1.
How
African
Leaders
View
US
and
PRC
Engagements
on
the
Continent
Kathleen
Brindley,
Jason
Bryant,
Christopher
Carolin,
Mindy
Duong,
Zach
Fedor,
Tyler
Garner,
Jessica
Herring,
Yasmine
Kulesza,
Will
McHenry,
Joseph
Quinn,
Jared
Sarkis,
John
Storey,
Kyle
Verhoeve
American
University,
Spring
2016

2.
1
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
______________________________________________________________
3
INTRODUCTION
____________________________________________________________________
4
METHODOLOGY
____________________________________________________________________
4
CAMEROON
Primary
Assessments
_____________________________________________________________
5
Security
________________________________________________________________________
5
Economic
_______________________________________________________________________
7
Political
________________________________________________________________________
8
Key
Projections
__________________________________________________________________
9
DJIBOUTI
Primary
Assessments
____________________________________________________________
10
Security
_______________________________________________________________________
10
Economic
______________________________________________________________________
12
Political
_______________________________________________________________________
14
Key
Projections
_________________________________________________________________
15
ETHIOPIA
Primary
Assessments
____________________________________________________________
16
Security
_______________________________________________________________________
16
Economic
______________________________________________________________________
17
Political
_______________________________________________________________________
19
Key
Projections
_________________________________________________________________
21
KENYA
Primary
Assessments
____________________________________________________________
22
Security
_______________________________________________________________________
22
Economic
______________________________________________________________________
24
Political
_______________________________________________________________________
27
Key
Projections
_________________________________________________________________
30
SOUTH
AFRICA
Primary
Assessments
____________________________________________________________
31
Security
_______________________________________________________________________
31
Economic
______________________________________________________________________
33
Political
_______________________________________________________________________
35
Key
Projections
_________________________________________________________________
38

3.
2
MOST
LIKELY
OUTCOME
____________________________________________________________
39
LOW
PROBABILITY/HIGH
IMPACT
_____________________________________________________
39
CONCLUSION
_____________________________________________________________________
41
BIBLIOGRAPHY
___________________________________________________________________
42

4.
3
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
China
and
the
United
States
are
not
in
direct
competition
with
each
other
in
the
investment,
trade,
foreign
aid,
or
military
spheres
in
Cameroon,
Djibouti,
Ethiopia,
Kenya,
and
South
Africa.
Rather,
these
African
states
are
benefiting
from
the
two
powers
in
separate
economic
development
and
security
spheres.
Leaders
in
these
states
currently
use
their
relationship
with
China
for
infrastructure
development,
economic
growth,
and
arms
imports
while
looking
to
the
US
for
short-­‐term
development
projects
and
counterterrorism
assistance.
Current
trends
indicate
this
relationship
will
not
change
in
the
next
five
to
10
years.
● Politically,
African
state
leaders
are
opportunistic
regarding
diplomatic
relationships
as
long
as
they
are
able
to
maintain
their
hold
on
power.
● Economically,
these
African
states
are
closely
tied
to
China
because
of
China’s
minimal
conditions
for
aid
and
extensive
investments
in
African
state
infrastructure
projects.
This
relationship
will
continue
despite
the
slowdown
in
China’s
economic
growth.
By
comparison,
the
US
provides
emergency
aid
but
does
not
engage
in
long-­‐term
infrastructure
development
projects.
● Current
trends
indicate
that
China
will
likely
maintain
or
increase
its
military
weapons
sales
and
training
to
African
militaries.
The
US
military
complements
this
security
effort
by
playing
a
supporting
role
to
African
state
security,
especially
to
support
counterterrorism
operations
against
Boko
Haram
and
al-­‐Shabaab.
In
contrast,
China
has
a
small
military
presence
on
the
continent
outside
of
peacekeeping.

5.
4
INTRODUCTION
This
paper
will
focus
on
African
leaders’
perspectives
regarding
US
and
Chinese
influence,
and
how
leaders
use
the
US
and
China
in
the
functional
domains
of
security,
economics,
and
politics
to
benefit
their
respective
states.
This
is
an
alternative
approach
to
focusing
on
Chinese
motives,
perspectives,
and
actions
on
the
African
continent
and
how
they
impact
US
foreign
policy
toward
China.
Our
analysis
focuses
on
the
following
countries:
Cameroon,
Djibouti,
Ethiopia,
Kenya,
and
South
Africa.
Contrary
to
the
discourse
surrounding
US
and
Chinese
influence
in
Africa,
US
and
Chinese
weapons
sales,
military
cooperation,
investment,
trade,
and
foreign
aid
activities
exist
in
predominantly
complementary,
rather
than
directly
competitive,
spheres.
This
is
important
to
African
leaders
because
they
use
investment,
aid,
and
military
assistance
from
both
powers
to
modernize
and
develop
their
respective
states.
METHODOLOGY
We
focused
our
research
on
Cameroon,
Djibouti,
Ethiopia,
Kenya
and
South
Africa
because
these
countries
have
observable
interactions
with
the
US
and
China
in
the
military,
economic,
and
political
sectors.
Arms
transfers,
military-­‐to-­‐military
cooperation,
significant
infrastructure
investment,
and
diplomatic
visits
are
observable
interactions.
We
then
developed
two
hypotheses:
1)
African
leaders
are
pitting
the
US
and
China
against
each
other
to
compete
for
influence
on
the
continent,
or
2)
African
state
leaders
are
using
the
US
and
China
to
fill
gaps
in
different
sectors;
therefore,
the
US
and
China
operate
in
a
complementary
fashion.
Our
research
included
open
source
and
academic
research
as
well
as
interviews
with
experts.
We
sought
direct
quotes
from
African
state
elites
regarding
their
relationship
with
the
US
and
China
in
the
three
functional
sectors.
Since
the
information
acquired
did
not
support
our
first
hypothesis,
we
chose
to
focus
on
our
second
hypothesis.
Our
research
suggests
that
the
five
selected
African
states
are
using
their
relationship
with
the
US
and
China
to
make
gains
in
the
security
and
economic
sectors.

6.
5
CAMEROON
Primary
assessments
Cameroonian
elites
place
a
strong
emphasis
on
security
due
to
the
rise
of
Boko
Haram,
causing
elites
to
turn
to
China
for
weapons
transfers
to
augment
counterterrorism
capabilities
and
modernize
its
military
at
a
lower
cost.
Due
to
the
small
US
economic
presence,
Cameroon
will
continue
to
rely
upon
Chinese
economic
assistance
to
develop
long-­‐term
infrastructure
projects.
Source:
CIA
World
Factbook
President
Paul
Biya
will
look
to
China
for
additional
military
assistance
to
supply
weapons
with
greater
operational
value
to
Cameroon’s
army
and
its
counterterrorism
campaign.
This
will
allow
the
Cameroonian
Army
to
transition
from
US
military-­‐supplied
weaponry
to
low-­‐cost
Chinese
alternatives
in
order
to
modernize,
fill
capability
gaps,
and
take
on
a
larger
regional
role
in
counterterrorism
operations.
● According
to
the
Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute,
Chinese
arms
exports
to
Cameroon
increased
from
$25
million
to
$75
million
between
2012
and
2015,
while
US
transfers
declined
from
$10
million
to
$2
million.1
Additionally,
Cameroon
purchased
a
total
of
1
“Arms
exports
to
Cameroon,
2000-­‐2015,”
Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute,
Arms
Transfers
Database.
Accessed
22
March
2016.
SECURITY

7.
6
29
major
conventional
weapons
systems
compared
to
four
from
the
US
between
2000
and
2015.2
Graph
1:
China
Military
Equipment
Imports,
United
States
and
China
Source:
SIPRI
Arms
Transfers
Database
● The
Cameroonian
Air
Force’s
aging
aircraft
has
hampered
its
combat
capability,
according
to
Jane’s
Sentinel
Security
Assessment.3
Although
Cameroon
has
previously
purchased
US
aircraft
to
modernize
its
aircraft,
Cameroon
is
purchasing
more
Chinese
aircraft
to
fit
the
military’s
operational
needs.
In
2012,
the
Cameroonian
Air
Force
accepted
an
MA60
twin
turboprop
aircraft
from
China
funded
primarily
by
Chinese
grant
aid.4
This
purchase
supplements
the
US
CN235,
which
was
considered
the
lowest
cost
solution
until
the
MA60.
Like
the
CN235,
the
MA60
has
short
takeoff
and
landing
(STOL)
capability,
does
not
require
a
high
standard
of
runway
conditions
to
operate,
and
has
additional
carry
capacity.
● Cameroon
purchased
the
Chinese
Type
054A
and
Type
053H
guided
missile
frigates
in
2014
to
modernize
its
navy
and
better
conduct
anti-­‐piracy
and
counterterrorism
missions
in
the
Gulf
of
Guinea.5
2
Ibid.
3
“Military
(Cameroon)-­‐Sentinel
Security
Assessment,”
IHS
Jane’s,
November
2012,
http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/cafrsu/cames060.html
4
“Cameroon
receives
MA60,”
Defence
Web,
November
30,
2012,
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28718%3Acameroon-­‐receives-­‐
ma60&catid=35%3AAerospace&Itemid=107.
5
“Poly
Technologies
of
China
Building
76mm
Gun-­‐Armed
Large
Patrol
Craft
for
Cameroon
Navy,”
The
Cameroon
Journal,
May
3,
2014,
http://www.journalducameroun.com/article.php?aid=17181.
China, 74
US, 00
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2010 2013 2014
Million USD

8.
7
President
Biya
will
continue
to
exploit
Chinese
infrastructure
development
projects
to
make
Cameroon
the
economic
hub
of
the
Gulf
of
Guinea.
Cameroon’s
geographic
location
allows
it
to
capitalize
financially
on
the
shipping
industry’s
need
for
ports
capable
of
accommodating
large
container
ships
and
a
larger
volume
of
shipping
traffic.
Additionally,
Cameroon’s
demand
for
electricity
is
met
through
Chinese-­‐constructed
hydroelectric
dams,
allowing
businesses
to
operate
with
fewer
power
outages.
● China
provided
85
percent
of
the
$1
billion
in
funding
for
the
Kribi
deep-­‐water
port,
with
an
expected
capacity
of
100
million
tons
in
shipping
per
year.
This
will
be
a
major
source
of
revenue
generation
once
fully
operational.6
● China
appropriated
$716
million
for
the
construction
of
the
Memve’ele
hydroelectric
dam.
Cameroon
is
now
able
to
power
its
businesses
and
industries,
further
increasing
Cameroon’s
economic
output.7
● In
April
2014,
the
Biya
government
introduced
legislation
calling
for
“the
ratification
of
the
convention
on
promotion
and
reciprocal
protection
of
investments
between
China
and
Cameroon.”8
The
proposed
legislation
demonstrates
the
importance
of
Chinese
investment
and
infrastructure
projects
to
help
Cameroon
become
a
newly
industrialized
country
by
the
year
2035.9
The
Cameroonian
government
has
not
introduced
similar
legislation
to
foster
and
protect
its
economic
relationship
with
the
US.
6
“What’s
it
like
to
have
China
build
you
a
port?
Ask
Cameroon,”
Port
News,
February
28,
2015,
http://en.portnews.ru/digest/15330/.
7
Richard
Kwang
Kometa,
“Cameroon:
Memve’ele
Hydroelectric
Dam
-­‐
Life
Changing
Project,”
allAFrica,
June
18,
2012,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201206191140.html.
8
“Cameroon
introduces
Chinese
investment
bill,”
Star
Africa,
April
2
2014,
http://en.starafrica.com/news/cameroon-­‐introduces-­‐chinese-­‐investment-­‐bill.html.
9
Cameroon
Ministry
of
Economy,
Planning
and
Regional
Development,
“Cameroon
Vision
2035,”
Cameroon
Embassy,
June
2009,
http://www.cameroonembassyusa.org/docs/webdocs/Cameroon_VISION_2035_English_Version.pdf.
ECONOMIC
Image
1:
Kribi
Deep-­‐Water
Port
Source:
Arabian
Supply
Chain

9.
8
The
politically
repressive
tactics
of
President
Biya’s
US-­‐supported
Rapid
Intervention
Battalion
(BIR)
counterterrorism
team
is
likely
to
undermine
political
stability
as
well
as
foster
distrust
towards
the
US.
President
Biya
is
less
likely
to
maintain
political
legitimacy
and
weaken
Boko
Haram
if
he
relies
solely
on
the
BIR.
He
will
therefore
need
to
rely
on
the
general
Cameroonian
Army
to
conduct
counterterrorism
operations.
● The
BIR
killed
an
estimated
100
citizens
when
suppressing
protests
over
the
high
cost
of
living
in
the
northern
cities
of
Douala
and
Yaoundé
in
February
2008.10
Furthermore,
according
to
Amnesty
International,
“Since
2014,
Cameroon
security
forces
have
arrested
and
detained
more
than
1,000
people
suspected
of
supporting
Boko
Haram,”
and
most
of
these
arrests
were
made
in
“mass
screening
operations
or
cordon-­‐and-­‐search
raids
where
security
forces
round
up
dozens,
sometimes
hundreds
of
men
and
boys.”
The
report
further
details
looting
and
rampant
abuses
by
the
BIR
through
the
process
of
mass
detention.11
● BIR’s
heavy-­‐handed
response
to
Boko
Haram
is
beginning
to
marginalize
populations
in
the
Northern
region,
particularly
among
unemployed
youth
who
tend
to
be
more
loyal
to
their
respective
tribe
than
to
the
nation.
According
to
Malte
Liewerschiedt,
a
senior
Africa
analyst
at
US-­‐based
risk
consultancy
firm
Verisk
Maplecroft,
“Boko
Haram
operates
rear
bases
in
remote
border
areas,
which
are
supported
by
networks
on
ethnic
kinship
in
Cameroon’s
Far
North
Region.”12
Ethnic
and
regional
loyalties
continue
to
play
a
role
in
the
radicalization
of
young
people.
● US
Ambassador
to
Cameroon
Michael
S.
Hoza
highlighted
US
security
assistance
to
the
BIR:
“We
[the
US]
are
partnering
closely
with
the
BIR,
who
are
fighting
courageously,
and
we
are
doing
everything
we
can
to
assure
that
they
stay
alive
to
continue
the
fight
and
that
they
have
all
the
training
and
equipment
they
need
to
be
fully
successful.”13
Extensive
US
assistance
to
the
BIR
undermines
US
credibility
as
an
outside
partner
trying
to
help
northern
Cameroonians.
10
“Rapid
intervention
military
unit
strays
from
its
mission,”
IRIN,
August
28,
2008.
http://www.irinnews.org/report/80065/cameroon-­‐rapid-­‐intervention-­‐military-­‐unit-­‐strays-­‐its-­‐mission.
11
“Cameroon:
Hundreds
slaughtered
by
Boko
Haram
and
abused
by
security
forces,”
Amnesty
International,
September
15,
2015,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/cameroon-­‐hundreds-­‐slaughtered-­‐by-­‐
boko-­‐haram-­‐and-­‐abused-­‐by-­‐security-­‐forces/.
12
Bax
Pauline,
“Boko
Haram
focuses
on
Cameroon’s
soft
targets,”
Business
Day,
February
5,
2016,
http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2016/02/05/boko-­‐haram-­‐focuses-­‐on-­‐cameroons-­‐soft-­‐targets.
13
“Charge
d’Affaires
Matthew
D.
Smith’s
Remarks
to
the
Media,”
U.S.
Embassy
Yaoundé,
September
2,
2015,
http://yaounde.usembassy.gov/spdcm_090315.html.
POLITICAL

10.
9
Key
Projections
Cameroon’s
economic
growth
is
expected
to
remain
strong
with
a
continued
average
GDP
growth
rate
above
five
percent
for
the
next
five
years.
Additionally,
the
economic
downturn
in
China
will
not
likely
alter
trends
in
long-­‐term
investment
projects
in
Cameroon.
Security,
rather
than
economic
considerations,
will
likely
be
the
driving
force
in
President
Biya’s
decision-­‐making
calculus.
The
current
security
environment
is
not
likely
to
change
as
Boko
Haram
strengthens
its
position
among
the
marginalized
population
in
Northern
Cameroon.
Biya’s
ability
to
strengthen
civil-­‐military
relations
by
relying
less
on
the
BIR
will
be
vital
to
maintain
his
popular
legitimacy.
To
do
so,
he
will
start
to
depend
more
on
Chinese
arms
transfers
to
bolster
and
modernize
the
Cameroonian
general
army.

11.
10
DJIBOUTI
Primary
assessments
Djibouti
will
have
a
significant
Chinese
military
presence
because
China
is
placing
its
first
ever
overseas
base
in
Djiboutian
territory.
Djiboutian
leaders
are
opportunistic
and
permit
foreign
bases
on
their
territory
primarily
for
their
own
economic
gain
rather
than
enhanced
security.
Leaders
also
gain
revenue
from
China’s
use
of
Djibouti’s
deep-­‐water
ports.
However,
the
Djiboutian
Armed
Forces
(FAD)
receives
adequate
military
assistance
from
the
US
instead
of
China
because
China
does
not
yet
support
Djibouti
in
a
military
capacity.
Djiboutian
leadership
will
allow
the
buildup
of
Chinese
and
other
foreign
military
bases
for
financial
gain
rather
than
added
regional
security.
The
future
Chinese
base
located
in
Djibouti
is
the
first
foreign
military
posting
in
the
history
of
the
People’s
Liberation
Army
(PLA).
The
base
will
generate
revenue
and
spur
job
creation.
Djibouti
does
not
exclusively
favor
the
US
or
China
regarding
military
base
construction
or
assistance
because
the
Djiboutian
government
views
foreign
military
bases
as
revenue
generators.
In
addition
to
debt
reduction,
it
boosts
Djibouti’s
credentials
as
a
regional
military
and
shipping
hub.14
14
Michel
Arseneault,
'Historic'
Chinese
military
base
to
open
in
Horn
of
Africa,
November
5,
2015,
http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20150511-­‐historic-­‐chinese-­‐military-­‐base-­‐open-­‐horn-­‐africa,
accessed
March
2016.
SECURITY

12.
11
● African
expert
Jennifer
Brass
of
Indiana
University
states
that
the
Chinese
base
will
bring
in
$100
million
per
year
in
revenue
and
potentially
create
hundreds
of
jobs
for
Djiboutian
locals.15
● According
to
President
Ismail
Omar
Guellah,
the
largest
concern
for
Djibouti
is
its
financial
standing,
as
their
public
debt
is
80
percent
of
GDP
with
an
unemployment
rate
of
48.4
percent.16
In
relation
to
China,
Guellah
states,
“They
are
the
biggest
investors
in
our
country.
They
are
the
ones
who
were
sensitive
to
what
we
feel
and
seek,
and
our
interests
are
complementary."17
● From
the
US
perspective,
the
future
Chinese
base
is
cause
for
concern,
as
it
could
house
up
to
10,000
PLA
soldiers,
posing
the
potential
threat
of
Chinese
surveillance
of
US
military
activities.18
From
the
Djiboutian
perspective,
the
new
Chinese
base
is
an
opportunity
to
generate
$100
million
per
year
in
rent.
● Djibouti-­‐based
AFRICOM
Camp
Lemonnier
is
the
only
permanent
US
base
on
the
continent
of
Africa
as
well
as
being
the
only
installation
dedicated
to
counterterrorism.19
The
Djiboutian
government
accepts
Camp
Lemonnier’s
presence
because
of
the
$63
million
yearly
revenue
supplied
by
the
US
Government.
From
the
Djiboutian
perspective,
Camp
Lemonnier
is
valuable
for
its
financial
potential
rather
than
the
security
it
provides.
The
Djiboutian
Armed
Forces
(FAD)
will
not
increase
military
cooperation
with
the
People’s
Liberation
Army
because
they
receive
adequate
military
assistance
from
the
US
in
the
form
of
training
and
military
equipment.
The
FAD
liaises
with
US
and
French
military
personnel,
but
does
not
participate
to
the
same
extent
with
the
PLA.
The
FAD
relies
primarily
on
US
military
assistance
due
to
the
US’
experience
and
capabilities
in
countering
terrorism
and
violent
extremism.
15
Morgan
Winsor,
With
China’s
Naval
Base,
Djibouti
Could
Become
Africa’s
Singapore,
February
4,
2016,
http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-­‐naval-­‐base-­‐djibouti-­‐could-­‐become-­‐africas-­‐singapore-­‐2292581,
accessed
March
2016.
16
International
Monetary
Fund.
IMF
Executive
Board
Concludes
2015
Article
IV
Consultation
with
Djibouti.
Press
Release
No.
15/587,
December
28,
2015,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15587.htm.
17
Edmund
Blair,
China
to
start
work
soon
on
naval
base
in
Djibouti:
Guelleh,
February
3,
2016,
http://news.yahoo.com/china-­‐start-­‐soon-­‐naval-­‐djibouti-­‐guelleh-­‐074246196-­‐-­‐business.html,
accessed
March
2016.
18
Winsor,
With
China’s
Naval
Base,
Djibouti
Could
Become
Africa’s
Singapore.
19
Craig
Whitlock,
The
Washington
Post,
October
25,
2012,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-­‐
security/remote-­‐us-­‐base-­‐at-­‐core-­‐of-­‐secret-­‐operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-­‐197a-­‐11e2-­‐bd10-­‐
5ff056538b7c_story.html,
accessed
March
2016;
Steve
Contorno,
Hillary
Clinton
says
in
memoir
that
there's
very
little
U.S.
military
presence
in
Africa,
June
12,
2014,
http://www.politifact.com/truth-­‐o-­‐
meter/statements/2014/jun/12/hillary-­‐clinton.

13.
12
● The
US
National
Guard
and
AFRICOM
work
closely
with
the
Djiboutian
military
on
countering
violent
extremism
and
terrorism.
They
also
share
best
practices
on
Entry
Control
Points
(ECPs)
such
as
personnel
search
procedures,
border
patrol
security,
and
first
aid.20
Additionally,
the
US
State
Partnership
Program
facilitates
military-­‐to-­‐military
engagement
between
the
Kentucky
National
Guard
and
the
Djiboutian
military.21
Such
cooperation
helps
maintain
open
lines
of
tactical
communication
between
states,
facilitate
civilian
engagements,
and
boosts
trust
between
both
forces,
according
to
Sgt.
Darron
Salzer
of
US
AFRICOM.22
● The
Department
of
Defense
(DoD)
supports
Djibouti’s
military
and
civilian
authority
because
Djibouti
lacks
the
manpower
and
military
capabilities
needed
to
combat
terrorist
threats.
DoD
contributes
to
regional
missions
and
projects
power
from
Camp
Lemonnier
through
counterterrorism,
peace
operations,
and
counter
piracy,
and
has
nearly
doubled
the
Djiboutian
navy
by
equipping
it
with
extended-­‐range
patrol
vessels.23
There
is
no
indication
whether
Djibouti
will
prefer
US
or
Chinese
military
training
in
the
future.
Djibouti’s
leaders
will
rely
on
Ethiopia
and
China’s
use
of
the
country’s
deep-­‐water
ports
to
continue
strong
economic
growth.
Djibouti’s
status
as
a
regional
shipping
hub
is
especially
important
to
landlocked
Ethiopia,
which
has
extensive
trade
ties
with
China.
Ethiopia’s
reliance
on
Djibouti’s
ports
is
likely
to
increase
with
Sino-­‐Ethiopian
trade
growth,
resulting
in
increased
revenue
for
Djibouti.
China
desires
to
protect
shipping
routes
through
its
recent
plans
to
construct
a
military
base
in
Djibouti.
20
Rachel
Waller,
2-­‐138th
FSC
Shares
Best
ECP
Practices
With
Djiboutian
Army,
Edited
by
Djibouti
Loyada.
June
7,
2013,
http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/10861/2-­‐138th-­‐fsc-­‐shares-­‐best-­‐ecp-­‐practices-­‐with-­‐djiboutian-­‐
army,
accessed
March
2016.
21
Djibouti,
Embassy
of
the
United
States-­‐,
Djibouti,
State
of
Kentucky
Forges
Lasting
Ties
Through
Partnership
Program,
June
2,
2015,
http://djibouti.usembassy.gov/press-­‐releases/untitled5.html,
accessed
March
2016.
22
Daron
Salzer,
National
Guard
State
Partnership
Program:
East
Africa,
October
23,
2015,
http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/26681/national-­‐guard-­‐state-­‐partnership-­‐program-­‐east-­‐africa,
accessed
March
2016.
23
Joseph
Giordono,
U.S.
Donation
of
Patrol
Boats
Beefs
up
Djibouti's
Navy,
June
16,
2006,
http://www.stripes.com/news/u-­‐s-­‐donation-­‐of-­‐patrol-­‐boats-­‐beefs-­‐up-­‐djibouti-­‐s-­‐navy-­‐1.50402,
accessed
March
2016;
Commander,
Navy
Installations
Command
(CNIC),
Mission
and
Vision,
http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti/about/mission_and_visio
n.html,
accessed
March
2016.
ECONOMIC

14.
13
● “Djibouti’s
economy
is
dependent
on
foreign
financing,
foreign
direct
investments,
rents
from
foreign
countries’
military
bases,
and
port
services,”
according
to
the
World
Bank.24
Trademark
East
Africa
also
states
that
“Ethiopia
currently
uses
Djibouti
port[s]
for
over
90-­‐95
percent
of
its
[$4
billion]
imports
and
[$3
billion]
exports
[annually].”25
DPWorld,
an
Emirati
shipping
company,
states
that
it
charges
between
$272
to
$544
per
container
(depending
on
size)
at
the
Doraleh
Port
in
Djibouti.
The
average
number
of
containers
on
a
ship
numbers
at
20,000,
resulting
in
average
revenue
between
$5.4
million
and
$10.8
million
per
ship.26
● Workeneh
Gebeyehu,
the
Ethiopian
Minister
for
Transport
stated,
“5-­‐10
percent
of
the
country’s
imports
are
planned
to
come
through
the
port
of
Berbera
(Somaliland),
and
we
will
be
looking
for
proper
ports
for
different
areas
of
the
country.
But
the
Port
of
Djibouti
continues
to
be
the
major
one.”27
This
demonstrates
that
Djibouti
benefits
from
Ethiopia’s
reliance
on
the
coastal
nation’s
ports
for
shipping.
● Djibouti
experienced
a
steady
increase
in
container
port
traffic
since
2007
as
economic
relations
between
China
and
Ethiopia
rose.
The
bilateral
trade
between
Ethiopia
and
China
has
managed
to
show
12
percent
positive
growth,
which
accounts
for
about
half
a
billion
USD.28
Djibouti’s
economic
growth
(5
percent
in
2013,
5.6
percent
in
2014)
is
expected
to
reach
6.2
percent
in
2016,
according
to
African
Economic
Outlook.29
The
Government
of
Djibouti
will
continue
to
use
funding
from
foreign
military
bases
to
subsidize
infrastructure
projects,
such
as
those
affiliated
with
Vision
2035.
Vision
2035
is
a
domestic
strategy
that
aims
to
improve
Djibouti’s
infrastructure.
Djibouti
seeks
to
take
advantage
of
foreign
investment
24
World
Bank,
Overview
[Djibouti],
September
16,
2015,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/djibouti/overview,
accessed
March
2016.
25
Trade
Mark
East
Africa,
Ethiopia
Look
to
Ports
in
Kenya…
to
Increase
Imports
and
Exports,
June
18,
2015,
https://www.trademarkea.com/news/ethiopia-­‐looks-­‐to-­‐ports-­‐in-­‐kenya-­‐somaliland-­‐and-­‐sudan-­‐to-­‐increase-­‐
imports-­‐and-­‐exports/,
accessed
February
2016;
John
Sambo,
Ethiopia
to
Widen
Choices
Over
Ports,
June
28,
2015
,
accessed
February
2016.
26
DPWorldwide,
Doraleh
Tariff
Book
2015.
27
Sambo,
Ethiopia
to
Widen
Choices
Over
Ports.
28
Yared
Gebremeden,
Ethiopia:
Ethio-­‐China
Trade
Volume
Steadily
Growing,
Yet
Untapped
–
Ambassador,
March
17,
2016,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201603170796.html,
accessed
March
2016.
29
Guy
Blaise
Nkamleu,
Djibouti.
African
Economic
Outlook,
May
28,
2015,
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-­‐notes/east-­‐africa/djibouti/,
accessed
March
2016.

15.
14
from
the
United
States
and
China
to
develop
infrastructure
that
will
transform
the
country
into
a
regional
platform
for
commercial,
logistical,
and
financial
services.30
● President
Guelleh
justified
the
presence
of
the
Chinese
military
base
in
Djibouti
by
stating
that
“[foreign
governments]
have
the
right
to
defend
their
interests
[through
building
military
bases],
just
like
everybody
else
does."
This
demonstrates
that
Guelleh
allows
investment
from
any
country
regardless
of
Djibouti’s
political
relationship
with
said
country.31
● Djibouti
uses
Chinese
funding
for
Vision
2035.
This
plan
focuses
on
“the
development
of
roads,
ports,
airports
and
telecommunications
infrastructure
to
make
Djibouti
the
hub
of
regional
and
international
traffic.”32
The
program
includes
the
addition
of
six
ports
to
those
already
existing,
which
will
further
increase
Djibouti’s
capacity
as
a
regional
shipping
hub.33
● According
to
Tomi
Oladipo,
BBC
Africa
Security
Correspondent,
the
income
from
all
foreign
military
bases,
including
the
United
States,
France,
Japan,
Germany,
China-­‐-­‐and
soon
Saudi
Arabia-­‐-­‐provides
Djibouti
with
steady
sources
of
funding
to
complete
infrastructure
projects.34
President
Guelleh’s
fourth
presidential
victory
ensures
that
Djibouti
will
continue
to
accept
investment
from
China
and
the
United
States.
Guelleh
prioritizes
investment
for
infrastructure
development
from
both
China
and
the
US,
allowing
Djibouti
to
maintain
economic
growth.
Guelleh’s
even-­‐handed
approach
to
investment
will
likely
continue.
● President
Guelleh
has
a
strong
desire
to
continue
investment
in
infrastructure
projects,
stating
"Infrastructure
always
pays
off,
doesn't
it?"
in
response
to
a
question
on
the
country’s
debts.35
30
Embassy
of
the
Republic
of
Djibouti
–Ankara,
Djibouti
Vision
2035,
2014,
http://djibembassytr.org/business-­‐
and-­‐investment/djibouti-­‐vision-­‐2035,
accessed
March
2016.
31
Edmund
Blair,
China
to
Start
Work
Soon
on
Naval
Base
in
Djibouti
–
Guelleh,
February
2,
2016,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­‐djibouti-­‐china-­‐idUKKCN0VB1Z6,
accessed
March
2016.
32
Embassy
of
the
Republic
of
Djibouti
–Ankara,
Djibouti
Vision
2035,
2014,
http://djibembassytr.org/business-­‐
and-­‐investment/djibouti-­‐vision-­‐2035,
accessed
March
2016.
33
Ibid.
34
Tomi
Oladipo,
Twitter
Post,
March
7,
2016,
8:18pm,
https://twitter.com/JQuinn1266/status/707204510729551872.
35
Blair,
China
to
Start
Work
Soon
on
Naval
Base
in
Djibouti
–
Guelleh.
POLITICAL
“[Foreign
governments]
have
the
right
to
defend
their
interests
[through
building
military
bases],
just
like
everybody
else
does.”
-­‐President
Ismail
Guelleh
of
Djibouti

16.
15
● The
ministers
in
President
Guelleh’s
cabinet
predicted
the
country
will
become
“the
next
Dubai,
a
magnet
for
capital
and
free
trade”
in
the
next
20
years
if
it
continues
its
commitment
to
accepting
investment.36
Key
Projections
The
Djiboutian
government
will
continue
to
allow
more
military
base
construction
on
its
territory
regardless
of
the
base’s
national
ties.
While
the
US
military
may
view
other
base
constructions
as
a
threat
to
its
interests
and
operations,
the
Djiboutian
government
views
the
presence
of
foreign
military
bases
positively
because
they
generate
revenue.
Djibouti
will
continue
to
engage
both
China
and
the
US
for
financial
benefit.
36
Monte
Reel,
Djibouti
Is
Hot:
How
a
forgotten
sandlot
of
a
country
became
a
hub
of
international
power
games,
March
23,
2016,
http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-­‐djibouti/,
accessed
March
2016.

17.
16
ETHIOPIA
Primary
assessments
Ethiopia
prefers
China’s
contributions
in
the
security
and
economic
sectors
over
those
of
the
United
States.
However,
Ethiopian
leadership
approaches
foreign
partnerships
and
investment
pragmatically,
placing
Chinese
and
US
influence
in
complementary
rather
than
competitive
spheres.
Lower
conditional
standards
on
Chinese
investment
allows
Ethiopia
to
dictate
its
own
economic
policies,
creating
an
environment
where
the
Ethiopian
government
increasingly
uses
Chinese
political
ties
and
monetary
support
to
complement
existing
gaps
in
US
and
other
foreign
contributions.
Ethiopian
leadership
will
increase
Sino-­‐Ethiopian
security
collaboration
due
to
the
reduced
US
military
presence
in
the
country.
High-­‐level
military
personal
relationships,
ongoing
military
training
exchanges,
and
continuing
arms
imports
influence
Chinese
security
involvement
in
Ethiopia.
Ethiopian
officer
training
and
the
courting
of
the
senior
military
leader,
General
Samora,
provide
professional
development
to
Ethiopian
armed
forces
and
builds
confidence
in
Chinese
commitment
to
the
country.
Ethiopia
also
displays
a
recent
trend
of
acquiring
the
bulk
of
its
military
ground
equipment
(excluding
tanks)
from
China.
Reinforced
by
the
presence
of
Chinese
military
equipment
across
the
continent,
this
trend
should
continue.
These
current
Sino-­‐Ethiopian
security
engagements
will
likely
increase
due
to
the
reduction
of
US
military
presence,
specifically
Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicle
operations.
Strained
US-­‐
Ethiopian
relations
drive
this
reduction
in
US
military
presence.
SECURITY

18.
17
● Ethiopia
purchased
more
than
100
APCs,
artillery,
and
SAM
systems
from
China
between
2005-­‐2015.
During
this
time
period,
Ethiopia
purchased
one
C-­‐130
transport
aircraft
from
the
US,
according
to
SIPRI
arms
import
data
(not
including
small
arms
transfers).37
Ethiopian
leaders
view
Chinese
weapons
systems
as
adequate
in
quality
and
less
expensive
than
western
options.38
● “Every
year
[China]
trains
an
undisclosed
number
(perhaps
ten)
Ethiopian
officers,”
Ethiopian
Armed
Forces
Chief
of
Staff
General
Samora
Yenus
stated
on
a
2010
visit
to
China.
He
met
with
former
Vice
Chairman
of
the
Central
Military
Commission,
Xu
Caihou,
and
Chief
of
the
General
Staff
of
the
People’s
Liberation
Army
of
China,
Chen
Bingde.
Samora
stated,
“The
exchanges
and
cooperation
previously
conducted
by
the
two
countries
was
of
great
benefit
for
the
Ethiopian
side.”
Samora
and
Chen
vowed
to
build
closer
military
ties
in
the
future.39
● The
US
drone
base
in
Ethiopia
closed
in
January
2016
because
it
was
“not
required
at
this
time,”
according
to
Pentagon
spokeswoman
Lt.
Col.
Michelle
Baldanza.
However,
the
closure
of
the
US
drone
base
was
likely
due
to
the
insistence
of
Ethiopian
leadership
as
a
result
of
declining
US-­‐Ethiopian
relations,
according
to
multiple
sources.40
Ethiopian
leaders
believe
that
Chinese
investment
in
infrastructure,
manufacturing,
and
industrial
sectors
will
maintain
economic
stability.
Ethiopian
leaders
favor
long-­‐term
Chinese
economic
development
strategies
that
secure
footholds
for
Chinese
industry.
Ethiopia
illustrates
the
capacity
and
desire
to
mobilize
a
low-­‐cost
labor
force
to
attract
Chinese
investment.
China
demonstrated
that
it
is
a
reliable
economic
partner
due
to
historically
high
levels
of
FDI,
infrastructure
investment,
and
industry
projects.
Sino-­‐Ethiopian
trade
relations
will
therefore
continue
despite
a
projected
Chinese
economic
slowdown.
37
(SIPRI
Arms
Transfers
Database.
"Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute”
n.d.)
38
David
Shinn,
Interview
with
the
research
team,
March
25,
2016.
39
Jean-­‐Pierre
Cabestan,
"China
and
Ethiopia:
Authoritarian
affinities
and
economic
cooperation,"
China
Perspectives
4
(2012):
53;
He
Wenping,
“A
new
Era
of
China-­‐Africa
Cooperation,”
China-­‐Africa
Cooperation
Net,
http://www.zfhz.org/plus/view.php?aid=3271.
40
John
Hudson
and
Siobhan
O.
Grady,
"As
New
Threats
Emerge,
U.S.
Closes
Drone
Base
in
Ethiopia,"
Foreign
Policy,
January
4,
2016;
Shinn,
Interview
with
the
research
team;
Hudson
and
Grady,
"As
New
Threats
Emerge,
U.S.
Closes
Drone
Base
in
Ethiopia."
ECONOMIC

19.
18
● Chinese
FDI
in
Ethiopia
quadrupled
from
2006-­‐2012
from
$24
million
to
$122
million,
with
China
being
the
number
one
foreign
investor
in
the
country.
41
Chinese
FDI
increased
at
the
same
time
Ethiopia’s
GDP
was
on
the
rise
and
the
World
Bank
reduced
grants
for
projects.42
Graph
2:
Ethiopia’s
External
Economic
Picture
Source:
World
Bank
UNCTADFDI/TNC
Database
and
IMF
Country
Report
● Regarding
the
Ethiopian
preference
for
Chinese
loans,
former
Deputy
Prime
Minster
Hailemariam
Desalegan
stated
in
2010
that
“[China]
largely
follows
a
‘no-­‐strings
attached’
approach
in
its
dealings
with
Africa.
We
like
the
Chinese
way
of
doing
things,
because
they
don’t
say
‘do
this,
don’t
do
that’—there
are
no
preconditions.”43
● Condition-­‐based
loans
from
the
US
discourage
Ethiopia
from
seeking
those
loans
because
it
would
force
the
Ethiopian
government
to
institute
political
reforms,
thereby
limiting
its
ability
to
govern
according
to
its
own
principles.
41
UNCTADFDI/TNC
database
42
Ibid;
IMF
Country
Report
No.
14/303.
October,
2014.
43
Elsje
Fourie,
New
Maps
for
Africa?
Contextualising
the
‘Chinese
Model’
within
Ethiopian
and
Kenyan
Paradigms
of
Development,
School
of
International
Studies
University
of
Trento,
Italy
(2012):
157;
David
H
Shinn,
"Ethiopia
and
China:
When
Two
Former
Empires
Connected,”
International
Policy
Digest,
June
11,
2014.
1
10
100
1000
United
States
China
Total
FDI
inflow
Million USD

20.
19
● Chinese
state-­‐owned
enterprises
subsidize
and
construct
the
bulk
of
renewable
energy
initiatives,
hydropower,
and
Ethiopia’s
urban
rail
transportation.44
This
improves
Ethiopia’s
energy
efficiency
and
infrastructure
at
little-­‐to-­‐no
cost
to
the
Ethiopian
government.
● Ethiopia’s
“inexpensive,
yet
relatively
skilled
labor
force”
and
efforts
to
bring
in
Chinese
investment
enable
Ethiopia
to
attract
substantial
investment
in
labor-­‐intensive
industries,
according
to
the
World
Bank.45
Ethiopia
supplies
labor
at
one-­‐quarter
that
of
China.
Ethiopian
foreign
minister,
Tedros
Adhanom
Ghebreyesus,
stated,
“I
expect
even
more
foreign
direct
investment
flow
from
China.
There
is
strong
interest
to
migrate
manufacturing
to
Ethiopia.”46
Ethiopian
leaders
favor
Chinese
diplomatic
partnerships
because
of
continued
Sino-­‐Ethiopian
bilateral
agreements
and
strong
personal
ties
among
elites.
Continual
Sino-­‐
Ethiopian
diplomatic
visits,
professional
development
of
Ethiopian
elites
in
China,
and
personal
relationships
illustrate
a
durable
diplomatic
alliance.
Public
Chinese
visits
occurred
more
frequently
than
US
diplomatic
interactions,
accompanied
by
bilateral
economic
agreements.
Ethiopian
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs’
(MFA)
press
releases
and
rhetoric
demonstrate
a
positive
view
of
Sino-­‐Ethiopian
relations
while
remaining
ambivalent
towards
US-­‐Ethiopia
ties.
● “[T]wo
factors
that
contribute
largely
to
the
consolidation
of
the
bonds
between
Ethiopia
and
China
are
the
frequent
exchange
of
visits
by
high-­‐level
officials
and
legislators;
and
secondly,
the
successful
signing
of
agreements
on
a
number
of
significant
bilateral
issues,”
according
to
the
Ethiopian
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs.47
44
Ethiopia
Energy
Situation.
Energypedia.info;
Ethiopia:
Sub-­‐Saharan
Africa
gets
its
first
metro,
The
Economist,
September
22,
2015.
45
Miria
Pigato
and
Wenxia
Tang,
China
and
Africa:
Expanding
Economic
Ties
in
an
Evolving
Global
Context,
World
Bank,
March,
2015
46
Adrienne
Klasa,
“Ethiopia
Industry:
Still
Banking
on
China,”
Financial
Times,
January
7,
2016.
47
“Federal
Democratic
Republic
of
Ethiopia
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
–
PRC,”
http://www.mfa.gov.et/web/guest/asia-­‐countries.
POLITICAL
“Ethiopia
and
the
US
have
largely
maintained
more
or
less
effective
cooperation
in
matters
of
security
though
the
relationship
hasn't
been
as
close
as
some
critics
have
tried
to
suggest.
Ethiopia
has
never
been
a
US
‘poodle’.”
-­‐Ethiopia,
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs

21.
20
● Ethiopian
President
Mulato
Teshome
attended
Peking
University
and
maintains
personal
ties
with
Chinese
Premier
Li
Keqiang,
indicating
a
strong
political
and
cultural
understanding
of
China.
Current
educational
programs
for
Ethiopian
leaders
in
China
exhibit
an
upward
trend.48
“The
Chinese
leadership
has
increasingly
followed
a
strategy
of
bringing
African
elites
to
China
for
study
visits…
Chinese
embassy
in
Addis
Ababa
estimates
that
the
number
of
Ethiopian
ministers
who
visit
China
annually
has
doubled
over
the
past
decade,”
according
to
Elsje
Fourie,
Assistant
Professor
of
Globalization
and
Development
Studies
at
Maastricht
University.
Approximately
60
percent
of
the
91
governmental
elites
interviewed
in
the
article
cited
visited
China.49
● Two
meetings
occurred
between
Ethiopian
and
Chinese
presidential
leaders
in
the
past
three
years,
as
well
as
one
US
presidential
meeting.
Ethiopian
Prime
Minister
Meles
Zenawi
met
with
Chinese
President
Hu
Jintao
in
2012.50
Cabinet
level
visits
between
Ethiopian
and
Chinese
leaders
are
conducted
twice
as
often
as
those
of
Ethiopian
and
US
visits,
with
the
Sino-­‐
Ethiopian
agendas
focused
on
improving
bilateral
relations.51
By
comparison,
US
Department
of
State
officials
attended
addresses
at
the
African
Union
headquartered
in
Addis
Ababa.52
Ethiopian
leaders
view
US
strategy
as
short-­‐term
and
reactive,
whereas
China
is
valued
for
its
long-­‐
term,
development-­‐focused
assistance.
The
US
government
remains
the
largest
donor
to
Ethiopia
by
providing
food
and
other
assistance
during
humanitarian
crises.
However,
Ethiopian
leadership
believes
the
US
does
not
assist
with
long-­‐term
development
efforts.
In
contrast,
Ethiopian
leaders
see
Chinese
humanitarian
efforts
as
more
beneficial
in
building
long-­‐term
capacity,
even
though
overall
Chinese
monetary
contributions
are
lower
than
that
of
the
US.
Ethiopian
elites’
perspectives
on
US
assistance
are
affected
by
a
perceived
lack
of
commitment
to
Ethiopian
economic
issues.
● Ethiopia
received
$532
million
in
total
US
aid
in
response
to
the
2015
drought,
including
60
percent
in
nutrition.53
Comparatively,
in
2015,
China
constructed
a
$13
million
hospital
near
48
China’s
Old
Friend:
Mulatu
Teshome,
President
of
Ethiopia,
China
Scholarship
Council,
December
24,
2014,
49
Fourie,
New
Maps
for
Africa?
Contextualising
the
‘Chinese
Model’
within
Ethiopian
and
Kenyan
Paradigms
of
Development,
154.
50
“U.S.
Senior
Officials
Visits
Addis
Ababa,
Ethiopia,”
Embassy
of
the
United
States,
http://ethiopia.usembassy.gov/.
51
Ethiopian
Prime
Minster
Meles
Zenawi
met
with
Chinese
President
Hu
Jintao,
Xinhuanet,
August
12,
2011;
China-­‐Ethiopia
relations:
an
excellent
model
for
South-­‐South
cooperation,
Ethiopian
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs,
December
1,
2014;
Ethiopia:
Chinese
Vice-­‐Premier
Concludes
Her
Visit
to
Ethiopia,
Allafrica.com,
November
26,
2011.
52
“U.S.
Senior
Officials
Visits
Addis
Ababa,
Ethiopia,”
Embassy
of
the
United
States,
http://ethiopia.usembassy.gov/;
“Secretary
Clinton
to
Travel
to
U.A.E.,
Zambia,
Tanzania,
and
Ethiopia,”
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164673.htm.
53
Food
Assistance
Fact
Sheet
–
Ethiopia,
USAID,
Food
Assistance
Fact
Sheet,
February
3,
2016.

22.
21
Addis
Ababa
and
sent
a
military
medical
team
to
provide
support
to
the
Ethiopian
National
Defense
Forces.54
● The
Ethiopian
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs’
official
policy
statement
towards
the
US
acknowledges
Ethiopia’s
appreciation
of
humanitarian
assistance,
but
states
“the
US
has
remained
aloof…
in
structural
projects
in
development
in
the
last
decades.”
The
Ethiopian
MFA
further
stresses
the
integrality
of
long-­‐term
development
projects
and
infrastructure
to
Ethiopia’s
future.55
● The
Ethiopian
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
official
policy
statement
for
the
PRC
commends
China’s
aid
and
assistance
and
states
that
Chinese
doctors
serving
in
Ethiopian
hospitals
are
“assisting
Ethiopia
achieve
the
Millennium
Development
Goals.”56
Key
Projections
The
Chinese
economic
slowdown
will
not
markedly
affect
Ethiopia’s
economy,
diplomatic
relations,
or
security
agreements
with
regards
to
the
complementary
nature
of
US
and
Chinese
involvement
in
Ethiopia.
China
is
committed
to
Ethiopia
because
of
long-­‐term
infrastructure
programs
and
low-­‐cost
labor.
Ethiopia
will
also
continue
to
rely
on
China
for
development
of
infrastructure
and
industry,
due
in
part
to
Chinese
non-­‐conditional
monetary
support.
In
the
event
of
reduced
Chinese
investment,
Ethiopian
leaders
will
continue
their
pragmatic
approach
to
foreign
relations
in
order
to
ensure
economic
stability.
54
Shinn,
"Ethiopia
and
China:
When
Two
Former
Empires
Connected.”
55
“Federal
Democratic
Republic
of
Ethiopia
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
–
United
States
of
America,”
http://www.mfa.gov.et/web/guest/united-­‐state-­‐of-­‐america.
56
“Federal
Democratic
Republic
of
Ethiopia
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
-­‐
PRC”
http://www.mfa.gov.et/web/guest/asia-­‐countries.

23.
22
KENYA
Primary
assessments
Kenya
maintains
strong
economic
ties
with
China.
Kenyan
elites
accept
non-­‐conditional
Chinese
funding
to
subsidize
significant
infrastructure
projects
to
boost
Kenya’s
economic
power
and
regional
influence.
However,
Kenya
engages
pragmatically
with
both
China
and
the
US
to
achieve
goals
outlined
in
Vision
2030,
a
domestic
strategy
that
aims
to
transform
Kenya
into
a
middle-­‐
income
country
by
2030
via
infrastructure
and
development
projects.57
Kenya
also
uses
both
US
and
Chinese
assistance
to
fund
different
aspects
of
its
security
apparatus.
Kenyan
leaders
will
rely
primarily
on
China
as
an
arms
supplier,
whereas
leaders
will
increase
coordination
with
the
US
to
bolster
its
counterterrorism
operations.
Kenya
accepted
substantial
military
exports
from
China
in
2015,
including
arms,
armored
personnel
carriers
(APCs),
and
tanks
to
bolster
internal
security
operations
and
combat
arms
smuggling.
While
the
Kenyan
government’s
security
partnership
with
China
is
likely
to
increase,
Kenyan
leaders
will
continue
to
receive
substantial
counterterrorism
assistance
from
the
United
States
in
the
form
of
aircraft
and
training
and
equipping
of
Kenyan
Defense
Forces
(KDF).
Chinese
forces
cooperate
with
the
KDF
to
conduct
peacekeeping
operations;
however,
they
do
not
coordinate
with
China
on
countering
terror.
Kenyan
leaders
will
therefore
continue
to
rely
on
the
United
States
to
carry
out
counterterrorism
operations,
specifically
against
al-­‐Shabaab.
57
Government
of
Kenya,
“Kenya
Vision
2030,”
accessed
on
March
6,
2016,
http://www.vision2030.go.ke/.
SECURITY

24.
23
● Kenya’s
police
force
purchased
30
Norinco
VN
armored
vehicles
from
China
in
February
2016
for
peacekeeping,
anti-­‐terror,
and
police
missions
conducted
by
Kenya’s
National
Police
Force,
according
to
Defence
Web.
President
Uhuru
Kenyatta
stated
during
the
commission
ceremony
on
February
1:
“Kenya’s
police
force
will
for
the
first
time
in
history
acquire
armored
personnel
carriers
[APCS]
to
increase
their
mobility
and
protective
gear
when
deployed
in
volatile
areas.
You
don’t
have
to
depend
on
the
military
or
other
security
agents
for
you
to
perform
your
duties.”58
● Kenya
purchased
$77
million
in
arms
from
China
in
2015,
including
tanks,
Harbin
z-­‐9
light
attack
helicopters,
and
spare
parts,
according
to
Business
Daily
Africa.59
Kenyan
leaders
purchase
military
materiel
from
China
rather
than
the
United
States
because
they
are
less
expensive:
Chinese
APCs
cost
approximately
$700,000
compared
to
US-­‐produced
APCs,
which
cost
approximately
$1.2
million,
according
to
the
Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute
(SIPRI).60
Comparatively,
Kenya
has
decreased
arms
trade
with
the
US.
The
US
only
exported
$1
million
in
arms
to
Kenya
from
2010-­‐2014,
according
to
SIPRI.61
Kenyan
leaders
therefore
use
China
as
a
primary
arms
source.
● While
China
provides
more
arms
to
Kenya,
the
United
States
provides
more
overall
security
assistance.
The
United
States
provided
$100
million
in
counterterrorism
assistance
to
Kenya
in
2015—a
163
percent
increase
from
FY
2014—due
to
the
rising
level
of
terrorist
violence
in
the
country,
according
to
Security
Assistance
Monitor.62
$95
million
in
US
aid
aims
to
enhance
the
KDF’s
participation
in
AMISOM’s
operations
against
al-­‐Shabaab,
according
to
Security
Assistance
Monitor.63
They
enhance
efforts
to
create
a
“maneuver
and
border
force,
counter-­‐
58
“Kenya’s
Police
Receive
Norinco
VN4
Armoured
Vehicles,”
DefenceWeb,
February
10,
2016,
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42285%3Akenyas-­‐police-­‐
receive-­‐norinco-­‐vn4-­‐armoured-­‐vehicles&catid=50%3ALand&Itemid=105;
Neville
Otuki,
“Kenya
Boosts
China
Ties
with
Sh
7.9bn
Arms
Purchase
Deal,”
Business
Daily,
February
15,
2016,
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-­‐boosts-­‐China-­‐ties-­‐with-­‐Sh7-­‐9bn-­‐arms-­‐purchase-­‐deal/-­‐
/539546/3076738/-­‐/pisutkz/-­‐/index.html.
59
“China-­‐
Africa
News:
Kenya’s
Arms,
Nigeria’s
Collapsed
Security
Deal,
Zimbabwe’s
Elephants,”
China-­‐Africa
Reporting
Project,
February
22,
2106,
http://china-­‐africa-­‐reporting.co.za/2016/02/china-­‐africa-­‐news-­‐kenya-­‐
arms-­‐nigerias-­‐collapsed-­‐security-­‐deal-­‐zimbabwes-­‐elephants/#sthash.uo7AejjZ.dpuf.
60
Otuki
“Kenya
Purchases
sh2.6bn
Weapons
from
East
Europe.”
61
Ibid.
62
“U.S.
Counterterrorism
Aid
to
Kenya,”
Security
Assistance
Monitor,
July
21,
2015,
http://www.securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/us-­‐counterterrorism-­‐aid-­‐kenya.
63
Ibid.

25.
24
IEF,
intelligence,
and
logistics”
as
well
as
aircraft
to
enhance
troop
mobility
to
help
soldiers
target
al-­‐Shabaab
operatives.64
Kenya’s
increased
military
trade
with
China
bolsters
Kenya’s
overall
security,
thereby
complementing
US
counterterrorism
aims.
Kenyan
leaders’
increased
military
trade
with
China
enhances
internal
security,
as
Chinese
military
hardware
strengthens
Kenya’s
internal
policing
and
peacekeeping
operations.
China
and
the
US
therefore
operate
in
complementary
spheres.
● Kenya
will
increase
military
imports
from
China
to
gain
regional
military
superiority
and
aid
the
KDF
and
AMISOM’s
fight
against
al-­‐Shabaab,
according
to
Samuel
Perlo-­‐Freeman,
SIPRI
military
expenditure
program
director.65
● The
KDF
provides
construction
assistance,
medical
care,
and
enhanced
security
to
Chinese
peacekeepers
aiding
the
UN
Peacekeeping
Mission
in
South
Sudan,
according
to
African
Defense.66
Kenya
continues
its
strong
military-­‐to-­‐military
relationship
with
Chinese
peacekeeping
forces
to
degrade
al-­‐Shabaab
and
enhance
stability
in
South
Sudan.
● “China
and
Kenya
have
a
long-­‐standing
friendship.
I
hope
peacekeepers
of
the
two
countries
will
carry
on
the
friendship
and
work
more
closely
to
make
greater
contributions
to
peace
in
South
Sudan,”
KDF
Lt.
Gen.
Leonard
Muriuki
Ngondi
said
during
a
trip
to
Chinese
peacekeeping
forces
in
November
2015.67
While
China
will
likely
increase
peacekeeping
forces
in
the
region—mostly
to
protect
the
flow
of
oil
from
South
Sudan—China
bolsters
KDF
operations
via
arms
and
APC
exports,
not
aid
and
training.
Kenyan
leadership
seeks
to
judiciously
foster
relations
with
both
the
US
and
China
through
foreign
aid,
FDI,
and
infrastructure
loans
in
support
of
Vision
2030.
Vision
2030’s
highest
priority
project,
the
LAPSSET
corridor,
will
require
financial
support
from
multiple
international
partners.
Kenya’s
economic
64
Ibid.
65
“China-­‐Funded
Railway
in
Kenya
Accelerates
Military
Ties,”
Foreign
Military
Studies
Office,
November
28,
2013,
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201401/Africa_07.html
66
“Kenyan
Army
Commander
Visits
Chinese
Peacekeepers
in
South
Sudan,”
African
Defense,
November
20,
2015,
http://www.african-­‐defense.com/defense-­‐news/kenyan-­‐army-­‐commander-­‐visits-­‐chinese-­‐peacekeepers-­‐in-­‐
south-­‐sudan/.
67
Ibid.
ECONOMIC

26.
25
relationship
with
China
and
the
US
is
a
rare
instance
in
which
both
the
US
and
China
work
in
similar
spheres
to
develop
Kenya’s
infrastructure.
● The
$26
billion
LAPSSET
corridor
is
Vision
2030’s
highest
priority
infrastructure
project
and
enjoys
broad
political
support
among
Kenyan
elites.68
The
LAPSSET
corridor
will
require
financial
support
from
multiple
international
partners.
President
Kenyatta
affirmed
the
pragmatic
nature
of
Vision
2030
during
President
Obama’s
2015
visit
to
Nairobi,
stating
that
Kenya
could
“not
afford
the
luxury
of
aligning
itself
with
either
the
East
or
West.”69
● Currently,
the
China
Road
and
Bridge
Corporation
is
poised
to
build
the
first
three
berths
of
the
Lamu
port
at
a
cost
of
approximately
$500
million.70
US
companies
are
involved
in
talks
to
construct
oil
pipelines
from
the
Kenyan
interior
to
the
Lamu
port,
as
well
as
six
new
berths
at
the
Lamu
port.71
● According
to
a
2015
memorandum
of
understanding
between
the
Kenyan
and
US
governments,
Kenyan
leadership
views
Vision
2030
as
a
strategic
priority:72
“In
particular,
68
David
M
Doya,
“Kenya,
US
Companies
in
Talks
on
Multi
Billion
Dollar
Port
Deal,”
Bloomberg
News,
July,
26,
2015,
accessed
March
2016,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-­‐07-­‐26/kenya-­‐u-­‐s-­‐companies-­‐in-­‐
talks-­‐on-­‐multibillion-­‐dollar-­‐port-­‐deal;
Adrian
J
Browne,
“LAPSSET:
The
History
and
Politics
of
an
Eastern
Africa
Megaproject,”
The
Rift
Valley
Institute,
2015.
69
Otiato
Guguyu,
“Kenya
Risks
Souring
Ties
with
Partners
Over
Projects,”
Sunday
Nation,
August
30,
2015,
http://www.ipsos.co.ke/NEWBASE_EXPORTS/Prosperity/150830_Sunday%20Nation_34_a0495.pdf.
70
Apurya
Sanghi
and
Dylan
Johnson,
“Deal
or
No
Deal:
Strictly
Business
for
China
in
Kenya?”
World
BankGroup
Working
Paper,
March
2016,
http://www-­‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/03/23/090224b08422cf5b/2_0/Render
ed/PDF/Deal0or0no0dea0for0China0in0Kenya00.pdf.
71
Doya,
“Kenya,
US
Companies
in
Talks
on
Multi
Billion
Dollar
Port
Deal.”
72
“Memorandum
of
understanding
between
the
Government
of
the
United
States
of
America
and
the
Government
of
Kenya-­‐Concerning
the
Development
and
Implementation
of
Strategic
Priority
Infrastructure
Projects
in
Kenya,”
US
Government
Trade
Database,
2015,
http://trade.gov/dbia/signed-­‐usg-­‐gok-­‐infrastructure-­‐
mou-­‐usg-­‐07242015.pdf.
Source:
The
Africa
Report
Map
1:
LAPSETT
Corridor

27.
26
[Kenya]
seeks
to
promote
US
commercial
participation
and
investment
in
Kenya’s
infrastructure
sector,
including
strategic
infrastructure
priority
projects
(re:
LAPSSET).”
The
Kenyan
government
will
maintain
close
ties
with
China
despite
the
current
Chinese
economic
downturn.
Kenyan
elites
seek
to
emulate
China’s
domestic
infrastructure
boom
and
use
China’s
expertise
in
completing
low-­‐cost
and
efficient
large-­‐scale
projects.
Large-­‐scale
infrastructure
development
remains
the
single
biggest
priority
of
Vision
2030
and
the
backbone
of
Kenya’s
Second
Medium
Term
Plan
(2013-­‐2017).
● As
of
2015,
there
are
approximately
80
ongoing
Chinese
development
and
infrastructure
projects
in
Kenya
worth
about
$3.5
billion.73
China’s
low
cost
infrastructure
providers
will
seek
to
market
their
services
in
Africa
due
to
the
slowdown
of
the
Chinese
economy.
Therefore,
Chinese
infrastructure
projects
in
Kenya
will
likely
continue,
according
to
the
World
Bank.74
● The
Chinese
slowdown
and
rebalancing
has
the
potential
to
actually
strengthen
Kenya’s
economy
through
an
increase
in
exports,
according
to
a
March
2016
World
Bank
assessment
of
Kenya’s
economic
future
with
China.
The
report
states
that
“exports
to
China,
especially
of
services,
may
increase
once
China
transitions
to
a
consumption
driven
economy
closer
to
2030.”75
● The
Chinese
“grand
strategy”
and
the
Kenyan
domestic
agenda
are
linked.
According
to
Shannon
Tiezzi,
managing
editor
of
The
Diplomat
and
expert
on
China/Africa
relations,
infrastructure
projects
such
as
LAPSSET
and
SGR
are
key
components
of
China’s
One
Belt,
One
Road
(OBOR)
initiative
in
addition
to
Kenya’s
Vision
2030.76
Evidence
suggests
that
Kenyan
elites
view
Western
aid
and
traditional
avenues
of
financial
loans
as
ineffective.
Kenya’s
governing
elites
seek
out
Chinese
aid
because
they
view
western
aid
as
having
too
many
stipulations.
China
applies
its
non-­‐interference
policy
to
loan-­‐seeking
states.
Kenya
benefits
from
this
because
it
does
not
have
to
alter
its
governing
policies
to
accept
loans
for
development.
73
“President
Kenyatta:
Sustained
Strategic
Ties
with
China
Will
Boost
Development
in
Africa,”
Government
of
Kenya,
accessed
March
5,
2016,
http://www.president.go.ke/2015/12/05/president-­‐kenyatta-­‐sustained-­‐
strategic-­‐ties-­‐with-­‐china-­‐will-­‐boost-­‐development-­‐in-­‐africa/.
74
Apurva
and
Johnson,
“Deal
or
No
Deal:
Strictly
Business
for
China
in
Kenya?”
75
Ibid.
76
Shannon
Tiezzi,
“Africa’s
role
in
China’s
One
Belt,
One
Road
global
trade
strategy,”
The
China
in
Africa
Podcast
(2015),
The
China
Africa
Project,
March
8,
2016.
http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/podcast-­‐china-­‐obor-­‐belt-­‐road-­‐shannon-­‐tiezzi-­‐africa-­‐trade/

28.
27
● “In
my
view,
the
prescriptions
by
the
World
Bank
do
not
help
developing
countries
to
grow.
It's
like
they
look
at
you
as
if
you
are
a
small
baby
–
‘do
this,
do
that’.
Sometimes
they
are
very
wrong.
And
that's
why
I
prefer
private
capital
to
borrowing
from
the
World
Bank,”
according
to
Samuel
Poghisio,
the
former
Minister
of
Information.77
Kenyan
leaders
even-­‐handedly
engage
with
the
US
and
China
in
political
and
economic
sectors
despite
recent
anti-­‐West
campaigns.
Former
President
Mwai
Kibaki’s
rhetoric
was
frequently
anti-­‐
West
in
recent
years,
and
elites
looked
to
China
for
economic
assistance
instead
of
the
US.
However,
President
Uhuru
Kenyatta
is
beginning
to
rebuild
diplomatic
ties
with
the
US
in
order
to
realize
Kenya’s
economic
goals.
● President
Mwai
Kibaki’s
“Look
East”
policy
encouraged
stronger
relationships
with
Asia,
the
Middle
East,
BRIC
countries,
and
Eastern
Europe
due
to
their
adherence
to
non-­‐interference
policies,
according
to
The
East
African.78
● President
Kenyatta
used
his
indictment
by
the
International
Criminal
Court
(ICC)
to
win
the
2013
elections
by
propagating
anti-­‐West
rhetoric.
He
led
an
anti-­‐US
campaign
to
appeal
to
anti-­‐colonialist
and
populist
elements
in
Kenya.
He
portrayed
the
US
and
Europe’s
policy
of
limited
“essential
business”
contact
as
the
meddling
of
western
powers
in
Kenyan
elections,
according
to
The
New
York
Times.79
● The
al-­‐Shabaab
attack
at
Garissa
University
in
April
2015
and
President
Obama’s
visit
to
Kenya
in
July
2015
signaled
an
expanding
relationship
between
the
US
and
Kenya
in
77
Fourie,
“New
Maps
for
Africa?
Contextualizaing
the
‘Chinese
Model’
within
Ethiopian
and
Kenyan
Paradigms
of
Development.
78
“Kenya
reaps
handsome
rewards
from
its
robust
‘Look
East’
policy,”
The
East
Africa,
accessed
March
10,
2016,
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-­‐/2558/914708/-­‐/view/printVersion/-­‐/pq3m5q/-­‐/index.html.
79
Michela
Wrong,
“Indictee
for
President!”
The
New
York
Times,
March
11,
2013,
accessed
March
10,
2016,
http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/being-­‐prosecuted-­‐by-­‐the-­‐i-­‐c-­‐c-­‐helped-­‐uhuru-­‐kenyattas-­‐chances-­‐
in-­‐kenyas-­‐election/?_r=0.
POLITICAL
"Kenya
cannot
afford
the
luxury
of
aligning
itself
with
either
East
or
West."
-­‐President
Uhuru
Kenyatta,
2015