign Relations 2013).. In 2006, the HRC established a universal periodic review
process which the regime uses to evaluate the human rights records of states, creating higher
rates of accountability and transparency in the international community (Council on Foreign
Relations 2013). Similarly, CEDAW serves as an additional source for state transparency and
responsibility, as it habitually watches over states party to the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in order to ensure that women’s
rights are being supported (Council on Foreign Relations 2013). The ICESCR in particular has
served as a supportive legislative framework for persons suffering from environmental
degradation, and has effectively monitored and advocated for their access to health services, and
to access to the state’s natural wealth and resources (Council on Foreign Relations 2013). For
instance, the ICESCR’s adoption of the General Comment Number 15 in November 2002
established the guidelines for states on the interpretation of the right to water which adhered to
the ICESCR’s articles of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health (CFR
2013). The Russian Federation’s ratification of the ICESCR was characteristic of the state by
virtue of the institutions’ aligned interests in terms of defending the so-called rights of the second
generation which include the protection of a person’s economic, social, and cultural rights
(Council on Foreign Relations 2013).

21. 21
Although the ICESCR has been successful in applying international laws to provide aid
for groups who have been impacted by environmental degradation, a critical consequence of
climate change, its capacity to improve the human rights conditions’ for environmental refugees
through international law is inapplicable (Moberg 2009). In keeping with the 1951 Convention’s
condition to isolate the agent of ‘persecution’, the source of the ICESCR’s ineffectiveness
derives mainly from the organization’s mandate which requires plaintiff’s to identify the actor
who has caused their displacement (Moberg 2009). Because climate change and its effects are
the byproduct of many actors’ contributions, in addition to the fact that there is much dispute
over recognizing nature as a cause of persecution, it is impossible for an environmental refugee
to provide the institution with this request (Moberg 2009).
Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol is a global environmental treaty that the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1997 created with the intent to slow the rate of
climate change (UNFCCC 2011). To achieve this goal, the signatory states agreed upon
mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emission parameters, which should ultimately keep emissions
below the targeted range (UNFCCC 2014). As of 2013, there are 195 Parties to the UNFCCC
and 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 2013). For this protocol to be effective in
diminishing the risk of environmentally-induced migration, the agency must be committed to
creating an atmosphere for negotiations which guarantees each member states’ adherence to the
principles of accountability and stability.
In 1999, Russia agreed to sign the Kyoto Convention, which did not require any formal
commitment (Walsh 2004). Although the Protocol appeared to have achieved some degree of
success in persuading states to cut greenhouse gas emissions in its first stage, the façade was

22. 22
negated once the United States announced that it would not ratify the Protocol. Due to the fact
that the Protocol could only “enter into force” after it received authorization by a minimum of 55
countries, coupled with the requirement of needing developed countries representing 55 percent
of carbon dioxide emissions in 1990, Russia, in turn, was left with the capacity to have final say
over the treaty’s fate (Wintergreen 2007). Russia’s dominating power over the outcome of the
Protocol rests on the fact that it had accounted for 17 percent of the world’s GHG emissions in
1990, which would allow for the Protocol to reach its required threshold (Wintergreen 2007).
Because Russia is a major supplier of fossil fuels, the Kyoto Protocol did not appear to
serve Russia’s economic interests, given the nature of the agreement which would restrict the
country’s sale of carbon credits, and its likelihood to lower fossil energy prices (Bernard,
Paltsev, Reilly, Vielle & Viguier 2003). In other words, if the Protocol had in fact restricted
carbon permit sales, Russia would have experienced a dramatic loss of export revenue as the
Kyoto Protocol would have depleted the quantity and price of oil and gas exports tremendously
(Bernard, Paltsev, Reilly, Vielle & Viguier 2003). As a result, Russian President Vladimir Putin
declared in December 2003 that Russia would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that
the agreement would not serve useful in achieving the international community’s desired
objective (Bell 2013). The Russian Academy of Sciences explained the flaws that its researchers
saw within the Kyoto Protocol agreement, arguing first and foremost that the rise in earth’s
temperature should not be attributed to CO2 levels and instead offering a new explanation which
drew a causal relationship between the earth’s temperature and solar activity (Bell 2013).
When put into Russia’s historical context, its initial decision not to ratify the treaty was
appropriate given its longstanding focus on achieving economic growth and building its role as a
super power, rather than on environmental regulations and treaties (Henry & Sundstrom 2005).

23. 23
Also important to consider is that many top Russian scientists and environmentalists disregarded
the concept of climate change as either a serious point of concern or even an existent problem
(RT 2012). For this reason, Putin’s initial decision appears to be based on the environmental
good, rather than on purely economic objections.
Nevertheless, Russia did in fact ratify the protocol on 18 November 2004 (RT 2012).
Theories offered to explain Russia’s subsequent decision to give its consent are often built
around the argument that President Putin viewed the state’s participation in the protocol as an
opportunity to position Russia at the forefront of promoting environmental protection (Tipton
2008). Other explanations suggest that Putin’s ratification of the protocol was done in an attempt
to improve Russian relations with Europe (Tipton 2008). But whatever the underlying cause may
have been, it would seem that it lost its persuasive power as Russia declared in 2012 that it
would not be signing onto the second phase of the protocol (RT 2012). This decision was based
largely on Russia’s discontent with the fact that the United States, China and India were not
bound to mandatory emission reductions under the protocol. This integral question of balanced-
burden sharing was a major point of contention among the states during the Cancun Agreement
in 2010 (Booth & Eilperin 2010). Frustrated by the provisions, Moscow has instead committed to
a voluntary pledge led by the European Union to cut emissions by 15 to 25 percent by 2020 (RT
2012).
Conclusion
By virtue of Russia’s adherence to central international treaties aimed at protecting
fundamental human rights, it is likely that the state would be in support of a policy directed at
accomplishing corresponding goals. Furthermore, based on Russia’s agreement to participate in
the European Union’s pact against climate change, it would undoubtedly seem advantageous to

24. 24
President Putin to pioneer a policy intended to curb the adverse effects of climate change, whilst
also allowing him to avoid significant GHG emission cuts. Lastly, supporting this policy would
allow Russia to maintain a level of influence over the former Soviet states as many of these
countries, particularly Uzbekistan, face tremendous challenges caused by climate change.
III. Policy Recommendation
Noting with deep concern the millions of environmentally displaced persons who lack
any form of legal protection under the standards of international law, this policy intends to
address this issue by expanding the definition of “refugee status” in the 1951 Convention. The
definition should be guided by the principles of the Second Generation Human Rights. The
doctrines set forth by the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and its Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Handbook) are inadequate in dealing
with climate change-related displacement by virtue of the subject’s disregard within the
Convention and its handbook. The lack of legal protection of environmentally displaced persons
(EDPs) within the context of the Convention raises a number of concerns over the framework’s
effectiveness and applicability to mitigate the mass movement of migrants which are expected to
occur for reasons beyond their judicial boundaries (UNFCCC 2011).
The disregard for the complexity of environmentally displaced persons under the
Convention’s standards has been problematic for Russia, given the nation’s unique vulnerability
to its threat. With more than two-thirds of the country’s ecosystem resting on frozen ground, or
permafrost, the results of climate change are predicted to dramatically affect aspects of citizens’
livelihoods in a number of ways, which will increase the inevitability of forced migration.
Furthermore, the scientifically proven causal relationship between climate change and population
displacement irrefutably indicates the fact that EDPs experience the same level of vulnerability

25. 25
as that of populations displaced by poverty, armed conflict, political turmoil, or social strife.
Therefore, Russia wishes to petition the UNHCR to formally expand the definition of “refugee
status” under the standards of the 1951 Convention. Given the authoritative power of the
UNHCR, this definition will effectively set forth guidelines that shall be accepted by all
participating governments in their efforts to manage the growing phenomenon of EDPs.
Furthermore, the principles outlined in the definition should protect and enforce the EDPs’
economic, social, and cultural rights, including the EDP’s access to health services and housing,
as this follows Russia’s foreign policy emphasis on protecting second generation human rights.
Although the predicted effects of climate change, particularly warming temperatures,
could serve to benefit Russia economically, the implications of environmental displacement are
still an associated concern both regionally and globally. The establishment of a formal definition
would thus benefit Russia by virtue of the inevitability for climate change to cause forced
migration within and around its own borders. Furthermore, a formal definition that establishes
the legal protection of environmental refugees would benefit the CIS and the global community
immeasurably, as scientific research suggests that environmentally-induced migration will affect
hundreds of millions of people. In the absence of this definition, these displaced populations
would not be guaranteed security for their fundamental human rights (IOM, 2011).
IV. Policy
Introduction.
Taking into account the projected effects of climate change, the Russian Federation
acknowledges the serious implications which climatic variability will likely impose on a large
portion of the population’s ability to maintain a stable livelihood in their homeland (Moberg,
2009). Guided by scientific estimations and reports, consequences of climate change including

26. 26
increased sea level rise, soil erosion, floods, drought and desertification will result in the
displacement of 50 to 350 million people by 2050 (Ďurkova, Gromilova, Kiss & Plaku, 2012).
Humanitarian crises, slum growth, declining health resilience, and unsustainable agricultural
systems are also corollaries of climate change displacement, and further emphasize the need for
acknowledgement under international refugee law (Boana & Morris 2008) (FMR, 2008).
Although a causal relationship between climate change and displacement has been
acknowledged by the international community, current international refugee policies,
conventions, and protocols fail to include binding decrees intended to institutionalize the
acceptance or protection of environmentally displaced persons under existing international
refugee law. The deficiency derives mainly from the absence of a formal definition to categorize
persons displaced for climate change reasons, and this absence is often attributed to the relative
recentness of the issue of climate change, as well as the complexity of directly diagnosing
environmental changes as an isolated cause for migration (Home, 2006).
The international community views with appreciation The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a leading international agency for the protection of
refugees for over fifty years and further recalls the organization’s close collaboration with
governments in their efforts to protect and assist through domestic refugee operations. The
actions of both States and the UNHCR are chiefly guided by The 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 2001). This particular Convention established the globally-
accepted definition of the term “refugee” which institutionalized the principles for the treatment
of persons who are perceived as eligible for refugee status. Despite this accomplishment, the
legal framework of the Convention disregards a critical area of refugee concern which has been
developed in recent years through the context of climate change. Keeping in mind the

27. 27
Convention’s Handbook neglecting to include persons displaced by environmental changes
within the definition of “refugee status”, 20 million migrants have been displaced but receive
minimal government assistance at present time (IOM 2009).
Main Text: Petition to the UNHCR for Definition Expansion of “Refugee Status”
According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, “refugee status” is
currently defined as follows:
“[A person] owing to well-founded fear of external aggression for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not have a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
Taking into consideration that new refugee situations have arisen since the 1951
Convention and its 1967 Protocol were adopted and that the refugees connected with
environmental changes may, therefore, not fall within the scope of the international legal
protection, Signatories of this petition agree to request the UNHCR to expand the definition of
“refugee status” in the Convention to the following:
"[A person] owing to a well-founded fear from an element of threat to life and livelihood
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political
opinion, or sudden-onset or slow-onset natural disaster relating to climate change, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it."
Funding
As this proposal serves as a petition to the UNHCR, no funding is required.
Conclusion
By integrating environmental forces into the Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, millions of migrants will receive proper aid and

28. 28
attention from asylum governments through improved governmental coping strategies and
international agencies (IOM 2009). Incorporating the notion of “environmentally displaced
persons” into legal frameworks will be valuable in the development of stronger adaptation plans
and responses to the phenomenon of climate change, including for instance mapping potential
environmental ‘hotspots’ (Boana & Morris 2008). Expanding the definition of a ‘refugee’ will
promote state development and empower millions of migrants on a global scale.
Environmentally displaced persons will be ensured access to financial grants, food aid, tools,
shelter, schools or clinics allowing their rights and livelihoods to be promoted all around the
world (IISD, 2007).
V. Justification
Russia’s policy proposes the integration of climate change-related pressures into the
definitions concerning “refugee status”. This expansion will be a critical step to achieving the
international community’s goal of creating a durable solution to the effects of climate change and
mass migration. A substantial amount of scientific research has been conducted by the IPCC in
recent years demonstrating the global effects of climate change and its regional variability on a
number of different levels (IRIN, 2009). Nonetheless, regional implications projected by climate
change experts serve as an important source of legitimacy in regards to Russia’s policy, as the
effects demonstrate the necessity surrounding the issue of climate change and the extent to which
international aid needs to adapt.
Africa
According to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment, increased water stress as a result of climate
change will affect between 75 and 250 million people in Africa by 2020 (IFAD 2009).
Furthermore, rain-fed agricultural production is projected to decline up to fifty percent,

29. 29
accompanied by an increase in sea levels which will dramatically impact the livelihoods of those
people living in low-lying coastal areas (IFAD 2009). According to the Stockholm
Environmental Institute (2009), the effects of climate change could lead to roughly two to four
percent annual loss in gross domestic product (GDP) in Africa by 2040. Furthermore, past armed
conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan) and the Great Lakes Region
(Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) indicates a direct correlation
between altered resource availability due to climate change, such as food shortages and land
scarcity, to a rise in political disputes in the already fragile African region (Chalecki 2013). This
exact link is what most strongly represents Africa’s exceptional vulnerability to sudden and
slow-onset natural disasters relating to climate change. Given Africa’s strikingly low levels of
technological innovation, substantially inadequate public services, exceptionally poor public
health, and rapidly declining access to water it is of the utmost importance that the African
people receive the proper assistance in their efforts to resist the adverse effects of climate
change.
Asia
According to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, access to freshwater will be
extensively reduced as a result of climate change by the 2050s for Central, South, East and
South-East Asia (IFAD 2009). Additionally, South, East and South-East Asia are all considered
highly at risk of experiencing increased flooding throughout coastal areas which experts are
suggesting will likely result in an emerging pervasiveness of diarrheal disease (IFAD 2009). The
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report also suggests that temperatures in the Asia/Pacific region will
increase up to 0.5-2 degrees Celsius by 2030, and that this event will pose a critical threat to the
livelihoods of the 500 million subsistence farmers residing in the region (IFAD 2009). In fact,

30. 30
the economic implication of climate change on the amount of agricultural revenue that will be
lost, coupled with the cost of water management resources and medicine to combat the ensuing
diseases, is estimated to cost hundreds of billions of USD each year (IFAD 2009). These events
will have tremendous consequences on Asia’s already vulnerable communities and their ability
to sustain what little food security and economic progress they possess. Furthermore, the
established causal relationship between depleted natural resources and the emergence of political
or armed conflict indicate the region’s exceptional vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate
change, as well. Given the rate at which land and ecosystems are being degraded and the rapid
decline of water supply, the Asia/Pacific region would unquestionably benefit from the
incorporation of environmental factors into the 1951 Convention’s definition of “refugee status”,
as this would increase the amount of protection their populations receive as conditions continue
to worsen.
Latin America
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment exposed the significant impacts of climate change on
Latin America’s agricultural production as temperatures continue to rise and precipitation
patterns begin to vary (Soriano 2014). Increased flooding has already been observed in the La
Plata River Basin, and warming temperatures in Colombia have already led to the increased
cases of malaria (Soriano 2014). Rising sea levels and the shrinking of the cryosphere are also
significant points of concern for Latin America (Soriano 2014). Furthermore, the massive
Amazon droughts which occurred in 2005 and 2010 are recognized as byproducts of the
warming temperatures incited by climate change, and significant representations of the risk
which these environmental trends impose on their region’s sustainability (ECLAC 2014).
According to a report by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

31. 31
(2014), these climatic changes will have considerable economic implications on the region, with
costs averaging at about 2.5 percent of the region’s GDP per year. Even more profound is a
report released by the Inter-American Development Bank, which indicated the cost of reduced
agricultural yields, melting glaciers, flooding, and droughts to be in the order of $100 billion by
the year 2050 (IDB 2012). Guided by these assessments, it is substantially clear that a definition
expansion would be advantageous for the Latin American regions as the manifestation of these
events would almost certainly provoke trends of migration.
VI. Negotiation Strategies
Foreign policy approach
Russia approaches the negotiations, above all else, with the intent to promote and
preserve international peace and security, while also ensuring the protection of state’s sovereign
rights. Russia also intends during the negotiations to promote cooperation in the area of
responding to natural disasters and large-scale man-made disasters in a manner that favors
capacity building for disaster response and that also ensures the protection of fundamental
human rights. Russia will embrace collaborative negotiation methods as its approach to the
negotiations, as the common interests among the states will serve as a useful tool when seeking
an agreement.
Argentina
Government
Argentina operates under a republic system comprised of 23 provinces (ICONS 2015;
“Argentina”). Due to high inflation and international debt, Argentina underwent major economic
catastrophes which resulted in the destitution of roughly 60 percent of Argentineans in 2002
(ICONS 2015; “Argentina”). Nevertheless, the implementation of major economic reforms

32. 32
following the election of Former President Kirchner prompted significant repairs to Argentina’s
financial system, reducing the number of Argentineans living below the poverty line by half at
approximately 30 percent (ICONS 2015; “Argentina”). Since the state’s economic crash in 2002,
Argentina’s gross domestic product has increased by 8 percent, totaling 14,715.18 USD as of
2013 (World Bank 2013). Argentina’s economy is heavily dependent on the production of grains
and cattle (ICONS 2015; “Argentina”).
Migration
As a result of limited employment opportunities coupled with increased foreign labor
demand, the discussion of migration within the context of Argentina is typically framed as an
issue of transit. In fact, an estimated 300,000 people abandoned their homes in Argentina from
2002 to 2006 (Jachimowicz 2006). Nevertheless, Argentina’s strong demand for unskilled, low-
wage labor workers has become an appealing attribute of the state to regional migrants, and has
driven a relative amount of migration into the state (Jachimowicz 2006). As of 2013, Argentina
is the asylum for 1.8 million foreign immigrants, 85 percent of them coming from neighboring
South American countries (MercoPress 2013). Argentina’s immigration system is defined by
three main sources of admission: permanent, temporary, and humanitarian flows; Argentina is
also a signatory of the 1951 Convention (Jachimowicz 2006). The state’s Migration Law passed
by Congress in December 2003 indicated Argentina’s commitment to the protection of
immigrant’s access to education and health care, free legal representation, the right to a fair trial
prior to expulsion, and the right to family reunification (Jachimowicz 2006).
Climate Change
Instances of increased rainfall in Buenos Aires, outbreaks of tropical diseases, drought in
the country’s middle region, and rising temperatures are clear indications of Argentina’s

33. 33
vulnerability to climate change (Jachimowicz 2006).The consequences of these occurrences pose
severe threats to the human population in Argentina, and have ranged from cases of constant
flooding, fire outbreaks and the receding of the Upsala Glacier located in the South American
Andes (Jachimowicz 2006).In response to these environmental pressures, Argentina ratified the
Kyoto Protocol in 2001 as a non-Annex I signatory which classified the state under the
convention’s framework as a developing country with no emission commitments (RTCC 2013).
Since then, Argentina has demonstrated a leadership role among its fellow non-Annex I countries
through its implementation of power sector reforms which effectively promoted a more efficient
economy that served positive environmental results (Bouille 2000). In fact, Argentina
successfully eliminated coal from its marketplace (Claussen 2013). Additional policies included
Argentina’s voluntary decision to lower greenhouse gas emissions to between 2 and 10 percent
below its projected standard emissions for 2012 (Claussen 2013).
Negotiations
The Russian Federation will approach negotiations with Argentina based on a shared
respect and understanding for the protection of refugee rights. Russia will also place emphasis on
Argentina’s observable vulnerability to the dangers of climate change and the risk which it will
likely impose on its human populations. Taking into consideration also Russia and Argentina’s
recently signed nuclear energy cooperation deal, the Russian Federation will continue to work
towards strengthening its ties with the nation and Latin America as a whole. The nuclear energy
deal is representative of Russia and Argentina’s shared desire to promote an allegiance between
one another. Their commitment to one another as global partners was also demonstrated through
Argentina’s decision to withdraw from a UN vote which sought to gain the support of member
states in their refusal to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea (Anishchuk & Lough 2014).

34. 34
Furthermore, the Russian Federation has supported Argentina’s claim over the Falkland Island,
and has recently discussed the potential of providing Argentina with fighter jets (RT 2014). The
Russian Federation and the Republic of Argentina’s international cooperation in recent years will
likely prove useful during future negotiations.
Post-Simulation Report:
Although our delegation was successful in gaining Argentina’s affirmative vote in favor
of Pro-Disco, our negotiations with the Argentinian delegation were not entirely productive.
During the summit, we respectfully expressed our reservations with the language used in
Argentina’s proposal which appeared to threaten the principle of state sovereignty, most
observably in the statement, “every country has the obligation to prevent...” In replacement of
the word “obligation”, our delegation suggested the use of words like “responsibility” or
“commitment” when requesting a state to engage upon a certain task. The Russian Federation
was also concerned with Argentina’s propensity to cooperate with NGOs, and respectfully
suggested the amendment of focusing operations primarily through existing multilateral
organizations, particularly the UNHCR. Nevertheless, our requests were not met, and so we were
unable to provide our affirmative vote in favor of Proposal 14.1.
Brazil
Government
Brazil is a federal republic and currently represents the largest economic power in South
America (CIA World Factbook 2015). Brazil’s economic proficiency relies heavily on its
success in manufacturing, agricultural, mining and service sectors, and its current gross domestic
product is 2,245.67 billion USD (Trading Economics 2015). Despite Brazil’s apparent economic
achievements and decreasing rates in poverty, however, wealth inequality continues to be an

35. 35
important point of contention among the nation’s citizens. In 2014, nearly ten percent of Brazil’s
population of 200.4 million reported living on less than $1.3 USD (Vogel 2014).
Migration Policies
Brazil has demonstrated a devotion to the protection of refugees in a number of ways. For
instance, Brazil was the first country in South America to adopt the standards put forth by the
1951 Convention on 16 November 1960 (Silva 2013). In doing so, Brazil guarantees that all
refugees within its borders will be granted equal access to the social services given to Brazilian
citizens (United Nations 1954, p. 137). Brazil adheres primarily to its own legal framework, the
Status of Refugees or Law 9474/97, which was purposely designed by the government to
emulate the 1951 Convention, especially in defining the term ‘refugee’ (Silva 2013). Brazil’s
creation of the Refugee Act of 1997 led to the establishment of the administrative body for
refugee status determination, the National Commission for Refugees, as well as to a multilateral
cooperation between the government, the UNHCR, and NGOs in dealing with refugee status
policy (Savabi 2014). The institutionalization of this guiding framework also led to the creation
of Solidarity Resettlement Programme in 1999, which advanced the nation’s ties with the
UNHCR even further (Savabi 2014).
Climate Change
Ample evidence provided by climate researchers has revealed Brazil’s distinct
vulnerability to the effects of climate change, particularly in areas with both high population
density and unstable environments (Brucker, Gemenne, Glasser 2011). Fitting this description,
Northeast Brazil is projected to be at high risk of experiencing instances of desertification,
increasing temperatures, and decreasing rainfalls (Brucker, Gemenne, Glasser 2011). The
implications of these environmental disasters will likely materialize through increased cases of

36. 36
damaged agricultural sectors, a dramatic rise in migration, and worsened urban conflicts (Hunter
& Nawrotzki 2011). Furthermore, the Ministry of Environment has projected that desertification
in the Northeast could cost up to $100 million annually (Brucker, Gemenne, Glasser 2011).
In the interest of decreasing the threatening facets of climate change, Brazil signed on to
the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, and has since then played an important role in the operations of the
agreement (Harvey 2012). As a rapidly developing state and a member of BRICS, Brazil has
embraced the integral role of being the intermediary between the developed nations and its
fellow BRICS partners (Harvey 2012). Brazil made a concentrated effort to promote the
extension of the commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol to 2020, and during the UN
Climate Change Conference in Doha, Brazil’s aspiration was reached (Harvey 2012).
Negotiation Strategies
The Russian Federation and Brazil have expressed a parallel interest in strengthening
relations in recent years. Guided by their common interests both economically and politically,
observable efforts have been made by both Russia and Brazil to develop their relations in ways
that will strategically complement both the interests of BRICS and their own national objectives.
In 2013, Russia and Brazil made significant advances towards achieving this goal through an
establishment of several agreements designed to increase trade and to improve partnership in
operations of defense, energy and agriculture (MercoPress 2013). Russia and Brazil’s coalition in
foreign affairs will be an important asset during negotiations. Brazil’s tendency to recognize its
national interests as being in agreement with Russia’s will be beneficial during our efforts to
frame the policy in a way that demonstrates our policy’s advantages for the international
community. Furthermore, Brazil’s recent diplomatic engagements, with a particular reference to
its military assistance in Haiti, reveal the nation’s desire to appear powerful and compassionate

37. 37
at the international level in hopes of achieving a seat at the UN Security Council (IOM 2014).
This specific objective of obtaining recognition from the international community will also be
useful during negotiations, as our bureau can demonstrate to Brazil how participating at the
forefront of this mission to provide aid to a large portion of the population will be valuable in
their efforts to appeal to the United Nation Security Council.
By virtue of Brazil’s apparent vulnerability to the effects of climate change and the
likelihood of increased migration, it would be advantageous for the nation to ratify the Russian
Federation’s proposed policy. This vulnerability was displayed especially in the case of the 2010
earthquake in Haiti which resulted in the arrival of approximately 50,000 Haitians in the
territorial borders of Brazil (IOM 2014). In response to this inflow, a considerable amount of
evidence put forth has demonstrated a causal link between the declining socioeconomic and
sanitary conditions in Brazil’s metropolitan areas and the influx of Haitian migrants in recent
years, which further maintains the practicality of our policy (IOM 2014).
Post-Simulation Report
My anticipation to work harmoniously with the Brazilian delegation, given our
states’ traditional cooperation through BRICS, failed to come to fruition. Instead, our
delegations’ communication throughout the summit was marked by consistent hostility and a
perpetual unwillingness to compromise. Our delegations’ biggest point of contention concerned
the issue of state sovereignty, as Brazil was displeased with our delegation’s decision to omit the
category of IDPs in our definition expansion regarding environmentally-displaced persons.
Brazil was unwilling to acknowledge the central rule of state sovereignty, and the implications
which the incorporation of IDPs would have on a state’s integral ability to wield its authority
within its territorial borders autonomous of any external actors’ involvement. In the end, neither

38. 38
of our delegations were willing to provide our affirmative votes in favor of each other’s proposed
policy.
China
Government
The People’s Republic of China operates under a one-party authoritarian regime
governed by the Communist party (CIA World Factbook 2015). China’s decision in the late
1970s to implement economic reforms which encouraged the state’s participation in world
trading was extremely beneficial for the Republic and critical to its current economic growth.
China’s gross domestic product, which depends heavily on exports, is currently 13.4 trillion USD
(Heritage 2015). The Republic is ranked as the second largest economy in the world and has an
unemployment rate of 6.4% (Heritage 2015). The People’s Republic of China and the Russian
Federation recently merged their economic ties to an important degree through a memorandum
of understanding which will make China the largest consumer of Russia gas (RT 2014).
President Putin’s decision to sanction the partnership between Gazprom and the China National
Petroleum Corporation is demonstrative of Russia’s commitment to positioning its economic
focus on Asia, in addition to President Putin’s commitment to BRICS, and will conceivably
prove useful during future negotiations (Kramer 2014).
Migration
China’s manufacturing industry in Eastern urban areas received tremendous foreign
investments after the implementation of China’s reformed economic policies (Hu 2012). As a
result, an increased demand for cheap labor in manufacturing industries rose at unprecedented
levels, and ultimately, this labor recruitment became the target objective of many rural-urban
migrants (Hu 2012). Taking note of China’s ratification of the 1951 Convention, migration is

39. 39
strictly regulated in the Republic by its household registration system known as the hukou (Chan
2011). In 2012, The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the Exit-Entry Law
which declares penalties for visa overstays and unauthorized work (Lefkowitz 2013). In this
revised law, punishments are significantly harsher than the measures put forth in the law’s
precursor, the Law for Foreigners and the Law for Citizens, all of which indicates China’s clear
disinterest in receiving transnational migrants (Lefkowitz 2013). Additionally, the hukou system
has made the acquisition of permanent residency a profoundly difficult and at times impossible
task for rural migrants; and as a result, many of the migrants are unentitled to enjoying local
benefits and second generation human rights, including schooling for migrant children (Chan
2011).
This violation of human rights, with particular attention to education, is problematic for
many migrant workers by virtue of the fact that 83 percent of rural migrants have completed no
more than nine years of schooling (Siham 2006). Health conditions for migrant workers are
equally meager, with data reports showing that death caused by labor injuries account for 90
percent of rural migrants’ (XHN 2005). Furthermore, according to the National Bureau of
Statistics a majority of the urban labor migrants endure enormously high pressure from work and
receive very minimal and unstable financial compensation in return (Hu 2015). Migrant workers’
wage insecurities were demonstrated by a report conducted by the RMS-NBS in 2006 which
showed that around 10 percent of workers receive their wage payments on average seven months
late (Siham 2006). Additionally, research data conducted in 2002 showed reports indicating that
the average monthly income of migrant workers was only 58 percent to that of the average wage
of urban workers; accompanied by reports in 2006 showing that hourly wage rates for migrant
workers are about one quarter of those for urban workers (Shi 2008). This income discrepancy is

40. 40
especially troublesome by virtue of the amount of migrant workers who are subjected to these
conditions. In 2011, the total number of migrant workers estimated to be about 155 million
(Chan 2011).
Climate Change
The People’s Republic of China faces a unique threat from the effects of climate change.
This exclusivity stems largely from the fact that China allowed for their economic growth to
prosper devoid of any environmental regulations, causing unsurmountable damages to the
sustainability of its natural resources and its environment as a whole (Lai 2009). According to
the IPCC, the Republic is projected to experience an annual increased surface temperature of 3.5
degrees by the end of the 21st century (Lai 2009). Rising temperatures will likely trigger melting
of glaciers in the Himalayan Mountains, which will in turn lead to extreme instances of flooding,
and ultimately, human displacement (Lai 2009). Likewise, rises in sea levels have also been
evident in areas with large populations including regions such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hong
Kong (Lai 2009). The IPCC has also distributed reports indicating that instances of extreme
weather events including heat waves, tropical cyclones, droughts, intense rainfall, and snow
avalanches are likely to increase in China to a significant extent (Lai 2009). Aware of its
vulnerability to climatic variability, China signed on to the Kyoto Protocol in August 2002
(UNFCC 2013).
Negotiations
The Russian Federation’s negotiations with China will be difficult in certain aspects, but
manageable to a large degree. Although the Republic has demonstrated a clear indifference to the
issue of protecting migrant’s second generation human rights, China’s exceptional exposure to
the impacts of climate change might lend itself to the interests of Russia’s proposed policy.

41. 41
Furthermore, President Putin and President Jinping have, on a number of different occasions,
proclaimed to the international community the reality of an undeniable bond that exists between
their two nations (Chang 2014). The Sino-Russian strategic partnership was originally
established at a Shanghai summit in April 1996, and has ultimately grown deeper since then
(Cohen 2001). Through bilateral agreements, such as the Treaty for Good Neighborliness, the
leaders have acknowledged both each other and their respective states as equals in regards to
their national interests and shared interest in crafting an Asian security apparatus independent of
the West (Clackson 2014). Russia and China have strategically joined alliances through
multilateral groups as well, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, BRICS, and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Clackson 2014). The SCO was formed as an
intergovernmental group of Central Asian countries with the intent to enhance mutual aid,
economic integration, and overall coordination in the region (Clackson 2014). China and Russia
also share interests in preserving their positions on the United Nations Security Council, which
they have often used as a tool to counter the United States’ dominant international supremacy
(Cohen 2001).
By emphasizing the importance of Sino-Russian relations in respect to their economic
ties, regional interests, and opposition to the West, the Russian Federation anticipates a
productive negotiation with the Republic, defined, to a minor extent, by a healthy degree of
challenge. Russia will approach its negotiation with China with the intent to diminish China’s
dissent against transmigration by depicting the Republic’s multilateral objectives and
environmental vulnerability as issues that are of greater and more relevant importance to the
interest of its state.
Post-Simulation Report

42. 42
Our negotiations with the People’s Republic of China were productive predominantly throughout
the summit. We consistently expressed our support for Proposal 13.0, as we sincerely felt that it
was designed in a way that could produce valuable mechanisms aimed at reducing the harmful
effects of natural disasters. Moreover, our delegation provided its sponsorship of Proposal 13.0,
despite the fact that China had overlooked our suggested amendments regarding the funding
section of their policy. Throughout the summit, China had demonstrated an equal level of
cooperation and willingness to advance each other’s’ proposals, but on the final day of voting,
their delegation chose to abstain from voting upon Proposal 2.1.
Egypt
Government
Egypt operates under a republic system (CIA World Factbook 2015). Since 2012, Egypt
has experienced intense political instability which has resulted in recent attempts to reform its
constitution (CIA World Factbook 2015). Civil unrest and government transitions have also
imposed major implications on Egypt’s economic prosperity, demonstrated to a large degree by
its rapidly increasing unemployment rate (12.5% in 2012) and widening rural-urban income
disparities (Muthuthi 2014). In 2014, Egypt’s public debt was in surplus of 100% of GDP which
was 272 billion USD (Muthuthi 2014).
Climate Change
Egypt signed the Kyoto Protocol on 15 March 1999. Evidence gathered by a
questionnaire revealed that 72 percent of migrants in Egypt identified environmental degradation
due to climate change, often in the context of declining crop yields, as the primary driver behind
their reasons for migrating (Afifi 2011). Egypt is particularly vulnerable to the onset effect of
rising sea levels due to climate change given the fact that it has one of the most densely

43. 43
populated river deltas in the worlds (Paton 2013). According to the IPCC, Egypt can expect sea
levels in the Nile River Delta to rise up to 101 centimeters in the 21st century (Paton 2013). This
is especially problematic, as low-lying areas of the Delta are occupied by 1/3 of Egypt’s
population and produce half its crops (Paton 2013). Rising sea levels in the Delta region could
incite extensive terminal damage as it will likely cause mass flooding resulting in a decrease in
agricultural production and the displacement of millions (Paton 2013). In 2006, this form of
natural disaster unfolded in the Nile River killing approximately 600 people and displacing a
total of 35,000 (Paton 2013). The sustainability of Egypt’s natural resources and socioeconomic
structures are deeply threatened by the looming effects of climate change. With the tourism
industry as Egypt’s foremost contributor to GDP, rising sea levels on the Mediterranean and the
Red Sea have become increasingly threatening subjects in respect to the fate of Egypt’s
economy.
Negotiation Strategies
Throughout negotiations the Russian Federation will affirm its commitment to
maintaining strong relations with Egypt. The Russian Federation will also place emphasis on
Egypt’s legitimate security concerns regarding the effects of climate change, in addition to
highlighting Egypt’s authorization of the 1951 Convention.
Post-Simulation Report
Our delegation was ultimately successful in gaining the affirmative vote of the Egyptian
delegation. Although our collaboration with the delegation was rather limited, it still served a
productive purpose. Egypt did not have a Humanitarian Emergencies proposal.
India
Government

44. 44
India operates under a relatively stable federal republic system (Heritage 2015). In the
past five years, India’s economic standing has been defined by definite variability and
governmental constraint, with the state reaching a decade-low gross domestic product rate in
2013 at 1,876.80 billion USD (Heritage 2015). The election of Prime Minister Modi in 2014 is
considered to be a promising step in the right direction for India’s economy, which in the past
has been plagued by government corruption and overspending (The National 2015). Prime
Minister Modi has also demonstrated an increased willingness to engage strategically in
international affairs, although the government has made clear that protecting India in the context
of its troubled neighborhood is of the utmost importance to India’s foreign policy (Kapadia
2014).
Migration
Population movement from Bangladesh to India has become increasingly common with a
rise in multi-dimensional factors including religious, political, economic, and environmental
pressures (Alam 2013). According to reports, approximately 20 million illegal Bangladeshis
reside in India at present time (Alam 2013). Environmental crisis, however, has become a more
significant source of migration, with particular respect to Bangladesh, as limited natural
resources continue to be on the decline (Alam 2013). This harmful reduction in Bangladesh’s
natural resource base has been scientifically attributed to environmental changes such as frequent
natural disasters in the form of floods (Alam 2013). Additionally, substantial areas of arable land
have been affected by environmental degradation causing a severe loss in crop cultivation (Alam
2013). In fact, reports have indicated for the loss of fertile land in Bangladesh to have reach
around 8 million hectares of land (Alam 2013).

45. 45
India is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention, and is instead primarily guided by the
Foreigners Act of 1946 which was established to handle the issue of illegal population
movements into its borders (Bhattacharjee 2014). Prime Minister Modi has expressed his
concern over the issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh to India, and has indicated a no
tolerance approach will likely go into effect with the installation of his government in order to
solve the problem (Bhattacharjee 2014). Tighter border controls have often been used in this
discussion of resolutions.
Climate Change
According to the IPCC 4th Assessment Report, the effects of climate change on India will
be demonstrated through an increase in frequency of heat waves, melting glaciers, floods, sea
level rise, water scarcity, and considerable land loss (WWF 2015). Floods in the Northeast states
of India have already produced disastrous effects and in the case of Mumbai in 2005, resulted in
the loss of over 1000 lives (WWF 2015). Additionally, most delta regions of India have
experienced severe dying up of wetlands which have cost the regions substantial degradations to
their ecosystems (WWF 2015). Aware of these dangers, India became a signatory of the Kyoto
Protocol in August 2002 in order to commit itself to the global objective to reduce GHG
emissions (UNFCCC 2015).
Bangladesh, India’s current main source of immigration troubles, is also expected to
suffer dramatically from the effects of climate change. By virtue of its geographical location, flat
and low-lying landscape, poverty, and lack of institutional systems, Bangladesh is considered to
be one of the most vulnerable regions to the effects of environmental change in the world
(Denissen 2012). Bearing in mind the scientific conclusion which identifies a key relationship
between environmental changes and migration, it is crucial for India to anticipate these natural

46. 46
disasters as having a direct effect on immigration in order to preemptively handle the
complications that are bound to occur.
Negotiations
The Russian Federation will approach its negotiations with India on the basis of shared
concerns regarding the protection of both national and international security. Russia and India’s
bilateral ties in areas such as energy, trade, and defense will also be advantageous tools in the
Russian Federation’s efforts to bargain on topics which might appear to be contradictive to
India’s goals such as relaxed immigration policies. Furthermore, Russia and India’s historically
close relations which have continued to develop through their connections in BRICS and the
SCO will be beneficial to creating favorable conditions during future negotiations. The Russian
Federation will frame the urgency of India’s approval of the policy by demonstrating the
advantages the policy will ultimately serve to help India in their conflicts against Bangladesh.
Post-Simulation Report
Our delegation’s collaboration with the Indian delegation was immensely enjoyable.
Throughout the summit, India demonstrated unremitting support for Proposal 2.1 and a total
willingness to compromise. After addressing our concerns with their policy, NDCCRO,
particularly with regards to the subject of the organization’s involvement with NGOs, India
immediately made the appropriate amendments in order to appease both our worries and China’s.
India demonstrated the same type of commitment to mollifying our delegation’s reservations
when we pointed out a discrepancy in the breakdown of their funding section.
Throughout both conferences, India made an honorable effort to publicize their support
for our delegation’s policy and the fundamental goal of enhancing the protection of EDPs

47. 47
worldwide. Our delegations mutually exchanged affirmative votes in favor of both of our
policies.
Iran
Government
Iran operates under a theocratic republic which is often condemned for its disregard to
fundamental human rights and constraints on all aspects of Iran’s social sphere (ICONS 2015).
Iran’s economy which is heavily reliant on oil has been marred by government corruption, price
controls, and an ineffective state sector (CIA World Factbook 2014: “Iran”). The UN and United
States’ recently imposed sanctions on Iran intended to thwart its development in nuclear
activities have had substantial implications on the nation’s economy as well (Peterson 2015). In
2013, Iran’s GDP was worth 368.90 billion USD and its unemployment rate accounted for 15.5
percent (Trading Economics 2015).
Climate Change
Iran is vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change particularly in the scenarios of
rising sea levels, reduced rainfall, and the sinking of regions (Karami 2015). Water scarcity has
been a prominent concern for Iran as officials warn that current strategies for collecting water are
becoming no longer feasible (Karami 2015). Iran ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 20 December
2005 in an effort to mitigate the effects of climate change (UNFCCC 2015). Furthermore, rather
than to create new migration problems, an increase in environmentally-induced migration would
exacerbate existing conflicts in Iran, including scenarios of inadequate shelter and access to
health care facilities (McAdam 2010). The instability of political and social systems in Iran,
despite it being a member of the 1951 Convention, therefore indicates the severity in addressing
the issues of EDPs.

48. 48
Negotiations
Based on Iran’s marginalized position in the international community, largely as a result
of its attempts to gain nuclear capability, negotiations with Iran will be inherently more complex.
Nevertheless, recent communications between President Putin and President Rouhani following
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit might be viewed as an indication of the
neighboring states’ desire to strengthen bilateral relations (Khajehpour 2014). Our delegation
will certainly emphasize Iran’s mutual opposition to the West, and will establish our interest in
strengthening economic ties.
Post-Simulation Report
Our delegation’s cooperation with Iran was interesting, to say the least. While their
delegation was consistent in their efforts to promote the protection of environmentally displaced
persons, they would at times use their support of our policy in a manipulative way to ensure our
delegation’s sponsorship of UPIDPEIR. This manipulation was demonstrated primarily when
Iran threatened to withdraw their support of Pro-Disco, as a result of Brazil’s campaigns against
our delegation, unless we were willing to immediately proclaim our sponsorship of UPIDPEIR.
Although we did not give in to this petty threat, we were successful in creating a more stable
connection with Iran. We ultimately provided their delegation with our affirmative vote as a
result of their compliance to incorporate the aspect of humanitarian aid in reference to the
sanctions listed in Proposal 43.0. We effectively received their affirmative vote, as well.
France
Government
France functions under a republic, presidential system (CIA World Factbook 2015;
“France”). France has the sixth largest economy in the world and has an unemployment rate near

49. 49
ten percent (CIA World Factbook 2015; “France”). Although France’s political system has
operated with a relatively high level of stability, tensions between ethnic groups, predominantly
between French Arabs and non-Arab French, have served as a primary force behind any political
instability in the past (Bleich 2001). For this reason, France often places issues dealing with
ethnic conflict at the center of its policy agenda, while also adopting strict immigration laws as a
method for deterring the emergence of cultural conflicts in the future (Bleich 2001). This type of
legislation was significantly reflected through President Sarkozy’s brief implementation of an
annual quota system used to mitigate immigration flows on the basis of a migrant’s area of origin
(Bleich 2001).
Migration Policies
France is a signatory to the 1951 Convention. In 2006, France adopted an immigration
law which has often been described as taking the approach of “selective immigration” for
economic purposes, in that the country has made access into its borders a more reachable task for
highly skilled workers, but difficult for those who are not (Hollifield, Martin & Orrenius, 2014).
This selection was intentionally designed by virtue of policy makers’ theories that high-skilled
workers are integral to the development of France’s most globally competitive industries, and
therefore serve more value to the state than low-skilled workers (Hollifield, Martin & Orrenius,
2014). France has been successful in its efforts to discourage a certain class of migrants by
placing significant restrictions on foreign nationals working in the public sector and by enforcing
strict requirements for certain jobs, including obligations to have completed secondary education
(Simon & Steichen 2014). NGOs have also accused France of providing inadequate services and
accommodations for asylum seekers (HRW, 2015). For instance, the Human Rights Watch
deeply criticized France for having provided housing to only a third of the 15,000 asylum seekers

50. 50
who applied for such services (HRW, 2015). France’s hostility towards migrants and resistance
to provide proper amenities to asylum-seekers is largely driven by a belief that immigrants are
the source of France’s economic hardships and also serve to provoke political instability (Simon
& Steichen 2014). This philosophy could become a major obstacle during negotiations; therefore
placing a greater emphasis on the policy’s function of adapting to climate change will be
beneficial, as this approach will better appeal to France’s current interests.
Climate Change
France is a party member of the Kyoto Protocol. The French National Adaptation Plan
highlighted the state’s primary areas of concern in regards to the effects of climate change.
France acknowledged its vulnerability to climatic change in a number of different ways, but
mainly because of the threat it imposes on France’s agricultural sector as heatwaves and droughts
continue to occur, in addition to the threat it imposes on the state’s water resources (European
Environment Agency 2015). In order to address the problem of climate change and to reduce its
harmful effects, the plan suggests a variety of actions that must take place. These actions include
anticipating the potential damages caused by climate change and acting pre-emptively to reduce
the scope of its costs, gathering resources that will help to restore and replace any damages that
are made and encouraging lifestyle practices that will limit the risk of climate change threat
(European Environment Agency 2015). Unfortunately, the issue of environmentally displaced
persons is not mentioned within the framework of the National Adaptation Plan, although this
neglect could be explained by France’s relative display of hostility to the concept of migration.
In light of this information, it would serve useful to emphasize Germany’s adherence to the
concept of EDPs, particularly through the Solana Report, during our negotiations with France
given the close relations of the two states and France’s membership in the European Union.

51. 51
Negotiations
According to the Russian Council, President François Hollande seeks to stabilize his
state’s relations with Russia, as he is conscious of the fact that all presidents in the Fifth Republic
have promoted fostering a relationship between the two states (Obichkina 2013). Russia and
France’s joint membership in leading international organizations such as the UN Security
Council, G8, and G20 promotes a relationship between the two nations, as well (Obichkina
2013). The multilateral connection and cooperation between the two states should serve as a
useful tool during negotiations.
Post-Simulation Report
Our delegation was ultimately able to gain the affirmative vote of the French
delegation. Throughout the summit, we expressed our interest in Proposal 14.1, as well as a
number of minor reservations, as we considered it to be a valuable contribution to the collective
efforts towards enhancing the protection of refugees. The French delegation demonstrated an
honorable willingness to comply to our requests, and we eventually provided them with our
affirmative vote, as well.
Germany
Government
Germany operates under a federal republic system and has experienced a high level of
political stability since the reunification of its Eastern and Western parts on 3 October 1990 (CIA
World Factbook 2015; “Germany”). Germany’s primary focus is to maintain eastern
socioeconomic standards at a level that is comparable to the western parts of Germany, but
overall, the state’s economy has enjoyed a comfortable degree of success. As of 2013,
Germany’s gross domestic product was 3.73 trillion USD, and it is now ranked as the world’s