Notes

1. Unit 6: 1990s
• This theme looks at South Africa between 1990 and 1994. This is the period
of the end of apartheid and the transition to democracy.
• To understand the developments of this period, the following points forms
the discussion: what caused the apartheid government and the ANC to
negotiate?; the ANC and the negotiations; the NP government and the
negotiations; the influence of the international community; obstacles to
negotiations; and the outcome of the negotiations

2. Political stalemate/Deadlock
• The era between 1986 and 1989 can be characterised as the period of
political deadlock or stalemate.
• The Bothagovernment’sattempt to implement its reform package was brought
crushing down by the revolt of 1984-1986.
• The regime managed, through force and counter-revolutionary onslaught of
1986-1988, to re-establish the state’s physical control of those urban areas
which had been swept by insurgency
• However, it could not command absolute political control.
• Townships were controlled by the ‘people’.
• Despite the heightened political insurrection, the progressive movement could
not unseat the government.
• The political protagonists, i.e. the ANC and NP, were forced to settle the crisis
through dialogue and negotiations.

3. The ANC and the negotiations
•In May 1984, Oliver Tambo, the president of the ANC, said “the ANC must talk to
Botha and Botha must talk to the ANC”. This was the first sign, after the banning of the
ANC in 1960, of the possibility to settle the political crisis in South Africa through
negotiations
•This view was also gaining momentum internationally
•Replying to Tambo’s suggestion, PW Botha, the leader of the NP and president of
South Africa, remarked “We have no objections in talking to the ANC, but the ANC
must throw away its weapons first, and surrender. Then we can talk to them.”
•Responding to the mounting pressure from various interest groups on negotiations, in
1985 the ANC appointed a four-member sub-committee that was tasked to analyse
the substantive question of negotiations. This committee was made up of Pallo
Jordan, Sipho ‘Simon’ Makana, James Stuart (a.k.a. Hermanus Loots) and Thabo
Mbeki.

4. • The ANC’s sub-committee argued that the negotiations were not harmful. It
emphasised that the ANC should perceive them as another terrain for national
liberation.
• It advised the ANC that it should encourage the negotiations to commence as early
as possible.
• The following were the ANC’s pre-conditions to negotiations with the NP
government: the release of all political prisoners and detainees, all captured
freedom fighters and prisoners of war; the lifting of the state of emergency; the
withdraw all South African Defence Force (SADF) and police personnel from the
townships; ceasing all political trials; and the repeal of all politically repressive laws
and other laws permitting the regime to proscribe freedom of assembly, speech
and the press
The ANC and the negotiations

5. • Before engaging in the negotiations, the ANC felt that it needed to consult with
internally- based organisations that were their allies, for example, the
progressive and democratic trade unions, students, community, religious,
political and women’s organisations. The guiding principle here was the
intention to build maximum unity between the oppressed and progressive
organisations.
• For the ANC, it was equally important to hold consultations with
representatives of non- governmental elements representing the white bloc,
for example, big business and opposition parties in parliament. This idea was
to win over the hearts and minds of whites who were amenable to change –
and in the process to also weaken the government.
• In October 1987, the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) issued, for the
first time, an official policy statement on negotiations. It emphasised
negotiations as the viable option in resolving disputes.
The ANC and the negotiations

6. The NP and the negotiations
• P.W.Botha, in his speeches, always professed that the National Party (NP) was
willing to negotiate with the ANC on condition the ANC renounced violence.
• Furthermore, he proclaimed that the NP would never negotiate with the ANC
while it was still in an alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP).
• Botha emphasised that his government was prepared to negotiate with all the
leaders of minority groups.
• Outside the NP, the view of a negotiated settlement was gaining ground among
the whites.

7. The influence of the international community
• Africa:
• From the early 1960s, the South African liberation movements, the ANC and PAC, among others, were
accommodated in various parts of Africa The ANC was accommodated in Zambia, Angola, Mozambique,
Botswana, Lesotho, andSwaziland.
• Harbouring/Housing the ANC was a great risk for some of these countries, because they were
economically dependent on South Africa.
• In 1982 and 1984, the Botha regime signed Accords with Swaziland and Mozambique, respectively, to oust
the ANC from their territories.
• South Africa, especially during P.W.Botha’s reign, invaded and attacked these countries in search of the
members of the ANC and/or MK.
• When the view about negotiations began to gain momentum, southern African countries pushed the ANC
to engage the NP government through dialogue.
• In 1985, Kenneth Kaunda, the president of Zambia, played an important role in facilitating talks between the
ANC leadership and the South African white businesspeople.

8. • Western powers:
• The Western powers were represented by the USA, Britain, Italy, and West Germany.
• For a long time, the USA under Ronald Reagan and Britain under Margaret Thatcher
remained allies of the apartheid regime. This was largely because Botha was strongly
anti-communist and anti-Soviet Union, just like their states.
• The USA and Britain, despite international criticism against apartheid, refused to impose
sanctions against South Africa and continued to trade with it.
• After 1986, however, the relationship between the USA and Britain, on the one hand, and
the apartheid regime, on the other, began to deteriorate.
The influence of the international community

9. • In 1986, the USA, for the first time, referred to the ANC as a ‘liberation
movement’,andnot as a ‘terrorist organization’.
• In 1987, Tambo held official meetings with George Shultz, the US Secretary of
State. Here the ANC emphasised its pre-conditions on negotiations.
• The ANC leadership also met with the officials from West Germany and the
British Foreign Secretary.
• Botha’s old allies were now shifting loyalties toward the ANC.
The influence of the international community

10. • The Soviet Union (USSR):
• The mutual relationship between the USSR and the ANC can be traced back to the
visit by Oliver Tambo to Moscow in April 1963.
• Direct financial assistance to the ANC began in 1963 and continued for many years.
• The Soviets also supported the ANC in terms of humanitarian assistance, including
supplies of food, clothes, cars, trucks, stationery, sportswear, building materials
and other goods.
• All in all, according to the Russian government sources, the total value of
humanitarian assistance to the ANC from 1963 to 1990 was 16 million Roubles.
The influence of the international community

11. • Furthermore, African doctors and nurses were
trained in the USSR.
• Medicines and equipment were also supplied, and
in the 1980s, Soviet doctors were sent to the ANC
camps in Angola.
• From 1962, South African students started going to
the USSR for academic and political training. All in
all, about two hundred ANC members completed
training in Soviet tertiary institutions, mostly with
Masters and some with PhD degrees.
• The Soviet press reported that from 1963 to 1991,
more than 1500 ANC activists underwent military
training in Soviet institutions.
The influence of the international community

12. • Mikhail Gorbachev was elected secretary of the governing Communist
Party in 1985.
• Soon after coming to power, he introduced severe reforms in the Soviet
Union, in the process restoring elements of capitalism and
‘opening’/democratizing the society.
• This was a turning point in Soviet assistance to the ANC. In the early
1990s, the Soviet relations with the ANC and its allies started to "cool
down" and later deteriorated. The situation deteriorated further when
Boris Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev as head of state.
• While major Western powers were doing their best to build bridges
towards the ANC, Yeltsin’s government was in a hurry to develop ties with
the NP-government at the expense of its support tothe ANC. This included
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the NP government in
February 1992 and stopping of the financial support to the ANC office in
Moscow and sending away most of the ANC cadres.
The influence of the international community

13. F.W de Klerk and the negotiations
• FW de Klerk argued that the NP was prepared to negotiate with all who do
not engage in violence, and those who were committed to peaceful solutions.
If the ANC did not renounce violence, it practically disqualified itself from
negotiations.
• Just like Botha, De Klerk maintained the NP’s policy on group rights. The NP
was firmly against majority rule.
• De Klerk was of the view that whenever the Constitution was negotiated,
there should be no domination of one group by another.
• In December 1989, De Klerk met with Nelson Mandela, who was still
imprisoned, and reiterated the NP’s stance on group rights

14. • Mandela declared that these would be unacceptable to the ANC, and that it
would essentially preserve apartheid. Having said this, Mandela told De Klerk
that he acknowledged the reality of white fears of black domination.
• De Klerk assumed the presidency at an unfavourable time: domestic
insurrection was at its height; South Africa was isolated by much of the
international community; the economy was at its weakest; and the support
base of the NP was slowly crumbling. This was evident when the NP lost 27
seats in the by-elections and the Conservative Party’s seats increased from 22
to 39 in parliament.
• With 93 seats, the NP was still the majority party. With the Democratic Party
(DP) having 33 seats, De Klerk knew he could rely on the DP for support for any
reform he wanted to be embark on.
F.W de Klerk and the negotiations

15. • In 1988, among white South Africans, there was
a strong opposition to negotiate with the ANC
(nearly 62%).
• A poll published in 1990 found that only 54% of
NP supporters and 44% of all white voters
supported the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and
the SACP
• On 2 February 1990, De Klerk made a historic
speech, announcing the unbanning of the
liberation movements and permitting the safe
return of the exiles, and the imminent release
of Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison.
• This signalled the beginning of the substantive
negotiations in South Africa.
F.W de Klerk and the negotiations

16. The beginning of formal negotiations
• “Negotiations are usually between adversaries, people who have two interests that are
conflicting, and when you contest for state power, you always find that negotiations are
between enemies.” Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC’s chief negotiator.
• After the announcement on 2 February 1990, De Klerk set the ball rolling for the
negotiations for a democratic South Africa.
• Moving forward from the stalemate/deadlock into the negotiations, the apartheid
regime’s main objectives were to 1) relieve international pressure; 2) to confuse and
demobilise the liberation movements and other democratic organisations; and 3) to
infiltrate and divide the forces thatoperatedagainst apartheid.
• The ANC was committed to achieving its goal through a combination of its four pillars of
struggle: mass mobilisation, the political underground, the armed struggle and
international solidarity.

17. Initial talks
• On 4 May 1990, the ANC and the government met at Groote Schuur, the presidential residence
in Cape Town. It was the first official meeting between the two and it was aimed at removing
obstacles to future negotiations on a new South Africa, hence the 'Groote Schuur Minute’
document was drafted.
• At this meeting, the ANC and government agreed on the resolution on violence and
Intimidation, and the release of political prisoners and other exiles.
• Although the ANC had always contended that it would maintain its four pillars of struggle as a
guarantee to safeguard itself during the negotiations, at a meeting with the government in
Pretoria on 6 August 1990, it suspended the armed struggle with immediate effect.
• This meant no further military action and related activities by the ANC and its military wing
could take place.
• Despite this, political violence, which had erupted in the 1980s, continued almost without
control. Much of this violence was between the ANC and the IFP.

19. • The ANC and government met again on 15 February 1991 at the D.F. Malan
airport in Durban. Mandela and De Klerk led their delegations.
• There the two parties agreed that the ANC would stop military training inside
the country, end infiltration of armed fighters, and stop the creation of
underground structures.
• The government agreed to permit the return of exiles to South Africa without
any hindrances.
• This meeting was labelled the 'D.F. Malan Accord’.
• Despite these initial positive steps, the negotiations were not without their fair
share of challenges and tensions, and there were obstacles which nearly
collapsed the negotiation process. These were, most notably, political violence
between many of the involved parties, acts of violence by right-wing groups, the
assassination of Chris Hani,
Initial talks

20. CODESA 1
• The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was a multi-party conference in
Johannesburg to discuss the future of South Africa. It started on 20 and 21 December 1991
and ended in 1992.
• Among those present were the ANC, representing most oppressed people in South Africa,
and the NP, representing white minority rule
• CODESA 1 operated through Working Groups discussing different issues.
• It eventually collapsed mainly because of the deadlock in Working Group 2. This revolved
around the percentage needed to take decisions on a final constitution. The government
and the IFP insisted on 75%, while the ANC and its allies argued for a position whereby a
two-thirds majority (67%) could ratify a new constitution.
• Despite the tensions at CODESA 1, the parties involved, particularly the ANC and NP,
managed to reach some consensus. For example, negotiations at CODESA 1 influenced the
government to accept the notion of an elected Constituent Assembly which would draft
the final constitution.

22. CODESA 2
• CODESA 2 was convened on 15 May 1992 to adopt all the agreements reached
at CODESA 1.
• While CODESA 2 was continuing, the government took unilateral decisions in
parliament on issues which were still to be negotiated. These included, for
example, detention, private armies, illegal armies, etc.
• The tripartite alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU embarked on a rolling
mass action, involving strikes, marches and demonstrations.
• On 17 June 1992, after the launch of the mass rolling action, the Boipatong
Massacre took place. Hostel dwellers purported to be members of the IFP are
alleged to have invaded and attacked the residents of Boipatong in the Vaal
triangle. Some 38 people, including women and babies, were killed.
• Subsequently, on 22 June 1992, the ANC announced its withdrawal from
CODESA 2

23. • The ANC and the government accused each of negotiating in bad faith, and
this further collapsed the negotiations.
• To salvage the situation, the ANC compiled 14 demands to be met by the
government before the negotiations could be resumed.
• Parallel to this, it continued with the mass rolling action. It called a two-day
stayaway on 3 and 4 August 1992. More than 90% of people stayed away
from work and school countrywide. The marches, demonstrations, and
strikes culminated in a march to Pretoria led by Mandela on 5 August 1992.
• On 7 September 1992, 100 000 members of the ANC and its allies marched
to Bisho, and they were shot by the Ciskei soldiers. Many people were killed,
thus causing the Bisho Massacre.
CODESA 2

24. • After the Bisho Massacre, Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer (NP negotiator), met
for a fishing trip and managed to solve the major differences between the ANC
and the government.
• Subsequently, on 26 September 1992, Mandela and De Klerk met at the World
Trade Centre in Kempton Park, Johannesburg. They approved the agreements
reached by Ramaphosa and Meyer and this led to the signing of the 'Record of
Understanding', leading the government to acceding to major demands by the
ANC, for example, the installation of an interim government; an elected
Constituent Assembly; the release of the remaining political prisoners; banning of
the public display of dangerous weapons, including cultural weapons often
wielded by IFP members; the fencing of hostels; and the right of all parties and
organisations to participate in peaceful mass action.
• Mandela and De Klerk agreed to resume the negotiations, which had been
suspended since June 1992.
CODESA 2

25. • In 1992, the ANC and the government finally agreed that the democratic and non-racial
elections would be held in April 1994.
• After nine months, the negotiations resumed on 5-6 March 1993 at Kempton Park as the
Multi-Party Planning Forum (MPF), attended by 26 political parties, organisations and
groups, including the PAC and IFP.The Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and the right-
wing AWB declined to participate.
• The multi-party talks resumed on 6 May 1993 and on 2 July the delegates at the MPF
confirmed the 27 April 1994 as the election date.
• On 28 September 1993, parliament passed a Bill (the Transitional Executive Council Act of
1993) which essentially gave the African majority a legal role in central government for the
first time in their lives.
• The MPF also endorsed the Interim Constitution under which South Africa would be
governed.
• On 7 September 1993 representatives of various groups, including the ANC, took their seats
in parliament in Cape Town.
Multi-Party Planning Forum (MPF)

26. Towards democracy
• From 26 to 29 April 1994, millions of South Africans, both black and white,
elected their representatives.
• On 6 May 1994, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared the
elections free and fair.
• The ANC had received 62.7% of the votes (252 seats), making it the majority
party in parliament. Nelson Mandela was elected the first president of the
democratic South Africa.
• The Government of National Unity (GNU) was established, with Thabo
Mbeki and FW De Klerk being deputy presidents to Mandela.

28. • On his inauguration, Mandela gave a speech that set the tone for the future of
South Africa:
• "The time for the healing of the wounds has come. The moment to bridge the
chasms that divide us has come. The time to build is upon us. We have, at last,
achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our
people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender,
and other discrimination. . . . We enter into a covenant that we shall build the
society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall,
without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human
dignity – rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world. . . . We dedicate this
day to all the heroes and heroines in this country and the rest of the world who
sacrificed in many ways and surrendered their lives so that we could be free. Their
dreams have become reality. Freedom is their reward."
• And with that, a new democratic era began for South Africa.
Towards democracy