C-UAS against Swarms (Ulf Barth) - DroneSec GDSN#2

18/09/2020 GSDN - Challenges in Combating UAIED and SUAV Swarms in Civil and Military environments 1
Challenges in Combating UAIED
and SUAV Swarms in Civil and
Military environments
Ulf Barth

Personal background
❖ Active service 1983-85 in a tank bataillion of the (West) German Armed Forces
❖ Lieutenant Colonel
❖ Reserve officer with assignments at
❖ 61st Tank battalion
❖ 13th Armoured reconnaissance battalion
❖ Trained in Military Object protection
❖ Cyber and Information Domain Service
❖ As a reservist in the founding team of the Cyber Innovation Hub of the German Armed Forces
(7/2017 to 1/2018)
❖ Participants in the final round of the NATO Innovation Challenge 2/2018 (Counter UAV)
Military
Expertise
❖ Freelancer IT Consultant / IT Solution Architekt for more than 20 years
❖ Contact: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ulf-barth/
Civil
Expertise

Personal statement
This presentation reflects the opinion of the author and does not necessarily
represent the position of the German Armed Forces or the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Due to the abundance of material, I will only briefly touch on many topics - for
further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
In principle, this presentation is based on publicly available sources.

Used terms
SUAV
A small UAV (SUAV) is an unmanned aerial vehicle small enough to be man-
portable.
The size is not exactly defined internationally and currently ranges between 2 kg
and 25 kg. However, these values are flexible both upwards and downwards.
UAIED (Unmanned aerial improvised explosive device)
A UAIED is a subset of the SUAV and describes a drone converted with the simplest
of means for terrorist purposes.

Known incidents with UAIED (extract)
Venezuela: Suspected assassination attempt on the President
Syria / Iraq: Islamic state with SUAV bomber and reconaissence
drone
Russian Forces: Airfield attacked by a drone swarm
(in Syria):
Israel: Hamas
Yemen: Huthi Militia
Saudi Arabia: Attack on oil refinery probably with a swarm of
drones.

Damage caused by the drone strike in Saudi Arabia
2019

Remote Analysis of the drone
18/09/2020 7
• Technology from model making
• Much of the construction was done with glass fibre reinforced plastic.
• No camera sensor.
• Estimated material costs under 3,000 USD.
• Engine and propeller Commercial of the shelf (COTS).
• Duct tape replaces glue.
• Can be launched from a small ship.
• No problem to build this in a garage.
• Difficulty level: 14 to 99 years
GSDN - Challenges in Combating UAIED and SUAV Swarms in Civil and Military environments

The „brain“ of the drone
With these components for around 100
USD, you have the complete flight
control system for a drone with
autopilot.
This flight control system not only
works with a quadrocopter drone, but
can also be easily adapted for a star-
wing drone, as used during the attack
in Saudi Arabia.
These components are mass products.
Buy 50 units of them in another
country, put them into the hand
luggage (the space would be enough)
and back at home you have the control
system for 50 cruise missiles with 1 m
precision.
I can make the cruise missiles in any
garage - and that's what the quality
looks like.
GPS
Autopilot Pixhawk 4 mini
Telemetry Radio
Mini Telemetry Radio
Power Distribution Board

Conclusions
• It is not only developed countries that can build cruise missiles with a range
of more than 100 km - ambitious individuals can do so too today.
• The United States Air Force pays about US$ 800,000 for a BGM-109
Tomahawk - a private individual under US$ 3000. OK - less range, less
payload, but the same precision. And as you can see, with soft targets the
amount of explosive is not crucial.
• Given its size, the drone can be launched from any location.
• The launch can be done from the hand, with a small catapult or a cable
winch.
• All previous concepts for airspace defence are facing major problems - is it
reasonable to fight a US$ 3000 UAIED with a US$ 1,000,000 Patriot missile -
and what does the defence system do when 100 SUAV arrive?

Known incidents with drones
in Germany (excerpt)
• Drone lands at the feet of the German
Chancellor Dr. Merkel during an election
campaign event (2013)
• Frankfurt Airport had to suspend flight
operations for one hour on 09.05.2019.
• German air traffic control reports 158
incidents with drones (only in air traffic) in
2018
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GVbZL42
PwJw

Small drones
are dual-use
potential soft, civilian
targets …

...but also
military!
Camp Marmal, Mazar-I Sharif, Afghanistan
ISAF Contingent - German Armed Forces

Weaponized drones
There are already existing prototypes or actually used small mini drones that can be
used against soft targets. Use in the roles of:
• Bomber
• Reconnaissance vehicle
• Sniper
• Anti Tank Rocket Launcher
• Flamethrower
• UAIED
This is only a small selection and new variations are created daily.

Bomber Drone (Islamic State)
These two drones were part of
a swarm of about 15 drones
that attacked the Russian
airbase at Syrian Hmeimim in
January 2018. These drones
were probably forced to land
by electronic countermeasures.
Please note the use of
conventional mortar
ammunition as bombs.
The design was based on
model planes.

MultiCopter
Bombers
Islamic State
• Figure 1:
DJI Matrice 100
Quadrocopter with 2
improvised bombs (please
note the badminton tail
units)
• Figure 2
Self-built drone with RPG-7
warhead.
18/09/2020
GSDN - Challenges in Combating UAIED and SUAV Swarms in Civil and Military
environments 15

Reconnaissance drone
(Islamic State)
18/09/2020
environments 16

TIKAD Sniper drone
(Duke Robotics, Israel)
This is a slightly larger drone, with
a gimbal-mounted sniper rifle. This
drone is capable of stabilized
shooting during flight.

Anti-tank missile
(Belarus)
This example shows very typically how
civil technology is married to military
technology.
With simple means, the 250m range
of the RPG-26 or the related RShG-2
was increased many times over.
This weapon is able to penetrate 440
mm RHA (Rolled homogeneous
armour) or 1000 mm reinforced
concrete (manufacturer's data).
The RPG-26 was exported to many
countries and is also used in
asymmetric conflicts.
18

Flame thrower drone
(China)
This is a civilian Chinese drone
equipped with a flamethrower to -
as you can see - clear high-voltage
power lines of biological waste.
This technology could also be
relatively easily misused or copied
for terrorist purposes.
18/09/2020
environments 19

KUB-BLA drone
by Kalashnikov
This is a slightly larger drone from the military sector. It has a 3 kg warhead
that can be transported at 130 km/h for about 60 km.
The drone is 47 inches wide (120 cm) by 37 inches long (93 cm) and 6.5 inches
high (16 cm). This drone can be easily transported with a mid-size station
wagon.
With such small arms there is always the risk that these weapons fall into the
wrong hands when exported.
18/09/2020
environments 20

Payload
The payload of a drone is difficult to estimate - and very dependent on the
construction method and the mission profile. For example, the 75 kg heavy duty drone
Griff 300 can carry up to 225 kg payload. This is approximately three times its own
weight.
For the smaller DJI Inspire, the official 3.5 kg take-off weight and 0.8 kg payload are
specified. This would be a payload of approximately 20% of the maximum total weight,
but the motion profile of this drone is highly agile - so I assume that there are payload
reserves at the risk of loosing mobility.
But the further the payload is to be transported, the greater the share of the
accumulators in the total weight - and the payload becomes correspondingly smaller.
But I think that a good reference value could be a ratio of 2:1. In a worst case scenario I
would assume a ratio of tare weight to payload of 1:2 - one should never
underestimate that a great deal can be achieved in this area even with the simplest
resources.

Payload
Even 1 kg payload can cause severe
damage to soft targets.
• Explosive (1000 g corresponds to approx. six hand
grenades)
• Biological warfare agents (e.g. Anthrax) can be
distributed over large areas by a drone.
• Chemical warfare agents (VX lethal dose approx. 5 µg /
kg => 1.000.000 deaths / kg (theoretical))
• Dirty bomb (Nuclear Waste + C4)
• Psychological ( e.g. a full stadium and a drone is
distributing white powder => mass panic )
• Flamethrower

Procurement
of drones
COTS - Off the rack:
• Amazon, Ali Baba, … a lot
of other sources.
Flying scaffold
• 3D printers (Plastic or
metal), Balsa wood,
carbon fibre composite,
Amazon, Ali Baba, ...
Components
• Amazon, Ali Baba, …
Flight control
• e.g. Pixhawk 4 with GPS,
position control, ... for 40
€
• e.g. used Smartphone ...
Software
• Dronecode (Open
Source), DJI API, ...
Proliferation (in the
sense of small arms)
to terrorists by state
actors

Control of drones (Overview)
The control of drones can be done with different methods:
Type Name Human or
Computer?
Radio
Control?
Camera? Additional
Sensors?
Emissions
Control?
ECM
resistance?
1 Model plane
Human
2 FPV Drone
Human
3 Satellite
navigation
Computer
4 Inertial
navigation
Computer
5 Artificial
intelligence
Computer

Control of drones (Overview 2)
Type Name Human or
Computer?
Radio
Control?
Remote control
range
Target
accuracy
1
Model plane Human < 1.5 km >> 10 m
2
FPV Drone Human
Radio 1 – 50 km
4G/5G 8.000 km
< 1 m
3 Satellite
navigation
Computer irrelevant < 1 m - 10 m
4 Inertial
navigation
Computer irrelevant 10 m ++
5 Artificial
intelligence
Computer irrelevant < 1/2 m

Defensive measures
against drones
1 Detect
2 Identify
3 Tracking
4 Fighting

1
detection
Radar
Camera (motion, image recognition)
Noise detection and direction finding
Radio direction finding
Infrared
…

2
Identification
Noise signature
Image recognition
Frequency Signature
Radar signature
…

3
Persecution
Radar
Camera (motion, image recognition)
Noise detection and direction finding
Radio direction finding
Infrared
…

4
Combating
Counter UAV Drones
Electronic counter measures (control frequencies, GPS, ...)
EMP
Small arms (e.g. shotgun)
Air defence systems (automatic cannon 20 mm / 30 mm)
Passive measures (Net)
Laser
…
But not everything is suitable for use in urban
environments !!

Problems of individual defensive measures(1)
Let us look at the defence measures in extracts at e.g. a civil airport.
• ECM - not really safe when aircraft or friendly UAVs are in the air.
• EMP - eliminates any danger of drones by burning out the electronics
- but even most civilian aircraft are not allowed to be adequately
secured.
• Small arms - too short a range to protect a large area.

Problems of individual defensive measures(2)
• Air defence systems - deployment against drones flying at a height of
only 2 m - can cause major collateral damage.
• Laser - same problem - if the laser do not hit the drone – it start a
forest fire with the laser.
Of course, these are all just individual arguments - for example, the use
of lasers on board ships against drones can be useful. To determine the
defensive measures for a given location, all circumstances must be
taken into account.

Countermeasures
through drones
Speed Use of the terrain Emission control
Camouflage
Countermeasures
against image
recognition
Noise
minimization
EMP protection Swarms
Use of 4G / 5G
technology

Counter measures through drones
Speed
Fact
Today hobby model builders can
build drones with a speed up to
750 km/h
This is about 200 m/s or 1 km in
5 seconds.

Range and speed of drones
(worst case)
17.09.2020
World record (2016 in Germany)
This remote-controlled model aircraft with jet
turbine (a type 1 drone) flies at a speed of 744
km/h. The model weighs 7.5 kg and uses
aviation gasoline. The turbine is a Behotec 180
(Price: 2.500 € / US$ 2800). The jet is currently
the fastest RC model aircraft in the world.
Modified with a GPS module on type 3 drone, it
could theoretically fly 200 km in about 15
minutes and hit the target with an accuracy of
about 10 m.
GSDN - Challenges in Combating UAIED and SUAV Swarms in Civil and Military environment 35

Use of the terrain
Fact
Due to their manoeuvring capabilities,
multicopter drones in particular can
execute attack profiles close to the ground
(lower 2 m)
As a result, they are not detected by radar
or image recognition for a very long time
during the approach phase .

Emission Control
Fact
Already today, there are COTS drones that
can fly a pre-programmed GPS path as a
type 3 drones without any radio emission.

Camouflage

Countermeasures by drones
Disturb Image recognition with the
use of other or unusual patterns

Noise minimization
• Encapsulation of the rotors
• Propeller optimization
• Encapsulation of the electric motors
• Active noise control
• ...
Note:
Due to the increased use of commercial drones in urban
environments, the pressure on the manufacturers of
drones will increase to develop noise-reducing measures.
These will then also be available in the hobby sector.

Counter measures by drones
EMP protection
This is analogous to the way military
equipment is already protected
against EMP today.
EMP-protected drones will imho
primarily come from state sources
through proliferation to terrorists.

Attack with Swarms
(1)
Swarms of drones can be used to
perform an overload attack against a
target.
Even for a single person it is not an
insurmountable problem to launch
20 or 30 autonomous GPS drones.

The usage of the terrain is also a challenge for interception attempts. Combined with the high
thrust-to-weight ratio and the ability of multi-copters to hover, this enables unconventional attack
directions and trajectories, especially in urban terrain. So an all-round defense is required.
The most challenging factor of swarms is their number. Here is an example. Most SUAVs have a top
speed of 50 to 150 km/h. Assuming a detection range of 3 km in typical landscape (in urban terrain,
the detection range is probably much lower), the time frame for interception is between 72 and 216
seconds. Anti-air artillery systems can only fight one target per gun at a time. Assuming the required
duration of 5 seconds to detect, recognize, aim and shoot down one target combined with the
mentioned timeframe, this means that a swarm of 15 to 44 SUAVs overcomes the AA system with
an overload attack and eliminate it with a hit. This calculation neglects potential evading maneuvers
of the drones and the usage of terrain as cover.
Classical missile air defence systems such as the MIM 104 Patriot can only engage a limited number
of SUAVs in parallel. Furthermore, it does not make economic sense to destroy a €3000 drone with a
€1,000,000 missile.
Attack with Swarms (2)

ECM with control frequencies
• Switching to control by a 4G / 5G module on board of the drone
• 4G / 5G can be disrupted - but this leads to massive collateral damage to the digital
infrastructure.
• With 4G / 5G, it is currently impossible to distinguish whether the data traffic is coming from
a smartphone or a drone.
• Normally, a drone will return home if the radio connection is lost. However, the autopilot can also
be programmed to take full control until the drone has reached its destination.

GPS interference / spoofing
There are several solutions in case of
GPS signal interference
• Switch to Glonass or Beidou
• Using a processor that analyses
the interference signals and
restores the original signal. An
Israeli start-up has developed such
a chip
• Flying with inertial navigation. Not
very precise, but basically possible.

Protection of stationary installations
• At this point a few more suggestions on the active but also passive
protection of a stationary installation.
• These remarks do not claim to be valid for every case - in fact, the
individual elements of defence must be adapted to the situation on
site.

Passive
protection
• Module 1: Use of elevated camouflage nets in the camp area
• Module 2: Use of Kevlar fabric to strengthen the elevated camouflage
• Module 3: Vertical threads with hook
• Module 4: Vertical nets in the run-up to the camp
• Module 5: Using of smoke grenade launcher if a swarm is attacking and
intrudes the camp

Module 1: Use of elevated camouflage
nets in the camp area
• The view is blocked, and thus a targeted attack of persons, vehicles, and
buildings is difficult.
• The nets should be stable and elastic enough to stop the flight of a drone.
• Perhaps the camouflage net is even elastic enough to cushion the impact
of a falling "drone bomb" too far, which the detonator fails. With a 2 m
elastic braking distance, an acceleration of 250 g on the detonator would
have to be effected at a fall speed of around 100 m/s. I'm not an expert on
detonator technology, but you might want to test it once.
• A camouflage net could confuse future drones that fly autonomously and
identify targets with the support of image recognition software.
• This is also a good solution for a defence against swarms.

Module 2: Use of Kevlar fabric to
strengthen the elevated camouflage
If Module 1 is not working standalone, another idea
would be the use of one or more layers of Kevlar
fabric, which is mounted at a distance of 1 – 2 m
below the camouflage net to intercept explosion
splinters.

Module 3: Vertical threads with
hook
On module 1 or 2 additional vertical threads can be attached (1-10 threads /
m2), with an attached hook at the lower end.
Above container: up to 1 meter above the
container
About paths used by people: to 2.5 m above the way
About vehicles or streets used by vehicles: 3.5 m above the paths.
Shed areas: up to 0.5 m above the ground
The purpose of this measure is to press the drones near the ground, where the
navigation is obstructed by numerous obstacles (containers, vehicles, …).
The threads should be thin but stable (e.g., fishing line) so the drone camera
cannot see them. If a drone is in contact with a thread, it can either wrap itself
around the propeller or be dragged along by the drone until the hook at the
end of the thread is catching the drone.

Module 4: Vertical nets in the run-
up to the camp
The color of the mesh has to be adapted to the
terrain; the mesh size should be relatively large
so that a rotor can get caught in it. The threads
of the net should be as fine as possible so that
the drone camera cannot detect them.
1. All the drones that fly too deep are caught in
the Net.
2. All pilots who already know the net are
forced to fly so high that the sensors can
detect the drones and the defense system
has free firing field.

Use of smoke grenade launcher as used by
the combat vehicles of the German Armed
Forces. The terrain can be fogged within 3
seconds.
Thus, the GPS / inertial navigation cannot
be obstructed. But drones can no longer
fly on sight and no targets can be marked
with laser or any future target recognition
by AI image recognition will not work
anymore.
Also, GPS can be disturbed as an active
measure. Thus, for the drones is only
inertial navigation is available, which is
significantly inaccurate than GPS. In
particular, flying near the ground becomes
very risky due to inaccurate coordinates.
Module 5: Using of smoke
grenade launcher if a swarm is
attacking and intrudes the
camp

Active protection against small
drones – some thoughts
How to identify and destroy a drone?
Sensors work with different quality depending on
the sector.
• Sector I The airspace above the installation.
• Sector II The airspace in the apron, where
there are no obstacles for radar and cameras.
• Sector III The non-visible apron, which can be
used for a concealed approach.
• Sector IV The installation railing.
• Sector V is the area outside the sensors range.
The range of a sensor can be different for each
sensor.

Which sensor for which
defense sectors? (1)
Radar
Radar works well in Sectors I + II but has little benefit in
III + IV due to ground reflections. It can be used against
Type 1 to Type 5 drones. Weather conditions do not
matter.
Camera / IR Camera
A camera works well in sectors I + II but may be limited or
blocked by weather conditions (fog, low sun, night).
and propeller noise. There is no limitation thru weather
conditions.

Which sensor for which
defense sectors? (2)
Radio detecting
Can be used in all sectors, but only works with Type 1
and Type 2 drones. Types 3 to 5 have no detectable
radio emissions.
Microphone
Well suited for use in sectors III + IV, in sectors I + II
possible but depending on distance. Can be used
against Type 1 to Type 5 drones. In the future,
however, it can be expected that there are
technologies for lowering engine and propeller noise.
There is no limitation thru weather conditions.

Using audio signature to detect low flying
UAV
Drone produces a very characteristic sound that is made
up of a high-spinning motor and the propeller.
This noise can be filtered out with digital signal
processors.
If your safety zone is 1 km around the camp, you have a
warning time of 30 seconds (at a UAV speed of 120 km/h)
(regardless of the terrain).
These sensors are good at detecting low flying objects
The technology can be adapted by hearing aid
manufacturers or noise canceling equipment
.

Problems
It is difficult and dangerous to try to destroy SUAV with
conventional weapons because they are so small and fast.
You maybe have a chance to use anti-aircraft artillery in
the defense sectors I + II, but in the III + IV, you will have
to much collateral damage.

Protection through geofencing
• Actually, it is a good idea for commercial drones to have information
about no fly zones and to take them into account if possible.
• However, this does not guarantee that all protected areas are
covered. From my own experience in Berlin I know that this is not the
case.
• Home-built drones do not have geofencing - so they do not take no-
fly zones into account.

Summary
• The possibility of interfering with drones, even
in the UAIED area, is decreasing.
• The precision of a UAIED drone attack can be
very high (< 1 m).
• Terrorists are able to build precise 1-10 kg
UAIED with a range of 10 km ++ in a garage.
• Terrorists do not need to be on site.
• All components and software (except
detonators and explosives) are freely available
and can be obtained inconspicuously.
• Even terrorists can handle swarms

Outlook for the future
For the future, tried and tested concepts must be reconsidered and
adapted to the new circumstances.
I would like to illustrate this with 2 selected examples from the military
sector.
1. Drones endanger armoured vehicles
2. Swarms of drones endanger air defence

Drones endanger armoured vehicles
The first picture shows the almost complete loss of a battle tank in
Iraq. The image is from a drone video of the Islamic state, and the
drone has just manually directed an explosive device. The grenade
almost fell through the open hatch of the commander and almost
exploded inside the tank. If this had been an AI-controlled drone,
the precision would have been even higher.
The second picture shows the weak point on every modern main
battle tank (no matter which nation) - the optics I have outlined in
red. An AI drone programmed for these features will in future
target and destroy these points with absolute precision. This will
put a main battle tank out of action for a long time.
These capabilities do not only concern the army - bodyguards will
also have to consider them in the future. An AI drone can just as
well autonomously approach the weak points of an armoured civil
vehicle.

Swarms of drones
endanger air defence
And here is another example from
international drone research, where the
dual-use character of drones can be seen
quite well. China is not the only country
doing research in this direction, but China
seems to have realised earlier than
others that swarms of SUAVs are game
changers.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p1e
WmE3draU
GSDN - Challenges in Combating UAIED and SUAV
Swarms in Civil and Military environments
18/09/2020 62

Questions?
Contact:
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ulf-barth/
Mail: ulf.barth@gmail.com

C-UAS against Swarms (Ulf Barth) - DroneSec GDSN#2

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