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Mario Fernando Miralles II
May 3rd, 2015
The Military Might of China and Japan and the Future of East Asia
Looking at the current political landscape of East Asia, one cannot help but wonder just
how vital a role this area will play, regionally as well as globally, in our near future. With a
population well over two billion people, a rich historic background consistent with its fervent
nationalism, various exponentially increasing economic powers, and a prideful will to take on the
nations of the world it leads many analysts to believe that the East Asian region is destined to
receive a favorable swing of power headed in its direction. But with an immediate surge of
incurring power comes a host of responsibilities and concerns which becomes mainly a topic of
security on the subject of international relations. Security comes in many shapes and forms.
Senior Political Scientist at Princeton University, David A. Baldwin, wrote that the concept of
security, “takes the form of proposals for giving high priority to such issues as human rights,
economics, the environment, drug traffic, epidemics, crime, or social injustice, in addition to the
traditional concern with security from external military threats” (“The Concept of Security” 5).
This research paper will place a majority of its focus on the latter; the concept of security
from a militaristic point of view. It will center its attention on arguably two of the key nation
states that will lead the East Asian region to the pinnacle of its potential: China and Japan. I will
discuss the militaristic implications of their current political and economic state of affairs, as
well as each nation’s strategy for maintaining security (mainly focused on maritime security). In
addition, I will also discuss the growing impact of globalization and military modernization.
These points will be used to answer the central question; how will the military might of China
and Japan affect the future of East Asia?

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The Current State of Political Affairs
The need for security stems from the inability to trust. The political relationship between
China and Japan can be likened to a rollercoaster ride with some steady ups and sudden drops. A
brief review on relationships between China and Japan post the Cold War era is described in the
book The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations by Richard C. Bush. He explains
that these two countries were bound to engage in friendly diplomatic relations in the early 1970s
because of “their shared suspicion of Soviet expansionism” (Bush 174). However, if we compare
the promising future of the 1970s with the reality of today, it seems that the hopeful outlook has
withered over time.
Tensions were highest during the 1990s when a variety of events culminated in a higher
level of mistrust than ever before. China’s explosion of nuclear weapons right before the two
countries were to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty, its persistent problems with Taiwan’s
separatist motives that prompted China to fire missiles toward Taiwanese ports, and its military
patrols in the Senkaku/Diaoyu area have created a negative stir. This has led to a symbolic
stoppage of grant aid and further dismay by Japan’s part. Additionally, Japanese revisions to a
number of historic textbooks (which China found insulting and led to some rioting) and the
revolving door of Japanese leadership provide further uncertainty for China. Bush attributes the
political decline, not due to economics (which both countries have benefited prosperously from),
but from a lack of trust in the matter of security and military strength. “To be sure, economic ties
have broadened and deepened, but each country worries that the other's growing military power
will weaken its own security, if not right away then in the medium term” (Bush 178-179).

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Economic Interdependence
Military strength is as much an economic matter as it is any other. The countries differ in
their economic approach; Japan is a mercantilist capitalist economy while China uses a
command system (although China has recently experimented with free-market areas known as
Exclusive Economic Zones, such as Hong Kong, to great success) (CIA World Factbook: China
& Japan). However, both have found common ground through a series of pragmatic negotiations
since the 1970s that have intertwined the two economies into a strong bond of economic
interdependence. Chinese expansion into global manufacturing and the emergence of its
domestic market coupled with a Japanese interest to export and invest in China have aided as
mutual leverage to prevent impulsive conflict:
“Two-way trade grew from $18.2 billion in 1990 (right after the Tiananmen incident) to
$57.9 billion in 1995, $85.5 billion in 2000, and $267.0 billion in 2005. That is, the
volume of trade increased by more than ten times over just fifteen years. Japanese
cumulative foreign direct investment [FDI] grew from $1.8 billion in 1990 to $8.3 billion
in 1995, $15.1 billion in 2000, and $36.3 in 2005. By the summer of 2008, China had
replaced the United States as Japan's biggest export market” (Bush 232-235).
Military
Japan has a formidable military comprising of four branches: the Japanese Ministry of
Defense (MOD), the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force
(MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). It has close to fifty million men and women fit
for military service. The Japanese military has 2,850 armored fighting vehicles, 1,613 aircraft,
678 tanks and 131 ships which easily places it within the top ten military powers of the world

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(DOD; “Carter: Demographics, Economics Boost Asia’s Global Profile”). We should also
include the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) into the mix as data shows an increase in resources and
funding being infused into the organization. “As of late 2007, it had eighty-nine armed patrol
ships that each exceeded 500 tons and fifty-six that exceeded 1,000 tons” (Bush 645-646).
Japan’s defense budget for 2015 is $41.6 billion (DOD; “Carter: Demographics,
Economics Boost Asia’s Global Profile”). A key to understanding Japan’s defense budget is
rooted in Article 9 of its constitution that aims to characterize Japanese military defense as
pacifist in its purpose. It has enacted policies strictly for defense that contains a limit of one
percent or less of the country’s GDP (Bush 375). This has subsequently become a topic of
internal debate in Japan as security concerns in the region amount. Even with the acquirement of
new funds for upgrading its F-15 fighters in order to deal with Chinese modernization of its air
force, the one percent absolute ceiling has imposed some tough limits. “In 2004, the Japan
Defense Agency announced that it would have to cut back procurement of destroyers and tanks
in order to pay for missile defense” (Bush 369-370).
China, on the other hand, has various military branches which include: the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the People’s Liberation
Army Air Force (PLAAF), the Second Artillery Corps (strategic missile force), the People’s
Armed Police (PAP), and the PLA Reserve Force. A stark contrast to Japan, it has the world’s
largest armed forces with a staggering seven hundred fifty million men and women fit for
military services and it utilizes close to two percent of its GDP ranking it at #40 in the world in
GDP usage for military purposes (CIA World Factbook: China). China has well over 9,000
tanks, close to 5,000 armored fighting vehicles, over 3,000 aircraft in its armed forces, has
purchased an aircraft carrier from Russia and is currently attempting to create an aircraft carrier

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of its own (DOD; “Carter: Demographics, Economics Boost Asia’s Global Profile”). Much like
the JCG, China has its own maritime actor known as the Maritime Surveillance Force (MSF).
“The MSF inherits older ships from the PLAN as the latter acquires more sophisticated new
vessels; thus the MSF fleet of more than 200 ships and nine planes is becoming increasingly
modern, although it is not on a par with the Japanese or the U.S. Coast Guard” (Bush 755-756).
China’s stated defense budget for 2015 is $145 billion (DOD; “Carter: Demographics,
Economics Boost Asia’s Global Profile”). Katie Hunt, a journalist for CNN, mentions that
China’s military budget will increase by 10.1% this year although many analysts like Paul
Burton, Asia Pacific director at IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security, are skeptical. He claims
that China’s spending is “notoriously opaque” and estimates that actual spending will be “35%
higher than the announced budget” (Hunt “China to narrow gap with U.S. by increasing military
spending”). While the United States controls over a fifty percent share of global defense
spending, China’s commitment to ramp up its military places it in second place at a sizeable
fifteen percent share. Another analyst Alexander Neill, a senior fellow at the International
Institute of Strategic Studies in Singapore says China is “likely to prioritize spending on its naval
power [as] its force has traditionally been focused on winning land battles” (Hunt “China to
narrow gap with U.S. by increasing military spending”).
Security Strategy
Because of the proximity and geological positioning of both countries in the region, the
most worrisome place of interest is on the sea. Maritime defense has been crucial seeing as
though many of the intricate conflicts up to date have plenty to do with overlapping jurisdiction
and disputes over contested territories. No one understands the importance of maritime security

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more than Japan’s own Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, who in his appropriately titled article
“Securing the Rule of Law at Sea” explains that, “the sources of instability include not only the
threat of weapons of mass destruction, but also – and more immediately – efforts to alter the
territorial status quo through force or coercion. And those efforts are taking place largely at sea”.
This piece is aimed directly towards China’s frequently disputed territorial claims in the South
China Sea.
Recent activity by China to proactively advance in its undertaking to settle troops and
resources on these territories have raised many concerns. In 2007, Wu Shengli and Hu Yanli,
commanders and political commissars of the PLAN gave their own reasons as to why these naval
missions were necessary. To Japan, the most alarming part to of their explanation was their last
statement: “to realize those missions, Wu and Hu said, the PLAN will gradually ‘expand the
strategic depth of its offshore defensive operations” (Bush 724). And since then, China has
followed through on its strategy. Between 2014 and 2015, reports of China engaging in the
geoengineering of artificial islands on the Spratly Islands have been confirmed through satellite
images (Hunt “Report: China building new islands in disputed waters”).
Although China denies all claims, this strategy could create what some would call an air
defense identification zone (ADIZ) which could impose limitations on the flow of air and
maritime activity. And while this may seem like a bold strategic move by China, it could
ultimately backfire in a massive way. According to an article in Reuters “Testing Beijing, Japan
eyes growing role in South China Sea security” by Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, Japan has
intensified its collaboration with neighboring states. This includes naval exercises with the
Philippines, advising Vietnamese submariners on medical issues, and Shinzo Abe has even
entered into talks with Australia to build ties and strengthen its position in the area. Japan also

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has a strong alliance with the United States military as written in Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan
mutual security treaty:
“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under
the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
provisions and processes.” (Bush 3543-3545)
The Future of East Asia
Many analysts believe that China could gain an upper hand in the near future by means of
two areas which Japan is ill prepared for: Ballistic/Cruise Missiles and Cyber Warfare. As “the
world leader in gross value of industrial output” (CIA World Factbook: China), China can
quickly manufacture missiles with ease. Weapons like its CSS-5 and CSS-2 as well as its DH-10
land-attack missile are well within Japan and Taiwan’s territorial reach (Bush 817). In regards to
cyber warfare, studies show that China has attempted a growing number of unauthorized
attempts to access Japanese servers and websites. “A 2008 report of the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, which was established by Congress, found that "China is
pursuing cyber warfare capabilities that may provide it with an asymmetric advantage against the
United States". (Bush 827-828)
Despite the uneasy political environment and contending military tension on both sides,
there exists yet a healthy tendency to cooperate and resolve these matters. There is an
unequivocal acknowledgment that problems do exist and that while confrontation among the two
great powers of the east may not be a far off idea, the consequences of an unstable East Asia are
sure to upset the entire world. That being the case, many of the problems that were discussed

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earlier can be categorized into three basic security dilemmas. First is the ever important
relationship between China and Japan on the most pressing issues which include military
operations and a bilateral understanding of each other’s intentions. Second is the direction that
they take on forming their national identities, which could go on to affect how they each interact
in the present and the future.
Third is the capabilities race that will ensue because of mistrust on the other’s growth in
numbers and future intentions (Bush 3774-3777). The concept of globalization has brought about
an encouragement to cooperate. While these two nations may never be able to set aside their
ferocious history, they can certainly find commonalities as they have in their economic sectors.
They should be open to experimenting with joint operations such as military confidence-building
measures (CBM) or through multilateral institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). “One example is the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Document of the
Stockholm Conference, which stemmed from [CBMs]; together they created a variety of CBMs
in Central Europe” (Bush 3787-3788).
Conclusion
In conclusion, this research paper has discussed a few concepts of security in East Asia
from a militaristic point of view. It centered its attention on arguably two of the key nation states
that will lead the East Asian region to the pinnacle of its potential: China and Japan. It discussed
the militaristic implications of their current political and economic state of affairs, as well as
each nation’s strategy for maintaining security (mainly focused on maritime security). In
addition, it also discussed the growing impact of globalization and military modernization in an
attempt to answer the central question; how will the military might of China and Japan affect the

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future of East Asia? There are plenty of significant elements to gather from this dynamic
relationship.
I begin by acknowledging that there is no simple solution to the question of a very
complex situation. It is acceptable to place both countries’ desires into perspective and take away
the understandable logic as to why these two sides would actively pursue a capabilities race for
the sake of their own security. Nevertheless, I believe that there is hope in unraveling all
disconnect and mistrust through a timely series of rapprochement. That these two sides could
continue to enact policies and joint exercises through bilateral and multilateral efforts and
institutions would be of great value to the world. Otherwise, we could see an irreparable region,
much like the Middle East, with an abundance of resources and a squandered potential.

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Works Cited
Baldwin, David A. Review of International Studies: “The Concept of Security” (1997) Chapter
26, Page 5. http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20(1997)
%20The%20Concept%20of%20Security.pdf. British International Studies Association.
Web.
Bush, Richard C. The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (2010). Kindle
Edition.
CIA.gov: The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook. Web
Department of Defense (DOD). www.defense.gov. Web. Garamone, Jim “Carter: Demographics,
Economics Boost Asia’s Global Profile”.
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128528
Hunt, Katie. China to narrow gap with U.S. by increasing military spending & Report: China
building new islands in disputed waters (2015).
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/05/asia/china-military-spending/ &
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/17/asia/china-south-china-sea-reclamation/. Web
Kelly, Tim and Nobuhiro Kubo. Testing Beijing, Japan eyes growing role in South China Sea
security (2015). http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/11/us-japan-southchinasea-
idUSKBN0M62B920150311. Web.
Shinzo Abe. Securing the Rule of Law at Sea (2014). https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/shinzo-abe-appeals-to-asia-pacific-leaders-to-adhere-to-
agreed-principles-in-resolving-maritime-disputes. Web.