Ms Ivanka Barashka - Re‐examining NATO‐Russia Relations: The Role of Verifiable Missile Defence Transparency
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This is a presentation delivered by Ms Ivanka Barashka, at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference 2014
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Ms Ivanka Barashka - Re‐examining NATO‐Russia Relations: The Role of Verifiable Missile Defence Transparency
- 1. Re-examining NATO-Russia Relations THE ROLE OF VERIFIABLE MISSILE DEFENSETHE ROLE OF VERIFIABLE MISSILE DEFENSE TRANSPARENCY Ivanka Barzashka RUSI Missile Defense Conference March 18, 2014
- 4. Outline 1. Why should NATO’s strategy for BMD engagement with Russia focus on transparency?focus on transparency? 2. What would a transparency regime look like? 3. What are the challenges?
- 7. Data fusion center Sharing telemetry Integrating Russian technology Operations planning center Joint BMD analysis Observing BMD tests Joint satellite development Options for “Cooperation” Joint satellite development Joint threat assessment Reciprocal declarations of capability Joint radar development Military exercises Verification of capability Early warning of missile launches
- 8. Data fusion center Sharing telemetry Integrating Russian technology Operations planning center Joint BMD analysis Observing BMD tests Joint satellite development Joint Operational Response Joint satellite development Joint threat assessment Reciprocal declarations of capability Joint radar development Military exercises Verification of capability Early warning of missile launches
- 9. Data fusion center Sharing telemetry Integrating Russian technology Operations planning center Joint BMD analysis Observing BMD tests Joint satellite development Preserving Strategic Stability Joint satellite development Joint threat assessment Reciprocal declarations of capability Joint radar development Military exercises Verification of capability Early warning of missile launches
- 10. We propose to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about theinformation about the current respective missile defence capabilities of NATO and Russia. Chicago Summit Declaration, May 2012
- 11. The disagreements still remain, but I agree, in general, with President Obama that what we must and certainly canmust and certainly can do in this area is make all our actions more open and transparent. President Vladimir Putin, July 2013
- 12. RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTIBLE DECISIONS 9 CRITERIA LIST: technical performances of BMD components (interceptor’s speed, number of interceptors, radar range, control system capabilities etc.), deployment sites, capabilities for interception of various types of BMs at boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight. joint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for thejoint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for the relevant strategic deterrence capabilities development of verification measures to assure security of strategic capabilities legally binding agreements defining mutual obligations of the pertinent parties to deploy a European BMD system providing equal security to all participants
- 13. Lessons 1. Transparency is a prerequisite to serious cooperation with Russia 2. High level agreement that transparency is a good thingthing 3. Characteristics of a mutually agreeable regime a. Legally binding b. Technical criteria c. Verification mechanism d. No limits to capability
- 14. Confrontation
- 15. How Could Transparency Work?
- 16. Objectives Provide verifiable political and technical guarantees that BMD: •Does not threaten strategic stability•Does not threaten strategic stability •Deployments correspond to stated threat
- 17. Key Elements •Reciprocal exchanges of information on missile defense capability •Verification measures: NTM and inspections •Verification measures: NTM and inspections •No limits to capability
- 19. Verification •BMD verification not comprehensively explored •Past proposals for BMD confidence- building measures •Past proposals for BMD confidence- building measures •Experience with nuclear and conventional arms control
- 20. Reciprocity •Same data sharing and verification requirements •Asymmetry in BMD deployments•Asymmetry in BMD deployments
- 21. Offense-Defense •Russian military developments •Possible changes to deterrence postures •Link BMD transparency to INF•Link BMD transparency to INF compliance and non-deployment of new nuclear-capable missiles in Europe •Transparency should not jeapordize BMD capability
- 22. Re-examining BMD Engagement with Russia •Focus away from operational coordination and toward a verifiable transparency regime Transparency is a pre-requisite to•Transparency is a pre-requisite to serious cooperation •Transparency can help prevent arms races and de-escalate a crisis