My presentation at JSFoo Chennai 2012, IIT Madras Research Park

1. Krishna Chaitanya T
Security & Privacy Research Lab
Infosys Labs

2.  A web application which combines content from
multiple origins to create a new service
 Integrator-party combining the content
 Gadget-integrated content
 Provides more value add
 Fun, easy to DIY. It’s all JS madness!

4.  Approaches
 Embedding external scripts
 Loading content via iframes
 Requirements
 Interaction
 Communication
 Security
 Isolation of origins
 Secure data exchange

5.  Browser has to isolate different origins
 Origin = protocol://host:port
 http://bing.com, http://localhost:81/, https://icicibank.com
 Privileges within origin
 Full network access
 Read/Write access to DOM
 Storage
 Scripts of one origin cannot access DOM of another
 Strangely, scripts themselves are exempted from SOP!!

6.  Very good interactivity
 Assumption – Script is from trusted source
 No isolation of origin
 Embedded scripts have privileges of imported page,
NOT source server
 Ads, widgets, AJAX libraries all have same rights 

7.  “SOP-Prevents useful things. Allows dangerous things”
 “If there is script from two or more sources, the
application is not secure. Period.”
 “Fundamentally, XSS is a confusion of interests”
 “A mashup is a self-inflicted XSS attack!”
Douglas Crockford - JavaScript Architect, Yahoo

8.  Restricting JavaScript to a subset
 Object-capability security model
 Idea: If an object in JavaScript has no reference to
“XMLHttpRequest” object, an AJAX call cannot be made.
 Popular JavaScript subsets:
 Caja (iGoogle)
 FBJS (Facebook)
 ADSafe (Yahoo)
 Learning curve, usability issues

9.  Separate security context for each origin
 Less interactive than JS approach
 Comply with SOP
<!-- This is allowed -->
<iframe src="sameDomainPage.html"> </iframe> //page in same origin
alert(frames[0].contentDocument.body); //works fine
<!-- This is **NOT** allowed -->
<iframe src="http://crossDomain.com"> </iframe> //page outside origin
alert(frames[0].contentDocument.body); //throws error

10.  Beware! Frames can be navigated to different origins!
 Frame navigation is NOT the same as SOP!
 Frame-Frame relationships
 Can script in Frame A modify DOM of Frame B?
 Can Script in Frame A “navigate” Frame B?
<iframe src=“http://crossDomain.com"> </iframe>
<!-- This is **NOT** allowed -->
alert(frames[0].src); //throws error – SOP restriction
<!-- This is allowed -->
alert(frames[0].src=“http://bing.com”); //works fine - frame navigation

11. awglogin
window.open("https://attacker.com/", "awglogin");
Courtesy: Stanford Web Security Lab

12. top.frames[1].location = "http://www.attacker.com/...";
top.frames[2].location = "http://www.attacker.com/...";
...
Courtesy: Stanford Web Security Lab

13. Permissive
Window
Descendant
Child

14.  FIM=Fragment Identifier Messaging
 Limited data, no acknowledgements.
 Navigation doesn’t reload page
 Not a secure channel
//Sender.html
function send(){
iframe.src=“http://localhost/receiver.html#data”;
}
//Receiver.html
window.onload=function(){
data=window.location.hash;
}

15.  HTML5 postMessage API-the savior!
 Cross-origin client side communication
 Network-like channel between frames
 Securely abstracts multiple principals
 Frames can integrate widgets with improved trust!

16.  Syntax:
otherwindow.postMessage(message, targetOrigin);
 targetOrigin can be a trusted source/wildcard *“*”+
//Posting message to a cross domain partner.
frames[0].postMessage(“Hello Partner!”, "http://localhost:81/");
//Retrieving message from the sender
window.onmessage = function (e) {
if (e.origin == 'http://localhost') {
//sanitize and accept data
}
};

17.  Sandbox – whitelisting restrictions on iframe content
<iframe sandbox src="http://attacker.com"></iframe>
 Disable scripts, forms, popups, top navigation etc.
 CORS – Access-Control-Allow-Origin
AJAX
PostMessage
CORS

18.  Framed sites are susceptible to clickjacking & frame
phishing attacks
 Bust frames, avoid surprises.
Left: Genuine communication
Right: Stealing data with Recursive Mashup Attack

19. References
 “Secure Frame Communication in Browsers”-Adam
Barth, Collin Jackson, John Mitchell-Stanford Web
Security Research Lab
 W3C HTML5 Specification -
http://www.w3.org/TR/html5/
 Dive into HTML5 – http://diveintohtml5.info

20. http://novogeek.com
@novogeek