1. Copyright © Travel Security Services Limited 2015. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited without the prior consent of the Company.
Travel Security Services Limited (‘the Company’) endeavors to ensure the accuracy of all information supplied. Advice and opinions given represent the best
judgment of the Company but, subject to section 2 (1) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the company shall in no case be liable for any claims, or special, inci-
dental or consequential damages, whether caused by the Company's negligence (or that of any member of its staff) or in any other way.
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AIRSPACE ASSESSMENT
This brief complements the medical and security information available to clients through the MedAire.com portal and Trip Ready App. Clients are encouraged to
review current travel advisories and sign up for location specific push notification alerts (medical and security) through the portal. For additional questions or
assistance at any time please contact MedAire 24/7: +1 602-281-3330.
AIRSPACE LOCATION Pakistan COUNTRY RATING HIGH
AIRSPACE IDENTIFIER ICAO: OPLR (Lahore), OPKR (Karachi) TERRORISM RATING HIGH
PREPARED BY Matthew Borie DATE OF ASSESSMENT 29 October 2015
AIRSPACE RISK MAP — PAKISTAN
INTRODUCTION
Pakistan is a fertile breeding ground for terrorism. The government and security agencies have tolerated – and in some cases
openly supported – Islamist militant groups fighting in Afghanistan and India-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan is a
base for al-Qaida (AQ); there are strong personal connections between core AQ elements and various Pakistani Islamist militant
groups, including the Pakistani Taliban. Recent attacks on aircraft inflight and assaults on airport facilities highlight the intent and
capabilities of Islamist militants in the country to target the aviation sector. The risk to air assets stems from a general threat to
aviation from small arms and air defense weapons such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) possessed by Islamist militant groups. At altitudes above FL300, these weapons pose little danger to aviation;
however, aircraft are vulnerable upon take-off and landing while transitioning to and from higher altitudes.

2. Copyright © Travel Security Services Limited 2015. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited without the prior consent of the Company.
Travel Security Services Limited (‘the Company’) endeavors to ensure the accuracy of all information supplied. Advice and opinions given represent the best
judgment of the Company but, subject to section 2 (1) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the company shall in no case be liable for any claims, or special, inci-
dental or consequential damages, whether caused by the Company's negligence (or that of any member of its staff) or in any other way.
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AVAILABILITY
The Pakistani Taliban operates across the country and is assessed to possess rocket-propelled grenade (RPGs) and small-arms,
along with air defense weapons, such as AAA and MANPADS. AQ also maintains an operational capability within the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Additionally, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) operates in the Kashmir-area and is assessed to possess
RPGs and small-arms, along with air defense weapons, such as MANPADS and AAA. The Pakistani military possesses weapon
systems capable of targeting aircraft up to a low earth orbit; however, the government has expressed no intent nor have there
been any incidents targeting legal operations. The government has also has an effective and well-established control program on
its air defense infrastructure.
 AAA: Islamist militants are assessed to possess AAA systems capable of engaging aircraft below FL200.
 MANPADS: Islamist militants are assessed to possess MANPADS capable of engaging aircraft below FL260.
 SAM: Islamist militants do not possess air defense weapons capable of engaging aircraft above FL260.
PORTABILITY
The portability of air defense weapons varies dramatically by type. AAA and MANPADS can be relocated and or transported with
ease and are relatively easy to conceal. Reporting indicates that the Pakistani Taliban controls territory located in multiple
provinces of Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistan Taliban has control of border crossings with Afghanistan and there is
considerable territory in the border areas for the groups to utilize as a support base.
 AAA: AAA systems are highly mobile; the majority are vehicle mounted and some are towed/self-propelled.
 MANPADS: MANPADS inventories are highly mobile; also such systems are easy to transport and conceal.
LETHALITY
The lethality of air defense weapons varies dramatically by type. Although AAA and MANPADS can be used to down aircraft, they
are only capable below typical cruising altitudes.
 AAA: With most aircraft flying above FL300, AAA pose no threat to aircraft at a typical cruising altitude. However, aircraft are vulnerable
as they transit the threat envelope upon ascent after takeoff and descent while landing.
 MANPADS: With most aircraft flying above FL300, MANPADS pose no threat to aircraft at a typical cruising altitude. However, aircraft are
vulnerable as they transit the threat envelope upon ascent after takeoff and descent while landing.
EASE OF USE
The ease of use of air defense weapons varies dramatically by type; though, AAA and MANPADS can be used with relative ease.
Though the majority of the Unites States (US)-provided MANPADS were recovered since 1990, air defense weapons training and
tactics received by the Mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been proliferated across the Middle East and
North Africa to Islamist militants.
 AAA: Vehicle mounted and towed/self-propelled AAA are relatively easy to use; however, they can be inaccurate and highly dependent on
the skill and training of the individual operator.
 MANPADS: The use of MANPADS has a number of constraints that have traditionally limited their use and effectiveness. One of the most
common failures is related to batteries, particularly in areas that experience extreme heat. These batteries have a relatively short shelf-life
and many have been stored for a number of years. By the time they are put in use by a belligerent actor, many batteries will have already
lost sufficient charge to operate the launcher and missile. The seeker is another common point of failure which contain materials that
degrade over time, especially in hot weather. Finally, maintenance is a constant issue with MANPADS.
DOCUMENTED USE — TARGETING OF MILITARY AVIATION ASSETS
Since the 1980s, Islamist militants operating in the Afghan-Pakistan region have shown the capability and intent to utilize air
defense weapons, RPGs, and small arms fire to down military grade aircraft and helicopters.
 Fatality hull-loss incidents against military targets are too numerous to list but highlight the capability and intent of these forces to utilize
air defense weapons to target aircraft operating below FL260 in Flight Information Region (FIR) Lahore (OPLR) and FIR Karachi (OPKR).
DOCUMENTED USE — TARGETING OF CIVIL AVIATION ASSETS
We advise operators to conduct risk mitigation actions due to the threat posed by a MANPADS, AAA, small arms (including high-caliber rifles),
and or RPG engagement targeting aircraft during takeoff and approach at airports across Pakistani airspace. In addition, the Pakistani Taliban
claimed to have downed a government helicopter via a MANPADS engagement on 08 May 2015. Additionally, on four separate occasions in
2014, the Pakistani Taliban utilized small arms fire to engage civilian aircraft on take-off and landing at Peshawar (OPPS) located in FIR Lahore
(OPLR). Although security forces are actively trying to prevent additional targeting, the threat will persist.
 07 October 2014: Small arms fire used to target a commercial aircraft near Peshawar.
 27 September 2014: Small arms fire targeted a landing commercial aircraft.
 01 September 2014: A landing cargo plane was hit by small arms fire.
 24 June 2014: Militants used small arms fire to target a landing commercial aircraft, killing a passenger and wounding two others.

3. Copyright © Travel Security Services Limited 2015. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited without the prior consent of the Company.
Travel Security Services Limited (‘the Company’) endeavors to ensure the accuracy of all information supplied. Advice and opinions given represent the best
judgment of the Company but, subject to section 2 (1) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the company shall in no case be liable for any claims, or special, inci-
dental or consequential damages, whether caused by the Company's negligence (or that of any member of its staff) or in any other way.
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DIRECT ATTACKS — TARGETING OF AIRPORTS/AIRBASES
Islamist militants and the Pakistani Taliban have conducted numerous bombings and coordinated attacks in the vicinity of
international airports across Pakistan. The following is a list of selected major incidents that have affected international Airports
in Pakistan and their perimeters over the last 18 months:
 Due to the threat of attacks on installations and the associated risk posed to aircraft on the ground at locations within FIR Karachi (OPKC),
we advise operators to defer overnight flights operations to the area.
 09 June 2014: The Pakistani Taliban conducted a large-scale, coordinated, and complex attack on the cargo and VIP terminals at the
international airport in Karachi (OPKC).
 10 June 2014: Four Pakistani Taliban militants fired at an Airport Security Force (ASF) training camp near the airport in Karachi (OPKC).
 14 August 2014: Pakistani Taliban conducted an unsuccessful attack on Samungli airbase near the international airport in Quetta (OPQT).
 There is an ongoing tribal insurgency in Balochistan province by ethnic-Baloch militants led by the Islamist extremist group Jundallah, the
Balochistan Liberation front (BLF) and Balochistan Republican Army (BRA).
 21 April 2015: The BRA claimed responsibility for an attack on the air traffic control tower at Pasni Airport (OPPI) in Gwadar district
(Balochistan province). The incident began when heavily armed assailants attacked the facility with RPGs and gunfire. The perpetrators
fled after the security forces returned fire. No injuries were reported.
 31 August 2015: The BRA claimed responsibility for an attack on Jiwani Airport (OPJI) in Gwadar district (Balochistan province). During the
attack the militants killed one airport engineer and damaged aviation equipment. Another worker was abducted and later killed.
 18 September 2015: A fatal attack by militants targeting the Badaber Air Force Base killed at least ten people and injured 22 others.
AIRSTRIKES — AIRSPACE CONGESTION
The western portion of FIR Lahore (OPLR), comprised primarily of the area along the Afghan-Pakistan border, includes the FATA,
where Pakistani military operations and US drone activities targeting Islamist militant groups are ongoing.
 Refer to the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), airport specific NOTAMS, and NOTAMS for FIR
Lahore (OPLR) for specific information on restricted areas due to ongoing military operations within the airspace.
 Due to the active conflict area in FIR Lahore (OPLR), we recommend operators to avoid flight operations below FL260.
The eastern portion of FIR Lahore (OPLR), comprised primarily of the area along the Pakistan-India border in the vicinity of the
disputed Kashmir region, continues to be a major source of conflict between India and Pakistan. The territory remains divided
between the two countries, with India controlling nearly two-thirds.
 The Pakistani military maintains a robust military presence in this region and border skirmishes with the Indian military are frequent and
primarily involve artillery barrages.
 The disputed Kashmir region is a known operating location for Islamist militant groups. Specifically, the Pakistani Taliban and LET operate
in the area and are assessed to possess RPGs and small-arms, along with air defense weapons, such as MANPADS and AAA.
IDF ATTACKS — TARGETING OF AIRPORTS/AIRBASES
Indirect fire (IDF) attacks (rockets and mortars) against airports and airbases within Pakistan has occurred in the past. Aircraft
are at a higher risk of damage resulting from a rocket attacks while they are on the ground in airports and at airbases. These
incidents are too numerous to list in this report but highlight the capability and intent of Islamist militants to utilize IDF weapons
to damage aircraft on the ground in airports and at airbases in FIR Lahore (OPLR) and FIR Karachi (OPKR).
AIRSPACE PROHIBITIONS
In early-April 2015, the Pakistani Ministry of the Interior National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC) issued an advisory to all
provincial governments to enhance airport security due to the potential near-term threat of terror attacks on international
airports within the country. The advisory specifically mentions the Pakistani Taliban as the main group that is planning attacks
on the Pakistani civil aviation infrastructure. Additionally, the advisory highlights the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area as where
militants are preparing for the attacks and Peshawar (OPPS) as a potential high profile target location. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Peshawar (OPPS) are both located in Flight Information Region (FIR) Lahore (OPLR) where Islamist militant groups pose a threat
to civil aviation assets both on the ground and in flight below FL260.
A French Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGAC) advisory, United Kingdom (UK) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) notice and
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) bulletin have led civil aviation operators to halt or at least reconsider flight operations
over FIR Lahore (OPLR) and FIR Karachi (OPKR). Please see the links below to views these documents in their entirety:
EASA SIB 2015-02R2
DGAC France AIC A 05/15
UK CAA NOTAM

4. Copyright © Travel Security Services Limited 2015. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited without the prior consent of the Company.
Travel Security Services Limited (‘the Company’) endeavors to ensure the accuracy of all information supplied. Advice and opinions given represent the best
judgment of the Company but, subject to section 2 (1) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the company shall in no case be liable for any claims, or special, inci-
dental or consequential damages, whether caused by the Company's negligence (or that of any member of its staff) or in any other way.
www.medaire.com www.controlrisks.com
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CONCLUSION
Although aviation operations into Pakistan can continue; operators should consider additional planning and security measures
in order to minimize exposure to the threat environment. FIR Lahore (OPLR) and FIR Karachi (OPKR) comprise the entire Paki-
stani airspace; however, the severity of the risk posed to flight operations by non-state actors differs across the country. While
we can only speculate on the real reasons for the NOTAMs, bulletin and advisory discussed above, these seem to be in line
with the new “risk-based decision making” approach of many countries and airlines and the concern expressed by numerous
national and international civil aviation bodies regarding flight operations in conflict zones. Numerous Middle East-based and
some European civil aviation operators continue to operate over Pakistani airspace and to the major international airports
within FIR Lahore (OPLR) and FIR Karachi (OPKR).
EMERGENCY CONTACT INFORMATION
MedAire Assistance 24/7: +1 602-281-3330