Riara Law School Students grapple with the Boko Haram Insurgency and its effect on International Law

1. BOKO HARAM AND THE M23

2. Question
• Boko Haram and M23 have attracted significant
international attention. Who are they? What do
they want? What is their status in international
law? What international legal issues does their
being and continued conduct raise? What might
be an international law perspective of the
Nigerian government’s response to Boko Haram,
and of the affected countries response to M23?
What do they represent in the legal international
order, and how ought the international legal
order/community respond to them?

4. Evolution of Boko Haram
• Local terrorist group in Nigeria
• Formal name is Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda’wati Wal-Jihad meaning People
committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s teachings and Jihad
• Were nicknamed Boko Haram meaning
western education is forbidden

5. • Date of formation is not known
• Most people however trace back their origin
to 2002
• Led by Mohammed Ali when it started
• They started as a peaceful religious group
• After formation in 2002, they embarked on a
hijra to Kanama in Yobe state

6. • In 2003 while in Kanama, they ended up
clashing with the Kanama community over
fishing rights and ended up rioting. Police
were defeated. Army was involved. 70 of them
were killed including the leader .
• They scattered due to the fight and some
went back to Maiduguri which became their
headquarters

7. • Mohammed Yusuf became their new leader
• In Maiduguri they started their state within a
state.
• They constructed a mosque (Ibn Taimiyyah
Masjid). They had their own cabinet, own
police and a large farm. Mohammed Yusuf
was a judge in their courts
• This attracted more people to join them

8. The beginning of the Boko Haram as
we know it
• In 2009, the Nigerian Govt enforced a law that
stated that motorbike drivers and passengers
should wear helmets
• As they were going for a funeral, the police
stopped them as they were violating the law.
They got agitated which led to a shoot out with
the police. Some members died and others
arrested.
• Mohammed Yusuf, their leader was killed by the
police in prison

9. • After this incident, they went silent for almost a
year. They were training on ways to get back to
the Nigerian government
• Their first attack was in September 2010 where
they attacked a prison and freed 700 inmates
most of them previous Boko Haram members
• The leader who took over from Mohammed
Yusuf and helped to organize this attack was
known as Shekau

10. • Shekau adapted the Al Qaeda model of
running the group.

11. • The Boko Haram gained popularity in the
international scene in April 2014 when
theyattacked a girls boarding school and
captured 276 of them whose whereabouts are
still not known
• They rarely attack the Westerners

13. What does the Boko Haram want
• The group’s main goal is to establish an
Islamic caliphate within the country, which
would allow for the implementation of sharia
law. Boko Haram sees public schools as places
where students are brainwashed by a
“Western” curriculum, and earmarks them as
significant targets in its war to drive secular,
federal institutions from Nigeria’s Islamic
heartland.

15. • The conflict in the North-East against Boko
Haram has since 2013 been qualified as a non-
international armed conflict governed by
international humanitarian law rules

16. M23 (March 23 movement)(DRC)
• The name originates from a peace agreement
made between the Congolese government and
the CNDP(National Congress for the Defence of
the people)
• Formed in 2012
• They were led by Bosco Ntaganda who signed the
peace agreement on behalf of the group
• After the agreement, members of the CNDP were
integrated into the Armed Forces of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and
were also recognized as an official political party.

17. • They later rebelled and formed the M23
• This was because the Govt broke the promises
they made in the 2009 peace agreement
• They were also not happy with the conditions
and the salary they were paid
• Because of this, they held Goma which is a
mineral rich territory so that the government
would agree to negotiate.

18. On March 18, Ntaganda, one of the M23’s leaders,
surrendered to the US embassy in the Rwandan
capital, Kigali, following his defeat during infighting
between two M23 factions. He was transferred to
The Hague, where he is to face charges of war
crimes and crimes against humanity at the
International Criminal Court.

19. • In November 2013 the M23 decide to end its
rebellion and pursue its goals through purely
political means

20. What international legal issues does
their being and continued conduct
raise?
1. The 1884-85 Berlin conference on
the scramble and partition of Africa
led to disruption of societies.

21. CONTINUED…
2. Failure of the democratic experiment
(one size fits all -the takes it all
approach) in Africa to bring about
meaningful change & inclusion in the
governance structures.
3. Failure of the laws against illegal
possession of arms at national and
international levels.

22. CONTINUED….
4. The widening gap between the rich and the
poor fueled by bad leadership and
corruption.
5. Youth unemployment and underemployment
has created a hopeless class of recruits into
such groups when there is promise of a better
life.

23. CONTINUED…
6. Imbalanced regional development and
unequal distribution of resources in
different states leading to resentment by
the marginalized people.

24. CONTINUED…
7. Recognition of other rebel groups as
sovereign governments in different
governments such as the National
Resistance Army in Uganda led by
Yoweri Museveni, the Rwanda Patriotic
Front led by Paul Kagame and the Sudan
Peoples Liberation Movement led by
John Garang and later Salva Kiir.

25. QUESTION:
Nigerian Governments response to
Boko Haram ?
International law perspective of the
Nigerian government’s response to
Boko Haram and their impact?
PRESENTER: Niven Simiyu

26. The Government’s Response
• Sovereignty
• The escalation of the insurgency in early 2010
caught the government flat-footed

27. • Since 2012, it has tried to address the
challenge on multiple tracks but especially by
increasing the defence budget from 100 billion
naira ($625 million) in 2010 to 927 billion
naira ($6 billion) in 2011 and 1 trillion ($6.25
billion) naira in 2012, 2013 and 2014

28. Other measures include :
1. strengthening anti-terrorism legislation,
2. boosting the capacities of the military and other
security agencies,
3. exploring dialogue with the insurgents,
4. declaring a state of emergency in the North East
and launching military offensives against the
insurgents.
NB: Results have been limited.

29. Strengthening anti-terrorism
legislation
• President Jonathan signed the Terrorism (Prevention)
Act in 2011. It was amended in 2012 to designate the
Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) as the
national coordinator for anti-terrorism, in order to
prevent in-fighting among security agencies.
• On 4 June 2013, the government proscribed Boko
Haram and Ansaru, describing their activities as
terrorism, and warned that any persons associated
with the two groups was liable to prosecution.
• It is prosecuting hundreds of suspected Boko Haram
and Ansaru members and collaborators.

30. Boosting the capacities of the military and
other security agencies.
• The military had not anticipated the
insurgency and was not prepared for its
bombing campaign,
• The military and security services to respond
to the challenge, particularly by improving
training, equipment and coordination.

31. • In September 2012, the Counter-Terrorism and
Counter-Insurgency Centre graduated 316 personnel
• the army has trained over 7,000 from the army, police
• Seeking to strengthen counter-insurgency capacity, the
army recently built the country’s first indigenous
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and now produces
other protective gear, such as bullet-proof vests.
• On 17 December 2013, President Jonathan unveiled
the first drone designed and constructed by the air
force.

32. Challenges
 A lack of regional co-operation and international response
 Politics also sometimes interferes. Both General Sani
Abacha (who ruled the country from 1993 to 1998) and
former President Umaru Yar’Adua (2007- 2010) ordered the
release of some detained Islamist extremists for fear of
alienating northern supporters.
 Constraining factors also include interagency mistrust, poor
information sharing and institutional flaws such as unsound
recruitment.
 The troops are stretched too thin to control the large
region.
 Limited intelligence gathering

33. Contradictory strategies and fraud by entrusted
persons
Progress toward a negotiated end to the violence
has been minimal, due to the government’s
contradictory strategies and fraud, as well as
Boko Haram’s suspicion of the authorities’ intent
and its own divisions
Several shadowy individuals claiming to be
speaking on behalf of Boko Haram have been
disowned by the sect. Some observers assert that
government officials seeking to make private gain

34. Exploring dialogue with the
insurgents
• From the insurgency’s onset, the government has said
it is open to dialogue with Boko Haram, but it has often
wavered in seeing this through.
• At times, officials speak of ongoing indirect
negotiations; on other occasions they deny this.
• On 2 August 2011, the government set up an eight-
member committee, to study the Boko Haram security
challenge and advise on ending the violence.
• Its report, submitted on 26 September 2011,
recommended talks and amnesty for sect members
who renounce violence.

35. BOKO HARAM DEMANDS
• On 16 September 2011, former President
Olusegun Obasanjo held talks in Maiduguri with
Boko Haram members, who laid out conditions
for a temporary ceasefire.
• These were and remain
1. an end to arrests and killings of sect members;
2. compensation for families of members killed by
security personnel; and
3. prosecution of police responsible for Yusuf’s
extrajudicial execution.1

36. Military operations and civilian
vigilantes
• Starting in early 2011, the government deployed
some 3,600
• The government sent 2,000 additional troops,
accompanied by heavy military equipment
including fighter jets, to Maiduguri. On 14 May
Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the
North East (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe). In a
national broadcast, he ordered the troops to
“take all necessary action … [to] end to the
impunity of insurgents and terrorists”.

37. Effects
• The next day, fighter jets began bombarding
Boko Haram camps in northern Borno, and a
day later troops sealed parts of the borders
with Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Phone
networks were taken down on 16-17 May in
Yobe and Borno and remain down. On 19
August, a new army division, the 7th,
codenamed BOYONA and headed by a major
general, took over counterterrorism
operations in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa

38. The 2015 Elections
• Boko Haram violence posed a serious threat to the 2015 elections.
• Electoral officials and analysts express concerns it may not be
possible to hold the votes in the North East, particularly Borno and
Yobe states
• PROPAGANDA: Fuelled suspicions the ruling PDP and President
Jonathan, who is expected to seek a new term, are trying to
suppress ballots in the region, which is largely controlled by the
newly-formed opposition party the All Progressives Congress (APC).
• IMPLICATIONS: Not holding polls in the North East, or reducing
their scope, could create political chaos, with the opposition
rejecting a close unfavourable national tally. It is also feared that
Boko Haram could escalate attacks to undermine the elections.

39. IMPLICATIONS: Failure to conduct elections in the
three states could likewise raise serious
constitutional issues. The successful presidential
candidate must win “not less than one quarter of
the votes cast at the election in each of at least
two-thirds of all the States in the Federation and
the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja”.
• If the presidential polls are not held in the three
north-eastern states, the results could be
challenged as unconstitutional, leading to lengthy
legal battles.

40. Impact on the North and Implications for
Nigeria
 Undermined public safety across the region and scarred its
economy and development.
 Thousands of lives have been lost during the insurgency
more persons displaced thus refugee crisis created
 Currently, it is believed that Boko Haram controls about
20,000 square miles
 Most attack on schools has affected education
#BringbackOurgirls
 Deepened religious and regional fault lines, reversing some
of the country’s hard-won gains in building national unity
and stability. Its assaults on Christians and churches and its
declared goal of establishing an Islamic state

41. International law perspective of the Nigerian
government’s response to Boko Haram
1) Violations of International Humanitarian
Law
2) Crimes against Humanity
3) Individual Criminal Responsibility
4) Command Responsibility
5) State Responsibility for Crimes Committed
by Militia Members

42. The international response to Boko
Haram( general overview)

43. • The U.S. and British governments designated Boko
Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organisations in 2013,
while the United Nations designated Boko Haram an al-
Qaeda affiliate in 2014. In the aftermath of the Chibok
schoolgirls’ kidnapping a number of Western countries
offered to help Nigeria find and liberate the
captives.However, the government has done little to
take advantage of these offers. Moreover, credible
reports of human rights abuses by the Nigerian
security forces create difficulties for outside
involvement by democratic states committed to
furthering human rights..

44. US RESPONSE TO BOKO HARAM
• One reporter asked the White House an
obvious question at a briefing, “Why haven’t
we seen U.S. intervention in Nigeria?”
• But John Campbell, the former American
ambassador to Nigeria, argues the U.S. should
do more.

45. UK RESPONSE
• The Foreign Office minister Hugo Swire has
said, while ruling out sending British troops to
the country.
• The Conservative MP John Redwood asked the
minister to clarify why the west was right to
try to use military force in Syria and Iraq, in
similar situations, but not in Nigeria.

46. ICC RESPONSE TO BOOK HARAM
• Whats the position of the icc chief prosecutor.

47. QUESTION
• SINCE US AND UK ARE UNWILLING TO
PROVIDE SUPORT TO THE NIGERIA
GOVERNMENT, WILL THE ICC BE THE
SAVIOUR?

48. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
RWANDA AND UGANDA(overview)
• The U.S. and various European nations have moved to
suspend aid to Rwanda due to these allegations. The
DRC has demanded the imposition of sanctions against
complicit individuals in both Rwanda and Uganda for
violation of a U.N. Arms Embargo on Congo, despite
the denial of both countries that they are involved in
the ongoing conflict. As Rwanda assumes a seat in the
U.N. Security Council in January, those sanctions will
become difficult to impose, meaning heightened
international pressure on the two countries to cease
supporting the M23 rebellion must go into effect
immediately.

49. •
• INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO M23

50. U.S. Role in Ending the Conflict
• should be placed on all those responsible for
supporting M23.
• The United States should continue to use their
influence as the World Bank’s top donor to
delay the disbursement of $135 in aid to
Rwanda from the Bank in order to pressure
Rwanda to end their support to M23 and
commit to restoring peace to the region.

51. ICC RESPONSE TO M23
• What the ICC chief prosecutor say,