1) Smart munitions have been developed since the 1930s but few nations have mastered the technology due to challenges in reliability, effectiveness against countermeasures, and complexity of operation and maintenance. 2) Gun-launched smart munitions face even greater challenges as they must withstand extreme acceleration forces from being fired from artillery or tank guns. Miniaturizing guidance systems to fit smaller calibers adds to the difficulty. 3) The true effectiveness of smart munitions is difficult to determine due to inconsistent data and performance can be reduced by decoys or countermeasures like radar jamming. Large stockpiles are needed to assure target destruction as countermeasures improve.

1. 4 FORCE | June 2022 FORCE | June 2022 5
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The Sharp Curve
of Technology
Col Mandeep Singh (retd)
In2016,theRussian
defence ministry un-
veiled the Derivatsi-
ya-PVO self-propelled
anti-aircraft gun ca-
pable of firing smart
munition. The field
trials of the Derivat-
siya were completed in 2020 and one
of the munitions developed for the gun
system was a laser-guided smart shell
which can manoeuvre using folding fins
towards the target.
With a range of 3km, it was specifi-
cally developed to take on drones and
attack helicopters and would have been
effective in countering the drones in
the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict but
like many systems developed by Russia,
it proved to be a non-starter during the
war. Added to this are the reports com-
ing in of fast depleting Russian invento-
ry of smart munitions and their alleged
high failure rate. All this does not present
a very rosy picture of Russian smart mu-
nitions capabilities. But Russia is not the
only one to struggle with development
andfieldingofsmartmunitionsandeven
after decades of the operationalisation of
the first smart munition, there are only
a handful of nations with this capability.
FirstdevelopedduringtheSpanishCiv-
il War when the Germans experimented
with radio controlled or wire guided mu-
nitions to strike ships, smart munitions
came into their own during the Vietnam
War when the laser guided munitions
were used with telling effect by the Unit-
ed States. One of the oft repeated refer-
ences to the early use of smart munition
is of the destruction of the Thanh Hoa
Bridge during the Vietnam War. Between
1965 and 1972, the US conducted 869
bombing raids against the Bridge. All 869
attacks failed, and 11 aircraft were shot
down in the process. When a new bomb
was used in May 1972, the bridge was
destroyed at the first attempt. The ad-
vantages of using smart munitions were
obvious and by the 1990’s the United
States had developed enough types and
numbers to use them with telling effect
during the Gulf War.
The Smart Munitions
The smart munitions in vogue today can
actually trace back their lineage to the
late 1980s when the United States start-
ed refining its Air Land Battle concept
wherein smart weapons were identified
as one of the key components needed for
future warfare. These weapon systems
would enable the army to carry out pre-
cision deep attacks, provide the capabil-
ity of simultaneously engaging multiple
targets while enhancing fighting capa-
bility and survivability. Smart munitions
formed the basis of these weapons sys-
tems as these munitions were to have
the self-contained capability to search,
detect, acquire and engage targets.
Theocratically smart munitions were
one of three classes of precision guided
munitions, the other two being guid-
ed munitions and brilliant munitions.
Guided munitions were characterized
as one-on-one munitions that required
an operator in the loop to function. At
the next developmental stage were the
smart munitions that operated auton-
omously. They had the self-contained
capability to search for, detect, acquire,
and engage targets but had minimal
capability to discriminate among tar-
get classes or target types. They were
designed for the ‘many-on-many’ situa-
tion where a number of munitions are
directed into an area known to contain
numerous targets.
As these systems developed, the
lines separating the ‘smart’ and ‘preci-
sion’ munitions have blurred as most
munitions are now expected to deliv-
er on both counts. From air launched
smart munitions to ‘smart bullets’ for
the infantry, these munitions are now
increasingly being fielded by all ser-
vices though air forces use them more
than surface forces primarily because
the target sets vary and there are many
challenges in developing and opera-
tionalising them. However, smart ar-
tillery munitions especially top attack
munitions are now widely being de-
veloped for different artillery calibres
with varied ranges. One class of these
munitions are the cargo rounds that
were developed for engaging hard tar-
gets such as armoured fighting vehicles
(AFV). The cargo rounds have a large
number of small sub-munitions fitted
with a small high-explosive anti-tank
(HEAT) warhead to penetrate the vul-
nerable, lighter armoured upper sur-
faces of AFVs but as the sub-munitions
can have a high dud rate they can limit
the manoeuvre of follow up forces. The
other class of smart munitions are the
top attack munitions e.g., GIWS SMArt
155 and the Bofors/Nexter BONUS.
SMArt is a German munition and each
SMArt155carriestwotopattacksub-mu-
nitions, each having a heavy metal explo-
sively formed penetrator (EFP) warhead.
The BAE Systems Bofors/ Nexter BONUS
also carries two sub-munitions but they
are parachute retarded at the rate of 45
metres per second and have a search
area of 32,000 square metres each. The
other smart munitions include the Ray-
theon Excalibur 155mm M982 PGM,
Katana family of 155mm PGM and the
Russian 152mm 2K25 Krasnopol guided
weapon system (GWS), the latter being
in service with the Indian Army.
China has invested in PGM of which
GP 155 and GP 155A with a maximum
range of 20km and 25km respective-
ly are laser guided projectiles with HE
warhead. For 122mm artillery systems
China has developed the GP122 with a
maximum range of up to 14km. These
are more of ‘precision’ than ‘smart’ mu-
nitions as they do not have in-built tar-
get seeker capability. Similarly, the new
generation tank launched munitions
are PGM rather than ‘smart’. One of the
few tank launched smart munitions was
the XM943 Smart Target Activated Fire
and Forget (STAFF) smart munition
programme of the early 2000s.
A smart infantry munition, the Ex-
treme Accuracy Tasked Ordnance (EX-
ACTO) system is one of the few systems
The smart munitions in
vogue today can actually
trace back their lineage
to the late 1980s when
the United States started
refining its Air Land
Battle concept wherein
smart weapons were
identified as one of the
key components needed
for future warfare. These
weapon systems would
enable the army to carry
out precision deep attacks,
provide the capability
of simultaneously
engaging multiple
targets while enhancing
fighting capability and
survivability
Smart, as well as loitering, munitions are
shaping the battlefield
© Nexter

2. that is being carried forward by the
United States. The technology involves
optical sensors in the nose of the bullet
and fins capable of adjusting the bullet’s
flight path in the tail. The optical sensor
apparently homes in on a spot illumi-
nated by a laser designator.
The Challenges
The aforementioned examples are just a
handful of smart munitions in service but
in spite of their increasing use, their de-
velopment and fielding face a number of
challenges such as reliability under field
conditions, efficacy against new threats
and ease of operation and maintenance.
Much has been written about the
performance of smart munitions in the
Gulf War, but a careful study shows that
their performance left much to be de-
sired. A report of the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) of United States stated
that claims made by the United States
armed forces about the weapons used
in the air war against Iraq were ‘over-
stated, misleading, inconsistent with the
best available data or unverifiable.” Even
after the Balkans campaign, the De-
fense Science Board Task Force noted
that “there is currently no comprehen-
sive approach—empirical observation or
otherwise—to determine and document
operational combat failure rates of US
munitions. The available data is incon-
sistent, largely anecdotal, and often from
questionable sources.’ In such a case it is
difficult to determine the true reliability
rate of the smart munitions. This aspect
is important as in absence of reliable
data it is often not possible to deter-
mine the reliability of a smart munition.
Related to this is the assess-
ment of the munition’s capa-
bilitytoresistlikelycounter-
measures and doing so at a
reasonable cost. At times,
use of simple decoys have
fooled the smart munitions. During the
Gulf War, Iraq had deployed thousands
of dummy tanks and artillery procured
from an Italian company before the war.
The smart munitions were not able to
distinguish them from the actual equip-
ment. A realistic assessment of the kill
rate achieved by the smart munitions re-
mains elusive. During the Balkans cam-
paign the same problem persisted as a
report in New York Times mentioned
that ‘Bombs Are Smart. People Are
Smarter’ as the Serbs used phony
‘tanks’ and other ground de-
coys to misguide the smart
munitions. If
the smart munitions cannot distinguish
between real targets and decoys, then
they are not smart enough.
The counter-measures are not limited
to use of decoys and camouflage. Ad-
vanced air defence weapon systems can
effectively engage almost all aerial plat-
forms including smart bomb while soft-
kill systems can scramble radar and
GPS thereby rendering the smart muni-
tions ineffective. Lasers and high-pow-
ered microwaves are becoming practi-
cal weapons against incoming missiles.
The assumption that smart munitions
will always get through, leave aside hit
the target, is not correct in face of ad-
vanced counter-measures.
This has a cascading effect on the
number of smart munitions required for
an assured kill. As enemy countermea-
sures improve, the number of weapons
required to assure a hit increases expo-
nentially. This pushes up the number of
strikes required to be carried out and
increase the vulnerability of platforms
used to enemy defences. It is almost a
re-run of legacy strike missions.
Similarly, a smart munition may be
able to take on legacy equipment but
may not be very effective against newer
weapons systems. Or a larger number of
munitions may be required to neutral-
ize a target. This makes the smart muni-
tions costlier to use. And they cannot be
used against all targets.
Even if available in adequate num-
bers, the simple economics makes no
sense in using smart bombs for all mis-
sions. It was thus not very surprising
that over 90 percent of the bombs used
in Gulf War were of dumb variety.
The challenges involved are not only
of performance but of maintenance
and operations also. The smart muni-
tions need to be maintained, stored
and handled by
technicians and
operators who
may not be very
well qualified. While the top of
the line munitions and weapons
may be handled by well qualified
operators, a large part of the
munitions, even smart mu-
nitions, will invariably be
handled by average sol-
diers. The systems need
to be such that they are
not very complex to
maintain, test and op-
erate. The systems should
be accident proof with ade-
quate safety features built in.
Balancing these requirements
cover
story
The counter-measures
are not limited to use of
decoys and camouflage.
Advanced air defence
weapon systems can
effectively engage almost
all aerial platforms
including smart bomb
while soft-kill systems
can scramble radar and
GPS thereby rendering
the smart munitions
ineffective. Lasers and
high-powered microwaves
are becoming practical
weapons against
incoming missiles. The
assumption that smart
munitions will always get
through, leave aside hit
the target, is not correct in
face of advanced counter-
measures
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3. is important.
Another aspect is the complexities in-
volved in gun launched munition, be it ar-
tillery of tank munitions. They face great-
er challenges as compared with the air
launchedsmartmunitionsasthelatterare
generallylarger,haveslowerlaunchspeeds
thusofferinglessdesignchallenges.
The main challenge in designing a
gun launched munition is making them
“G-survivable.” A typical gun launched
smart munition experiences accelera-
tions greater than 30,000 times the force
of gravity (9.8m/s2) and leaves a barrel
with a spin exceeding 3000 revolutions
per minute. The munition fitted in a
casing small enough to fit inside a gun
barrel needs to withstand temperatures
exceeding 250°C as it is propelled by a
highly variable power source. For refer-
ence,theExcalibursmartmunitionmen-
tioned above is fired at 14,000 Gs. The
smart munitions must endure extreme
G stresses, have a high-density package
and withstand the thermal challenge.
The biggest technology challenge across
the board is the gun-hardening aspect.
In case of smaller calibre munitions,
the challenge is greater. The smart
bullet is .50 calibre and it needs to
pack in the guidance system within
itself and yet operate reliably. Newer
missiles have reduced in size to 50mm
in diameter but programs like MAD-
FIRES are driving to 30mm diameters
which creates ~24-25mm internal di-
ameter to put electronics into. One
can assume that 20mm may be in the
future as well which will drive an in-
creased need for miniaturization.
With the average of smart munitions
getting smaller, this problem will only
get tougher. This challenge will get
accentuated in the new generation
smart munitions when the rail gun
launched munitions enter service.
The tactical challenges are no less in-
teresting, the main being of matching
munitions to platforms and targets. A
choice between smart platform drop-
ping dumb munitions or a dumb plat-
form with smart munitions may not
seem a very complex problem but the
ability to penetrate contested areas
and conduct “stand-in” strikes that kill
multiple targets per sortie will depend
not only on the munition but also the
platform used. A stealth platform can
penetrate deeper and thus carry large
payloads of smaller munitions vis a vis
a non-stealth platform that will need to
carry outside the adversary’s defensive
parameter and thus be able to carry
fewer munitions (being larger muni-
tions with integral power plants). Com-
ing to a workable mix of both – smart
platform with dumb munitions and
dumb platforms with smart munitions
- will remain a challenge especially for
forces with tight budgets.
The Numbers Game
The cost factor also comes in play when
deciding the inventories of smart mu-
nition. How much is enough and what
scales of holding, tests and periodic fir-
ings are to be laid down. This is critical
as seen during Operation Vijay emer-
gent procurement of ammunition had to
be resorted to by India as the Army real-
ised the need for Krasnpol ammunition.
Coming back to the Russia-Ukraine
conflict. Though all states have their
unique challenges, the Russian and
Ukrainian experience is of special in-
terest because of their rapidly deplet-
ing stock of smart munitions and com-
monality of weapon systems with India.
The Russian Army had gone in for a
modernisation programme post 2008
but even then, reportedly the world’s
second most powerful military does
not have much to showcase as far as its
smart munitions are concerned.
Ukraine on the other hand is being
sustained by military aid from other
countries but is also facing a similar
problem of depleting stock of muni-
tions especially the new generation
missile systems. Ukraine has indig-
enous PGMs also but its supply has
not kept pace with the demand. The
supply of advanced weaponry by the
West has not been able to keep pace
as the expenditure far outstrips the
supply. There are reports that the in-
ventory of some weapons with United
States is dangerously low because of
supply to Ukraine and will take years
to recoup.
While the smart munitions have been
effective and have taken a toll but the
sheer numbers still favour the Russians.
While the exact numbers of munitions
given to Ukraine are not known, the
numbers of Stingers and Javelin can give
a guesstimate of expenditure and effi-
cacy of these munitions. United States
has transferred almost 25 percent of its
holding of Stingers and will take about
five years to build back its stock for its
own war plans.
Similarly, Ukraine has received about
7,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles and the
United States is left with only 14,000
of its own. The rate at which both are
being used the real fear is whether
the Russians will suffer enough com-
bat losses to ensure a stalemate be-
fore Ukraine runs out of its munition
stocks. To put this in perspective,
Russia has 2800 active tanks and an
additional 13,000 armoured vehicles.
Open-source intelligence indicates
that the Russians have lost about 1300
armoured vehicles of all types. Not
only it has enough armoured vehicles
to support its operations, it has anoth-
er 10,000 older tanks in storage and a
similar number of reserve armoured
personnel carriers. It is important to
understand this numbers game as
there is a limit to which the smart mu-
nitions can be depended upon to take
out all targets.
The Way Ahead
All states have their own challenges and
even with commonality of weapons sys-
tems, the Russian or any other template
cannot be used by India to define its
own needs for smart weapons. A system
that works well in a given environment
may not be the right choice for us, how-
ever good the munition may be, unless it
meets our specific needs.
The basic dictum to follow is to identi-
fy and define own threats and end goals
so that the type of smart munitions re-
quired for furtherance of the war plans
can then be identified. This should in-
clude the entire spectrum of plausible
future conflicts and not be restricted to
‘hot war’ scenarios alone.
Prioritise. Not all systems need to
be smart. The add-on kits to make the
dumb bombs smart should be exploit-
ed more to keep the inventory costs
low. During a hot war it may be difficult
but the usage of smart weapons should
be regulated to the extent possible so
that a smart munition is not wasted
on a target that can be destroyed by a
dumb bomb.
Mix of ex-import and self-developed
systems may have to be resorted to, not-
withstanding the Atmanirbhar push as
it will not make economic sense to de-
velop all types of smart munitions until
the ecosystem is so well developed that
it is financially viable to self-support it-
self by exports.
There is a need to involve private sec-
tor in development of indigenous tech-
nologies and capabilities for producing
smart munitions.
Conclusion
What was only in the realm of comics
and fantasy is already a reality. Smart
bullets that change their trajectory in
flight, loitering munitions as they float
in wait and hunt their prey, shells that
know where to hit the target for maxi-
mising the lethality of a single shot are
all in service today. As the technology of
warfare evolves it is important to stay
ahead of the curve, as a failure to do so
would mean imminent defeat in a fu-
ture conflict.
This has been learnt by Russia the
hard way. Even after three months of
fighting, the objectives elude Russia,
and it cannot declare victory. A major
reason is the lack of an advanced tech-
nological base in Russia that is essential
to support the modern armed forces. To
win a war even overwhelming numbers
do not guarantee a win unless support-
ed by the capability to carry out smart
precision strikes.
Relying on ‘dumb’ munitions will
only use up a lot of effort and mon-
ey without giving the desired results.
Look at World War II and the wars in
Korea and Vietnam. Only about 7 per-
cent of all bombs dropped achieved a
hit within 1000 feet of their aim point.
Only in the Gulf War and the Balkans
did the smart munitions start making
an impact but in themselves smart mu-
nitions are not enough to ensure suc-
cess as their inventory must balance
the range, size, speed and survivabili-
ty to maintain a long-range strike ad-
vantage in a cost-effective manner. To
do so, the smart munition challenges
need to be addressed which may seem
simple and dumb but unless they are
carefully considered and factored in,
they only end up making the supposed-
ly smart munitions dumb.;
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