The International Crisis Group WATCH LIST -MYANMAR 2018

2/3/2018 Myanmar | Crisis Group
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Myanmar
In Rakhine state, longstanding communal tensions and extreme discrimination by the government against the
Rohingya Muslim minority has morphed into a major crisis. Following renewed attacks by a militant group on
security targets in northern Rakhine in August 2017, a brutal response by the military has driven more than 430,000
Rohingya into neighbouring Bangladesh. In addition to the human catastrophe, this could undermine the political
transition and make Myanmar a target for transnational jihadist groups. The peace process with some 21 ethnic
armed groups has lost momentum, and a negotiated settlement remains elusive. Resurgent Buddhist nationalism
threatens to divide communities and faiths in this multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. Through eld research and
advocacy aimed at the Myanmar government as well as in uential regional and international actors, Crisis Group
works to help mitigate the crisis in Rakhine state, strengthen the peace process and promote improved
intercommunal relations.
Myanmar’s
Rohingya
Crisis
Enters
a
Dangerous
New
Phase

REPORT / ASIA
Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase
The mass ight of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar’s Rakhine State has created a humanitarian
catastrophe and serious…
REPORT / ASIA
Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar
Also available in Burmese
STATEMENT / ASIA
The Rakhine State Danger to Myanmar's Transition
REPORT / ASIA
Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State

Also available in 简体中文
CrisisWatch Myanmar
JANUARY 2018

Reports & Briefings
Unchanged Situation
Deadly crackdown on Buddhist Rakhine protesters in Rakhine state further exacerbated tensions and
complicated…
Continue reading

REPORT
Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase
The mass ight of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar’s Rakhine State has created a humanitarian
catastrophe and serious security risks, including potential cross-border militant attacks. The international
community should press the Myanmar government to urgently implement the Annan commission’s
proposals, including as regards discrimination, segregation and citizenship.
REPORT
Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar

REPORT
Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar
REPORT
BRIEFING
Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue
REPORT
Myanmar’s New Government: Finding Its Feet?
View more Reports & Brie ngs
In The News

e e s
29 NOV 2017
ABC
Richard Horsey
Consultant, Myanmar
The Pope was aware that inserting himself too strongly into a situation with a lot of religious
undertones could in ame tensions further in Myanmar.
“
”
26 NOV 2017
CNN
Richard Horsey
Consultant, Myanmar
[Buddhist] monks feel the [Myanmar] government is weak on the protection of Buddhism and
keeping the morals of the country intact.
“
”

Latest Updates
OP-ED / ASIA 22 DECEMBER 2017

/
Will Rohingya Refugees Start Returning to Myanmar in 2018?
Most went back home from Bangladesh in two earlier exoduses, but this time is different.
Originally published in Nikkei Asian Review
IMPACT NOTE / ASIA 21 DECEMBER 2017

The International Crisis Group is an independent
organisation working to prevent wars and shape
policies that will build a more peaceful world.
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Watch List 2018
Crisis Group’s early-warning Watch List identifies up to ten countries
and regions at risk of conflict or escalation of violence. In these
situations, early action, driven or supported by the EU and its member
states, would generate stronger prospects for peace. It includes a
global overview, regional summaries, and detailed analysis on select
countries and conflicts.
The Watch List 2018 includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh/Myanmar,
Cameroon, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Sahel, Tunisia, Ukraine and
Zimbabwe.
REGIONAL OVERVIEW Asia
Asia’s overarching security dynamic is marked by a gradual recalibration of power relations driven by
China’s growing influence. This shift has been long underway. But mixed signals from the new U.S.
administration and its belligerence around the Korean peninsula crisis (described in two January 2018
Crisis Group Reports) bring fresh uncertainty, and have further shaken confidence in a regional security
architecture that traditionally has rested on U.S. alliances. Japan and India seek greater influence –
partly to offset China, partly in their own right – and have strengthened their bilateral relations and ties
to other powers, notably Australia and Vietnam. Wider security in Asia will hinge upon whether these
shifts and competing interests can be managed peacefully: the risk of an arms race is real and opposing
claims over the South China Sea remain a flashpoint, notwithstanding Beijing’s active diplomacy with
other littoral states over the past year. If Asia’s big power rivalries are likely to define the future of its

security, its deadliest conflicts today have other drivers. Across parts of South and South East Asia,
leaders show increasing resistance to dialogue and compromise with domestic rivals, a tendency
aggravated by majoritarian politics and cultural or religious chauvinism. As elsewhere, they appear
increasingly ready to use force, a trend most evident in brutal operations by Myanmar forces and local
militias that forced much of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority to flee to Bangladesh, and in Afghanistan,
where a military escalation by U.S. and Afghan forces against the Taliban insurgency looks set to
provoke (indeed, already has been accompanied by) a bloody response from insurgents. The two crises,
which are covered in greater depth below, have both profound humanitarian consequences and
regional implications (the former feeding Bangladesh-Myanmar tensions; the latter having long involved
an array of regional and major powers). A number of high stakes elections in 2018 also carry the risk
either of bloodshed or of entrenching incumbents little inclined to accommodate their opponents.
Bangladesh is almost certain to see violence around polls scheduled for the final quarter of 2018,
particularly given the ruling Awami League’s rejection of the opposition Bangladesh National Party’s
concerns over the administration of the vote and the additional strain placed on the country by its
hosting of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees. In Cambodia, the government’s arrest and
shutdown of the opposition means polls this year are unlikely to be credible; the risk of violence
remains, particularly if younger voters feel they have no good options at the ballot box. In Pakistan,
general elections in August could bring the country’s second constitutional transfer of power. Yet, those
polls could be imperilled by a major political or security crisis, or disagreement over the composition of
the caretaker government that is to conduct them. In Afghanistan too, delayed preparations for
parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2018 have already provoked friction between
President Ashraf INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP | WATCH LIST 2018 21 Ghani’s government and his
opponents; those polls, if they take place as scheduled, almost certainly will usher a period of
heightened tension if not a full-blown political crisis. A final risk to watch is the emergence of new forms
of militancy. These might be inspired by the Islamic State (ISIS), though whether that movement will
survive the loss of its self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria and, if so, in what form, remains
uncertain. In the southern Philippines, a local militant group declaring affiliation with ISIS and bolstered
by foreign fighters captured the city of Marawi in May 2017 and held it for five months, before being
ousted by Filipino forces. The aerial destruction of Marawi by government forces, the heavy civilian toll
and the government’s glacial movement on passing a law to encode its 2014 peace deal with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front – a more established insurgent group in the southern Philippines – all risk
playing into jihadists’ hands. So too could the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh: while little
suggests that ISIS or al-Qaeda will find ready recruits among Rohingya refugees, both movements have
attempted to exploit the Rohingya’s plight to enlist followers and inspire attacks.
PAGE-24 -27-The Watch List 2018 MYANMAR
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP | WATCH LIST
2018 Myanmar/Bangladesh: A Humanitarian
Calamity and a Two-country Crisis Violent

operations by the military, border police and
vigilante groups in Myanmar have forced
some 750,000 Rohingya to flee northern
Rakhine for Bangladesh over the last twelve
months. These numbers represent more than
85 per cent of the Rohingya population in the
three affected townships. Significant bilateral
and multilateral criticism – in the UN Security
Council, General Assembly and Human Rights
Council – has failed to temper the approach of
the Myanmar government and military. The
UN, as well as the U.S. and other
governments, have declared the 2017
campaign against the Rohingya “ethnic
cleansing” and likely crimes against humanity;
some have raised the possibility that it may
constitute genocide. Several hundred
Rohingya continue to flee each week. For the
more than 100,000 who remain, as well as the
non-Rohingya population, life is extremely

difficult. Security fears, curfews and
checkpoints severely restrict civilian
movement, particularly for the Rohingya,
making it very difficult to reach farms, fishing
grounds and markets. The International
Committee of the Red Cross is exerting
enormous efforts to deliver aid to those in
need, but the government has denied access
to most other agencies, such as the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, human rights
bodies and media outlets. Myanmar also
refused to allow a UN-appointed international
fact-finding mission to visit the region and
subsequently announced it would no longer
grant visas or cooperate with the special
rapporteur on human rights. Two Reuters
journalists were arrested in Yangon on 12
December after gathering evidence of military
abuse, including information about a mass
grave; they are being held incommunicado

and face charges under the Official Secrets
Act. Continuing violence in northern Rakhine
also undermines prospects for a solution to
the crisis. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation
Army (ARSA) militant group (whose 25 August
2017 attacks triggered the crisis) claimed
responsibility for a 5 January ambush on a
military vehicle that injured five soldiers – the
first known attack by the group since the end
of its unilateral ceasefire in October. While
ARSA’s ability to sustain an insurgency
remains uncertain, even occasional minor
attacks have a major political impact,
amplifying security concerns and sharpening
anti-Rohingya sentiment. Prospects for
repatriation Many observers have expressed
concern that the November 2017 signing of a
repatriation “arrangement” between
Myanmar and Bangladesh, with a twomonth
timeframe for repatriations to start, could lead

to the premature and unsafe return of
Rohingya to northern Rakhine. For now,
however, that appears unlikely, given that the
process has stalled. Though Myanmar has
declared its readiness to commence
processing returnees through two new
reception centres as of 23 January, it has yet
to initiate much of the detailed logistical and
policy INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP |
WATCH LIST 2018 25 planning required for a
successful operation on this scale; for its part,
Bangladesh announced on 22 January that it
was postponing the start of repatriations.
Many of the 750,000 Rohingya who fled
northern Rakhine over the past year would
return under the right circumstances:
Myanmar is their home, where most have
lived for generations, and they see no future
for themselves and their children in the
Bangladesh camps. But there is unlikely to be

any voluntary repatriation in the near term.
Many refugees are still deeply traumatised
and remain fearful for their physical safety
should they return. The paramilitary Border
Guard Police, which operates only in northern
Rakhine, and Rakhine vigilante groups remain
unchecked; Rohingya blame both for
brutalities. Curfew orders and other onerous
restrictions on freedom of movement remain
in place, making it impossible to sustain
livelihoods. The prevailing political
environment also gives the Rohingya little
hope for a positive future in Myanmar. The
authorities deny most reports of abuses and
have made little effort to address fundamental
issues of desegregation, rights and citizenship.
Bangladesh’s government is wary of openly
espousing the Rohingya’s cause for fear of
stirring tensions with Myanmar and losing the
support of its main backer, India, and main

trading partner, China, both supportive of
Myanmar. It wants the refugees to return as
quickly as possible. But at the same time,
Dhaka is reluctant to force refugees to return
given domestic political dynamics ahead of the
2018 general elections and the glare of the
global media and political spotlight. The
upshot is that hundreds of thousands of
traumatised, hopeless Rohingya will remain
confined to the Bangladesh camps for the
foreseeable future, requiring a huge
humanitarian operation. Most Rohingya have
not been involved in violence and there is little
evidence of jihadist influence in their
communities. Nevertheless, their trying
circumstances could create risky new
dynamics for Bangladesh and the region.
Situation in Bangladesh Bangladesh is facing
the consequences of the fastest refugee
movement across an international border

since the Rwanda genocide in 1994. More than
one million Muslim Rohingya – a figure that
includes refugees from previous exoduses –
now live in camps near Cox’s Bazar in the
south-eastern corner of the country, close to
the border with Myanmar. The area is among
the country’s poorest. Since the influx of the
Rohingya refugees, local wages have fallen
while prices have climbed. Discontent among
local residents – now in the minority – is
rising. Camp conditions, though improving, are
still desperate: it is a major challenge to
procure water and fuel without depriving
other residents, and the threat of disease
looms. Addressing the emergency will cost
around $1 billion annually – 0.5 per cent of
Bangladesh’s GDP – and donors are paying
most of the aid bill. While relations between
Bangladesh and Myanmar are tense, there
appears to be little risk of direct conflict

between the two countries’ armies. Likewise,
in the view of Bangladeshi security forces, the
possibility of the displaced Rohingya being
recruited or used by Bangladeshi or
transnational jihadist groups is low. Perhaps
more dangerous, ahead of national elections
to be held near the end of 2018, is that the
presence of a large refugee population could
ignite the 26 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP |
WATCH LIST 2018 simmering communal
conflict among Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus
as well as ethnic minorities, especially in the
highly militarised Chittagong Hill Tracts. It also
is worth noting that these refugees – whose
presence Bangladeshi politicians privately
suggest could well be permanent – are located
in a part of the country where the influence of
Hefazat-e-Islam (Protectors of Islam), a
hardline coalition of government-allied
Islamist organisations, is strongest. The

Hefazat was first to respond to the refugee
crisis. It has since threatened to launch a jihad
against Myanmar unless it stops persecuting
the Rohingya. Hefazat has in recent years
gained significant influence over the nominally
secular Awami League, the ruling party, and
now holds effective veto power over the
government’s social and religious policies. The
gravest security risks, though, are associated
with the possibility of bungled repatriation.
While no repatriation appears likely any time
soon, the return of the Rohingya under the
wrong conditions – notably in the absence of
rights for Rohingya returning to Myanmar –
would jeopardise the lives of refugees and
prolong the crisis. The further suffering of the
Rohingya in Myanmar itself could lead foreign
jihadist fighters, notably from South Asia, to
adopt the Rohingya’s cause; Bangladesh itself
might even lend support to a cross-border

insurgency. One way to guard against this
outcome is to ensure UNHCR involvement in
any repatriation process, a demand many
Rohingya living in camps have themselves
made. But while Dhaka is not opposed to UN
involvement, it continues to seek a bilateral
arrangement with Myanmar knowing the
Myanmar government is more likely to accept
repatriation without what it would consider
intrusive international oversight. Moreover,
Bangladesh has traditionally refused to grant
stateless Rohingya refugees rights; in fact, the
government refuses to call them refugees and
threatens to move some to a flood-prone
island in the Bay of Bengal. Outside powers,
including the EU and its member states,
should not underestimate Dhaka’s willingness
to return the refugees if an opportunity
presented itself in the future – even under
conditions that are far from ideal.

Bangladesh’s current short-term policies risk
producing slum-like conditions in the camps,
which would amount to their protracted,
donor-funded confinement. The Rohingya are
barred from work and their children from
state-run schools, forcing many to work
illegally and leaving poorly regulated religious
schools as their only option. The government’s
approach is rooted in the belief that state
support in Bangladesh for the Rohingya risks
attracting more refugees. With the population
now mainly in Bangladesh, this logic no longer
holds; the government should take steps to
allow the Rohingya to better integrate
including by working and attending regular
schools. Straddling two countries and
competing preoccupations The challenge for
Bangladesh and its international partners is to
craft a longterm humanitarian response to
provide for the refugees, while maintaining

diplomatic engagement and other forms of
pressure on the Myanmar authorities to create
favourable conditions for their eventual
voluntary, safe and dignified return. At the
same time, they should start laying the
groundwork for steps toward more politically
sensitive policies, notably integration in
Bangladesh or INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
| WATCH LIST 2018 27 resettlement
elsewhere, in the most likely scenario that
voluntary repatriation proves impossible. For
now, Dhaka and many Western diplomats
resist such discussion, not wanting to ease
pressure on Myanmar; Delhi, too, rejects it,
fearing that the Rohingya may end up in India.
But given the slim prospects of the Rohingya’s
return, preparing for their potential
integration in Bangladesh – a process which
already is informally underway – and the
possibility of resettlement elsewhere would

make sense. Regional actors have critical roles
to play. China and India in particular are
among Myanmar’s and Bangladesh’s closest
international partners; neither power wishes
to see a festering two-country border conflict
in the Bay of Bengal. The EU and its member
states should engage Beijing and New Delhi to
forge a common approach to encourage
Myanmar to commit to a pathway to
citizenship for most Rohingya, in keeping with
the recommendations of the Advisory
Commission on Rakhine State headed by Kofi
Annan. The EU and its members also should
impress on Dhaka that botched repatriations
would present the greatest security risk, even
while acknowledging the enormous burden
Bangladesh is shouldering. They should work
closely with the government, UN agencies and
humanitarian organisations to determine how
best to coordinate the enormous task of

providing services and relief to the Rohingya in
the camps. These decisions should be made in
consultation with the Rohingya themselves –
including women, whose voices are even more
rarely heard, in part due to cultural barriers.
The EU pledged an additional €30 million at an
October UN conference, but funding remains
insufficient given the magnitude of what
inevitably will be a prolonged crisis.
Simultaneously, the EU and its member states
should use their diplomatic leverage to
pressure Bangladesh and Myanmar not to
implement their repatriation agreement
without adequate international oversight.
Finally, they should continue to push for
accountability, including supporting efforts to
gather the detailed evidence necessary to
identify those responsible for violence against
the Rohingya and their forced expulsion.

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EU WATCH LIST 10 / FROM EARLY WARNING TO EARLY ACTION 31 JANUARY 2018
Watch List 2018

For Europeans who have chafed at the embrace of U.S. hyper-power, resented being relegated to the part of bankroller-in-chief,
and longed for a more assertive European role on the world stage, now would seem the moment. Disengaged from some areas,
dangerously engaged in others, and disconcertingly engaged overall, the U.S. under President Donald Trump provides the
European Union (EU) and its member states with a golden opportunity to step up and step in. The challenge is doing so without
either gratuitously antagonising or needlessly deferring to Washington.
On a rst set of issues – broad policy choices and matters of values – Europe’s response has offered early promise. Its
reaf rmation of the Paris climate accord and the vigorous defence by the likes of French President Emmanuel Macron and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel of a more tolerant, less nativist form of politics and a rules-based international order were
the right form of push-back. Europe’s internal challenges, from economic woes to the dif culties of managing migration, are far
from resolved. They require European leaders to balance foreign priorities with those at home. But 2017, in some ways and with
some exceptions, was the year of the dog that didn’t bark: populists and anti-immigrants didn’t prevail in France, the
Netherlands or Germany. The threat they pose remains, yet the wave many feared was only beginning to gather force with Brexit
and Trump, for now at least, appears to have crested. This has created space for several European leaders to speak out in support
of norms the U.S. appears in danger of neglecting.
On a second set of issues U.S. policies directly clash with Europe’s interest in stability and con ict resolution. This is most
obviously the case with the Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), on which Trump’s ultimatum –
agree with us to alter the agreement or I’ll withdraw from it – requires Europe to grapple with how much it is willing to ght
back. The wise response would be to simultaneously encourage Washington to stick to the deal, reject any attempt to make
Global Overview
Crisis Group’s early-warning Watch List identi es up to ten countries and regions at risk of con ict or escalation of violence. In these
situations, early action, driven or supported by the EU and its member states, would generate stronger prospects for peace. It includes a
global overview, regional summaries, and detailed analysis on select countries and con icts.
The Watch List 2018 includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh/Myanmar, Cameroon, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Sahel, Tunisia, Ukraine and
Zimbabwe.

Europe an accomplice to its breach, while preparing for a U.S. walkout. That means immunising as much as possible economic
relations between Europe and Iran from the re-imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions. Brussels could, for example, revive
blocking regulations (prohibiting companies from complying with such sanctions) and adopt other measures to safeguard Iran’s
business ties with Europe.
A similar dynamic is at play in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Trump’s “I’ve-taken-Jerusalem-off-the-table” refrain, coupled with
his threat to withhold funding from the Palestinian Authority should President Mahmoud Abbas ignore U.S. desiderata, are
stripping Palestinians of whatever slender hope they retained in a negotiated settlement. That is reason enough for European
governments – which already have moved to plug a separate gap left by the U.S. withholding its funds for the UN agency
supporting Palestinian refugees – to work with the Palestinians on devising novel ways of advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace.
In the cases of both the JCPOA and Israel/Palestine, Europe’s objective ought to be simple: shore up bilateral relations so that
Iran and the Palestinians, despite being spurned by Washington, resist the allure of alternate and more hazardous routes – away
from the nuclear deal, in one instance, and toward violence, in the other. In the two instances, there may be only so much
Europeans can do. But they should do it.
The third category is trickiest, for it entails Europe at times breaking not solely with the U.S., but with some of its own habits as
well. Over the past several years, European foreign policy progressively has de ned itself as an extension of domestic anxieties –
mostly about terrorism and migration. That’s understandable. Political leaders can ill afford to come across as divorced from
public opinion – however revved-up and exploited for partisan purposes its apprehensions. They must make public angst at least
“ Over the past several years, European foreign policy progressively has de ned itself as an extension of domestic
anxieties – mostly about terrorism and migration. ”

OP-ED / GLOBAL 2 JANUARY 2018
10 Conflicts to Watch in 2018
From North Korea to Venezuela, here are the con icts to watch in 2018.
partly their own.
But carried too far, this runs the risk of producing a narrow and short-sighted approach. Indeed, it risks replicating in some
places the U.S.’s policy aws: too heavy a reliance on military force; unsavoury deals with autocratic leaders who pledge to
counter terrorism or stem migration; a capricious human rights policy that spares allies while penalising foes; a diminished role
for diplomacy; and the neglect of measures to address political or social factors that drive people to join violent groups or ee
their homes.
Examples of what the EU and its member states can do to counter this trend are legion, and developed in some detail in the
entries of this Watch List. But to mention a few: European leaders might use the EU’s position as Africa’s chief peace and
security partner to work with its leaders and regional organisations to help nudge the continent’s long-serving incumbents
toward peaceful transitions of power. They might more critically assess the performance of strongmen who (from President
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, to President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, or President Idriss Déby in Chad) promise aggressive
counter-terrorism operations in the hope of external leniency toward their repressive behaviour at home.
Certainly, they should ensure that the African counter-terrorism force deploying across parts of the Sahel (the G5 Sahel joint
force) – which is backed by European powers – comes hand-in-hand with local mediation efforts, lest it further militarise the
region and empower non-state proxies whose rivalries aggravate intercommunal con icts. More generally, they might see to it
that deals cut on migration (say, with Libyan militias) and alliances forged for counter-terrorism purposes don’t end up
entrenching the misrule that propels the very patterns – migration and terrorism – they aim to forestall.
In other areas, Europe could give diplomacy a shot in the arm where the U.S. appears to have abandoned it. European leaders
could press Saudi Arabia and Iran to open a channel of communication, even as the U.S. appears to encourage escalation. They
could use the leverage provided by European forces’ presence in Afghanistan to persuade Washington to pursue not military
“ Europe could give diplomacy a shot in the arm where the U.S. appears to have abandoned it. ”

Robert Malley
President & CEO
That’s a statement more easily written than believed, given the U.S. president’s erratic comportment on the world stage — his
tweets and taunts, his cavalier disregard of international accords, his readiness to undercut his own diplomats, his odd choice of
foes, and his even odder choice of friends. And yet, a more inward-looking United States and a greater international diffusion of
power, increasingly militarized foreign policy, and shrinking space for multilateralism and diplomacy are features of the
international order that predate the current occupant of the White House and look set to outlast him.
The rst trend — U.S. retrenchment — has been in the making for years, hastened by the 2003 Iraq War that, intended to
showcase American power, did more to demonstrate its limitations. Overreach abroad, fatigue at home, and a natural
rebalancing after the relatively brief period of largely uncontested U.S. supremacy in the 1990s mean the decline was likely
inevitable. Trump’s signature “America First” slogan harbors a toxic nativist, exclusionary, and intolerant worldview. His failure
to appreciate the value of alliances to U.S. interests and his occasional disparagement of traditional partners is particularly self-
defeating. His lamentations about the cost of U.S. overseas intervention lack any introspection regarding the price paid by
peoples subjected to that intervention, focusing solely on that paid by those perpetrating it. But one ought not forget that Sen.
Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) in the same election season, and Barack Obama, as a candidate in the preceding ones, both rejected
foreign entanglements and belittled nation building. Trump wasn’t shaping the public mood. He was re ecting it.
The retrenchment is a matter of degree, of course, given the approximately 200,000 active-duty U.S. troops deployed worldwide.
But in terms of ability to manipulate or mold events around the globe, U.S. in uence has been waning as power spreads to the
east and south, creating a more multipolar world in which armed nonstate actors are playing a much larger role.
Rob_Malley
It’s not all about Donald Trump.
escalation alone, but a settlement with the Taliban that involves regional powers. They also should match their criticism of
rivals’ abuses – from President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons to the Taliban’s horri c attacks on civilians – with
more forceful rebukes of those of its allies, members of the Saudi-led coalition at war in Yemen rst and foremost.
Standing up to the U.S., stepping in where it opts out, devising policies with or without it: all of this undoubtedly can attract
Washington’s ire. But the European Union and its member states ought to pay little heed. To forge a more independent and
forceful European foreign policy focused on diplomacy, de-escalation and con ict prevention at a time of uncertainty and
confusion in Washington is not to undermine the U.S., but to do it – and, more importantly, the rest of the world – a favour.
Robert Malley
President & CEO of Crisis Group
Africa
Cameroon: Electoral Uncertainty amid Multiple Security Threats
The Sahel: Promoting Political alongside Military Action
Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform?
Asia
A Dangerous Escalation in Afghanistan
Myanmar/Bangladesh: A Humanitarian Calamity and a Two-country Crisis
Europe and Central Asia
Table of Contents

The second trend, the growing militarization of foreign policy, also represents continuity as much as departure. Trump exhibits
a taste for generals and disdain for diplomats; his secretary of state has an even more curious penchant to dismember the
institution from which he derives his power. But they are magnifying a wider and older pattern. The space for diplomacy was
shrinking long before Trump’s administration took an ax to the State Department. Throughout con ict zones, leaders
increasingly appear prone to ght more than to talk — and to ght by violating international norms rather than respecting
them.
This owes much to how the rhetoric of counterterrorism has come to dominate foreign policy in theory and in practice. It has
given license to governments to rst label their armed opponents as terrorists and then treat them as such. Over a decade of
intensive Western military operations has contributed to a more permissive environment for the use of force. Many recent
con icts have involved valuable geopolitical real estate, escalating regional and major power rivalries, more outside
involvement in con icts, and the fragmentation and proliferation of armed groups. There is more to play for, more players in the
game, and less overlap among their core interests. All of these developments present obstacles to negotiated settlements.
The third trend is the erosion of multilateralism. Whereas former President Obama sought (with mixed success) to manage and
cushion America’s relative decline by bolstering international agreements — such as trade deals, the Paris climate accord, and
the Iran nuclear negotiations — President Trump recoils from all that. Where Obama opted for burden-sharing, Trump’s instinct
is for burden-shedding.
Even this dynamic, however, has deeper roots. On matters of international peace and security in particular, multilateralism has
been manhandled for years. Animosity between Russia and Western powers has rendered the United Nations Security Council
“ Over a decade of intensive Western military operations has contributed to a more permissive environment for the
use of force. ”
Ukraine: An Opportunity for Reinforced European Diplomacy
Latin America and Caribbean
Security and Electoral Perils for Colombia’s Peace Accord
Middle East and North Africa
Egypt’s Expanding Jihadist Threat
Iraq’s Pre-election Turmoil
Strengthening Institutions in Tunisia
In 2018, Africa faces some all-too-familiar peace and security challenges: tense winner-take-all elections that risk provoking
violence; authoritarian drift that erodes institutions and generates rebellions; and low-intensity insurgencies that create
humanitarian crises. Meanwhile, the spat between Gulf powers – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on one side, and
Qatar, on the other – threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa. 2018 also promises to be an important year for Europe’s
relations with Africa, particularly in the light of the Cotonou Agreement renegotiations.
Eighteen countries are expected to hold presidential, parliamentary or local elections in 2018. In many of these places, either
politics is zero-sum, raising the stakes and risking violence around the polls; or power is heavily skewed toward the ruling party,
often sowing the seeds of future con ict. Three elections to watch are in Cameroon, Zimbabwe – both covered in the entry below
– and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Cameroon’s contest is complicated by an insurrection in its Anglophone region
and Boko Haram violence in the Far North. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s unexpected departure offers the chance to
Africa
Critical elections and democratic backsliding

impotent on major con icts since at least the 2011 Libya intervention; that animosity now infects debates on most crises on the
council’s agenda. Trump is not the only leader emphasizing bilateral arrangements and ad hoc alliances above multilateral
diplomacy and intergovernmental institutions.
Then again, much of it is about Trump, inescapably.
The most ominous threats in 2018 — nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula and a spiraling confrontation pitting the United
States and its allies against Iran — could both be aggravated by Trump’s actions, inactions, and idiosyncrasies. U.S. demands (in
the North Korean case, denuclearization; in Iran’s, unilateral renegotiation of the nuclear deal or Tehran’s regional retreat) are
unrealistic without serious diplomatic engagement or reciprocal concessions. In the former, Washington could face the prospect
of provoking a nuclear war in order to avoid one, and in the latter, there is the possibility of jeopardizing a nuclear deal that is
succeeding for the sake of a confrontation with Iran that almost certainly will not.
(A third potential ashpoint that didn’t make it into our top 10 — because it came so late and was so unexpected and gratuitous
— is the Jerusalem powder keg. At the time of writing, it has not yet exploded, perhaps because when one is as hopeless as the
Palestinians there is little hope left to be dashed. Still, the Trump administration’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital
of Israel for purely domestic political reasons, with no conceivable foreign-policy gain and a risk of explosion, must rank as a
prime example of diplomatic malpractice.)
As with all trends, there are countervailing ones often propelled by discomfort that the dominant trends provoke. Europeans are
defending the Iranian nuclear deal and may end up deepening their own common security and strategic independence, President
Emmanuel Macron is testing the reach of French diplomacy, and international consensus on action against climate change has
held. Perhaps African states, already leading efforts to manage crises on the continent, will step up in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo or another of the continent’s major con icts. Perhaps they or another assortment of actors could make the case for
more engagement and dialogue and for defusing crises rather than exacerbating them.
These may seem slender reeds on which to rest our hopes. But, as the following list of the International Crisis Group’s top 10
con icts to watch in 2018 unhappily illustrates, and for now at least, they may well be the only reeds we have.
reverse the country’s economic crisis, but signi cant reforms are needed to ensure a level playing eld, a credible vote and thus
a government with a strong mandate to begin to repair the damage of his 37-year rule. In the DRC, President Joseph Kabila’s
extension of his tenure in of ce – he should have left in December 2016 – has already provoked a political crisis; even getting to
elections now scheduled for the end of 2018 will be hard, and the vote itself is likely to be contentious.
Democratic backsliding and authoritarian drift remain sources of instability. The Ugandan parliament’s December decision to
remove the presidential age limit will allow President Yoweri Museveni to run for a sixth term in 2021; longstanding and
seemingly mounting grievances against his continued rule are feeding popular discontent. One-person or one-party rule and the
closure of political space in Chad and Ethiopia risks stoking similar problems. All three governments enjoy signi cant Western
support, related to the role their security forces play in Western-backed military operations across the continent. But if these
governments are perceived as reliable security partners abroad, they increasingly deepen problems at home and behave in ways
that foment rebellion.
The Gulf crisis, pitting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on one side, against Qatar (and, indirectly, Turkey) on
the other, has spilled into Africa, particularly the Horn, complicating relations among states and often aggravating instability.
Even preceding that crisis, both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, propelled partly by the Saudi-led war in Yemen, had signed military
cooperation agreements with various states in the Horn – Saudi Arabia with Djibouti and Sudan; the UAE with Eritrea, Somalia
and Somaliland – thus strengthening their relations and presence on the Red Sea. Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland allowed their
airstrips and ports to be used as military logistics hubs. Both Sudan, which curtailed its ties with Iran to join the Saudi coalition,
and Somalia committed forces to the Yemen campaign.
The Saudi and Emirati spat with Qatar, however, put this expansion in a new light. Most Horn of Africa states have traditionally
pursued good relations across the Gulf. Now they are under pressure to pick sides. Gulf powers’ competition has rekindled old
hostilities and sown new tension between Sudan and Egypt, Egypt and Ethiopia, and Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Somalia may be most vulnerable. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt (which largely aligns with the Saudis and Emiratis), Turkey and
Spillover from the Gulf

North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing coupled with the White House’s bellicose rhetoric make the threat of war on the
Korean Peninsula — even a catastrophic nuclear confrontation — higher now than at any time in recent history. Pyongyang’s
sixth nuclear test in September 2017 and the increasing range of its missiles clearly demonstrate its determination to advance
its nuclear program and intercontinental strike capability. From the United States, meanwhile, comes careless saber-rattling and
confusing signals about diplomacy.
Kim Jong Un’s push for nuclear arms is driven partly by fear that without such deterrence he risks being deposed by outside
powers and partly by perceived threats inside North Korea, notably elite rivalries, the tightly managed but still unpredictable
impact of economic reform, and his dif culty in controlling information ow — including from foreign media channels.
The aggressive tone from Washington re ects equal urgency in the opposite direction. At least some senior of cials believe
North Korea must be prevented at all costs from advancing its nuclear program, in particular from being able to strike the
continental United States with a missile carrying a nuclear payload. After crossing that threshold, they believe, Kim Jong Un will
conclude that he can deter Washington from protecting its allies and thus impose demands — from lifting trade restrictions to
expelling U.S. troops, all the way to Korean reuni cation on his terms. Those same of cials appear convinced that he can be
dissuaded from retaliating in the event of limited, targeted military action.
For now, the United States is implementing a “maximum pressure strategy”: corralling the Security Council into tougher
sanctions, pressing China to do more to strangle its neighbor’s economy, conducting large Air Force and Navy drills, and
signaling directly or through congressional allies that it does not fear military confrontation. Despite con icting messages from
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the Trump administration is making clear that it is not interested in talks whose goal would be
anything short of North Korea’s denuclearization, an objective as worthy as it is delusional. As the White House sees it, the
approach is working: U.S. military action is no longer unimaginable for either North Korea or China. It hopes the former will be
compelled to back down and the latter will get them there.
But this approach means a race against time — with Washington almost certainly on the losing side. Restrictive measures will
1. North Korea
Qatar are all big donors and investors. Attempts by Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” to steer a neutral
course prompted Gulf powers, notably the UAE, to directly approach Somalia’s federal states, thus bypassing Mogadishu and
aggravating tension between the capital and local governments. In December 2017, Farmajo’s suspicions that the UAE was
actively fomenting opposition triggered a crackdown on politicians accused of receiving Emirati funds. The Gulf spat has thus
split Somalia’s government and institutions into two feuding camps, further eroding modest gains made to stabilise the country
that, even before that crisis, were tenuous.
Even more perilous to regional stability is mounting tension between Sudan and Egypt, whose relations a disputed border region
and trade quarrels had already strained. Relations have been further tested by Khartoum’s willingness to allow members of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to visit and consult with sympathetic groups in Sudan following their 2013 expulsion from Egypt
after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power. Khartoum accuses Egypt of arming Sudanese rebels from Darfur now active
in southern Libya, where they ght as mercenaries for the Egypt-backed Libyan National Army. Cairo strenuously denies the
accusation.
Ethiopia and Eritrea – the region’s most intractable enemies – have been drawn in. Ethiopia’s decision to construct a dam on the
Blue Nile, thus affecting the ow of water downstream, has increased tensions with Egypt. In response, Cairo has strengthened
ties to Eritrea and South Sudan – the latter of which Ethiopia sees as being within its own sphere of in uence – deepening Addis
Ababa’s unease. Frequent, usually technical negotiations reduce the likelihood of a water war. But Turkish President Recep
Erdoğan’s visit to Sudan at the end of December 2017 risks upsetting the fragile equilibrium. Turkey, already a big player in
Somalia, rival of Egypt under Sisi and supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, signed a deal to develop the ancient Ottoman port
of Suakin on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Cairo sees this move as a direct challenge to its own in uence. Soon after Erdoğan’s visit,
unveri ed reports emerged of an Egyptian military deployment at the Eritrean military base of Sawa, near the Sudanese border.
The story precipitated an announcement by Khartoum that it had closed the Eritrea border and deployed thousands of militias
east.
“ Given cross-regional dynamics, the EU should redouble efforts to coordinate internally among the regional divisions
of its own European External Action Service (EEAS) and between the EEAS and other services. ”

pp g g y g
not bite immediately, and they will bite the North Korean leadership last; ordinary citizens will suffer sooner and worse. Feeling
threatened, Pyongyang is more likely to accelerate weapons development than halt or slow it. Both China and South Korea
support tighter sanctions and are as frustrated with Pyongyang as they are alarmed by the prospect of U.S. military action. But
South Korea has little power to alter the situation, China’s willingness to pressure North Korea may be reaching its limit, and its
in uence over a ercely independent neighbor resentful of its reliance on Beijing is easily overstated. While Chinese President
Xi Jinping fears the prospect of war on the peninsula bringing chaos, a possibly U.S.-aligned regime, and U.S. troops to his
doorstep, he also fears that squeezing Pyongyang could precipitate turmoil that could spill over into China.
Without a viable diplomatic offramp, Washington risks cornering itself into military action. Even a precisely targeted attack
would likely provoke a North Korean response. While Pyongyang would think twice before initiating a conventional strike on
Seoul, it could take other steps: an attack on a soft South Korean target; an asymmetric strike against U.S. assets on or around
the peninsula; or crippling cyberattacks. These might not immediately trigger regional con ict, but they would provoke an
unpredictable escalation.
A successful diplomatic initiative ultimately will need to address two competing preoccupations: U.S. and wider international
fears of what the Pyongyang regime would do with an advanced nuclear capacity, and the regime’s fear of what might happen to
it without one. The U.S. government should marry its sanctions and those of the U.N. to a clear and realistic political goal. An
incremental solution could include pauses on North Korean testing of its missile system or weapons, before Pyongyang crosses
what the White House sees as a red line; the United States agreeing to less provocative military exercises; and consensus on
humanitarian support even as sanctions kick in. That might not satisfy anyone. But at least it would provide the space needed to
explore a more durable resolution.
This rivalry will likely eclipse other Middle Eastern fault lines in 2018. It is enabled and exacerbated by three parallel
developments: the consolidation of the authority of Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s assertive crown prince; the Trump
administration’s more aggressive strategy toward Iran; and the end of the Islamic State’s territorial control in Iraq and Syria,
which allows Washington and Riyadh to aim the spotlight more rmly on Iran.
2. U.S.-Saudi-Iran Rivalry
Whether the escalation was genuine or a means for Khartoum to distract attention from an economic crisis at home remains to
be seen. Clearly, though, Gulf and Middle Eastern politics are having a profound impact on the Horn. The African Union (AU)
has expressed unease at growing geopolitical tensions in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and mooted a joint Gulf-Horn summit in
2018. These dynamics should be watched carefully in 2018. At present, with U.S. in uence declining and the UN Security Council
divided, the European Union (EU) is one of few actors that could help prevent inadvertent con ict escalation among these many
actors, by positioning itself as an honest broker and potentially pushing for discrete con dence-building measures. Given cross-
regional dynamics, the EU should redouble efforts to coordinate internally among the regional divisions of its own European
External Action Service (EEAS) and between the EEAS and other services. Another war in the Horn would have disastrous
humanitarian consequences and undercut Europe’s efforts to counter terrorism and control the ow of migrants.
Europe’s relations with Africa

https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-watch-list-2018?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=e5720f95fa-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_01_29&utm_medium=em… 10/78
The contours of a U.S./Saudi strategy (with an important Israeli assist) are becoming clear. It is based on an overriding
assumption that Iran has exploited passive regional and international actors to bolster its position in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and
Lebanon. Washington and Riyadh seek to re-establish a sense of deterrence by convincing Tehran that it will pay at least as high
a price for its actions as it can in ict on its adversaries.
The strategy seems to involve multiple forms of pressure to contain, squeeze, exhaust, and ultimately push back Iran. It has an
economic dimension (via U.S. sanctions); a diplomatic one (witness vocal U.S. and Saudi denunciations of Iran’s regional
behavior and Riyadh’s ham-handed attempt to force Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation); and a military one (so
far exerted principally by Saudi Arabia in Yemen and by Israel in Syria).
Whether it will work is another question. Although recent protests in Iran have introduced a new and unpredictable variable,
Tehran and its partners still appear to be in a strong position. The Bashar al-Assad regime, backed by Russian air power, is
prevailing in Syria. Across Iraq, Iran-linked Shiite militias are entrenching themselves in state institutions. In Yemen, Tehran’s
relatively small investment in backing the Houthis has helped them weather the Saudi-led campaign and even launch missiles of
unprecedented range and accuracy into Saudi territory.
Despite demonstrating its resolve to confront Iran and its partners, Riyadh has been unable to alter the balance of power.
Forcing Hariri’s resignation back red, not just because he later withdrew it, but also because all of Lebanon united against the
move and Hariri then inched closer to Lebanese President Michel Aoun and Hezbollah. In Yemen, Riyadh turned the Houthis and
former President Ali Abdullah Saleh against each other, but in doing so further fragmented the country and complicated the
search for a settlement and a face-saving Saudi exit from a war that is enormously costly not only to Yemenis but also to
Riyadh’s international standing. The Trump administration confronts similar obstacles. Thus far its belligerence, refusal to
certify the nuclear deal, threats of new sanctions, and launching of several strikes at and near regime targets in Syria have done
little to reverse Tehran’s reach.
With so many ashpoints, and so little diplomacy, the risk of an escalatory cycle is great: Any move — new U.S. sanctions that
Iran would see as violating the nuclear deal; a Houthi missile strike hitting Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, for which Washington and
Riyadh would hold Tehran responsible; or an Israeli strike in Syria that kills Iranians — could trigger a broader confrontation.
2018 also will be an important year for Europe’s relations with the continent. By September, the EU must begin renegotiating the
Cotonou Agreement, its partnership with 79 African, Caribbean and Paci c countries, which expires in 2020. The agreement’s
development fund nances the African Peace Facility, which supports many of the AU’s peace and security activities. Agreeing
on a new funding mechanism that is predictable – to enable the AU to do more medium-term planning – but also exible,
allowing for new initiatives and adaptation to emerging threats, is vital.
Renegotiations over Cotonou and the EU’s development aid come as European policy in parts of Africa appears increasingly
military-centric. Motives driving European support for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, established chie y to ght jihadists across the
Sahel, are understandable: military action must be an important component of the response to such groups which pose a threat
to UN peacekeepers that they cannot confront alone. But, as examined below, the force risks stirring up a hornet’s nest unless
accompanied by support for negotiated political settlements, local peacebuilding and steps to minimise the risk that
sponsorship of militias might aggravate local con icts. Increased Western military support also could reinforce the authoritarian
tendencies of some Sahel leaders. Excessive militarisation risks worsening – terrorism and migration – the very trends Europe
wishes to curb.
Cameroon’s governance and security problems for many years have attracted little outside attention. But the country now faces
Crisis Group's Program Director for Africa Comfort Ero explains why the African Union-European Union summit in Abidjan on November 2017 provides a
crucial chance to reset relations between the two institutions after a painful 2016.
CRISISGROUP
AU-EU summit an opportunity to reset relations
Cameroon: Electoral Uncertainty amid Multiple Security Threats

Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis has entered a dangerous new phase, threatening Myanmar’s hard-won democratic transition, its
stability, and that of Bangladesh and the region as a whole.
An August attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a militant group in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, prompted a
brutal and indiscriminate military response targeting the long-mistreated Muslim Rohingya community. That assault led to a
massive refugee exodus, with at least 655,000 Rohingya eeing for Bangladesh. The U.N. called the operation a “textbook
example” of ethnic cleansing. The government has heavily restricted humanitarian aid to the area, and international goodwill
toward Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s Nobel Peace Prize-winning state counsellor, has dissipated. Her government retains its
hard-line stance toward the Rohingya and resists concessions on even immediate humanitarian issues. In this, it has the support
of the population, which has embraced the Buddhist nationalist and anti-Rohingya rhetoric disseminated through state and
social media.
Pressure from the U.N. Security Council is critical, and Western governments are moving toward targeted sanctions, which are a
key signal that such actions cannot go unpunished. Unfortunately, these sanctions are unlikely to have a signi cant positive
impact on Myanmar’s policies. The focus is rightly on the right of refugees to return in a voluntary, safe and, digni ed manner.
In reality, however, and notwithstanding a late-November Bangladesh/Myanmar repatriation agreement, the refugees will not
return unless Myanmar restores security for all communities, grants the Rohingya freedom of movement as well as access to
services and other rights, and allows humanitarian and refugee agencies unfettered access.
While publicly, Bangladesh’s government is trying to persuade Myanmar to take the refugees back, privately it acknowledges the
hopelessness of that endeavor. It has neither de ned policies nor taken operational decisions on how to manage more than a
million Rohingya in its southeast, along the Myanmar border, in the medium- to long-term. International funding for an under-
resourced emergency operation will run out in February. All this — indeed, the very presence of a large population of stateless
refugees — creates enormous dangers for Bangladesh. Con ict between refugees and a host community that is heavily
outnumbered in parts of the southeast and faces rising prices and falling wages is an immediate risk. The refugees’ presence also
could be used to stoke communal con ict or aggravate political divisions ahead of elections expected in late 2018.
3. The Rohingya Crisis: Myanmar and Bangladesh
violence in three regions: the Far North, where Boko Haram continues to mount small-scale attacks, as well as the Northwest
and Southwest, where an incipient Anglophone insurgency emerged in 2017. Added to this ambient insecurity is a refugee crisis
in the East and Adamaoua, to which 236,000 people from the Central African Republic have ed militia battles. Elections
scheduled for October 2018 will be a major test, as will the eventual transfer of power away from President Paul Biya, now 85.
2018 is a crucial moment for the international community, and in particular the EU and its member states, to engage in early
action and prevent further escalation.
Boko Haram, active in Cameroon’s Far North since 2014, has killed about 1,800 civilians and 175 soldiers, kidnapped around
1,000 people and burned and looted many villages, while the con ict has displaced some 242,000 and badly disrupted the local
economy. Some 91,000 Nigerians have ed Boko Haram-related violence in Nigeria to Cameroon. Though battered by security
forces and riven by internal divisions, Boko Haram remains a threat in the Far North: in 2017 the group has killed at least 27
soldiers and gendarmes, as well as 210 civilians. It could regain strength if Cameroonian authorities neglect the crisis.
Boko Haram ghters and associates have surrendered in increasing numbers. Dozens of former militants have been sent home,
after swearing on the Quran they would not rejoin the group. About 80 others are being held at a military camp in Mayo Sava. To
encourage more such surrenders, authorities should avoid blanket stigmatisation and differentiate between hard-core ghters
and others. The government also needs to develop a clear plan to counter the appeal of the jihadist ideas that some of the Boko
Haram ghters that have given themselves up or been captured continue to espouse. Effective justice and reintegration
mechanisms are lacking. Hundreds of supposed Boko Haram members are currently in pre-trial detention, a situation that risks
fuelling their further radicalisation; their status should be resolved as swiftly as possible. Authorities also should seek to
implement exible, locally-informed mechanisms to facilitate the social reintegration of former Boko Haram ghters and
encourage new surrenders. Leaving this to the whims of ad-hoc local efforts is inadvisable: given the destruction wreaked by the
Boko Haram: still a threat to a neglected region
“ The war against Boko Haram has strained local communities, given rise to humanitarian crises and highlighted the
need for longer-term development. ”

There are risks, too, for Myanmar. ARSA could regroup. It or even transnational groups exploiting the Rohingya cause or
recruiting among the displaced could launch cross-border attacks, escalating both Muslim-Buddhist tension in Rakhine state
and friction between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Any attack outside Rakhine would provoke broader Buddhist-Muslim tension
and violence across the country. Acknowledging the crisis, implementing recommendations of the Ko Annan-led Advisory
Commission on Rakhine State, and disavowing divisive narratives would put the Myanmar government — and its people — on a
better path.
With 8 million people on the brink of famine, 1 million declared cholera cases, and over 3 million internally displaced persons,
the Yemen war could escalate further in 2018. After a period of rising tensions, dueling rallies, and armed assaults, former
President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced in December that his General People’s Congress was abandoning its partnership with
the Houthis in favor of the Saudi-led coalition. Saleh paid for it with his life; he was killed immediately by his erstwhile partners.
Saudi Arabia and its allies — believing that the Houthi/General People’s Congress split opens new opportunities and still
convinced a military solution exists — will likely intensify their campaign at a huge cost to civilians. Iran will keep nding ample
opportunity to keep the Saudis bogged down, and the more anarchic Yemen’s north becomes, the more likely that violence is to
bleed across the border. The Houthis will continue to take the ght to the Saudi homefront, ring missiles toward Riyadh and
threatening other Gulf states.
Negotiations, already a distant prospect, have become more complicated. The Houthis, feeling simultaneously emboldened and
embattled, could adopt a more uncompromising stance. The General People’s Congress, a pragmatic centrist party, could
fragment further. The south is divided, owing partly to the widening rift between forces loyal to Yemeni President Abed Rabbo
Mansour Hadi and southern separatists backed by the United Arab Emirates.
There are signs of mounting U.S. discomfort with the indiscriminate Saudi bombardment and the blockade of Houthi-controlled
territories. But the Trump administration’s belligerent rhetoric toward Iran encourages all the wrong tendencies in Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia and its allies should instead lift the blockade of Yemen and reopen civilian airports. Politically, there should be a
new Security Council resolution providing for a balanced settlement The Saudis are loath to concede anything to a group they
4. Yemen
insurgency, communities are highly resentful, and poorly conceived reintegration schemes could sow the seeds of future
problems. This is in contrast to neighbouring Chad, where local communities seem to be integrating former militants somewhat
successfully on an informal basis. The EU should encourage national authorities, both in Yaounde and in regional capitals, to
elaborate and implement their own plans to manage the demobilisation of former Boko Haram members.
The war against Boko Haram has strained local communities, given rise to humanitarian crises and highlighted the need for
longer-term development. In 2018, Cameroon’s international partners, including the EU, should provide further humanitarian
assistance in the Far North, focused on strengthening support to displaced persons and host families as well as supporting the
voluntary return of Nigerian refugees. Where required, emergency operations should continue, but humanitarian efforts should
also evolve into a more sustainable development approach.
The challenge is to stimulate the local economy without lling the coffers of Boko Haram, which taxes local trade and whose
recruitment efforts in the past have been facilitated in part by offering small business loans and other nancial incentives.
Achieving the right balance will be dif cult. But European support for small businesses within the formal and informal
economies could help undercut local backing for Boko Haram. Separately, while Yaounde has long controlled the Far North by
co-opting local notables, Boko Haram’s spread into Cameroon was partly facilitated by tapping into anger at local elites, thereby
demonstrating the limits of that approach. Instead, Cameroon’s partners should encourage the state to reassert its presence in
the north in a participatory and inclusive manner rather than through proxies, including via development projects that boost
local earning potential.
The crisis in the Anglophone regions (the Northwest and Southwest), which started as a sectoral protest, is rapidly developing
into an armed insurgency, following the Cameroonian security forces’ violent repression on 22 September and 1 October. While
there are hardliners among the militants, the government bears a large share of the responsibility for the con ict. It failed to
recognise the legitimacy of Anglophone grievances; its security forces committed widespread abuses; and it imprisoned many
peaceful activists in early 2017.
Several small “self-defence” groups (the Tigers, Ambaland forces and Vipers, to name a few) now operate alongside two armed
The Anglophone crisis: an insurgency in the making

new Security Council resolution providing for a balanced settlement. The Saudis are loath to concede anything to a group they
consider an Iranian proxy, but were they to embrace a realistic peace initiative, the onus would shift to the Houthis to accept it.
The War in Afghanistan looks set to intensify in 2018. The United States’ new Afghanistan strategy raises the tempo of
operations against the Taliban insurgency, with more U.S. forces, ercer U.S. airstrikes, and more aggressive ground offensives
by Afghan forces. The aim, according to senior of cials, is to halt the Taliban’s momentum and, eventually, force it into a
political settlement. For now, though, the strategy is almost exclusively military.
This strategy faces serious obstacles. While hitting the Taliban harder might bring tactical gains, it is unlikely to change the
war’s course or the incentives of a locally rooted and potent insurgency. The Taliban currently controls or is contesting more
territory than at any time since 2001; it is better equipped and, even if pressured through conventional ghting, it would retain
the ability to mount spectacular urban attacks that erode con dence in the government. Besides, between 2009 and 2012, the
Taliban withstood more than 100,000 U.S. troops.
Military leaders contend that this time will be different because Trump, unlike Obama, has not set a withdrawal date. That
argument holds little water. It also misreads the insurgency: Battle eld losses in the past have not impacted Taliban leaders’
willingness to negotiate. Forthcoming Afghan elections (a parliamentary poll is slated for July 2018; a presidential vote is due in
2019) will suck oxygen from the military campaign. Every vote since 2004 has ignited some form of crisis, and political discord
today is particularly severe, with President Ashraf Ghani accused by his critics of monopolizing power in the hands of a few
advisors.
The strategy also underplays regional shifts. Thus far, U.S. regional diplomacy has centered on pressuring Pakistan; yet the
calculations that motivate Islamabad’s support for the insurgency are unlikely to change. The Taliban also now enjoys ties to
Iran and Russia, which claim to view it as a bulwark against an Islamic State branch in Afghanistan that is small but resilient—
and also capable of mounting high-pro le attacks. Washington’s militarized approach and diminished diplomacy risk signaling
to those countries that it seeks not to stabilize and leave Afghanistan but to maintain a military presence. Given that they are
likely to perceive such a presence as a threat to their own interests, it could lead them to increase support for insurgents. Nor
does U S diplomacy on Afghanistan currently involve China whose increasing clout in parts of South Asia will make it critical to
5. Afghanistan
militias: the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) and the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces. Since November 2017, these groups
have launched low-intensity attacks that have killed at least 22 and injured 25 among soldiers and gendarmes. An unknown
number of separatist ghters have died in these clashes. The military crackdown also exacted a large humanitarian toll and
involved signi cant human rights violations. The violence has left at least 90 civilians since October 2016. Around a thousand
have been arrested, with 400 still in jail. More than 30,000 Anglophones are refugees in Nigeria and tens of thousands have been
internally displaced.
Given that the crisis is rooted in historically grounded identity-based grievances, notably the strong sentiment among
Anglophones that they have been politically and economically marginalised, there will be no easy resolution. The government
will need to change course and negotiate in good faith. The government’s refusal to launch a dialogue with peaceful Anglophone
leaders has corroded the community’s trust in state institutions and provoked escalating violence. The crisis also illustrates the
limits of the country’s centralised governance model, which show signs of atrophy. Discontent is still mounting in Anglophone
areas. Reports suggest that some members of the security forces are joining the insurgency.
A direct dialogue between the government and Anglophone community leaders is critical to de-escalate the crisis, particularly
ahead of the October elections. A wider conversation, which should include discussion of different models of decentralisation
and federalism, is also important, given the failings of the current model. The EU and its member states should take advantage
of the government’s concern about its international image and desire to preserve cooperation with them to nudge it toward
direct talks and a national dialogue.

does U.S. diplomacy on Afghanistan currently involve China, whose increasing clout in parts of South Asia will make it critical to
any settlement.
It is true that demonstrating sustained U.S. support might reinforce the morale of the Afghan Army; a precipitous withdrawal, in
contrast, could trigger chaos. But as the battle eld tempo increases, the Trump administration should keep lines of
communication to the insurgency open and explore the contours of a settlement with Afghanistan’s neighbors and other
regional powers, however slim prospects currently appear. U.S. allies in Afghanistan should push for a greater diplomatic
political component to the U.S. strategy. As it stands, that strategy sets the stage for more violence while closing avenues for de-
escalation. Afghan civilians will pay the price.
After nearly seven years of war, President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has the upper hand, thanks largely to Iranian and Russian
backing. But the ghting is not over. Large swaths of the country remain outside regime control, regional and international
powers disagree on a settlement, and Syria is an arena for the rivalry between Iran and its enemies. As the Islamic State is
ousted from the east, prospects for escalation elsewhere will increase.
In eastern Syria, rival campaigns by pro-regime forces (supported by Iran-backed militias and Russian airpower) and the
Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (the SDF, backed by the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition), have forced an Islamic State
retreat. In Syria and Iraq, Islamic State remnants have retreated into the desert to await new opportunities.
For the regime and the SDF, the ght against the Islamic State was a means to an end. The two aimed to capture territory and
resources, but also to build on those gains — the regime by consolidating control; the Kurds by pressing for maximal autonomy.
Thus far, the two sides mostly have avoided confrontation. With the Islamic State gone, the risks will increase.
The east is also perilous due to wider U.S.-Iran rivalry and the close proximity of these rival forces. Iranian gains, particularly the
corridor linking regime-held parts of Syria to government-controlled Iraq, could provoke the U.S. to attempt to block what it
views as a dangerous land bridge from Iran to the Mediterranean. Iran might target U.S. forces to retaliate against U.S. actions
elsewhere or to push the United States out altogether
6. Syria

elsewhere or to push the United States out altogether.
In the southwest, Israel could view Iran-backed militias operating on and near the Golan Heights as a direct threat and take
military action to push them back. Whether Moscow can prevent any Iranian or Hezbollah presence there, as it has pledged to
do, is unclear. Israel may take matters into its own hands, striking Iran-allied forces. That pattern — prodding by Iran, pushback
by Israel — could last for some time. But a wider confrontation is only one miscalculation away and could quickly spread beyond
Syria, to Lebanon.
One of the gravest immediate dangers, however, is the possibility of an offensive by the Assad regime in Syria’s northwest, where
rebel-held areas are home to some 2 million Syrians and into which Turkey has deployed military observers as part of a de-
escalation deal with Iran and Russia. Regime and allied forces appear to have shifted some attention from the east to those
areas, placing that deal under stress. A regime offensive in the northwest could provoke massive destruction and displacement.
Weak states across the Sahel region are struggling to manage an overlapping mix of intercommunal con ict, jihadi violence, and
ghting over smuggling routes. Their leaders’ predation and militarized responses often make things worse.
Mali’s 2012 crisis — which saw the Malian army routed from the country’s north, a coup that overthrew the government, and
jihadis holding northern towns for almost a year — illustrates how quickly things can unravel. Since then, implementation of a
peace deal that aimed to end that crisis has stalled, while instability has spread from the north to Mali’s central region as well as
parts of neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso.
Dynamics in each place are local, but governments’ lack of authority and their inability to stem — and, at times, their frequent
contribution to — violence is a common theme. Weapons that ooded the region as Libya collapsed after Muammar al-Qadda ’s
overthrow have made local quarrels deadlier. The instability has opened a rich vein for jihadis, who piggyback on intercommunal
con ict or use Islam to frame struggles against traditional authorities.
7. The Sahel
Most of the country’s security threats stem, at least in part, from bad governance and an over-centralised political system. While
the 2018 elections are likely to see the ruling party retain power, a vote perceived as manipulated or unfair could further
diminish its legitimacy, making it even more remote from citizens and feeding greater levels of violence. Election season will be
an especially risky time if, as appears likely, Anglophone militants attempt to disrupt the balloting in the Northwest and
Southwest regions, and possibly elsewhere.
More broadly, while many local activists and international actors see an eventual transition from President Biya, whose party
dominates the government, as a prerequisite for improvements in governance, they also fear that his departure could trigger
instability. European and other foreign powers should start laying the groundwork for a peaceful transfer of power; the longer
the situation deteriorates, the harder it will be to pick up the pieces. They have two opportunities to do so in 2018: rst, by
supporting dialogue between the Biya government and Anglophone leaders, as described above; and, second, by working with
Cameroon’s electoral body (ELECAM) and pressing the government to permit, and then deploy, election observers to protect the
integrity of the vote, as best possible, and thus build con dence in the electoral system. Even small gains in these areas would
help mend the frayed contract between the Cameroonian state and its citizens.
The Sahel region faces particularly acute challenges. Rural insurgencies across parts of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are
expanding. Jihadi groups exploit local con icts to secure safe havens and win new recruits. Other militias are being formed,
whether to defend communities, conduct criminal activities or both. Sahelian states, supported by Western powers, rely ever
more heavily on force. The new G5 Sahel joint force (FC-G5S), encompassing army units from ve Sahelian states, must avoid
angering local communities and stoking local con icts. It should be accompanied by local mediation and peacebuilding
initiatives, outreach to communities and, where possible, efforts to engage militant leaders.
Uncertainties ahead
The Sahel: Promoting Political alongside Military Action
Mali’s stalemated peace process

As the situation has degenerated, the regional and international response has focused excessively on military solutions.
Europeans in particular view the region as a threat to their own safety and a source of migration and terrorism. In late 2017, a
new French-backed force known as the G5 Sahel — comprising troops from Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania —
prepared to deploy into a eld already crowded by France’s own counterterrorism operations, U.S. Special Forces, and U.N.
peacekeepers. While military action must play a part in reducing jihadis’ in uence, the G5 force raises more questions than
it answers. It lacks a clear de nition of the enemy, instead envisaging operations against an array of jihadis, traf ckers, and
other criminals. Disrupting smuggling in regions where that business represents the backbone of local economies could alienate
communities. Regional leaders also appear likely to misuse military aid to shore up their own power.
To avoid further deterioration, military efforts must be accompanied by a political strategy that rests on winning the support of
local populations and defusing rather than aggravating local disputes. Opening or restoring lines of communication with some
militant leaders should not be ruled out, if doing so can help diminish violence.
President Joseph Kabila’s determination to hold on to power threatens to escalate the crisis in Congo and a humanitarian
emergency that is already among the world’s worst. At the end of 2016, the Saint Sylvester agreement appeared to offer a way
out, requiring elections by the end of 2017, after which Kabila would leave power (his second and, according to the Congolese
Constitution, nal term in of ce should have ended December 2016). Over the past year, however, his regime has backtracked,
exploiting the Congolese opposition’s disarray and waning international attention and reneging on a power-sharing deal. In
November, the election commission announced a new calendar — with a vote at the end of 2018, extending Kabila’s rule for at
least another year.
The most likely course in 2018 is gradual deterioration. But there are worse scenarios. As the regime clamps down, fails to secure
parts of the country, and stokes instability in others, the risk of a steeper descent into chaos remains — with grave regional
implications.
There are already troubling signs. Popular discontent raises the risk of unrest in urban centers; in recent days, the violent
dispersal of protesters in Kinshasa and other towns has left several people dead. Elsewhere, local militias plague several
8. Democratic Republic of Congo
In Mali, the epicentre of the Sahel crisis, implementation of the June 2015 Bamako peace agreement that aimed to turn the page
on the country’s 2012-2013 crisis, has stalled. Having acted as chief broker of the agreement, Algiers appears to have lost
interest in leading the process. No African or other actor has stepped in.
Malian leaders’ attention has shifted to the July 2018 presidential election. In parts of the country, particularly central and
northern Mali, a credible vote appears a remote prospect, due to insecurity and state weakness. But any attempt to postpone the
vote would likely spark street protests: President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta has struggled both to restore security and stimulate
development, and is increasingly unpopular even in his core constituencies of Bamako and other southern cities.
Nor have state authorities, ousted from much of the north during the 2012-2013 crisis, returned. Security continues to
deteriorate in central Mali (Mopti region) and further south (Segou region), fuelling tension among communities. Jihadist
groups capitalise on local disputes in rural areas, recruiting new ghters and launching attacks against national and
international forces. Their reach is extending into neighbouring countries.
An expanding crisis
REPORT 12 OCTOBER 2017
REPORT 6 SEPTEMBER 2016
Related Content
The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso’s North
“ Jihadist groups capitalise on local disputes in rural areas. ”

d spe sa o p oteste s s asa a d ot e tow s as e t seve a peop e dead. sew e e, oca t as p ague seve a
provinces. Fighting over the past year in the Kasai region has reportedly left more than 3,000 dead, and the con ict in the
country’s east claims dozens of lives each month.
International engagement has been lackluster. Disagreements between Africa and the West do not help: Western powers are
more critical and have sanctioned some of Kabila’s entourage, and African leaders and regional organizations are reluctant to
criticize the regime openly, even as some recognize the dangers behind closed doors. Only more active, forceful, and united
diplomacy — and ideally a more engaged Congolese opposition — stand a chance of nudging Kabila toward a peaceful transition.
The Saint Sylvester principles (credible elections, no third term for Kabila, an opening of political space, and respect for human
rights) still offer the best route out of the crisis.
The con ict in eastern Ukraine has claimed over 10,000 lives and constitutes a grave ongoing humanitarian crisis. While it
persists, relations between Russia and the West are unlikely to improve. Separatist-held areas are dysfunctional and dependent
on Moscow. In other areas of Ukraine, mounting anger at corruption and the 2015 Minsk II agreement, which Russia and
Ukraine’s Western allies insist is the path to resolve the con ict, creates new challenges.
Implementation of that agreement has stalled: Moscow points to Kiev’s failure to carry out the Minsk agreement’s political
provisions, including devolving power to separatist-held areas once they are reintegrated into Ukraine; Kiev argues it cannot do
so while Russian interference and insecurity in those areas persist. Both sides continue to exchange re across the line dividing
Ukrainian troops from separatist and Russian forces.
Yet the east is not the whole story. The Ukrainian state remains fragile even outside areas where Moscow interferes directly.
President Petro Poroshenko’s government has not addressed the systemic corruption at the root of many of the country’s
problems. Many Ukrainians are losing faith in laws, institutions, and elites. Anger at the Minsk agreement, which Ukrainians see
as a concession to separatists and Moscow, is growing, even among reformists.
Given the diplomatic deadlock, Russia’s circulation of a draft U.N. Security Council resolution proposing peacekeepers for
9. Ukraine
Northern Burkina Faso is suffering its own insurgency: notwithstanding spillover from Mali, violence there largely obeys its own
logic and feeds off local dynamics. The emergence of Ansarul Islam, a Burkinabe jihadist group that has perpetrated a string of
attacks against security forces and state institutions, re ects widespread discontent with the prevailing social order in the
country’s north. Ouagadougou and most of its foreign partners recognise that a military campaign alone will not end the
con ict, but their response needs to better factor in the deep social roots of the crisis, which means greater efforts to stimulate
or facilitate communal dialogue. Ultimately, as militants operate between Mali and Burkina Faso, the crisis also requires that
Mali secure its borders and both states deepen their police and judicial cooperation.
In Niger, the October 2017 killing of U.S. Special Forces and Nigerien soldiers near the border between Mali and Niger brought
international attention to a long-neglected region that has become the Sahel’s latest jihadist front line. An armed group
claiming links to the Islamic State has repeatedly targeted Nigerien security forces. In response, Nigerien authorities brie y
backed Malian armed groups as proxy counter-terror forces along the border. Such action can prove counterproductive, adding
to the already vast quantities of weaponry in the region and fuelling intercommunal con ict. The large number of armed young
men in the border area between Mali and Niger – frequently now with combat experience, including ghting both against and
alongside jihadist groups – are a key source of instability. Their demobilisation and reintegration into society is a critical
component of any effort to end violence.
Chad is vulnerable to instability in southern Libya, where Chadian rebels have found refuge, and in the Lake Chad basin, where
the Boko Haram crisis has spread. President Idriss Deby has positioned his military as a bastion against jihadism. This stance has
brought nancial and political support from Western powers and largely spared him their criticism, notwithstanding the
country’s fragility, growing political and social discontent, and deep economic recession. Many businesses have gone bankrupt.
Unemployment, especially among youth, is high. The International Monetary Fund suspended budget support in November 2017
after Chad failed to reach an agreement to restructure loans granted by a mining and oil company. Mounting political and socio-
REPORT 12 DECEMBER 2017
Burkina Faso: Preserving the Religious Balance
Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force

p , y p p g p p
Ukraine in September 2017 came as a surprise. There are good reasons to suspect Russia’s intentions. Despite the high costs of
its entanglement, little suggests it intends to loosen its grip on eastern Ukraine. The lightly armed force it proposed, whose
mandate would include only providing security to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe monitors, would more
likely freeze the con ict than resolve it.
Yet Moscow’s proposal opens a window for Kiev and its Western allies to explore how peacekeepers might secure not only the
line of separation but also the Ukraine-Russia border, and to create conditions for local elections and the reintegration of
separatist-held areas. They should, however, factor in growing animosity toward the Minsk agreement. Europe’s involvement is
essential for progress on peacekeeping negotiations and to promote a more measured debate in Ukraine that can halt the
nationalist backlash against the Minsk agreement.
Venezuela took yet another turn for the worse in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro’s government ran the country further into
the ground while strengthening its political grip. The opposition has imploded. Prospects for a peaceful restoration of
democracy appear ever slimmer. But with the economy in free fall, Maduro faces enormous challenges. Expect the humanitarian
crisis to deepen in 2018 as GDP continues to contract.
In late November, Venezuela defaulted on part of its international debt. Sanctions will make debt restructuring nearly
impossible. Increasing Russian support is unlikely to suf ce, while China appears reluctant to bail Maduro out. A default could
provoke the seizure of Venezuelan assets abroad, crippling the oil trade that accounts for 95 percent of the country’s export
earnings.
Street demonstrations and clashes that killed over 120 people between April and July subsided after the July election of a
National Constituent Assembly composed entirely of government allies. Subsequent polls for state governors and mayors led to
major opposition losses amid disputes over whether to participate. But food shortages, a collapsed health system, and spiraling
violent crime mean conditions for unrest persist.
10. Venezuela
economic challenges pose a grave long-term threat to Chad; left to fester, these problems would till fertile ground for violent
actors of all stripes, including jihadists.
After considerable delays, the G5 Sahel joint force has started to deploy at the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso border. But it is
struggling with funding shortfalls and to de ne its role, particularly in relation to other forces in the Sahel, from UN
peacekeepers to French and U.S. counter-terrorism forces. To secure the support of local populations, the joint force should
respect the rights of those living in its operations zones. Efforts to de-escalate local con icts and, where possible, open or
exploit existing lines of communication with militant leaders should accompany military action.
Sahelian states remain worryingly dependent on security assistance. Indeed, foreign donor priorities, to some degree, drive the
Sahelian states’ security policies: the focus on curbing human traf cking and migrant smuggling in the region in good part
re ects European worries about migration and terrorism. Yet overly strict security measures can upset fragile local economies
and balances of power between central state and nomadic communities or between local authorities and ethnic or religious
groups.
In this light, the Alliance for the Sahel, launched in July 2017 by France, Germany and the EU, and designed to address both
security and development challenges in the Sahel region, could be a step in the right direction, if European short-term concerns
over migration and terrorism do not trump efforts to reform local governance, especially in neglected rural areas. The EU and its
member states should also support government initiatives to strengthen local law and order – again critical in rural areas –
through its EU Capacity Building Missions (EUCAP) Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger.
In particular, the EU, including its special representative for the Sahel, should warn governments against relying on militias as
proxy counter-terrorism forces. It should instead encourage regional leaders to promote bottom-up reconciliation through local
dialogues, especially in Mali. In Chad, the EU and its member states should not only pursue short-term security objectives but
also seek to check, as best possible, the government’s authoritarian impulses so that political space does not shrink further.
Going beyond military solutions
Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform?

While opposition politicians look to the presidential vote, due by late 2018, as an opportunity and entry point for foreign
engagement, the government is unlikely to permit a credible vote. It might call early polls, catch its opponents unprepared, and
deploy the same voter suppression tactics it has used to win local and regional elections. If the opposition begins to show signs
of recovery, Maduro might seek to avoid elections altogether by claiming that external threats warrant a state of emergency. A
less probable scenario is that the ruling party splits over who will succeed Maduro; without a formal mechanism, the military
would be the likely arbiter. Meanwhile, the weak Venezuelan state will continue to provide a haven for criminal networks and
opportunities for money laundering, drug traf cking, and people smuggling, further disquieting Venezuela’s neighbors.
The prognosis for 2018 is further deterioration, humanitarian emergency, and an increased exodus of Venezuelans. Sustained
domestic and international pressure — as well as guarantees of future immunity — will be required to push the government
toward credible presidential elections.
FROM EARLY WARNING TO EARLY ACTION
Related Tags
Amid a rise in authoritarian tendencies across parts of the continent, Robert Mugabe’s resignation and the November 2017
appointment of his former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, as president make Zimbabwe a potential exception, carrying fresh
prospects for reform and economic recovery. Mnangagwa and his administration have set a different tone, promising to clean up
government, reach across political, ethnic and racial lines, strengthen Zimbabwe’s democracy and reform its moribund economy.
Re-engaging with Western partners and nancial institutions is an integral component of his strategy. Questions remain,
however, as to whether Mnangagwa’s administration represents a genuine change or simply a recon guration of the ruling
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), now dominated by security sector interests and factions aligned
to the new president. International actors will have an important role in encouraging the reforms that will determine whether
the country can recover economically and steer a more open and democratic course.
African and non-African governments alike agree that Zimbabwe’s continued isolation would be counterproductive. Following
the lead of the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC), actors including Western governments and China –
most of which were happy to see the back of Mugabe – stopped short of calling the “military-assisted transition” a coup d’état,
thus ensuring they could maintain diplomatic relations with and provide assistance to the government. Most also agree that the
new government should be given an opportunity to demonstrate it is serious about its commitments. But while encouragement
and incentives are important, Zimbabwe’s partners, including the EU, should calibrate support to maintain pressure on the
government to enact both political and economic reforms, particularly given ZANU-PF’s long track record of backtracking on its
promises.
bab e Oppo tu ty o e o
BRIEFING 20 DECEMBER 2017
COMMENTARY 4 DECEMBER 2017
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