1. GLOBAL RISKS AFTER THE IPCC REPORT
New tools and approaches for estimating risk
from low-probability/high-impact events
Notes written by:
Madeleine Enarsson, Dennis Pamlin, Kennette Benedict and Lydia Veliko
Date: 26 August 2013, 9am-5pm
How: Virtual (Skype) or on-site participation
Venue: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists at the Harris School of Public
Policy University of Chicago, 1155 E. 60th St., Chicago IL
1. Background
IPCCs launch of the Working Group I report will be important for how global risks are discussed
in the near future. It also provides an opportunity to establish new policy strategies to approach
significant (low-probability/high-impact) global risks. The workshop will discuss a proposed
global risk and opportunity indicator to be launched in September 2013, in conjunction with the
release of the first AR5 report. The purpose of the new tool is to help policy makers, business
leaders and the general public to better understand the significance of low-probability/high-impact
global risks.
2. Goal
The goal of the workshop was to discuss the following topics:
1. Ways that significant low-probability/high-impact global risks can be integrated into policy
making
2. Translating IPCC language about climate sensitivity into numbers that estimate the
probability for different degrees of warming based on different PPM projections
3. Communicating low-probability/high-impact outcomes. For example, how can relatively
small changes in absolute risk be communicated when media focus is on relative changes?
How can different kinds of risk be communicated to the public (e.g. dangerous climate
change, 2C; and ruin/existential/deadly climate change, >4-8C)?
4. Communicating significant global risks in ways that inspire action to manage the risks,
rather than despair leading to inaction
5. Further work to clarify and communicate how different global risks are linked (nuclear
war, pandemics, climate change, etc.)
3. Specific questions
1. How can IPCC’s language about climate sensitivity be translated into a probability
distribution that includes low-probability/high-impact scenarios that can be used by policy
makers and business leaders as well as understood by the general public?
globalchallengesfoundation.org/
Global
Challenges
Foundation

2. 2. Based on the different ways to translate IPCC language into probability numbers
(especially low-probability/high-impact), what is the best way to combine and illustrate
these in an indicator?
3. What are the best ways to communicate low-probability/high-impact outcomes? For
example, how can relatively small changes in absolute risk be communicated when media
focus is on relative changes? How can different kinds of risk be communicated (e.g.
dangerous climate change, 2C; and ruin/existential/deadly climate change, >4-8C)?
4. How can communication about significant global risks inspire action rather than lead to
despair and inaction? Who is credible in providing the information in a way that inspires
this change?
4. Key conclusions from the workshop*
• There are many audiences for messages about climate change: political leaders and
policymakers; financial decsionmakers; corporate leaders; environmental groups; civic
groups; general public. Each of these audiences resonates to different messages, and
perhaps, different ways of portraying risk.
• Low-probability (below 1%)/high-impact events are not currently adequately studied
either among research institutions or among relevant governmental bodies.
• It is important to support research and policy work that studies low-probability/high-
impact events, especially events with potential catastrophic outcomes.
• The language about risk is different across disciplines, creating misunderstanding and
confusion among policy makers and media. For example, it is common among climate
scientists to talk about “conservative” estimates and provide estimations in which
uncertainties are excluded, while insurance experts use “conservative” when they wish to
indicate that worst-case scenarios are also included. In the first case the risk is
underestimated, in the second the full risk is included.
• Many policy makers ask for certainty from scientists even when scientific certainty is not
possible. It is important to educate policy makers about decision-making under conditions
that do not allow for scientific certainty.
• Communicating extreme risks in a meaningful and ethical way to the all stakeholders poses
great challenges, but is very important. Most current risk communication relates to more
marginal risks with a focus on “the general public.”
• Key target groups for communication about extreme risks are policy makers and
corporations. Communication should always take account of different national and sub-
national contexts. In order to avoid “doom and gloom,” heroes with 21st
century solutions
and champions inside the relevant companies could be considered part of the message and
strategy.
• Some studies indicate that many people have a low sensitivity to probability. This means
that for certain topics, people tend to treat different probability numbers more or less the
same, especially when the probability is low. Therefore, when communicating low-
probability/high-impact risks to the general population, one should consider a focus

3. primarily on the potential consequences, rather than on the probability. These
consequences would include food shortages (and rising food prices), wildfires and storms
that damage homes, increasing insurance prices, flooding of subway systems (like New
York City after hurricane Sandy.
• For communicating risk to the actual decision makers, however, a full risk assessment is
obviously important.
• When discussing climate sensitivity it is very important to be sure that the whole
probability distribution is included, especially as a fat tail cannot be excluded (including
sensitivity of 4-5°C and above). Despite the potential fatal consequences of such
sensitivity, very little research or concrete action occurs.
• The fact that many important elements (such as methane release from the tundra/Arctic,
forest feedback and albedo) are not included in the models that provide the climate
sensitivity makes it important to communicate to policy makers that such models can
significantly underestimate the probability for extreme climate change.
• Financial analytical tools and instruments can be very useful in addressing global risks.
From a financial perspective, an increase in uncertainty means increased action, such as
higher premium (while we react in the opposite way about issues concerning the climate).
Financial markets also have the ability to distil information in ways that are useful for
climate risk assessment.
• In addition to concrete numbers, visualization can be a powerful tool to evoke emotions,
motivate people and convey action. In that way, a global risk and opportunity indicator can
be an effective tool since it makes it possible to see easily what the risks are for various
temperature increases at various greenhouse gas concentrations. Likewise the solutions can
benefit from illustrations. For example, telling stories about heroes who are pursuing
solutions is appealing to those looking for positive models of what can be done. Likewise,
a contest could be created to develop relevant and compelling images for global risks and
opportunities. A core question is how, and even whether, existential risks, such as the “end
of civilization” when nothing is left, can be depicted.
• National security usually trumps action against global risks. The link between global risks
and local well-being must be clarified in order to achieve a good understanding of the
impact of global risks at the local level, thereby spurring collective action against those
affected.
• Any action regarding global risks should include representatives from all interested
countries and stakeholders. Many initiatives and communication strategies only focus on
OECD/Western countries.
• Very little has been done to analyse links between global risks even if clear and important
links exists. More work should be done in this area.

4. 5. Participants
• John Balkcom Chair of the Governing Board, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
• Kennette Benedict Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
• Oliver Bettis Chairman of the UK Actuarial Profession's Resource &
Environment Group
• Madeleine Enarsson Founder and consultant, TransformativeME
, Catalyst, 21st
Century
Frontiers
• Baruch Fischhoff Professor in the Departments of Social and Decision Sciences and
of Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University
• Molly Jahn Professor in the Laboratory of Genetics and Department of
Agronomy, Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment,
University of Wisconsin-Madison
• Gavin Maguire Agriculture Markets columnist for Thomson Reuters' Chicago
bureau
• Jason Matheny Program Manager at the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Activity, IARPA (participated via Skype)
• Robert Michael Professor Emeritus, Harris School of Public Policy, University of
Chicago
• Dennis Pamlin Project manager, Global Challenges Foundation
• Robert Rosner Professor in the departments of Astronomy & Astrophysics and
Physics at the University of Chicago and co-director of the Energy
Policy Institute at Chicago
• Paul Slovic President of Decision Research and professor of psychology at
the University of Oregon
*These do not necessarily represent a consensus among participants