1. Costs and benefits of labour migration on migrants’professional
trajectories and their households’ well-being: comparative case
study of Ukrainian labour migration to Italy and Ireland
Olena Fedyuk
“ChangingEmployment” Marie Curie ITN
University of Strathclyde
E-mail: olena.fedyuk@strath.ac.uk
*This research project was developed within the ERSTE Foundation Fellowship for Social Research 2013.
** Parts of this project have been developed with a support of ENPI project on “Costs and benefits of increased
labor mobility between the EaP countries and the EU.”
2. Effect of various degrees of regularity on migrants’access to
labour market and social benefits - objectives:
To challenge the assumption that “legality” or “regularity” of migrants’ status is a clear-
cut categorical state.
To reveal that achieving regularity status is a complex and lengthy process for
migrating individuals and often takes years to achieve and can result in various partial
statuses.
To explore, how the various degrees of regularity, semi-regular conditions and
limitations of migrants status affect their access to work, social security, mobility and
family rights.
To explore the informal safety networks that emerge in response to various status
limitations.
By referring to two country studies to compare possible impact of policies on migrants’
trajectories and networks.
3. Methodology: ethnographic and policy analysis components
Small scale research including semi-structured in-depth interviews, (respondent-driven
sampling):
Dublin: 12 respondents: 5 women and 7 men of different age (between 25–52)
Bologna: 9 women and 1 man (age between 33 and 70)
Allowed me to:
(a) trace professional trajectories before and during migration, (b) discuss envisioned
prospects for further careers and professional plans, (c) account for personal experience
of overcoming employment difficulties, (d) trace the role of semi-formal strategies and
networks that lead to employment, (e) account for the effects of various partial regularity
statuses on personal lives and mobility.
Contrasting practices and personal histories with policy analysis of two distinct national
immigration, (relevant) welfare and labour regimes allowed me to try and trace the effects
of these policies and regimes on personal trajectories, informal practices of migrants’
employment, security and mobility.
4. Ukrainian Labour Migration: brief profile, numbers and politics
Ukrainian emigration flows can be characterized by:
• A conspicuous uncertainty of estimates: from 1.5-2 million indicated in some surveys to
8-9 million estimates
• Multi-directionality (Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, Italy, USA)
• Gendered flows to some countries, determined by gendered occupational divisions in
the receiving countries
• Variety and frequently transforming forms of migration patterns (seasonal, temporary,
shuttle, circular, for settlement)
• “Economic” migration
• No unified national position of Ukrainian state is articulated in relation to this outflow of
almost 20% of working population => very few bilateral agreements granting rights and
protection to Ukrainians abroad
5. Ukrainians in Italy and Ireland
Italy Republic of Ireland** data for 2009
218.099 residence permit holders (* data for 2011) 13 thousandwork permit holders (** data for 2009)
6 % (5th largest migrant group)
insignificant, even for the % among the 3rd country
nationals
mean age 42 between 19-40
20% men , 80% women 55 % men, 45% women
* social and family services – approx 70% construction – about 80 %
* commerce , agriculture household service (cleaning)
* construction (for men) farm work
* work permit are central to the stay permit work permit are central to the stay permit
* from 2000 – planned flow system or on call system
from 2003-4 end of regulation allowing regularization
of the those migrants whose children were born in
Ireland
* 2002 and 2009 – amnesties for all migrants who
have work contract
***2013: a list of ineligible categories of work for work
permits, including most unskilled and semi-skilled
occupations
* in 2010 Ukrainians appear for the first time as
having a national quota in the regularization
process
***work permits form jobs with 30 000 Euro minimum
salary
6. Findings: Italy- an aging care-worker
• Entering Italy on a tourist visa to other EU states and overstaying the visit
• 2-5 years in irregular employment
• Women are more likely to get regularized than men
• The need to renew residence permits every 1-3 years for at least 5 years
• Personal negotiations vs. rights
• Health services and social benefits
• No bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Italy concerning pension systems
7. Findings: Ireland – liminal identities
• Entering Republic of Ireland either on a British work permit (through Northern
Ireland), Irish work permit (in early 2000s) or on an ID from NMS.
• In order to access employment – purchase of work-permitting and travel documents
from NMS nationals.
• Access to health benefits on the basis of “other identity”.
• Feeling of guilt and fear for using double identities.
• No prospects for transferring earned benefits to their name, to Ukraine or to
regularizing their status at all.
• Limited mobility (within the EU) and no mobility outside of the EU.
• Effect on family rights and personal lives - no possibility for marriage or divorce.
Limited possibilities for establishing trusting relations with Irish or other nationals
colleagues, partners, neighbours.
8. Analysis and conclusions
• Effects of national employment and care regimes on immigration regimes
• National immigration regimes have very serious impacts of migrants’ occupational
trajectories, family rights and spatial mobility
• Contrary to the proclaimed purpose of regulating unlawful migration, more restrictive
immigration policies cause further fragmentation of migrants’ statuses, sliding into
irregularity and irregular employment
• Due to fragmentation of employment and legal statuses, full “regularity” is extremely
hard to achieve, while it takes many years and sacrifices to achieve certain level of it
• The social, occupational and economic costs of the regularization and protraction of
fragmented or liminal legality often rest squarely on migrants’ shoulders, often
becoming a source of income for state bureaucratic institutions, private health /law
services, individual employers.
• Various forms of irregularities occur not only due to migrants' violations but due to
regulation change. These and various other changes in the status, as well as various
fragmentation of statuses lead to migrants’ putting on hold their professional advance,
family reunifications, opportunities for studying, limitations of spatial mobility, and
various aspects of personal lives.
9. • Deneva, N. (2013), “Assembling Fragmented Citizenship Bulgarian Muslim Migrants at the Margins of Two
States” PhD dissertation manuscript. Central European University.
• De Genova, N. (2013), “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion”. In
Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 7, 2013. Pp.1-19.
• Isin, E. F. and Nielsen, G. M. eds. (2008), Acts of Citizenship. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Libanova, E., Burakovskyj, I. and Myroshnychenko, A.(2008), [“Ukrainian labor migration : reality, challenges
and answers”]. Open Ukraine Retrieved March 18, 2011
(http://openukraine.org/ua/programs/migration/research-program/)
• Malynovska, O. (2010), “Migration policy of Ukraine: current stance and development perspectives.“ National
Institute of Strategic Research, (retrieved from
• http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/Malynovska- 79a87.pdf).
• Menjivar, C. (2006), ‘Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States’,
American Journal of Sociology 111(4): 999-1037.
• Mezzadra, S. and Neilson, B. (2013), Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. Duke University Press
Books
• Sommers, M. (2008), Genealogies of Citizenship. Cambridge University Press.
• Squire, V. (2011), “The contested politics of mobility: politicizing mobility”. In Vicki Squire (ed.) The Contested
Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity Abingdon: Routledge. Pp. 1-16.
• Williams, F. (2012), “Converging variations in migrant care work in Europe.“ Journal of European Social Policy
22(4). Pp. 363–376.
• Williams, J.F. (2011), “Towards the Transnational Political Economy of Care and a Global Ethic of Care”, In:
Mahon R; Robinson F (eds.) Feminist Ethnics and Social Policy: Towards a New Global Political Economy of
Care. Vancouver: UBC Press. Pp. 21-38.
References:
What’s behind this long and somewhat technical title is an inspiration to explore new theoretical approaches in migration studies:
On the one hand – expansion of the EU and new forms of borders and controls
On the other – studies of regularity / citizenship:
There emerges a certain crisis of discipline in migration studies, as scholars are grappling with the nature of these changes, defining them as proliferation of borders (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013), fragmented citizenship (Deneva 2013), differential inclusion (De Genova 2013), contractual or contribution-based citizenship (Sommers 2008). All of these analytical frameworks grapple with the same idea – how the state redraws inclusion and exclusion of particular groups of people and individuals into labour markets and welfare, maximizing its benefit and individualizing the cost. Regulating migration by the ethnic, gender, social and professional profile of migrants becomes one of the main ways of maximizing profits. The principle of categorization of migrants justifies the different treatment of the human beings based on their perceived value for the EU labour markets (an approach which in many ways became not only a normative vision of the policy makers but a form of “common sense” in thinking about migration).
Finally, identifying the utmost centrality of labour/work and employment for immigrants daily lives, legal status, spatial mobility, scope of rights, I felt the need to concentrate on the overlap of migration and employment regimes, as a site of emerging borders and as a site of power struggles and lived practices
So building up on the research for my PhD
In relation to such objectives my methodology consisted of ethnographic and policy analysis components.
All in all 12 respondents were interviewed in Dublin, the Republic of Ireland and 10 in Bologna, Italy. The factual information about the respondents can be found the charts (Appendix 3 and 4), however, it is important here to say a few words about the background of both groups.
Despite the relatively small number of respondents, Irish cohort demonstrated much bigger diversity of occupations, age and gender than Italian cohort, which in general reflects the difference in composition of Ukrainian migratory flows to these two countries. In Dublin the total of 5 women and 7 men of different age (between 25–52) were interviewed. Among them Among the women two worked as cleaning ladies, one - as a super-market manager, one as a hair dresser and one more in a coffee-shop. In Italy, 9 women and 1 man between the age of 33 and 70 were interviewed. 6 out of 9 women worked in geriatric care, 1 (the youngest woman) worked as a baby-sitter and 2 were self-employed (one was running a cleaning agency and the other - a women's clothes shop). The interviewed man was out of work.
The ethnographic component, which comprised of semi-structured in-depth interviews, was essential for accessing respondents, who due to the complexity or partiality of their legal status remain otherwise “invisible” to authorities and various forms of surveying. Following migrants through informal networks and conducting in-depth interviews allowed to (a) trace professional trajectories before and during migration, (b) discuss envisioned prospects for further carriers and professional plans, (c) account for personal experience of overcoming employment difficulties, (d) trace the role of semi-formal strategies and networks that lead to employment, (e) account for the effects of various partial regularity statuses on personal lives and mobility.
Contrasting practices and personal histories with policy analysis of two distinct national immigration, relevant welfare and labour regimes allowed me to (a) embed personal stories and trajectories into the relevant policies, (b) see the effects of the policies on personal trajectories, (c) compare the effects of the policies and the informal practices for migrants’ employment, security and mobility.
Trying to compare possible impact of policies on migrants’ trajectories and networks it was important to have a comparative perspective between at least two migratory regimes. I looked into Italy and Ireland, which provided me with a number of differentiated factors that I would like to describe briefly, before turning to the main analysis of this study.
Statistics on contemporary labour migration from Ukraine display a conspicuous uncertainty of estimates: from 1.5-2 million indicated by some Ukrainian large-scale sociological surveys (Libanova, et al 2008, Malynovska 2006) to 5 million, i.e. 20 per cent of working population of Ukraine (Kyzyma 2006, Hofmann and Reichel 2011). Malynovska (2004) estimates that 8-9 million unregistered Ukrainians are working abroad.
Russia is the preferred destination country (almost 50% ), Italy and Czech Republic (13-14%) follow it, 7-8% of Ukrainians migrate to Poland, 2-4% of them to Spain, Portugal, and Hungary and 8-9% to other countries (estimations from Malynovska 2010).
Gendered occupational sectors in the receiving countries; while more men migrate to Russia and Czech Republic to perform construction work, more women migrate to Southern Europe to engage in domestic and care work. Though male migrants dominate Ukrainian emigration, the number of migrating women is reportedly higher in Western regions of Ukraine, where women comprise 60-70% of those working abroad (Volodko 2011, Zhurzhenko, 2008). The flows to such countries as Italy and Greece are particularly feminized: over 80% of all migrants are women in both cases (Istat 2011, Volodko 2011). Employment in the domestic sector among the Ukrainian migrants has the lowest per cent of written contracts (just over 16%). Respectively, the countries that hire a great number of Ukrainian domestic workers share the lowest percentage of the written contracts (Russia, Poland, Italy) (Vakhtinova and Coup, 2013).
By work sector there is the following division of Ukrainian migrants abroad: 50-55% of migrants are involved in construction and 15-20% of them provide domestic and care services, 8-9% are in agriculture and a similar ratio of them in trade activities, 8.5% in agriculture and only about 5% in industry (Malynovska 2010, Vakhtinova and Coup, 2013).
No unified national position of state as articulated in relation to this outflow of almost 20% of working population => very few bilateral agreements granting rights and protection to Ukrainians abroad ____ UKRAINIANS have to rely only on the rights granted to them by their migrant status in the receiving countries.
I refer to William’s definition of regime as a sum of policies, practices and outcomes, which lead to a particular configuration of opportunities and limitations for migrants (Williams 2012). Williams observes that nation-states exist in a dynamic relationship of such interconnected domains as family, nation and work. Immigrant domestic care labour comes in particularly timely into a shifting nature of all three of these domains, i.e. the changing nature of work (as in rising rates of women’s participation in labour markets), families (changes in the family structures linked to ageing and decrease of fertility rates) and nations (increasing role of multi-level governance, shifting dimensions of inclusion and exclusion mechanisms). In order to understand the emerging forms of migrant labour one needs to unfold the specificities of the national migration regimes, employment and care policy legacies, as well as ethnicized and gendered discourses (Williams 2012: 369).
Regulation of migration in the EU is happening at a number of levels: supranational, national and local. Envisioning internal mobility as one of the founding principles of the EU, it has been striving to create an effective overarching principle of protecting its exterior borders, as well as principles of regulating internal flows of labour. While supra-national policies can serve as overarching principle, the main immigration policies in effect are the ones at the national level, which can be clearly seen in a variety of national migration policies and in Blue Card debates of the last 7 years (see De Sommers 2013). Moreover, while national policies overwrite general EU principles, local institutional practices often create additional passages or dead-ends on the local level. While exploring the effect of the local institutional framework would require a much more immersed ethnographic research, I will focus on the national level of policies as ones creating particular migration regimes that affected my interviewees.
National migration regimes in Italy and the Republic of Ireland.
The group of immigration policies that set the basis of present-day immigration regime in Italy dates back to the end of the 1990s – early 2000s. Drafted by the right-wing government at the time and being rather harsh on immigration in general, it became challenged by many social actors (including the Catholic Church, trade unions, employers’ associations and individual employers) exactly on the basis of the importance of the role of the domestic workers and carers in Italian families (van Hooren 2010, 2011). This resulted in adaptation of the regulations to allow for annual regularization of immigrant workers, in particular domestic and care givers. The annual waves of regularization, were organized around national and general immigrant quotas till 2005, when domestic workers were singled out in addition to national and other occupational quotas, receiving 15 000 places, comparing to 16 000 places for all other occupations. Domestic workers’/ carers’ quotas grew at an amazing pace ever after. In 2008, due to the perceived effect of the economic crisis, Berlusconi’s government abolished any other occupational quotas for migrants, at the same time raising domestic worker’s quotas to its record number of 105,400 domestic workers (van Hooren 2010).
Thus, there are three distinct ways in which Italy has opened the doors to domestic and care workers while maintaining quite high anti-immigrant sentiment in general: (1) regularization for domestic workers already present in the country illegally or working in this sector irregularly (i.e. without proper work permits), (2) special entrance and work permit quotas for care and domestic workers (vs. national quotas for migrants for other occupations), and (3) allowing Romanians and Bulgarians to take up work in care sector without any restrictions (as opposed to limitations in other occupations) (van Hooren 2010, Marchetti et al 2013).
This outstanding effort to maintain the supply of immigrant care labour went in sharp contrast not only to the generally anti-immigrant governments and raising negative sentiments among the public (especially in relation to particular nationals, such as Romanians). It further went along with the 20 years-long persistent failure of Italian state to reform its welfare in the areas of long-term care and particularly care for elderly and disabled (Da Roit and Le Bihan 2010). This particular combination of care and immigration regimes marked the transformation of the Italian “family” care model into the “migrant-in- the-family’ model of care (Van Hooren 2010, Bettio et al., 2006, Van Hooren 2011) and positions migrants as providers of the welfare (Marchetti 2013).
Unlike Italy, entering Ireland on a tourist visa to a different Schengen state is complicated by the fact that ithas on land borders with other Schengen states that can be crossed easily and unnoticeably,. However, it shares only a nominal border with the Northern Ireland and thus is open for those who succeeded entering the UK. Since 2011, Ukrainian holders of the UK general visa became eligible for visiting the Republic of Ireland as well, under a Short-stay Visa Waiver Programme that was conspicuously described by the Irish Government, as a“part of its Jobs Initiative with a view to promoting tourism from emerging markets”. Work is only allowed for Ukrainian citizens with the valid work permit, however, the list of jobs currently ineligible for work permit applications include most of the “unskilled” occupations, including Craft Workers and Apprentice, Hotel Tourism and Catering, all categories of Childcare Workers, Labourers and Operatives, Administrative Positions, Sales and Transport Staff. The only set of jobs that qualify for work permits have no occupational limitations but an income threshold; i.e. the annual salary is EUR 30,000 a year or more makes work permit available for all professions. This regulation not only blocked an opportunity to enter for work but to stay in work for all those Ukrainians who’s work permit has expired thus marking a major shift towards illegalization of the immigrant labour force by the Irish state.
Both eastward expansion of the EU in 2004 and economic crisis of 2007-2008 made major practical difference for Ukrainian labour force attempting and entering the Republic of Ireland. Since majority of the respondents in this study entered and stayed Ireland using the identification documents purchased from NMS nationals, I briefly account here for the welfare and labour regulations linked to the NMS nationals.
Prompted by the Irish booming economy, the state readily opened its borders and the labour market to ten NMS in 2004. However, already in 2004 measures have been taken to limit migrants’ access to welfare by introducing 2-year residence rule, according to which NMS immigrants could claim welfare benefits on the basis of “habitual residence”, i.e. a proved continuous residence in the UK or Ireland for two years prior to the application. The deepest economic recession since the 1930s that hit Ireland in 2007-8 caused an insurgence of anti-immigrant sentiment and the restrictions of migrants’ access to the welfare system on account of five criteria: (1) length and continuity of stay or residence, (2) length and purpose of any absence from Ireland, (3) nature and pattern of employment, (4) person’s main centre of interest, (5) future intensions (Barret and Joyce 2011). Since most of the respondents in this study maintained work-permitting documents of NMS nationals, they remain invisible in any form of surveying, appearing as NMS nationals. In 2006 there were 94 thousand of Polish and 20 thousand for Lithuanian Personal Public Service Numbers (PPSN) registered in Ireland; a number that in 2008 declined to 42 thousand and five thousand respectively. While the crisis affected sharply the number of new PPSNs it gave no evidence of the return of migrants already registered in the country. Thus, while 209 thousand NMS nationals were living in Ireland in the beginning of 2008, 185 thousand were registered in 2009 (Krings et al. 2009).
Finally, a few words need to be said about the difference in the effect of the economic recession on Italy and Ireland and their migration policies. Italy, which has in the recent 30 years increase in the demand for care (especially geriatric care) maintained the steady demand in this sphere irrelatively of the crisis. Ireland has undergone the construction boom before 2007, and sharp drop and increase in unemployment after 2007, which was felt particularly sharp among the immigrant population employed in the labour sectors suffering most from recession (e.g. construction). Thus, while unemployment rates among Irish nationals increased from 4.6 to 9.4 per cent it grew from 6.4 to 17.7 per cent among the NMS nationals (Krings at al. 2009).
http://www.irishconsulate.kiev.ua/en/short-stay-visa-waiver-programme
http://www.workpermit.com/ireland/ineligible_job_categories.htm
Entering Italy on a tourist visa to other EU states and overstaying the visit
2-5 years in irregular employment, reluctant to change the original employer in hope that the latter might regularize them (agreeing on less money, more work, harsher conditions).
Women are more likely to get regularized then men, as men work in construction sites and less regular jobs that do not lead to establishing close connection to the employer.
After regularizing their status for the first time, the need to renew residence permits every 1-3 years for at least 5 years. The renewal of the papers was often delayeddue to some bureaucratic drag, forcing respondents to postpone their visits home or switching to a better job == Preferring to stay with employers who can secure renewal of the documents, even in cases of underpayments, extra work and lack of lawful free time.
Due to personalized nature of care work most respondents preferred not to solve tax, regularization or payment contested issues via legal means, but through negotiation and avoiding conflict.
Often prefer to use health services during their visits to Ukraine, even if entitled to health benefits in Italy. Due to the nature of care work many have little or no opportunity to leave the person in care to attend hospitals or schedule long-awaited appointments. In Ukraine, they rely on informally paid services that are quick and personalized.
No bilateral agreements exist between Ukraine and Italy concerning pension systems; a care-giver is eligible for a pension payment in Italy after 15 years of regularized work, which in case of Ukrainian migrants has 2 problems: (1) many migrants spend several years in irregular employment, which are “lost years” form the social benefits perspective, (2) due to the particular demographic profile of Ukrainian care-givers in Italy (i.e. over 40) many quit due to age and hardships of the occupation before they reach the required 15 years of regularized occupation.
Entering the Republic of Ireland either on a British work permit (through Northern Ireland), an Irish work permit (in early 2000s) or on an ID from a NMS (post-2004 and 2007).
In order to access employment (or after expiration of the original work permit)– purchase documents from NMS nationals.
Access to health benefits on the basis of “other identity”.
Feeling of guilt and fear for using double identities.
No prospects for transferring earned benefits to their name, to Ukraine, or to regularizing their status at all.
Limited mobility (within the EU) and no mobility outside of the EU.
Effect on family rights and personal lives - no possibility for marriage, divorce, acknowledging parenthood. Limited possibilities for establishing trusting relations with Irish or other non-Ukrainian nationals, colleagues, partners, neighbours.
Personal Public Service Number
Comparing interviews from two countries it became clear that various forms of regularity, that the national migration regimes offered to my respondents, created differentiated set of obstacle for individual migrants in advancing claims for social security, slowing down their professional mobility, enforcing dependencies on state bureaucracy, creating particular fragmentation of migrants’ . Various temporary work statuses, however, unanimously left migrants in pro-longed waiting for the rights that would equate them and give an equal status with the local workers.. These resulted in migrants’ putting on hold their professional advance, family reunifications, opportunities for studying, spatial mobility, starting a family, etc. Additionally, years spent in waiting for full legalization of statuses left most respondents with “white spots” in their carriers which negatively affected further professional opportunities, access to social benefits in both countries and obscured the opportunities of return to Ukraine. I will now turn to discussion of the main points in these findings by detailing them through my interview materials.
Effects of national employment and care regimes on immigration regimes
National immigration regimes have very serious impacts of migrants’ occupational trajectories, family rights and spatial mobility
Contrary to the proclaimed purpose of regulating unlawful migration, more restrictive immigration policies cause further fragmentation of migrants’ statuses, sliding into irregularity and irregular employment
Due to fragmentation of employment and legal statuses, full “regularity” is extremely hard to achieve, while it takes many years and sacrifices to achieve certain level of it
The social, occupational and economic costs of the regularization and protraction of fragmented or liminal legality often rest squarely on migrants’ shoulders, often becoming a source of income for state bureaucratic institutions, private health /law services, individual employers.
Various forms of irregularities occur not only due to migrants' violations but due to regulation change. These and various other changes in the status, as well as various fragmentation of statuses lead to migrants’ putting on hold their professional advance, family reunifications, opportunities for studying, limitations of spatial mobility, and various aspects of personal lives.
