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MARAWI AND BEYOND: Extremism and Law Enforcement
John Henry O. Valencia, RN, RM, CCCN, MAN
On 23 May 2017, a firefight broke out between Philippine government forces and an alliance of
IS-aligned militants in Marawi – a city of 200,000 in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao in the southern Philippines.
The militants, including the Maute group and the Abu Sayyaf group, quickly took control of large
areas of the city, prompting Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to impose martial law and
suspend the writ of habeas corpus on the entire island of Mindanao.
Within a month, the conflict displaced 360,000 people in Marawi and surrounding areas.
Hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians remained in the besieged city for weeks or months,
either as hostages or trapped in the crossfire.
The battle lasted for five months, and resulted in the mass displacement of civilians, the
widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the loss of civilian lives. According to
official figures, 920 militants, 165 soldiers and 47 civilians were killed in the fighting, and more
than 1,780 hostages were rescued from the IS-linked militants. But restrictions on access to
Marawi during the conflict have precluded any independent corroboration of these numbers.
As it dragged on for months, the Marawi siege was a revelation of the changing dynamics of
war, criminality, and violence in Mindanao. The ideological tendencies of Muslim insurgency
groups are changing shaped by political events beyond Mindanao; and have turned more
radical and extreme. From small local bands of bandits, the Maute, ASG and the BIFF are
increasingly becoming global threats by proclaiming themselves as local jihadist networks of
ISIS (Islamic State), symbolically or literally, by brandishing ISIS black flag and head bands.
Developing a strong government structure is the best strategies that the Philippines government
can employ to flush out terrorism within the Mindanao region as well as its growing prevalence
across the country. The reason for this assertion is that these terror groups take advantage of
the weak Philippines government to promote and perpetrate terrorism activities within the
country. The weak state of the government is evident from the fact that the government troops
have failed to recapture the city of Marawi several months after the Marawi siege planned and
executed by militant groups led by the Maute Group and the Abu Sayyaf group. In such a case,
if the government were strong enough, then such a case would not have happened, as the
militants would fear to take on the government troops by themselves. In this regard, it is
appropriate to assert that the militants dare the government and are even willing to engage it in
an armed combat because they perceive it as weak. Conversely, if the Philippines government
develops a strong government structure, then the terrorists and other militant groups would fear
to engage it in running battles, let alone engage in terrorism activities within the country, and
especially within the region of Mindanao.

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The state of lawlessness in the country is the highest precipitate for the growing intolerance and
insecurity within the country. In fact, most of the terror groups take advantage of this state of
lawlessness to perpetrate their activities under the nose of the security forces. A good example
of this is the growing prevalence of terrorism within the Mindanao region, especially because the
region is home to over 20 ISIS linked militant groups. In this regard, strict enforcement of law
and order in the country and especially within the Mindanao region is the best approach to
control and eliminate the threat of terrorism in the country. As such, it requires the police and
other law enforcement agencies to conduct repeated security checks to root out terror groups
before they form militant groups.
Furthermore, strict enforcement of the law will also ensure that cases of extremism and
radicalization do not exist in the country, as these also contribute to the perpetration of terrorism
ideals within the country. Some of the ISIS returnees from the Middle East take advantage of
the porous borders and insecurity to sneak back into the country and continue their terrorism
activities in the Philippines, specifically in the Mindanao region. Conversely, the strict
enforcement of law and order will not only prevent small militant groups from cropping up in the
country, but will also prevent ISIS militants from returning home to resettle in the Mindanao
region. In this case, a strong government structure would be the most effective tool in facilitating
the strict enforcement of law and order within the country, thereby the best medicine for the
terrorism scourge experienced in Philippines, particularly in the region of Mindanao.
The reason for the increased prevalence of lawlessness in the country including heightened
terrorism is poor governance by various governments in the country. All preceding
governments, including that of President Rodrigo Duterte, failed to incorporate the entire
Philippines community in their administration. Philippines is largely a Christian country but has
minority Muslims. Any government in office should give credence to all members of the
community in the country regardless of their religion, tribe of race. However, the Philippines
governments have procedurally sidelined the minority groups in the country, especially the
Muslim community. In fact, this alienation from government is what prompted the Bangsamoro
revolution within the Mindanao region, giving rise to an internal conflict that polarised the region
and heightened insecurity, thereby creating a conducive environment for terrorism to thrive in
the country. Consequently, practicing good governance in Philippines is another possible
strategy that the government can use in overcoming the growing prevalence of terrorism,
whereby those in office consider inclusivity in governance, dialogue with minority groups, and
avoid dictatorship leadership.
In general, more law enforcement—and more professional law enforcement—is needed.
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have stepped up naval patrol cooperation in the Sulu-
Celebes sea, in the area being labeled “Southeast Asia’s Somalia” This is useful in the face of
the seaborne piracy that has led to the kidnapping in this area of many seafarers, but it is not
the only route foreign fighters might use to join violent extremists. Many enter through regularly
scheduled flights, and so immigration enforcement must be improved, but this flies in the face of

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a months-long dispute over pay for immigration officers that have resulted in severe manpower
shortages.
While some argue that the actions of IS-Ranao and the Maute brothers, or the Abu Sayyaf
faction headed by Isnilon Hapilon, are motivated by money or political rivalries, the radical
ideology supporting Islamic State is clearly at the core of their ideology. As long ago as 2008,
the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan sent a letter threatening Christians: “The Quran provides that non-
Muslims who stay in Muslim areas should convert or pay jizya (Islamic tax) and failing to do so
would mean armed struggle.” In Marawi, the extremists burned a Shi’a mosque, and posted a
video of the trashing and then burning of a Catholic Church. In this way, Islam provides “an
emotional vehicle” (in Scott Atran’s words) for their extremist actions.
Thus, we ought not to target Islam as the “cause” of extremism—a point eloquently
demonstrated in Marawi City when devout members of the Tabligh who had gathered
there helped rescue Christians trapped in the fighting. However, often recruitment into such
violent extremist groups begins with an offer to provide education into Islam—and “grooming”
can then take place via social media or in person. Local Muslim communities have for some
years recognized the threat. Fortunately, some Muslims themselves are eager to confront the
readings of Islam propagated by violent extremists—and ulama are organizing themselves with
statements that terrorism is haram (forbidden/unlawful).
In addition to this explication of why the ideology of Islamic State does not comport with the
consensus of scholars, other efforts try to trace the pathways of individual radicalization. In the
poorer areas of the Sulu archipelago, the appeal of such groups, particularly among vulnerable
youth, comes from economic struggles and the search for a better livelihood. In a city like
Marawi, where recruitment can happen on college campuses or at the workplace, social
networks and peer-to-peer efforts might make more of an impact than messages from formally
respected elders.
In the end, communities must be encouraged to be more resilient if they are to counter violent
extremism. Better access to employment, disaster preparation, social networking, and education
would all provide alternatives to potentially vulnerable individuals. We must understand
pathways to recruitment and the personal issues involved, and not allow preconceived notions
(e.g, considering only male-dominated networks, rather than understanding the role women can
play in this dynamic) to dominate our thinking.
Above all, the low-hanging fruit—full implementation of agreements reached in 1996 with the
Moro National Liberation Front and in 2014 with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front—must be
picked. The narrative of the Moro in the Philippines is not the same as the narrative of the
worldwide caliphate, and the former narrative could be very productive for lives and futures in
Mindanao and the entire Philippines. As so many have stressed recently, vigorous progress on
this front is the best political argument against violent extremism.