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  1. 1. Sharing Water: Water Allocation, Water Quality and Conflict ManagementJacob W. Kijne, Water Management Consultant, Washington DCText of a lecture presented at the Robert B. Daugherty Water for Food Institute, NebraskaUniversity, Lincoln, September 20, 2012In early August 2012, BBC World News and other news agencies reported that half of thecounties in the USA (in 35 states) had been declared disaster areas because of drought. USDAhad said that yields, especially corn (maize) and soya were badly affected. Since then therehave been headlines in the news papers about the higher food prices to come. Droughts hereand in many other countries, as well as floods in Burma and Niger, are the background for thisdiscussion about water sharing and water conflicts. A motto for this discussion might be:“There is a sufficiency in the world for man’s need but not for man’s greed” (as said byMahatma Gandhi1).IntroductionSome twenty years ago, Ismail Serageldin, then Vice-President of the World Bank, andChairman of the CGIAR, said that ‘the wars of the next generation will be about water’. At aboutthe same time, the then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali made a similarstatement. Perhaps it is no coincidence that both gentlemen are from Egypt, a country thatdepends entirely on Nile river water, a source that could easily be cut off by upstream countriessuch as Ethiopia, with its population of more than 80 million people and still growing, or Sudan.This essay starts with a discussion of the water war argument, followed by some data ondifferent types of water conflicts, and their number reported in the past. Then there follows abrief review of incentives to cooperate rather than to enter into a dispute. The process of waterconflict management and its key issues are discussed before concluding with an analysis ofwhether the history of conflicts can be seen as a predictor of what the future will bring.But first a word about terminology: the terms transboundary and international waters needclarification. Generally, the term ‘international waters’ refers to those waters that crossboundaries of two or more countries, while ‘transboundary water’ is a more inclusive term thatrefers to waters crossing any jurisdictional or sectoral boundaries, including those withincountries. The terms conflict and dispute also have distinct meanings in the literature. A‘conflict’ involves two or more parties with one of them disagreeing on a change in water useby one of the other parties, with the disagreement leading to violence of some kind. A ‘dispute’1 Quoted on 2012page 259 of Gustaf Olsson’s new book ‘Water and Energy: threats and opportunities’. IWAPublishing. 1
  2. 2. is a conflict that results in non-violent tensions among parties, including political, legal, oreconomic actions.The water war argumentThe competition for water is becoming stronger every year because of increased food andbiofuel needs for a growing world population, aggravated by changing eating patterns, greaterdemands for water from urban centers for drinking water and sanitation and also fromindustrial and economic development, and finally as a result of changing rainfall and runoffpatterns due to climate change. The causes of conflicts include both hydrological factors andthe social and economic needs of riparian states, but also the need for changes in water use,e.g. arising from economic development. The critical issues in conflict management to bediscussed later are of course linked to the causes of conflict.Some scientific papers point to water not only as a cause of historic armed conflict but also asthe resource that will bring soldiers to the battlefield in this 21 st century. Invariably, water warsare mentioned in the context of the arid and hostile Middle East where the situation is rapidlygetting worse with a diminished flow in the River Jordan and a much lower water level in theDead Sea. The basic arguments for ‘water wars’ therefore are:(1) water scarcity in arid and semi-arid regions that leads to immense political pressures;(2) water ignoring political boundaries; and(3) the fact that international water law is poorly developed and hard to enforce, complicatingwater conflict management.On the legal aspects, the 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses Commission, which took 27 years to develop, reflects the difficulty of matchinglegal and hydrological realities. The Convention, based on the Helsinki Rules (1966), providesimportant principles for cooperation, such as ‘equitable use’ and the ‘obligation not to causeappreciable harm’2. The Convention, however, provides little practical guidelines for waterallocation, the most common cause of conflict. International laws are concerned with the rightsand responsibilities of nations; as a result that some non-national political entities, such as thePalestinians along the Jordan River and the Kurds along the Euphrates, cannot claim waterrights in international courts.Data on transboundary river basins, conflicts and agreements2 The Helsinki Rules have been used explicitly only once to help define water use, when the Mekong Committeeformulated their Declaration of Principles in 1975. 2
  3. 3. Globally, nearly half of the total land area is found in international basins; for Africa, thepercentage is as high as 62%. There are about 270 international river basins and more than halfof the world’s population lives in transboundary basins (Gleick, 2012).Water conflicts have been reported since people first started to leave written records. The Atlasof Water (Black and King, 2012) counts a total of 816 conflicts between 1948 and 2008, half ofwhich were about the allocation of water. Other sources present slightly different data (Gleick,2012; Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009). Additional causes of conflict cited by these authors includewater resources being used as weapons or targets during military action. In terrorism theaction is caused by non-state actors; such actors may use water resources as targets or tools ofviolence and coercion. In development disputes the harm can be done by state or non-stateactors.Data show an increase in water disputes over time. This increase may partly be explained bybetter reporting and the globalization of news. Since the end of WWII, all regional wars andconflicts, such as those in the Balkans and Central Africa, have resulted in water-related harm.The effects in these two areas reflects one of the most important changes in the nature ofconflicts over the last several decades – the growing severity and intensity of local and sub-national conflicts, and the relative decrease of conflicts at the international level (Gleick, ibid). Agrowing number of these disputes over water allocations across local boundaries, ethnicboundaries, or between economic groups have escalated into conflicts.An early example of a terrorist-cum-development-related conflict happened from 1907 till 1913in the Owen’s Valley of California. The Los Angeles aqueduct/pipeline suffered repeatedbombings in efforts by the affected people in the Valley to prevent diversions of water from theOwen Valley to Los Angeles.Another well-known development conflict resulted from the 1947 partition of India andPakistan over the waters of the Indus River. This was not resolved until 1960 with the IndusWater Agreement, reached through World Bank intervention, involving the construction of anumber of large link canals to bring water from the Indian side of the new border to Pakistan.An example of a conflict in which water was used as a political tool occurred in 1998 in Angola.Fierce fighting broke out at the Gove dam on the Kunune River as UNITA and Angolagovernment forces battled for control of the installation.A recent example of a development conflict occurred in 2006 in Ethiopia. At least 12 peopledied and more than one hundred were wounded in clashes over competition for water andpasture in the Somali border area. 3
  4. 4. The ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is an example of a political conflict. In theWest Bank, it is mainly caused by competition for water supplies, with Israel getting more thanthree quarters of the supply, including water for the controversial settlements in the WestBank.At the same time as this increasing number of disputes and conflicts, there are many examplesof peaceful resolutions. The Atlas of Water (2012) reports a total of 1743 cooperative eventsbetween 1948 and 2008. Delli Priscoli and Wolf (2009) report the number of internationalwater treaties from 1888 till 2000 as 62. Most of the treaties specify boundaries and indicatesome limits on the use of surface water. Only nine of the 62 treaties deal specifically withgroundwater regulations, including allocation, quality and protection of the land. About 25include some conditions on groundwater management, but not on water allocation, while anequal number mention water quality only indirectly.Although the exact number of disputes and treaties may not be known, it is evident from thedata that there are more cooperative events than conflicts. It should also be realized thattreaties seldom clearly define water allocations and limits on water quality. Moreoverenforcement mechanisms on water quality are often absent, especially in international basinagreements. Thus, although helpful, the mere presence of a treaty does not automaticallytranslate into behavior altering cooperation (Warner and Zawahri, 2012)Incentives to cooperateCooperation among riparian countries is becoming imperative as pressure on the waterresource increases. In March 2012 in Marseilles, at the initiative of the International Networkof Basin Organizations, some 69 basin organizations in Africa, America, Asia, and Europe signed‘The World Pact for Better Basin Management’. They expressed their intention – among otherthings – to improve water governance in their basins, organize dialogues with stakeholders,facilitate agreements on a ‘shared vision of the future of the basin’, develop action andinvestment plans that meet the economic, social and environmental priorities of the basins, andorganize in each basin a harmonized data base as part of an integrated information system.Although important, these agreements do not include a methodology for dealing with disputesor conflicts. A case in point is the Mekong River basin. There is a long history of internationalcooperation under the Mekong River Committee and the Mekong River Commission,established in 1957. This Commission is made up of representatives of Cambodia, Laos,Thailand and Vietnam. In December 2011, the Commission urged for a second time thatapproval be withheld for the construction of a potentially devastating dam at Xayaburi innorthern Laos until more is known about its effect on the Lower Mekong (Economist, May 5th2012). Apart from high up in the gorges of south-western China, the Mekong remains 4
  5. 5. undammed. But now a Thai construction company has been contracted to build the dam, andapparently 5000 workers have been hired. Two countries, Laos and Thailand, are expected toshare the power to be generated at the dam. The news that the dam will be built has triggeredan angry response from the other riparian neighbors. The December agreement, calling forfurther environmental studies, included Laos. Opponents of the dam argue that the Xayaburydam will adversely affect the livelihood of 65 million people in South-East Asia who depend onfishery for their sustenance. In fact, the Mekong Agreement of 1995 requires the four nationsto consult and respect their neighbors’ concerns but leaves the final decision to each sovereignstate.Interesting in this context is a 2011 decision of the International Court of Justice in a decision ona dispute about water pollution from paper mills between Argentina and Uruguay which statesthat Environmental Impact Assessment is an essential requirement of customary internationallaw and diligence to prevent significant transboundary harm and its notification are requirednot just between states that have concluded international agreements (McIntyre, 2011). Theinternational Court of Justice has also stipulated that the principle of equitable utilizationshould be seen as a process rather than a normative determinative rule.Equity versus efficiencyUnder ideal circumstances striving for equity and preventing harm would be strong incentivesfor collaboration between neighboring countries. However, rarely are the potential partners incollaboration equal partners in power. A review of the treaties from the past half centuryreveals an overall lack of robustness (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.). Nevertheless, on the positiveside, in some of the more recent treaties, there has been a broadening in the definition andmeasurement of basin benefits, with the intention to equitably allocate the benefits derivedfrom the use of water, not the amount of water itself. One example is the 1961 Columbia RiverTreaty, in which the US paid Canada for the benefits of flood control and Canada was grantedrights to divert water between the Colombia and Kootenai Rivers for hydropower generation.Some scientists support the introduction of ‘efficiency’ rather than ‘equity’ into water conflictmanagement, where ‘efficiency’ is defined as the allocation of water to its highest use. ‘Highestuse’ may be illustrated by the following example. There is much variation in current waterdemands for producing 1 kg of corn: in the USA it is 0.57 m3, in India 3.05 m3, and in Nigeria5.34 m3. This is an example of inefficient water use in India and Nigeria. Water sharing shouldtake into consideration the possibility of increasing the overall efficiency of water utilization byreallocating the water according to these values. But different water users, for exampledomestic water users versus users of golf courses, along a watercourse may value waterdifferently. 5
  6. 6. The logical extension of this efficiency concept is the so-called ‘virtual’ water, i.e. the waterrequired to produce specific goods and services. Some argue that the virtual water trade willbecome increasingly important as nations or regions experience water scarcity and then desireto mitigate the economic and political impacts of the internal water shortage by importingfood. This can only work if nations in water-scarce regions have the hard currency to buy thefood they need on the world market and are willing to forgo food self-sufficiency in their staplefood crops. To complicate this issue: water-poor countries often export fruits and other highvalue crops to water-rich countries as these crops cannot be grown in the importing country forclimatic reasons or can be produced much more cheaply in the exporting country. Trade shouldbe beneficial to both the exporter and importer. The assumption that nations are willing todepend for their staple crops on import from elsewhere is doubtful, especially when worldmarket prices of agricultural products are volatile as a result of drought in the main productionareas.Possible procedures for successful water conflict managementProcedures for collaboration and dispute management range from initiatives taken by theconflicting parties themselves towards increased participation and interventions by thirdparties. The most far-reaching type of outside intervention is third-party decision making.Unassisted conflict management procedures include conciliation, information exchange,collaborative problem solving and negotiations. Assistance by others could consist of help inrelationship building, such as counseling, team building, and procedural assistance (i.e.coaching, facilitation and mediation), as well as more substantive assistance through technicaladvisory boards, dispute panels, fact finding, and advisory mediation. Third- party interventioncould be nonbinding or binding arbitration and mediation, and judging. A critical tipping point isreached when the power to resolve the dispute moves from the parties in dispute into thehands of an outside party. With third party decision-making, the primary communicationpattern is between parties and the arbiter or the panel charged with the decision making (DelliPriscoli and Wolf, ibid.).The extensive literature on dispute management shows a trend toward procedures of assisteddispute resolution but without the third-party making the decision. In the USA, the growingexperience of litigation or threat of litigation when a third party made the decision, acts as anincentive to move away from third-party involvement. Reviews of international mediationsdescribe similar experiences. Procedures with minimal assistance allow the parties in disputemore control over the outcome. Some reviewers suggest that disputes with a third-partydecision have limited capacity to deal with the multiple parties and issues that characterizewater disputes. Yet expert panels or commissions have been common in the water resourcesfield. For example, there are technical committees on the Nile, the Euphrates, the Indus and 6
  7. 7. other rivers. Technical committees have also been central to the work of a variety of river basincommissions in the USA and Canada.Stages in water conflict managementMany disputes, such as upstream-downstream conflicts, start as zero-sum confrontationswhere one party’s loss is another’s gain. As the adversarial stage plays out, negotiations canshift from rights (what a party feels it is entitled to) to needs (what is actually needed to fulfillits goals). At the same time, the attention shifts from past to future. The next stage – if all goeswell – is usually a move towards more cooperative solutions which entail the desire to increasethe benefits of the resource throughout the basin. This is often called ‘expanding the pie’,meaning no longer conceiving the situation as a zero-sum argument. The most successful casesof building regional approaches to water have gone beyond seeing water as the end torecognizing it as a means to achieve other goals such as socio-economic development orreducing the risks of floods or drought. The last stage is agreeing on the sustainableimplementation of an action plan in which the benefits are distributed fairly equitably amongthe parties. Needless to say, this is a very brief summary of what is usually a complicated andtime-consuming process which is often characterized by one step forward and two steps back(Delli Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.).The interesting studies by Professor Lynn of the Department of Agricultural Economics atUniversity of Nebraska, Lincoln, (UNL) should be mentioned in this context. He and his co-workers (Sheeder and Lynn, 2011) studied farmers’ motivation to engage in conservation tillagein the upstream area of the Blue River/Turtle Creek watershed on the border betweenNebraska and Kansas. Runoff from irrigated fields of upstream farmers contributes to thepollution of the lake which is the source of drinking water for the downstream people.Traditionally, upstream farmers have not been concerned about downstream water users’ lackof access to clean water. To reduce water pollution from agricultural runoff, conservationmeasures are stimulated by payments. Three groups of people were identified in the studyarea: upstream farmers, downstream water users and people who were both upstream farmersand downstream water users. The researchers analyzed the sense of empathy (thinking yourselfin the shoes of others) of those in each group. The key finding from their research is thatincreasing conservation payments is not likely to be cost-effective on their own for addressingpollution problems. Individuals may ultimately make choices based on empathy/sympathy. Astrong feeling of empathy leads to a sense of a shared interest in enhanced water quality anddiminishes the more primal tendency to maximize profits. They conclude that water policy andeducational programs need to pay attention on how to induce, and otherwise ’nudge’,empathy. A key question in conflict management is indeed how to stimulate this feeling ofempathy for the other party in the conflict. 7
  8. 8. Critical issues in conflict management Power often plays an important role in water disputes. Unequal power relationships, without arobust third-party involvement, can create strong disincentives for cooperation. A strongregional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states, as wasthe case with the Central Asian Economic Community in disputes around the Aral Sea. This wasalso the role of the World Bank (especially of its president Eugene Black) with the World Bank’spositive, active and continuous involvement in the India-Pakistan water treaty after partition in1947. Note that the World Bank was also the donor facilitating the solution in this conflict. Ithas been recognized that in particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override thewater issues, a sub-optimal solution may be the best that can be achieved. Sometimesseparating resource issues from political interest may not be productive. Involvement of a non-riparian, regional power may then be important. A case in point was the role of Egypt inconflicts about the water of the Jordan River. Elsewhere, solving political and resource usedisputes was accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks (also in the Middle East). Aspecial type of unequal power occurs in disputes between Mexico and USA in the use of waterfrom a shared aquifer when federal and state governments hold different opinions and thusimpede cooperation (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).Upstream-downstream power. Equitable agreements are hard to reach when one ripariancountry holds most geographic and military power. Examples include disputes between Turkeyand Iraq and Syria over the water allocation from Tigris and Euphrates, and also with respect tothe Salween River, with China as the upstream power, and Burma and Thailand downstream.The water disputes between Turkey and Iraq and Syria have been studied in detail (Warner,2012, and Warner and Zawahri, 2012). Turkey is clearly the dominant power (hegemony) in thissituation, while Syria and Iraq complained but had little choice but to accept the fact thatTurkey was building dams and the remaining flow in the two rivers would be much reduced.Turkey needed the water for the development of the South East, the Greater Anatolia Project(GAP), including hydropower and irrigation of 2 million ha. Gradually, Turkey started to framethe right to water as a security issue. Presenting policy issues as a security issue(‘securitization’) has been done by many countries and is often a potent way of rallying apolitical constituency behind a policy. Securitization involves presenting a threat as a life anddeath concern legitimizing extraordinary measures, such as top-down decision-making andclassifying information. [On May 9, 2012, Mario Otero, Under-secretary for Civilian Security,Democracy and Human Rights, in the State Department (USA) commented that “if leftunaddressed, water challenges worldwide will pose a threat to US security interests”.3]3 American Society of Agronomy CSA News September 2012, page 20. 8
  9. 9. The political situation in the area changed with the US occupation of Iraq, Syria’s support forKurdish fighters, privatization of Turkey’s water sector and the outcome of the WorldCommission on Dams (FAO and World Bank, 2000). Turkey at the time wanted to construct theIlisu dam close to the border with Syria. The downstream water users objected as they fearedfor their own water supplies; the river shows large variability in its flow. The need to findinternational funding for the construction of the Ilisu dam alerted national and internationalNGO’s to the destruction of heritage sites below the reservoir, the environmental impact of thedam and the inevitable resettlement issues. As a result of international pressure, the donorcountries and banks withdrew their support which led to long delays. Yet, in 2005 Turkeyrevised the project. More protests followed but the construction has now started withcompletion expected in 2015.This brief discussion of power and power distribution shows the complexity of the various rolesplayed by domestic and international political players, and the limited validity of thesecularization attempted by Turkey.Data. Data collection and sharing is essential before an agreement can be reached orconstruction takes place. But parties in developing countries often disagree about the validityof the collected data, especially on the ecological impacts and development projections.Requesting increasingly detailed data clarifications is often used as a delaying tactic. Agreementon the minimum data necessary for a solution can be a first step in establishing trust, and if thatis not possible delegating data gathering to a third party may speed up negotiations.Benefits. All the water resources in the relevant domain of the parties in conflict need to beincluded in the water management programs and strategy. Ignoring the link between quantityand quality, and between surface water and groundwater ignores the hydrologic reality. Whatis needed is Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM; see Lenton and Muller, 2009),which is difficult to realize. In all disputes, but especially between nations with unequal powerall economic benefits from a possible agreement between parties should be considered.Forecasting the future from past trendsSeveral important trends of the recent past could raise the likelihood of water disputes in thefuture. These are population growth and the associated increased demand for food, biofuel andmeat, urbanization, economic development, the associated energy and industrial waterdemands, and climate change. These challenges are closely interlinked. For example, Vaux(2004) argued with great clarity that water scarcity will constrain the extent to which we areable to provide adequate water and sanitation services to most of the world’s population. Thenotion that water for domestic purposes is of such high value and clear priority that it takesprecedence over other uses, cannot be maintained. There are no well-functioning markets 9
  10. 10. which respond to relative values to ensure that water is allocated to uses with the highestvalues. Communities in both dry and humid areas struggle to obtain the water supplies neededto support existing and anticipated population and economic growth. The need to maintainsustainable ground water resources, the maintenance and improvement of water quality andthe need to feed a more populous world will compete in part with the need for water thatshould be allocated to sanitation and drinking water supplies for poor people. Alleviatingground water overdraft by importing additional surface water supplies is becoming less viableas surface water becomes fully appropriated (Vaux, ibid.). Increasing energy supplies incountries with frequent power cuts require large amounts of water; energy from biomass andoil need most4. A case in point is South Africa, one of several countries that are both water- andenergy-scarce, and where much needed water is diverted to coal-fired power plants with SO2scrubbers.To make matters worse, there are concerns about the implications for transboundary watersarising from the rapid increase in acquisition and leasing of large areas of agricultural land byothers countries and investors. Since 2000, more than 1000 of such deals have been made,involving a land area of about half the size of Europe, 40 percent of which is in Africa (230 Mha,according to a recent report from Kings College, London). In Mali 100,000 ha of land previouslycultivated by small family farmers was last year allocated to investors for large-scale farming.The process has largely bypassed the official procedures established by the Office du Niger atregional scale. Negotiations are done behind closed doors and water is often presumed to beincluded without it explicitly being mentioned in the land lease agreements. Large scalefarming for the production of sugarcane or palm oil (perennial crops), and double croppingrequire more water than was used by the family farmers in the past. Local farmers often haveno legal ownership of their land or the water they use. In dry seasons of deficit years the watersupply in the Niger River is not adequate to meet this increased demand. The Niger BasinAuthority has put restrictions on the flow of water that Niger is allowed to divert upstream ofthe Markala dam, in order to maintain a significant downstream flow for fishing and ecologicalreasons. A recent special issue of Water Alternatives (Mehta et al., 2012) reports several similarcases. Unfortunately, as the SIWI report (Jägerkog et al, 2012) points out, the Principles forResponsible Agricultural Investments agreed by FAO, International Fund for AgriculturalDevelopment (IFAD), the UN conference on Trade and Development, and the World Bank donot explicitly mention water. Is the acquisition of land in a developing country land grabbing ora normal business transaction? It should be recognized that large-scale investment is oftendesperately needed in rural areas to deliver social and environmental benefits, and help reducerural poverty. The SIWI report concludes that there is a clear trend for deals to occur in placeswith weak governance and legislation.4 See also Olsson (2012). 10
  11. 11. As mentioned climate change complicates the already existing competition for scarce water.The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007)notes that climate change will lead to “changes in all components of the freshwater system”and includes impacts on water availability, timing, quality and demand. Most transboundarywater agreements, however, are based on the assumption that future water supply and qualitywill not change (Gleick, 2012). As the Egyptian hydrologist Fekri Hassan has observed “In thelong run, the only constant is change.”5 Currently, global circulation models are not of muchhelp to water managers as they are not reliable predictors of rainfall and runoff at the scalerequired for catchment water management. There are 23 of such models which generatehundreds of scenarios (Delli Priscoli, 2012). Policy changes will also be needed. As Delli Priscoli(ibid) writes, “anticipatory policies and actions can improve the capacity of a watershed toadapt to transboundary impacts of changes in water use, land use and climate on waterresources and services. But these policies are still in their infancy”.Closing commentsFull-scale water wars are unlikely but the frequency of water conflicts is likely to increasebecause of strong competition for the scarce resource. Conflicts can be anticipated as the mostcommon causes are known. Such anticipation should include data collection and measures toencourage cooperation between the opposing parties. Parties should not be allowed to getstuck in rigid positions or in securitization. Broad sets of benefits should be identified.There is no one-size-fits-all solution for water disputes. Much depends on the local situation butinternational institutions might play a role as third party mediators. Coping with water scarcityrequires both mitigation and adaptation. There are various ways to augment the supply ofwater by constructing more storage in reservoirs, reuse of drainage water and treated wastewater, and desalinating sea water; all of which are controversial, expensive and require energy.Equally important, there are various ways to reduce the demand for water, including reducingwater consumption in high-income countries, reducing the amount of animal products weconsume, and reducing the amount of non-revenue water (losses). There is a role forgovernments and water companies in achieving these demand reductions.Demographics are important: the growing population of the Sahel can expect their watersupplies to diminish, while the decreasing population of Southern Europe will have relativelymore water. Similar dichotomies exist elsewhere. In future, they might cause a flow ofecological refugees.5 Quoted in Delli Priscoli (2012). 11
  12. 12. Overall, then, with respect to water conflicts there is room for optimism as well as pessimism,since water sharing has the potential for win-win solutions.ReferencesBlack, M. and King, J. (2012) The Atlas of Water: Mapping the World’s most critical resource. 2 ndedition. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los AngelesDelli Priscoli, J. (2012) Reflections on the nexus of politics, ethics, religion and contemporarywater resource decisions. Water Policy 14:21-40Delli Priscoli, J and Wolf, A.T. (2009) Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge and New YorkGleick, P.H (2012) The World’s Water, vol. 7. Island Press, Washington DCIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) The Fourth IPCC Assessment Report.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New YorkJägerskog, A, Cascao, A, Harsmac, M, and Kim, K (2012) Land acquisitions: how will they impacttransboundary water? Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI)www.siwi.org/publcationsMehta, L, Veldwisch S.J. and Franco, J. (2012) Introduction to the Special Issue: WaterGrabbing? Focus on the (Re)appropriation of Finite Water Resources. Water Alternatives5(2):193-207McIntyre, O. (2011) The World Court’s ongoing contribution to International Water Law: thePulp Mills case between Argentina and Uruguay. Water Alternatives 4(2):124-144Olsson, G. (2012) Water and Energy: threats and opportunities. IWA Publishing, London, NewYorkSheeder, R.J. and Lynne, G.D. (2011) Empathy-conditioned conservation: “Walking in the shoesof others”. Land Economics 87(3): 433-452Vaux jr, H. (2004) Perspective Paper 9.2 pp 535-540 In: Global Crises, Global Solutions (B.Lomborg, ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York 12
  13. 13. Warner, J. (2012) The struggle over Turkey’s Ilisu dam: domestic and international securitylinkages. Int. Environ. Agreements 12:231-250Warner, J. and N. Zawahri (2012) Hegemony and asymmetry: multiple-chessboard games ontransboundary rivers. Int. Environ. Agreements 12: 215-229World Commission on Dams Report (2000). UNDP, New York and World Bank, Washington DC 13