Embryo Adoption Legislation Ambiguities

THE AMBIGUITIES WITHIN EMBRYO ADOPTION LEGISLATION 1
“Snowflake Babies”:
The Ambiguities within Embryo Adoption Legislation
26 November 2019
Emma Hatala, Marissa Perry, Paige Hellinger, Morgan Geurts
University of Georgia

Abstract
The introduction of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) during the 1970s granted
alternatives to individuals suffering from infertility difficulties. In vitro fertilization (IVF)
remains the most common example of these progenitive innovations. During this procedure,
gametes become harvested for fertilization, yielding numerous embryos. Few become implanted
within the mother’s uterus, while the remaining embryos become frozen. However, significant
controversy has arisen from discussion of embryo disposition. Concerning the remaining frozen
embryos, creators retain the choice to donate these embryos for scientific purposes, destroy the
embryos, keep the embryos within storage, or adopt these embryos to another couple.
“Snowflake babies” result from the implantation of one of these given embryos into an
adopted mother’s uterus. This beneficial practice allows adoptive mothers the opportunity to
experience pregnancy despite lack of genetic relations. Still, this practice remains contentious as
the lack of legal precedent prevents the regulation of this procedure. While traditional adoption
procedures or private contracts may remain employed, these licit mandates may become
overturned upon varying court basis. Without defining these entities, these ambiguities remain
present on a global scale. To find resolution against this issue, legislators must evaluate
continuous themes amidst these individual cases to produce a framework outlining strict
directives for implementation.

Introduction
Reproductive technology remains the threshold between intimacy and science, permitting
persons the means by which to manipulate nature. The introduction of assisted reproductive
technologies (ART) in the 1970s allotted desperate couples this authority. ART remains an
umbrella term comprised of fertility treatments utilizing both sperm and eggs. These innovative
treatments include in-vitro fertilization or IVF, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and zygote
intrafallopian transfer (Dostalik, 2010). Between 1985 and 2006, ART programs have resulted in
approximately 500,000 healthy births throughout the United States (Baiman, 2009). In 2007,
fertility clinics registered with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention documented
142,435 ART cycles enacting 43,412 live births (Dostalik, 2010).
For IVF, the most common ART procedure, a fertility doctor augments the probability of
pregnancy by surgically extracting the mother’s eggs, fertilizing the eggs outside of the womb,
and then implanting the embryos directly in the patient’s uterus. Typically, couples will elect to
freeze the remaining embryos following implantation. This measure preserves the residual
embryos supposing implantation does not result in pregnancy. Couples may implant embryos in
multiple instances without the burden of continually extracting and fertilizing harvested eggs
(Baiman, 2009). If more embryos result than needed, discussion remains necessary regarding
embryo disposition plans. Parents retain four possible preferences concerning this distribution.
Couples may continue to freeze the given embryos, dispose of the embryos, donate the created
embryos for research, or allow these embryos to become compassionately transferred or adopted
(McRoberts & LaSalle-Hiller, 2017). An estimated 400,000 embryos remain cryogenically
preserved within the United States (Moore, 2007).

Individuals typically confuse embryo donation and adoption. Embryo donation refers to
couples who forfeit all legal rights to the cryogenically preserved embryos. The relinquished
embryos become granted to another couple or individual who do not share genetic ties.
Anonymous donations through fertility clinics require the genetic parents to cede all legal rights,
prior to potential transfer. In comparison, embryo adoption remains executed by private agencies
and attorneys (Dostalik, 2010). Within embryo adoption, “snowflake babies” result from the
implantation of a past, frozen embryo into an adoptive mother. The embryo, conceived through
IVF, remains within the adopted mother’s uterus throughout gestation until birth (Levick, 2008).
Still, many individuals with unused embryos perceive any of the listed possibilities as
impermissible. These persons may select to keep these embryos continually preserved to
circumvent strenuous decisions. Individuals’ decisions concerning disposition relies upon a
person’s perspective of what the term embryo describes. From a medical viewpoint, embryos
remain defined as fertilized eggs until 8 weeks gestation. The Food and Drug Administration
describes embryos as tissue. Legal purposes may describe embryos as property if perceived as
non-living. Yet, licit definitions remain overwhelmingly ambiguous as some courts pose that
these entities exist between person and property, as embryos retain the potential for human life
(McRoberts & LaSalle-Hiller, 2017). Overall, perspectives concerning the moral status of ex-
utero embryos span across a wide cue. Continuous debates surrounding stem cell research
demonstrate this lack of consensus concerning these preimplantation embryos. Questions of legal
status remains inseparably compounded with this discourse of ethical standing.
With this universal moral uncertainty, courts remain compelled to determine the legal status
of the given ex utero embryos by individual basis. With the continued lack of consensus
concerning the ethical status of embryos, the court retains no legislative counsel at both state and

federal levels. For individuals perceiving embryos as the equivalent of a born human being, even
within storage, persons will largely oppose embryo freezing and stem cell research. Individuals
who perceive these entities as bodily tissues or clumps of cells will not grant these ex utero
embryos any moral claims upon the reasoning that cells lack sentience. Makers of the given
embryo will be granted total authority. Falling between these two contrasting opinions, some
persons will advocate for the donation of surplus embryos and possibly the mandatory transfer of
these beings into other women’s uteri for potential pregnancies (Katz, 2006).
This study will initially examine the technological innovations permitting the genesis of
embryo adoption and the procedures by which to carry out this transfer. The discussion will then
delve into current legislative diction associated with snowflake babies. The review will seek to
examine the legal inconsistencies resulting from this moral debate, and then refute current
employed practices for embryo adoption, such as private contract and traditional adoption means.
Effectiveness of embryo adoption practices will be evaluated and connections to global law will
remain considered. Yet, for a society lacking effective legal precedents concerning embryo
adoption operations, this study strives to pose a potential solution for this vague practice.
Preceding Technological Innovations
The technology of IVF remains instrumental in allowing approximately 12% of
American women who struggle with infertility the opportunity to begin a family. IVF fertilizes
the woman’s eggs within a lab. The created embryos are then implanted into the wall of the
uterus, thus creating a potential pregnancy. Often for heteronormative couples, more viable
embryos are created in the lab than recommended for transfer to the uterus. A dilemma occurs of
what to do with the remaining embryos. As stated, the four options include donating the embryos

to science for future research purposes, paying to freeze the embryos for later use, disposing of
the embryos, or granting the embryos to another couple (Baiman, 2009).
Cryopreservation, technology giving medical professionals the means by which to freeze
the embryos, previously raised the concern that freezing these embryos would form damaging ice
crystals as cells are primarily comprised of water. However, the use of cryoprotective agents
(CPAs), prevent the embryo from freezing during the two most common ART processes. The
first process includes vitrification, in which high levels of CPAs become used within a short
period of time. In the second process, the slow freezing method, CPAs become added in lower
amounts over an extended period of time. Following freezing for both procedures, the embryos
remain stored in liquid nitrogen, creating a glass-like consistency in which ice cannot form. The
embryos typically undergo cryopreservation one to six days following creation. When an embryo
becomes needed for transfer or potential scientific inquiries, the clinic will slowly thaw the
embryo while removing the CPAs. These measures allow the embryo to reach its original pre-
cryopreservation water balance (Cleveland Clinic, 2019).
Besides offering couples the chance for immediate implantation, this technology also
creates an extended period of time between conception and implantation of an embryo. This
lengthened frame gives couples freedom in determining the desired timing for family planning.
Additionally, this period allows the genetic parents to donate the embryo to individuals seeking
alternative pregnancy options. While the embryo contains the possibility of life once implanted
within a woman’s uterus, the embryonic cells still have not differentiated and may become any
type of human body cell (Walz, 2007). These potentials forestall universal agreement of a
proposed embryo definition.
Legislative Diction

Of the 400,000 currently frozen embryos, 87% will become employed for “future family
building”, 3% will be donated to science, and 2% will become available for adoption. Of the
87% stored for future use, there remains no means by which to distinguish between those that
will be used eventually for future family building and those that will remain frozen indefinitely.
Due to the considerable number of potential lives, the Nightlight Christian Adoptions created the
“Snowflake Program” to connect couples who wished to donate their frozen embryos with
couples unable to conceive children. This program markets the available transfer by labeling
these embryos with the term, “Snowflake Embryos”. The program compares the embryos to
snowflakes. Each entity retains unique genetics as potential living beings (Moore, 2007).
Conversely, The University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy released a
statement characterizing embryos as a stockpile continuing to increase at a current rate of 18.8%
annually. The expression “stockpile” depicts these embryos as potential property rather than
possible beings (Walz, 2007).
The disagreement in determining the status of these frozen embryos stems from a lack of
consensus and differing ethics as a result of the limited knowledge individuals retain on this
subject. Arguments claiming the frozen embryos as human beings often overestimate the size or
stage of development of these embryos. These assumptions discredit the argument and support
the notion that the majority of people retain false conceptions concerning frozen embryos
(Levick, 2008). A radical religious group, The Donum Vitae, argues that these embryos should be
considered as human beings; however, this body does not support adoption. Rather, the
organization encourages thawing the embryos without implantation. The group seeks to kill the
embryos as these entities were created by unnatural means (Falker, 2008). Overall, groups that
agree on the definition of the frozen embryos may not agree on the solution to this debate.

Controversial Legal Precedents
The debated definition directly affects the previous court case Roe v. Wade. The case
awarded women the right to terminate a pregnancy prior to the second trimester, or prior to
carrying a viable life. Essentially, a future court’s definition of an embryo could potentially
overturn Roe v. Wade and eliminate the freedom to an abortion (Falker, 2008). The United States
Supreme Court has rejected that fetuses, later in gestational development than embryos, remain
judicial persons. If the courts labeled these frozen embryos as human beings or considered
persons, this ruling would directly conflict with the Supreme Court’s previous conclusions
(Baiman, 2009).
If the embryos earned the honorary title of persons, current embryo adoption procedures
would transfer jurisdiction from medical centers to the state. This change in jurisdiction would
become enacted to align with current traditional adoption law. If embryos became considered
property within embryo adoption, the process would remain entrusted to medical centers. For
embryo adoption to be enacted, a justification would remain needed to warrant the transfer of the
property to another couple in hopes of conceiving a living being (Katz, 2006). As the definition
of embryos retains the authority to alter current law, the Supreme Court remains silent on this
discussion, despite states retaining significant disagreement on the manner in which to handle
these frozen embryos. This silence could enact potentially dangerous repercussions concerning
the well-being of the resulting children from embryo adoptions and the rights of their genetic
parents (Baiman, 2009).
Current Ineffective Legal Procedures
Concerning family law, the United States behaves on the presumption that these matters
should remain determined at the state, rather than federal level. However, according to the

National Conference of State Legislatures, only 16 states have introduced statutes discussing
embryo disposition. Solely Georgia retains laws that explicitly permits the practice of embryo
adoption (Caster, 2011). With this present inaction, interested persons have adopted contract
procedures or traditional adoption models as means to practice embryo adoption. Yet, state
legislative courts remain silent on whether embryo adoption should fall within traditional
adoption procedures or contract law (Baiman, 2009). Without guidance from legislation on the
needed provisions for these practices, both standards remain easily nullified (Dostalik, 2010).
Private Contract
Without stable legislation, judges may annul private contracts upon religious, political or
moral premises if presenting the agreement as violating public policy (Caster, 2011). Besides
intent, courts also erroneously emphasize genetics and gestation in determining parentage
(Miller, 2009). Without defining provisions to become included within these arrangements,
intended parents may struggle to establish parentage if these clauses remain unenforceable.
Surrogacy agreements, appearing analogous to these embryo adoption commitments,
demonstrate the inadequacies of private contract law against public policy (Dostalik, 2010).
The 1994 Uniform Adoption Act dictates that biological parents may issue a
relinquishment only following the child’s birth. This consent may become revoked within 192
hours following the birth of the given minor. If a mother receives the authority to reconsider
within live adoption, this right logically extends to adopted embryos. Previous cases demonstrate
the dismissal of specific contracts if considered a violation of this public policy (Caster, 2011).
In the Baby M case (1988), William and Elizabeth Stern sought a surrogacy contract with Mary
Beth Whitehead. Whitehead agreed to be artificially inseminated with Stern’s sperm, and carry
and deliver the child. She would later surrender her parental rights for ten thousand dollars. The

Supreme Court of New Jersey held the contract as invalid for the arrangement conflicted with a
parent’s right to become fully informed concerning the relinquishment of a child. In the case R.R.
vs M.H. (1998), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overturned a similar contract that
required the surrogate mother to relinquish custody. The surrogate renounced the arrangement,
and the court proposed that the mother should receive time following birth to reflect. A surrogate
mother’s consent to relinquish the child’s custody would remain unrecognized until four days
following birth (Dostalik, 2010).
In surrogacy disputes, courts typically acknowledge the biological factors of genetics and
gestation, apart from parental intent, in determining custody. This common criterion of applying
biological standard to parentage insinuates numerous gaps. In the case Belsito vs. Clark, intended
parents sought to place their names on the birth certificate of the genetic child, carried to term by
the mother’s sister. The court designated the couple as parents under the protection of the right to
procreate. Yet, the shortcoming of this given test appears as often neither or only one of the
intended parents remains biologically related to the child, specifically with embryo adoption. In
the case In re C.K.G, a couple planned to fertilize a donated egg with the father’s sperm to
implant into the mother’s uterus. With the couple’s divorce, the court reviewed factors such as
the intended mother’s gestation of children, her previous husband’s intent that she remains the
triplet’s mother, and the reality that the genetic mother did not want custody. In this instance, the
court dictated that the intended mother receives parentage with the distinction that she remains
biologically connected to the embryo. Gestation grants protection to the embryo implanted
within the uterus, but hinders couples seeking surrogacy. Biology-based recognition contradicts
parental authority of intended mothers who remain neither gestationally nor genetically

connected to the resulting child. Overall, the basis of genetics bars the practice of embryo
adoption.
Without clarification on what precepts should become included to achieve validation, public
statues will create loopholes allowing varied rulings to result (Miller, 2009). Irregularities in
public policy and acknowledgement of biological standards among surrogacy cases impede
enforcement. As demonstrated by fallible surrogacy arrangements, private contract remains an
infeasible means by which to enact embryo adoption procedures unless strict regulation of these
agreement occurs.
Traditional Adoption
An example of state statutory law, traditional adoption refers to means of legally obtaining
another child as one’s own, terminating both the biological parents’ rights and responsibilities.
For adoptions achieved by parental consent, the child will become directly placed with his or her
prospective adoptive parents. This consent only transfers physical custody of the minor to the
adoptive parents. The biological parents will retain legal custody until a petition for adoption
becomes granted. In determining approval for the order for adoption of the minor child, the
welfare of the child receives greatest consideration. Once satisfied that the transfer promotes the
best interests of the adoptive child, the judge will approve the adoption. The minor will become
regarded in all aspects the child of the adoptive parents. For embryo adoption, this transfer
resembles traditional means only if a legally recognized child remains involved. Hence, the
acquisition of traditional adoption procedures remains fallible as characterizations of embryos
vary upon state basis, eliminating overarching regulations.
With each adoption proceeding, the judge determines whether the transfer remains within the
best interest of the given child. This basis stems from the conception that the child already exists

(Dostalik, 2010). Yet, the United States Supreme Court rejects fetuses, entities further developed
than embryos as judicial persons (Caster, 2011). In the first United States appellate case
discussing leftover embryos, Davis vs, Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court proposed the
possible legal status of frozen embryos amidst a divorcing couple’s disagreement on their
disposition. The Court analyzed the state’s wrongful death statute which forbade the unjust death
of a viable fetus not born alive. The legislature also dissected the Supreme Court decision in Roe
vs. Wade that allowed for abortion within the first three months of pregnancy. The Tennessee
Supreme Court describe these pre-embryos as part of an interim category garnering respect due
to their potential for life (Bender 2009). In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme determined
that the standard of best interests did not apply to embryos, as these entities were not children. In
Louisiana, the state defines embryos as biological human beings and not the property of either
the agent of fertilization or the gamete donor (Caster, 2011). Employment of traditional adoption
procedures fails to provide universal mandates regulating embryo transfers as state definitions
vary. Without universal recognition of embryos as legal persons, traditional adoptions remain
infeasible.
Clinical Effectiveness
A major issue since the beginning of IVF and assisted reproductive technology remains
the regulation of embryo implantation internationally and within the United States. Significant
controversy arises concerning the number of embryos that may become implanted in one
instance. The media has presented this issue through television programs, such as Kate Plus
Eight. With these concerns, questions about the lack of regulation concerning embryo
implantations has arisen. Legislature discussing the limit of embryos implanted at once appears
necessary. The British Medical Journal examines the effectiveness of single versus double

embryo transfer. The article poses that “compared with double embryo transfer, elective single
transfer increased the change of delivering a term singleton live birth and reduces the risk of
multiple births and low birth weight. Although live birth rates are lower after a single transfer in
a fresh IVF cycle, this difference is overcome by replacement of an additional frozen single
embryo” (McLernon al., 2010) Single embryo implantation overwhelmingly reduces the risk of
birth complications. Double embryo transfer ensures a high occurrence of twin births, a rate
associated with increased perinatal morbidity (McLernon al., 2010). Concerning arguments for
the implantation of multiple embryos, two positions remain employed. Either the mother wants
to receive the best chance of implantation, or the mother wants to grant all embryos the
opportunity for birth. However, there remains concern of whether these arguments outweigh
increased dangers of perinatal morbidity, low birth weight and other risk factors.
Global Implications
Discussion concerning snowflake babies, IVF practices and the regulation of
reproductive health similarly appears within global conversation. The concerns faced by the
United States remain present within other countries. The topic of embryo disposition following
separation specifically remains contested globally. In the Irish court case, Roche v Roche, a
couple underwent IVF in 2001 resulting in the birth of their daughter. However, when the couple
divorced, questions arose concerning the placement of the remaining fertilized embryos
(Mulligan, 2011). The couple disagreed on how to handle the present issue. Mrs. Roche argued
that the given embryos retained a constitutionally protected right to life. Thus, the court remained
mandated to grant her the opportunity to carry the embryos to term (Mulligan, 2011). The
argument remained rejected upon the conclusion that the constitutional protection of the unborn
solely applied after implantation (Mulligan, 2011). Mrs. Roche did not act according to her legal

rights to fight for these embryos prior to implantation. An additional concern became voiced that
a donor who had signed away his parental rates may change his position when confronted with
the reality of a biological child (Mulligan, 2011). Without the clear waving of parental rights, a
biological parent may remain present within the child’s life. In comparison to a sperm bank,
where donation occurs anonymously and parental rights become waived upon donation, parental
rights of a fertilized embryo within legal marriage remains harder to dissolve.
A similar case arose in Texas resulting in the formulation of a contract to potentially
mandate the disposition of remaining embryos during the occurrence of divorce (Bender, 2009).
In 2002, married couple Ray and Liska Best struggled to conceive. After nine months of fruitless
results, Ray and Liska sought help from a fertility specialist in Dallas. As Ray was 42 years old
and Liska was 34 years old, the pair sought an elderly pregnancy as defined by medical terms
(Bender, 2009). On March 2, 2007 the couple welcomed their first son (Bender, 2009). They
welcomed their second son, Quitin, in April. Unlike the Roches, the Bests signed a contract with
the clinic outlining stipulations concerning various scenarios. The contract discussed potential
options the couple retained in the case of divorce. These choices included donating the embryos
to other infertile couples, discarding the entities, or granted to either parent (Bender, 2009).
These guidelines provided the necessary structure concerning the custody and disposition of
conceived embryos prior to implantation or separation of the couple as contrasted with Roche v
Roche.
These two cases depict identical circumstances. The issues of determining the status of
the given embryo and distributing parental rights appear within both cases. Discussion
concerning viability of embryos remains connected to abortion. As previously discussed the
labeling of an embryo as a judicial person, in states such as Lousiaina, challenges legislation

posed by Roe v Wade” (Falker, 2008). As discussed in the United States, internationally
legislature must become solidified concerning when life ultimately begins.
Potential Solutions
Difficulties have arisen with the attempts to consider legislation, ethical boundaries and
scientific research in resolving the issues within embryo adoption. Varying perspectives
throughout the legislation and common population have resulted in a government struggle to
determine a cohesive solution. This solution must determine embryo status while maintaining
parental desires in accordance to common law practice. Adjustments must also remain in
accordance to advances in technology. The 18.8% annual growth rate of stored embryos in the
United States (Moore, 2007) has led to an estimated one million accumulation (Cromer, 2019).
All nations must seek clarity concerning the implementation of regulations regarding in vitro
fertilization and embryo adoption processes. To achieve this understanding, the status of these
potential embryos must become defined, and further research must be explored within this field.
The necessity of legislation for these issues remains necessary as this technology appears more
common.
The United States determines legislation upon an individualistic perspective. Each
embryo adoption case remains evaluated singularly upon the principle of looking to common law
principles when determining issues. This procedure remains suggested by a dissertation with a
legal focus on the definitions of snowflake babies and the processes involved in adoption and
disposition (Walz, 2007). This case-by-case approach appears appropriate as strict regulation
would require determining the controversial legal status of the embryo. Future complications

prevent the continued adherence to the principle. A lack of consensus in legislative cases
prevents determining a strict system by which to adhere for embryo adoption.
To formulate a potential solution, precedent resources must become evaluated to aid in
this deliberation. Past legislative decisions, examples of traditional adoption procedures, and
continued research on embryo implantation may serve as useful devices. Individual cases may be
analyzed for continuous themes. These ideals may then become implemented within a future
framework. Retaining an understanding of connections between these occurrences will grant
legislatures the ability to establish a common standard.
Case studies on families who have both stored embryos and participated in embryo
adoption provide perceptive deductions concerning regarding embryo transfer. Participants in an
Australian study discussed their likelihood to donate their frozen eggs to infertile couples. The
majority remained against the idea of donation. Instead each couple adopted an attitude of
“ownership” over the frozen embryos. In contrast, many individuals experienced guilt. Couples
felt ashamed for seemingly preventing infertile couples from starting families (McMahon and
Saunders, 2009). A possible solution to resolving these contrasting feelings would include
defining the timeline of biological and legislative control before storage, during implantation,
and following the adoption of the frozen embryos.
With an established timeline for custody and a determined status for the given embryos,
legislation could address additional qualms with embryo adoption, particularly concerning
situations regarding the possibility of discrimination within the embryo selection process Often
parents seek potential embryos upon skill or interest. Donor Centers often exhibit ethnic
discrimination. These institutions must make inferences regarding ethnicity of embryonic parents

when talking to applicants. However, the government cannot attempt to denaturalize ethnicity.
Reasonably, embryo adoption agencies should attempt to distinguish between trait selection and
superiority preferences. The well-being and self-efficacy of the future child must receive greatest
consideration (Cromer, 2019).
An apparent solution to the unresolved legislative issues remains absent. Proposed
resolutions remain easily disputed by varying political and ethical platforms. The issue does not
remain contested by two contrasting sides, but rather by numerous factors. These tenants include
the definition of an embryo, the ruling of individual court cases, the eagerness of couples to
receive embryo transfers and the extent to which appropriate research has been implemented.
Injustice, vulnerability, distrust, and helplessness describe the proposed reactions to this debate.
These contentions hurt all citizens and prevent resolution (Eidelson, R. J., & Eidelson, J. I.,
2003). Regarding legislative action concerning snowflake babies, individuals must avoid
cultivating negative feelings between viewpoints. Instead persons should treat all contrasting
opinions with respect and listen to these opposing platforms in order to reach a decision that
represents all parties. Overall, through evaluation of the connections between individual cases, a
proposed framework will result granting citizens a solution.
Limitations
Although conducted with precision and accuracy, research studies retain limitations that
may hinder the ability to resolve the contentious debate surrounding embryo disposition.
Specifically, the timeline of data collection, the inclusiveness of subject group, and the
subjectivity amongst political, ethical, and holistic perspectives regarding this topic prevents

achievement of solution. Furthermore, legal formalities override opinion, creating barriers
between varying perspectives and external factors that result in solutions.
Data collection occurs through cross-sectional analysis. In this evaluation, a population at
various stages of development remain studied. Although this method provides quick, statistical
conclusions, this data ignores the specific environmental and genetic influences causing variation
within subjects. This data does continue to track their subjects following the short-term study.
For example, one study dissected that elicited responses from participants that discussed
relationship and identification status between donor families and recipient families. While the
study generated information regarding the perspectives of individuals involved in embryo
adoption, the depth and understanding amongst participants of different backgrounds, lifestyle
choices, and environmental influences changed with time following the study (Blyth, Firth, &
Lui, 2019). Accuracy increases when studies are performed longitudinally. The same subject
remains studied throughout an extended timespan. Subject consistency demonstrates changes in
individual attitude and contest, rather than disagreement amidst a group.
For evaluating these snowflake babies, a longitudinal study would range around fifty
years from initial storage to development as an adult. This slow progression contrasts against the
rapidly advancing technological innovations. The disconnection in rates ensures that legislation
continually lags behind advancements. For example, as individuals form opinions on their
likelihood to participate in egg freezing and adopting, the factors of price, safety and current
legality remain considered. Due to the constant variances in egg-freezing technology, limited
space within storage facilities, and global economic inconsistency, the presented statistics remain
outdated concerning present decision-making. In 2007, the cost of an egg internationally

remained valued at $2,500. Today, as technology remains more accessible, but storage space is
more competitive, this price does not reflect the current investment (Leslie, 2007). Previously,
safety concerns for the process of freezing became issued. In 2007, embryos remained difficult to
freeze with the possibility form harmful ice crystals. These hazards contradict current
cryopreservation practices and the method’s success rate against fresh transfers (Leslie, 2007);
(Barnhart, 2014).
Variations in perceptions result from differences in education, exposure, morals and
geographic location of these population studies. Within subject matter dissertations regarding
embryo disposition, moral implications remain frequently exhibited. Previous typical rulings
appear to affect current legislation. However, current inconsistencies among legislation result
from ambiguous legal status of these embryos and the lack of a legal outline mandating these
cases. Thus, individual cases continue to remain evaluated individually in hopes of reflecting the
wishes of citizens and the rights of common law (Walz, 2007). These recognized legal
inconsistencies and heated debates alienate contrasting opinions. Discussion remains essential to
initiate progress and eliminating these limitations of further division.
Discussion concerning hypothetical premises and the rights entitled to embryos remain
necessary to dissect. A judge implemented a theoretical disposition in which the egg and sperm
donor disagreed concerning the disposal of an embryo. This hypothetical instance formulated a
case study reviewing potential rulings relating to this case (Falasco, 2005). Although formulating
hypothetical situations may review challenges discerned within legislation, real examples
demonstrate the conflicts as situational; thus, exhibiting why an individualistic approach was
previously employed. Licit decisions may not become enacted upon subjective bases. Questions

arise concerning what authority retains the power to define embryos and regulate their
disposition. Hesitation exists over excessive intervention concerning embryo siblings and the
legal implications regarding defined relationships between genetic and adoptive parents (Collard
& Kashmeri, 2011). Genetic parents may witness melancholy concerning donation of these
potential siblings. However, inability to dissipate these emotions as a result of privacy rights may
result in effects upon the psychological development of embryos. Despite increasing
technological innovations, these obscure legislative mandates relating to hypothetical
circumstances limit conclusions drawn from previous studies and prevent progress towards a
cohesive solution.
While innovations within assisted reproductive technology, grants infertile couples the
means by which to procreate, the lack of legislation prevents this practice from remaining
effective. While private contracts and traditional adoption procedures may become utilized, these
methods remain licitly fallible. A necessary solution will stem once a proposed definition for
embryos remains established and successful legal precedents from individual court cases
becomes integrated within a proposed regulatory outline. Limitations within data analysis
prevent effective monitoring of changing opinions toward this practice.

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