Evaluating the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
Missile Defense System:
Does EPAA Threaten Russian ICBMs?
What Mea...
The Policy Problem – A Seeming
Disagreement over EPAA Capability
• The United States and NATO have endorsed
EPAA for defen...
Architecture of the EPAA Missile
Defense System
Russian ICBM trajectories
Iranian missile trajectories
EPAA Sites
Estimating the Performance of EPAA without
the SM-3 Block IIB Interceptor
• EPAA Phase IV (SM-3 Block IIB with Vbo of 5.5
...
Bottom Line: Results From the
Analytic Evaluation of EPAA
• The currently planned interceptors do not allow
EPAA to reach ...
Does EPAA as Currently Conceived
Threaten Russia?Threaten Russia?
6
Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack
(no time delay)
Vbo < 3.5 km/s
Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s
Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s
Vbo > 4...
Defense Against Russian ICBM
Attacks
– EPAA Phase II Aegis-Ashore site in Deveselu,
Romania with SM3-IB with a Vbo of 3.5 ...
Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks on
U.S. East Coast– All Launch Locations
120 seconds is a very favorable estimate of ...
Are there other deployments of EPAA (outside
current U.S. plans) that might interceptcurrent U.S. plans) that might interc...
Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack
(no time delay)
Vbo < 3.5 km/s
Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s
Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s
Vbo > 4...
Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack
(no time delay)
Vbo < 3.5 km/s
Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s
Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s
Vbo > 4...
Joint (North and Barents Sea) Defense
Against Russian ICBM Attacks
Cancelation of SM3-IIB Should Resolve All
Plausible Russian Concerns
• The baseline EPAA deployment after the cancelation ...
What measures of cooperation
between NATO and Russia arebetween NATO and Russia are
viable?
Russian Position on Cooperation
• Medvedev: “We do not want next generations of politicians in
2019 or 2020 to take decisi...
U.S./NATO Position on Cooperation
• The U.S. Senate resolution supporting ratification of New
START specifically states th...
Possible Measures of Cooperation
• Cooperation might instead be achieved via a range of
disparate interactions.
• Missile ...
Thank you. Questions.
EPAA Defense Against Present
Iranian Threats
20
EPAA Would Reach Present Iranian Threats
Interceptor Interceptor
Location
Target
Missile
Targeted
Location
Distance to
tar...
EPAA Would Reach Future Iranian Threats
Interceptor Interceptor
Location
Target
Missile
Targeted
Location
Distance to
targ...
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Mr Jaganath Sankaran - Evaluating the EPAA Missile Defense System: Does it Threaten Russian ICBMs? What Measures of Cooperation with Russia are Viable?

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This is a presentation delivered by Mr Jaganath Sankaran, at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference 2014.

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Mr Jaganath Sankaran - Evaluating the EPAA Missile Defense System: Does it Threaten Russian ICBMs? What Measures of Cooperation with Russia are Viable?

  1. 1. Evaluating the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Missile Defense System: Does EPAA Threaten Russian ICBMs? What Measures Of Cooperation With Russia Are Viable? RUSI Missile Defense Conference Session II - March 18, 2014 Jaganath Sankaran Post-Doctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Managing the Atom Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University This research was performed as a Stanton Nuclear Security Post-Doctoral Fellow from August, 2012 to August, 2013 at the RAND Corporation. The views expressed are the author’s.
  2. 2. The Policy Problem – A Seeming Disagreement over EPAA Capability • The United States and NATO have endorsed EPAA for defense against Iranian ballistic missiles • Russia has raised concerns about the effect of EPAA on its deterrent forcesEPAA on its deterrent forces • Russia has pegged further nuclear arms reductions to a resolution of these concerns Analysis of EPAA performance can inform discussions on these issues. 2
  3. 3. Architecture of the EPAA Missile Defense System Russian ICBM trajectories Iranian missile trajectories EPAA Sites
  4. 4. Estimating the Performance of EPAA without the SM-3 Block IIB Interceptor • EPAA Phase IV (SM-3 Block IIB with Vbo of 5.5 km/s) has been cancelled, leaving only slower interceptors in planned deployment – Does this change the perceived threat to Russian– Does this change the perceived threat to Russian ICBMs? – Does it render all Russian concerns invalid; i.e. will this action make both Aegis-Ashore and ship-based Aegis ineffective against Russia? – Is the system still capable of effectively defending against Iranian threats? (Not discussed here, but yes) 4
  5. 5. Bottom Line: Results From the Analytic Evaluation of EPAA • The currently planned interceptors do not allow EPAA to reach Russian ICBMs aiming for the U.S., even given optimistic assumptions for defensedefense • Analytic result dependent only upon final velocity of interceptors, which is realtively easier for Russia to verify by monitoring EPAA inteceptor flight tests
  6. 6. Does EPAA as Currently Conceived Threaten Russia?Threaten Russia? 6
  7. 7. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack (no time delay) Vbo < 3.5 km/s Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s Vbo > 5.5 km/s Offense: Russian ICBM Missile Attack from Vypolzovo, Russia to Washington D.C. Defense: From Aegis Ashore SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in Redzikowo, Poland 7 ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and (3) No Countermeasures Vypolzovo, Russia Washington D.C., U.S.A Redzikowo, Poland
  8. 8. Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks – EPAA Phase II Aegis-Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania with SM3-IB with a Vbo of 3.5 km/s does not have a capacity to intercept this particular (or any other) Russian missile trajectory. – Neither does Phase III Aegis-Ashore site in– Neither does Phase III Aegis-Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland with SM3-IIA with a Vbo of 4.5 km/s. – In fact, even the canceled SM3-IIB with a Vbo of 5.5 km/s has no capability against this particular Russian trajectory. – What about other Russian launch locations? Are they vulnerable? 8
  9. 9. Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks on U.S. East Coast– All Launch Locations 120 seconds is a very favorable estimate of the time needed by the Globus II radar in Norway to start tracking Russian ICBMs. The real-world conditions will be more demanding.
  10. 10. Are there other deployments of EPAA (outside current U.S. plans) that might interceptcurrent U.S. plans) that might intercept Russian ICBMs? 10
  11. 11. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack (no time delay) Vbo < 3.5 km/s Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s Vbo > 5.5 km/sVypolzovo, Russia North Sea 11 ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and (3) No Countermeasures Russia Washington D.C., U.S.A Offense: Russian ICBM Missile Attack from Vypolzovo, Russia to Washington D.C. Defense: From Ship-based SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in the North Sea Area
  12. 12. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack (no time delay) Vbo < 3.5 km/s Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s Vbo > 5.5 km/s Bershet, Russia Barents Sea 12 ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and (3) No Countermeasures San Francisco, U.S.A Offense: Russian ICBM Missile Attack from Bershet, Russia to San Francisco Defense: From Ship-based SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in the Barents Sea Area
  13. 13. Joint (North and Barents Sea) Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks
  14. 14. Cancelation of SM3-IIB Should Resolve All Plausible Russian Concerns • The baseline EPAA deployment after the cancelation of the SM3-IIB allows a strong analytic result: – The baseline EPAA deployment can not kinematically reach Russian ICBMs, even with implausibly short time delays • Realistic time delays eliminates the theoretical capability to engage Russian ICBMs with EPAA Aegis Ships with the SM3-engage Russian ICBMs with EPAA Aegis Ships with the SM3- IIA in the North Sea and the Barents Sea The cancelation of the SM3-IIB has in effect removed any threat from EPAA to the Russian deterrent potential against the United States. 14
  15. 15. What measures of cooperation between NATO and Russia arebetween NATO and Russia are viable?
  16. 16. Russian Position on Cooperation • Medvedev: “We do not want next generations of politicians in 2019 or 2020 to take decisions which would open a new page in arms race. But such a threat exists and everyone in Russia and the U.S. should understand this.” • Russia wants legally binding “military-technical” guaranteesguarantees – Certain changes to the algorithms of the missile defense radars – Refraining from bringing Aegis ships into areas that are in proximity to trajectories of Russian ICBMs – Stationing Russian observers at U.S. and NATO missile defense installations – Formulating a mechanism to monitor the implementation of these measures
  17. 17. U.S./NATO Position on Cooperation • The U.S. Senate resolution supporting ratification of New START specifically states that it would not accept any limitations on missile defense • U.S. will not accept limits on capabilities and numbers of missile defense systems or on where Aegis ships deploymissile defense systems or on where Aegis ships deploy • Non-binding political agreement affirming U.S. missile defenses are not aimed at Russia • Prominent scholarly suggestion rest on data sharing about interceptors. However, it is not clear what data can be provided that they are not capable of independently obtaining.
  18. 18. Possible Measures of Cooperation • Cooperation might instead be achieved via a range of disparate interactions. • Missile Defense isn’t always about Missile Defense – Not irreducible to technical arguments? Deployments close to Russia’s border regions – Russia wants to retain a say in (future) U.S. missile defense– Russia wants to retain a say in (future) U.S. missile defense plans? Reflection of broader U.S.-Russia relations? • Dialogue on Threat Assessment (Iran, North Korea) • Joint Data Exchange Center – Some form of monitoring U.S. missile defense operations – Demonstrating limitations of current U.S. space-based and ground-based early warning/missile tracking systems
  19. 19. Thank you. Questions.
  20. 20. EPAA Defense Against Present Iranian Threats 20
  21. 21. EPAA Would Reach Present Iranian Threats Interceptor Interceptor Location Target Missile Targeted Location Distance to targeted location (km) Intercept Possible? SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Eastern Mediterranean Sea Iranian Shahab-3/3A Incirlik Air Base, Turkey 964 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Eastern Mediterranean Sea Iranian Shahab-3/3A (depressed trajectory) Incirlik Air Base, Turkey 964 YES trajectory) SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Shahab-3/3A Incirlik Air Base, Turkey 964 NO SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Eastern Mediterranean Sea Iranian Shahab-3/3A Izmir Air Base, Turkey 1670 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Shahab-3/3A Izmir Air Base, Turkey 1670 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Shahab-3/3A (depressed trajectory) Izmir Air Base, Turkey 1670 YES
  22. 22. EPAA Would Reach Future Iranian Threats Interceptor Interceptor Location Target Missile Targeted Location Distance to targeted location (km) Intercept Possible? SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir Camp Darby, Italy 3064 YES SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) Redzikowo, Poland Iranian Safir Camp Darby, Italy 3064 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir Ramstein Air Base, 3309 YES km/s) Base, Germany SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) Redzikowo, Poland Iranian Safir Ramstein Air Base, Germany 3309 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir London, U.K. 3876 NO SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) Rezikowo, Poland Iranian Safir London, U.K. 3876 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Western Mediterranean Sea Iranian Safir Rota, Spain 4529 YES

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