Downloaded 117 times
![Seize the initiative.
Load Carriage
“There seem to be two persistent notions that lead
commanders to overload their soldiers (General Burba,
Chief of [US] Infantry, 1986):
• “Be Prepared” – Some commanders feel their soldiers
must be prepared to meet every imaginable
contingency.
• “The Supply System Will Fail” – Other commanders
conclude in advance of an operation that the supply
system will fail.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/ukcombatload-170809150432/75/Uk-combat-load-65-2048.jpg)
![Combat load presentation[1]](https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/combatloadpresentation1-140218173632-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=640&height=640&fit=bounds)
![Call combat load presentation[1]](https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/callcombatloadpresentation1-160517195943-thumbnail.jpg?width=640&height=640&fit=bounds)
Uk combat load
- 1. Seize the initiative. DCCLoad carriage – Project Payne CEFO - Combat Equipment Fighting Order (the sort of equipment you would carry on patrol) IBS - Infantry Battle School HFT - Hybrid Formation Training - the equivalent of Decisive Action Training as opposed to MST. ACMT - Annual Combat Marksmanship Test. CEMO - Combat Equipment Marching Order PSBC - Platoon Sergeants Battle Course. TES - Tactical Engagement Simulation - i-MILES equivalent. ASM - Anti Structure Munition. FIST - Future Infantry Soldier Technology (PNVGs etc) TAM - Tactical Aide Memoire (low level commander's handbook) DCC - Dismounted Close Combat PLCE - Personal Load Carrying Equipment (webbing) CTLS: Commander's Target Locating Equipment - A laser range finder with digital magnetic compass and a night II capability as well as day optic.
- 2. Seize the initiative. Scope The Current Situation Lethality Sustainability
- 3. Seize the initiative. “Thefighting value of a soldier is in inverse proportion to the load he carries” Cathcart et al., (1922). “On the maximum load to be carried by the soldier” Army Hygiene Advisory Committee Report No. 3, 435-443.
- 4. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation • 58 Kg average CEFO load. • Accepted max = 40 Kg • Accepted ideal = 25 Kg • The average soldier weighs 71 Kg
- 5. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation • 58 Kg average CEFO load. • Accepted max = 40 Kg • Accepted ideal = 25 Kg • The average soldier weighs 71 Kg The British Army Mule Pamphlet 1928 states a mule must not carry more than 25% of its body weight.
- 6. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation • 58 Kg average CEFO load. • Accepted max = 40 Kg • Accepted ideal = 25 Kg • The average soldier weighs 71 Kg The British Army Mule Pamphlet 1928 states a mule must not carry more than 25% of its body weight. Currently the average Infantry soldier carries 82% of his body weight in CEFO.
- 7. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation The Return to Contingency – HERRICK load in HFT. Impacts Cognitive Marksmanship Exposure CEMO?
- 8. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation
- 9. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation CASEVAC Vignette.
- 10. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation Background: 3 Pl deployed to a Tac Base for no more than 24 hrs – CEFO only. Conducted a dawn strike op on a building – sustained 1 x stretcher and 1 x walking wounded. Casevac on foot by road to the PB 2 Km away.
- 11. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig GPMG GPMG GPMG
- 12. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Weapons: GPMG/LMG + 200 Rnds Rifle + 6 Mags 60mm + 6 rnds 9 Kg 9 Kg 23 Kg 9 Kg GPMG 17 Kg 9 Kg 9 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 12 Kg 12 Kg 13 Kg 13 Kg 18 GPMG 17 Kg 9 Kg 9 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 12 Kg 12 Kg 13 Kg 13 Kg GPMG 17 Kg 9 Kg 9 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 12 Kg 12 Kg 13 Kg 13 Kg
- 13. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Additional Ammo: 6 x 40mm 600 x Link Reserve 1 Grenade per man 10 Kg 10 Kg 23 Kg 9 Kg 9 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 4 4 8 18 9 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 4 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 4
- 14. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig ASM 10 Kg 10 Kg 23 Kg 9 Kg 8 18 9 4 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 4 10 4 9 9 4 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 4 10 4 9 9 4 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 4 10 4 9
- 15. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Comms: PRC 355 PRC 354 10 Kg 10 Kg 23 Kg 9 Kg 11 183 6 9 4 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9 9 4 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9 9 4 GPMG 18 Kg 10 Kg 10 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 18 Kg 18 Kg 14 Kg 14 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9
- 16. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig PPE: Mk 7 Osprey + ECBA Plates 17Kg 17 Kg 30 Kg 16 Kg 11 18 9 4 3 6 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9
- 17. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Talon 17Kg 17 Kg 30 Kg 16 Kg 11 183 6 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9 8 8 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9 8 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 17 9 7 10 7 9 8
- 18. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Sustainability: 12 hrs rations 2 Litres water 17Kg 17 Kg 30 Kg 16 Kg 14 21 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 20 12 10 13 10 6 9 12 11 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 20 12 10 13 10 12 11 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 17 Kg 17 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 25 Kg 25 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 20 12 10 13 10 12 11
- 19. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig FIST/Comd Kit: NVG LLM CWS/Maxi/FTS TAM etc 18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg 17 239 11 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13
- 20. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig No: Webbing Clothing Torches etc Ladders/Thumpers 18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg 17 239 11 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13
- 21. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Casualties: 1 x Stretcher Case 1 x Walking Wounded 18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg 17 239 11 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 X X
- 22. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Casualties: 1 x Stretcher Case 1 x Walking Wounded 18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg 17 239 11 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 X X 78 Kg 8 Kg
- 23. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Casualties: 1 x Stretcher Case 1 x Walking Wounded 18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg 17 239 11 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 00 14 14 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 14 14 15 14 14 13 X X 103 Kg 97 Kg
- 24. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Casualties: 1 x Stretcher Case 1 x Walking Wounded 18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg 17 449 32 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 8 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 14 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 26 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 28 28 30 14 28 27 X X 103 Kg 97 Kg
- 25. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Men with no additional kit 18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg 17 449 32 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 8 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 26 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 28 28 30 14 28 27 X X 103 Kg 97 Kg
- 26. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Men with full kit and carrying stretcher 18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg 17 449 32 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 8 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 26 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 28 28 30 14 28 27 X X 103 Kg 97 Kg
- 27. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Man with 2 x ASM 18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg 17 449 32 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 8 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 26 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 28 28 30 14 28 27 X X 103 Kg 97 Kg
- 28. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig Man with 2 x Daysacs + Talon 18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg 17 449 32 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 8 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 26 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 28 28 30 14 28 27 X X 103 Kg 97 Kg
- 29. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation 60 mm Sig 18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg 17 449 32 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 8 Kg 18 Kg 18 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 00 00 14 00 14 00 4 9 4 GPMG 25 Kg 18 Kg 26 Kg UGL UGL LMG LMG 26 Kg 26 Kg 21 Kg 21 Kg 21 28 28 30 14 28 13 103 Kg 97 Kg • One man giving protection – GPMG Gunner 3 Sec • No change on the stretcher • Three men with hands on weapons – Pl Comd, Sgt and GPMG Gunner
- 30. Seize the initiative. TheCurrent Situation
- 31.
- 32. Seize the initiative. Lethality The Battle of Long Tan – Vietnam, 18 Aug 1966
- 33. Seize the initiative. Lethality The Battle of Long Tan – Vietnam, 18 Aug 1966 D Coy 6 RAR contacted a Reinforced Regiment of VC and NVA. In contact for 5 hours Ammunition scaling for a rifleman was 3 x 20 rnd magazines Ammo resupply was not requested until 80 minutes after contact The resupply took more than an hour Despite fighting for over 2 and a half hours before resupply ammunition did not run out
- 34. Seize the initiative. Lethality Weapons suppress or kill Suppression: Volume Accuracy KE Types of weapon: Area suppression Point suppression Assault
- 35. Seize the initiative. Lethality GPMGLMG LSWL129A1 RifleUGL
- 36. Seize the initiative. Lethality GPMGLMG LSWL129A1 RifleUGL
- 37. Seize the initiative. Lethality GPMGLMG LSWL129A1 RifleUGL
- 38. Seize the initiative. Lethality GPMGLMG LSWL129A1 RifleUGL
- 39. Seize the initiative. Lethality GPMGLMG LSWL129A1 RifleUGL
- 40. Seize the initiative. Lethality GPMGLMG LSWL129A1 RifleUGL
- 41. Seize the initiative. Lethality GPMGLMG LSWL129A1 RifleUGL
- 42. Seize the initiative. Lethality Belt fed weapons present a higher ammunition burden Belt fed weapons are heavier Belt fed weapons are not assault weapons
- 43. Seize the initiative. Lethality Current Section Mix: 1 x GPMG 2 x LMG 2 x UGL 3 x Rifle
- 44. Seize the initiative. Lethality Current Section Mix: 1 x GPMG – Long range area suppression; not assault 2 x LMG – Short range area suppression; not assault 2 x UGL – Short range area suppression and assault 3 x Rifle - Assault
- 45. Seize the initiative. Lethality Current Section Mix: 1 x GPMG – Long range area suppression; not assault 2 x LMG – Short range area suppression; not assault 2 x UGL – Short range area suppression and assault 3 x Rifle - Assault OPTIMISED TO SUPPRESS – NOT ASSAULT
- 46. Seize the initiative. Lethality “Determinedfrom experience, a unit of fire was the amount of ammunition that would last, on average, for one day of heavy fighting. A unit of fire for the M1 rifle was 100 rounds; for the light machine gun 1,500 rounds...” Eugene Sledge: “With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa.”
- 47. Seize the initiative. Lethality “Determinedfrom experience, a unit of fire was the amount of ammunition that would last, on average, for one day of heavy fighting. A unit of fire for the M1 rifle was 100 rounds; for the light machine gun 1,500 rounds…” USMC Rifle Coy structure 1943/44: 3 x Rifle Pls (M1 and carbine) Weapons Pl (3 x 0.3 MG and 3 x 60mm mor)
- 48. Seize the initiative. Lethality USMC– Pacific WW2 British Army - HERRICK
- 49. Seize the initiative. Lethality USMC– Pacific WW2 36 x Rfn = 3,600 Ball 1 x 0.3 MG = 1,500 link British Army – HERRICK 15 x Rfn = 3,600 6 x LMG = 6,000 link 3 x GPMG = 3,000 link
- 50. Seize the initiative. Lethality– The Solution Return to core weapons mix Teach the principles of suppression Teach appropriate weapons to task
- 51. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage
- 52. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage – A lesson from history Normandy 1944 An experienced Army A capable enemy The same human body and mind
- 53. Seize the initiative. 4911986Fus Tom Payne, 11 Pl, B Coy, 6 RWF
- 54.
- 55. Seize the initiative. •Gas Cape • Socks • Mess Tins • Cutlery • Shaving Kit • Cigarettes and Chocolate • Face net • Wash Kit • Balaclava • Boot laces • Hair Brush • Emergency Rations
- 56.
- 57. Seize the initiative. •Medical Kit
- 58. Seize the initiative. •Entrenching Tool Head and handle • Rifle Cleaning Kit • Boot Cleaning Kit
- 59. Seize the initiative. •Personal Items • Pipe and Tobacco • Family Photos • Wallet • Pay Book • Guide to France
- 60. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage – A lesson from history
- 61. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage – A lesson from history
- 62. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage – A lesson from history
- 63. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage – A lesson from history
- 64. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage – A lesson from history Scalable equipment Robust/reliable CSS Lean packing Appropriate weapon mix
- 65. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage “There seem to be two persistent notions that lead commanders to overload their soldiers (General Burba, Chief of [US] Infantry, 1986): • “Be Prepared” – Some commanders feel their soldiers must be prepared to meet every imaginable contingency. • “The Supply System Will Fail” – Other commanders conclude in advance of an operation that the supply system will fail.
- 66. Seize the initiative. RESTRICTEDDRAFT 1 . 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4s 4l 5 1 Kit on the man, immediate use ammo/trauma kit in pockets. 1 No Protection. 2 3x Mags in pouches and trauma kit. Smoke/HE gren as req. 2 Helmet Only. 3 ‘Go Bag’ / Man Bag packed with additional water / Mags / Signals. Additional rations med kit as req. 3 Helmet + OSPREY liner worn. 4 Webbing worn with 24hours fighting order. Daysack as alternative to increase manoeuvrability. 4s / 4l Helmet + OSPREY liner + Small Plates (s) OR large plate (l) Mobilitylevels 5 Webbing & Daysack worn for longer patrols. Bergen as required. Protectionlevels 5 Helmet + OSPREY liner + Small plate side. Planning Factors. General Principles IBS OSPREY configuration. Loose items must not be stowed on front of armour. Cumberbund fitted Minimum configuration is med kit and three single kangaroo mag pouches. • Type of Op. • Protection levels required. • Profile in COIN environment. • Likelihood of digging. • Terrain factors dictating type of emergency kit required. • Likely obstacles encountered. • Likely duration of task / likelihood of retasking. • Heat Stress Index leading to overburdening. • Weather conditions leading to additional PPE requirements. 1. Commander’s discretion on the requirements for the mission are final. 2. Load scales must be influenced by the task rather than personal preference. 3. Load carriage should vary for different members of the pl. 4. Maximise Survivability. 5. Use imagination to lighten loads. Profile should be minimised for max mobility and min weight configuration. D R O P Decide Mobility level to accomplish mission Reduce unnecessary eqmt Organize transport means to carry unit eqmt Police the ranks. Sentry Duty Defence Attack Ptl route out / in Withdrawal Ambush Standing Patrols Harbour Routine Adv to Con House Clearing Heli / Boat Ops Insertion March General OBUA PROTECTION Op routine Recce CTR MOBILITY and PROTECTION must be balanced to achieve optimum SURVIVABILITY M O B I L I T Y D Decide Mobility level to accomplish mission R Reduce unnecessary equipment O Organize means to carry Pl/Sect equipment P Police the ranks. COMMANDERS! It is your responsibility to tailor the load of your troops. Use the ‘DROP’ drill to maximise effectiveness. Kit is being redesigned to lighten the load and work is underway to encourage risk management to be devolved to the junior commander. The threshold target weight a soldier should operate with is 25kg. Any soldier, regardless of fitness or robustness, will see a marked drop in performance when carrying 40kg or more.
- 67. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage Modular: Decided before deployment – tailored to mission/task Scalable: Can be altered during the mission/task
- 68. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage Scalable Approach: Irreducible minimum on body Immediate sustainability Longer term sustainability Current issue: Only ability to scale is with daysac PLCE is fixed by Osprey
- 69. Seize the initiative. LoadCarriage – The Solution Immediate Level 1 (I1) = Osprey Immediate Level 2 (I2) = Belt kit Immediate Level 3 (I3) = Daysack Support Level 1 (S1) = Bergen Support Level 2 (S2) = Holdall
- 70. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Immediate Level 1 (I1) 3 x Magazines 1 x Frag grenade PRR Immediate trauma kit - carried on the man or in an additional magazine pouch (as per Unit SOP) Empty smoke grenade pouch. On the man: Map. Compass. Crib and Report cards. Pens.
- 71. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Immediate Level 1 (I1) Empty smoke grenade pouch enables a smoke grenade to be moved from I2 to I1 before assault if required. Immediate trauma kit: 2 x FFD CAT Yellow Cylume Morphine The above will fit in a pouch smaller than the issue med pouch.
- 72. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Immediate Level 1 (I1): Commander’s Radio PRC 354 carried in hydration pouch. This enables the radio to be carried in I3 or removed and placed on the back in I1/2.
- 73. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Immediate Level 2 (I2) 3 x Magazines. Bayonet. 1 x Smoke Grenade Water bottle 1 x utility pouch with: HMNVS. Torch Combi tool and gun oil. Additional trauma kit
- 74. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Immediate Level 2 (I2) The soldier must be able to remove this without removing Osprey: No yoke. Yoke over Osprey. Belt attached to Osprey with fastex clips.
- 75. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Immediate Level 3 (I3) Eye protection. Cam cream. Hexi/ Single mess tin/mug/Spoon Emergency rations. Additional water. Warm jacket (maximum - softy). Hat/headover and gloves Waterproof jacket. Remainder of weapon cleaning kit. Rations as required for the task. Ammunition bandolier if required. Aides memoire. Pen knife/leatherman. 1 x Poncho per Fire Team.
- 76. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Immediate Level 3 (I3): Rations Food for the duration of the task is separate to emergency rations. Gas/multi fuel stove is not carried in I3. Hexi is light and adequate. Emergency rations are for when task endures beyond planned time.
- 77. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Immediate Level 3 (I3) Daysac: Single jet pack may be appropriate for a rifleman. If issue 45 litre daysac is used - sides should be zipped up. The additional capacity is for use in extremis only. ETH - threat dependant. Lightweight stretcher – one per fire team.
- 78. Seize the initiative. ImmediateLevels – Concept of Use Immediate kit (I1, I2 and I3) is carried on the man. It can be shed as the situation requires, e.g: "Assaulting troops will drop off I3 in the FUP. At the entry point to the building assaulting troops will drop off I2. Once the building is secure the link man will bring in I2. On reorg I3 will be collected from the FUP." For certain tasks troops may operate in reduced scales, e.g: "All movement around the FOB/harbour will be in I1." "The clearance patrol will be conducted in I2." I3 may contain night vision, but only if the operation will span dark hours.
- 79. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Support Level 1 (S1) Bergen: 24/48 hrs rations. Sleeping bag. Bivi Bag. Poncho. ETH if not in I3. Night vision equipment. 1 x set combats. 3 x pairs socks. Additional warm kit (if warm kit in I3 is light). Gas stove/multi fuel stove - optional. Wash kit. Waterproof trousers. Housewife. Boot cleaning kit.
- 80. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Support Level 1 (S1) Night vision may be moved to I3 as required. If IDF threat will require digging on every halt/reorg and not just in harbours then the ETH will be moved to I3. If S1 is to be used as CEMO for a short period spare clothes, wash kit etc can be moved to S2. Sleeping bag may be swapped for jungle sleeping bag if temperature/duration/distance balance is considered appropriate.
- 81. Seize the initiative. ScalableLoad Carriage – Support Level 2 (S2) 1 x Black holdall per Fire Team (contents per man): Additional spare clothes. Spare boots. Light/soft foot wear (trainers/sandals). Jungle sleeping bag.
- 82. Seize the initiative. SoftBags Soft bag: One labelled Bergen liner per fire team. One labelled side pocket liner per individual. Soft Bags will be used to bring forward limited loads. Individuals' small soft bags will be put in Fire Team or Section soft bags. Example use: "Put lunch in your I3 and the balance of your 24 hrs rations in your soft bags. Centralise the soft bags before leaving this location and they will be brought forward on the CSM's quad for evening meal.“ "Put night vision in soft bags. It will be brought forward before last light, when you can either fit it or put it in I3.“ “At first light, soft bag your night vision. The CSM will come forward to collect it.” "Put dry clothes in soft bags. Once the crossing is secure these will be brought forward and wet cloths will be taken back." "Commanders - put spare radio batteries in soft bags and I will bring these forward within 10 hrs."
- 83. Seize the initiative. SupportLevels – Concept of Use Support kit will not routinely be carried. In extremis S1 may be carried, but equipment which will not be required will be moved to S2. The fire team shares 1 x black holdall. Soft Bags will be used to bring forward or back load limited loads.
- 84. Seize the initiative. GeneralPrinciples In general terms any kit movement should be up, not down the chain. Ammo from I3 to S1. If S1 has to be carried as much of it as possible should be moved to S2. In hot weather warm kit may be moved from I3 to S1. The support chain must be robust and reliable. It must be considered a task which requires resourcing during planning. I1 is for assault - assault does not require a stove, model kit, TAM etc. I2 is for immediate support - ammo for F Sp, to reload I1 with ammo before the next assault, to have a drink. I3 keeps the individual functioning between access to Support kit - there should be no "just in case" except true emergency rations.
- 85. Seize the initiative. SpecialistEquipment The Talon stretcher is on the CSM’s quad. Light weight stretchers carried in I3. HMNVS in I2 will cover unplanned night deployments. Bringing forward night vision will need to be planned for operations spanning dusk. Similarly, back loading night vision should be considered for operations spanning dawn.
- 86. Seize the initiative. Conclusion We carry too much “just in case” We carry it in the wrong place We often carry the wrong weapons We carry too much ammunition
- 87.
- 88. Seize the initiative. PlatoonSergeants’ Battle Course Opening Address Seize the initiative.
- 89. Seize the initiative. Conclusion 1995 SA-80A1 PRC349 CBA 2012 SA-80A2 UGL PRR and PRC 354 Osprey ASM CTLS
Editor's Notes
- #4 The above quote summarises the issue well: it is difficult to soldier well with a heavy burden. It also shows that this is not a new issue and the presentation will use historical examples of how this issue has been addressed in the past.
- #5 This shows the load average load on Op HERRICK, averaged across the multiple. Survivability is 25% of the burden; not inconsiderable, but not the largest. However, it tends to be where we focus when looking at the burden. CIED – ECM, VALLON etc – is only 11% of the average burden. Even if removed (in another theatre with a different IED threat for example) the base load remains above 50kg. It has long been accepted, following significant scientific study, that over 25 kg performance begins to more rapidly decline. Over 40 kg it declines exponentially. Therefore it is accepted that the ideal load is 25kg or less and that it should never be over 40kg. Larger than Survivability is Sustainability; food, water, clothes etc. Larger still is lethality; weapons and ammunition combined makes up 33% of the burden. Lethality and sustainability are areas we can influence without EP driven change.
- #6 The British Army mule pamphlet stated that a mule cannot carry more that 25% of its body weigh. Current accepted practice is that a mule cannot carry more that 20% of its body weight and that for long periods it should carry no more than 10% of body weight.
- #7 We currently expect our young soldiers to carry 82% of their body weight – in CEFO. They are expected to fight with this load.
- #8 At the IBS we do not conduct MST, we conduct HFT and we are therefore well placed to see what happens when this load – which has developed in theatre – comes into contact with HFT. In OBUA ladders bend or snap, men cannot climb into lofts without ladders, they cannot climb through windows, cross fences, safely cross country in the dark etc etc. The impact is not just sore shoulders.. There has been much scientific work into the impact of the burden on performance. USMC research has shown that cognitive ability – the ability to think, remember, make decisions, notice thing around you – is significantly degraded as the weight of the load climbs. Partly this is physical; as the load rises the head cants more; the individual looks at the ground, not around them. Also, as the core temperature rises our speed of thought drops. Discomfort also fills more and more of the individuals thoughts. Marksmanship standards fall as the burden climbs. A DSTL study had 8 men fire an ACMT. 6 passed, those that failed both only failed one of the five elements of the test and one of them only failed by one round. They were then given the current theatre load. They did not move anywhere, simply put on the load and returned to the firing point. Only one soldier passed the ACMT; the rest failed all 5 elements. During field firing those carrying 30kg hit 75% of targets, those carrying 50kg and more hit only 50%. Recent work has also shown that exposure times – the time you are up and moving – during contact increase exponentially with weight. At loads similar to our current theatre burden exposure time was almost doubled from baseline. Equally, under heavy loads maximum speeds were never reached. Ultimately, this means that by overloading our soldiers we not only cause them physical discomfort, we make them worse soldiers less likely to succeed. All of this deals with CEFO only. What of CEMO?
- #9 This is a student on PSBC carrying CEMO. It has almost become unrealistic, with some soldiers carrying more than their own body weight.
- #10 The following vignette illustrates how the burden issue can impact on realistic infantry tasks.
- #11 A Pl during battle camp on PSBC deployed with CEFO only and conducted a dawn strike op onto a building. During the contact TES showed that they had received two casualties, one walking and one a stretcher case. These casualties were recovered by stretcher to the Coy PB 2 km away. The move was solely on roads.
- #12 The Pl was down to 7 man sections. This is entirely normal. Large lozenges show individuals, The smaller lozenge next to it is their daysac.
- #13 First we add weapons and ready ammunition. Rifles have 6 x mags. In theatre some units have been carrying up to 11 mags per man
- #14 Then we add UGL rounds, additional link (routinely 1,000 rounds link are carried per belt fed weapon – here we just have 800). Pl Sgt and Sec 2ICS are given an ammo reserve. Each man has an HE grenade.
- #15 Each section carries an ASM.
- #16 Radios are added.
- #17 The soldiers were wearing helmets and Osprey BUT THE OSPREY ONLY HAD SMALL ECBA PLATES NOT LARGE PLATES OR SIDE PLATES.
- #18 Each section had a Talon stretcher.
- #19 Add 12 hrs rations (not a 24 hr ration pack) and 2 x litres water (less than a full camelback).
- #20 FIST kit and command kit (TAM, model kits etc) are added.
- #21 This is still not the full load a man would have. The weight of his load carriage equipment, his warm and water proof clothing, torches, stoves etc is not included. None of the strike equipment – ladders etc – are included. The average load is around 40kg.
- #22 The GPMG gunner in 1 Sec became a stretcher case. A UGL gunner in 2 Sec was walking wounded.
- #23 Two Talon stretchers (8 kg each) were deployed. The GPMG gunner (for illustrative purposes weighing 70kg) was put on one.
- #24 The GPMG gunners personal kit was put on the stretcher with him. The personal equipment of the UGL gunner was put on the second stretcher, as was the 60mm mortar.
- #25 Where possible, those carrying stretchers gave their daysacs to anyone not carrying a stretcher.
- #26 This left only the Pl Comd, Pl Sgt and 1 x GPMG gunner without additional equipment.
- #27 6 men were carrying stretchers, but had no one to give their daysac to, so they carried both.
- #28 One man had two ASMs.
- #29 One man had 2 x daysacs and a folded Talon stretcher.
- #30 This left one man giving protection – 3 Sec GPMG gunner.
- #31 This is a photograph from this serial. This man has his own rifle, an LMG, a section of ladder attached to his Osprey with a plasticuff, a thumper (a heavy item) on his shoulder and a daysac with radio. He has no hands on a weapon. He is looking at the ground ahead of him. He cannot fight and has no situational awareness; he is purely moving a heavy load from A to B.
- #34 The bullets here explain the situation at Long Tan. The Australians, albeit with significant artillery support (which is not cheating) fought a hugely more numerous enemy for over 2.5 hrs with 60 rnds per rifle and did not run out of ammunition. They also had 1 x M60 MG per Pl, with 500rnds link.
- #35 Weapons suppress of kill. Suppression is physiological incapacitation; it is a substitute for physical incapacitation – killing or injuring the enemy. Suppression is made up of volume of fire, accuracy and the KE of the round – how big the round is. If there is less volume this can be compensated for with accuracy or size of round etc. Within the DCC Pl we have three types of direct fire weapons; area suppression (characterised by throwing down a beaten zone), point suppression weapons capable of accurate aimed fire and assault weapons which can easily be carried during the assault (jumping fences, crawling, entering buildings etc).
- #37 The GPMG is a long range area suppression weapon.
- #38 The LMG a short range area suppression weapon.
- #39 The sharpshooter (a UOR weapon) gives point suppression.
- #40 The LSW gives long range point suppression.
- #41 The 40mm UGL gives short range area suppression.
- #42 The rifle gives short range point suppression, but is also a true assault weapon.
- #43 We have a propensity of belt fed weapons in the rifle Pl.
- #44 The current section weapon mix – informed by theatre experience and used at the IBS – is as above.
- #46 The current weapon mix is optimised for suppression, not assault. This is a product of theatre experience, where we rarely assault, but hold enemy at arms length and either extract or call in joint fires. Equally, frustrations with locating the enemy have driven us to use high volumes of area suppression fire. Few men in this Section can go through a window or crawl up to a bunker.
- #47 Eugene Sledge fought with the USMC in the pacific in WW2. He states that they considered the ammunition required by a rifleman for a day of heavy fighting was 100 rounds. For a .30 MG it was 1,500 rounds. This was fighting the Imperial Japanese Army, who had similar equipment capabilities and were fanatical. They required significant suppression and always required an assault to clear their position.
- #48 The USMC Rifle Coy of the time has 3 x Rifle Pls with rifles only and a Support Pl with 3 x 0.30 MGs and 3 x 60mm Mortars. If the MGs and Mortars are given to the Rifle Pls we end up with something not dissimilar to the current British Rifle Pl.
- #49 In 1944 the USMC were fighting a determined near peer enemy in high intensity, heavily contested close combat. In Afghanistan were are conducting influence Ops and demonstrating courageous restraint.
- #50 The USMC Pl had 3 x 12 man Sections. With 100 rnds per man this is 3,600 ball. The Current British Pl has 15 men with magazine fed weapons (Rifle and UGL Rifle) in the Sections. If each carries 8 mags (remember – in theatre up to 11 mags have been carried) and there is no Pl Sgt’s or Sec 2ICs’ reserve then these men have 3,600 rounds of ball. THIS IS THE SAME AS MORE THAN TWICE THE NUMBER OF USMC RIFLEMEN. The single MG in the USMC Pl (one from the Support Weapons Pl) has 1,500 link. Routinely an MG Gunner in the current British Rifle Pl will carry 1,000 rnds link. There are 6 x LMG and 3 x GPMG in the Pl, so the Pl has 9,000 rnds link. THE MODERN BRITISH RIFLE PL CONDUCTING COUNTER INSURGENCY CARRIES 6 TIMES MORE LINK THAN A USMC PL FIGHTING THE JAPANESE.
- #51 At Brecon we will: Return to the core weapon mix, with 1 x GPMG per Pl and with the LSW back in the fire team. Teach the principles of suppression – how people are suppressed and how much of what type of fire it takes – so that more effective use can be made of ammunition and informed fire control (not just “get some fucking rounds down”) can be conducted. Teach what weapons are suitable for what task. There is not often a need to manoeuvre a GPMG to 100 m of the objective. A lone rifleman can be suppressed with deliberate fire from one rifle etc. This will include assessing fire effect on the enemy and managing the fire accordingly. This will counter the following situation occurring again: During a pl attack with TES a Pl on PSBC grouped their 3 x GPMG as a fire support group. The first objective was an open fire pit with 2 x enemy in it. At H Hr the GPMGs began to engage at a rapid rate, The first Section then launched. It dropped off a Fire Team (with an LMG) as a point of fire. It then dropped off another pair (with an LMG) as a point of fire. The final pair then assaulted. This meant that at one point there were 9 men, with 5 belt fed weapons, engaging the enemy position. When the TES data was interrogated it showed that the first two rounds fired on H Hr had hit and killed the two enemy. The enemy had then neither moved nor fired for the rest of the attack. Therefore for approx 5 mins the Pl had fired several thousand rounds at two dead bodies.
- #53 The British Army in Normandy in 1944 saw some of the heaviest fighting of the second world war. This was a very capable Army. Several Division had fought in North Africa and Sicily before landing on D Day. Other Divisions had trained hard for years and by the final break-out most had been in heavy contact for 6 weeks. These were experienced soldiers. The British faced 2 x Waffen SS Corps around Caen. Several enemy divisions were fresh from the Eastern front. These Divisions were the best equipped the Germans had, they received the best recruits and they were fanatical. This was a capable near peer (and at times more than near peer) enemy. The human body in 1944 was the same as today, it still got cold, hungry, needed hydration etc. Equally it still took the same suppression; because most men had bolt action rifles this didn’t mean that both sides agreed to be more readily suppressed.
- #54 This is Fusilier Tom Payne in the fighting order of 1944. (Tom Payne was a regular soldier before the war. Here he is 33. He survived the war.)
- #55 On his belt is a respirator. This was not routinely carried in Normandy, so the pouch was removed; it wasn’t filled with other stuff. He also had a 2 pint water bottle.
- #56 In his 37 pack he carried the items above. Note – he has no food other than emergency rations and chocolate. He would routinely expect food to be brought forward to him. His gas cape is waterproofs, warm kit (ish) and shelter all in one. He has no sleeping kit; this would be brought forward to him when there was the opportunity for sleep. The 37 pack has an 8 litre capacity. The current issue daysac is 45l. The issue grab bag is 8 litres.
- #57 These are British Army emergency rations from WW2. They have a block of chocolate, matches and sugar and instant tea. It was for use in emergencies only. Now we tend to talk of “24 hrs emergency ration” and this is interpreted as a 24 hr ration pack. No British soldier has starved to death in recent history. In an emergency hydration, energy and warmth are critical. A few energy bars and a packet of hot chocolate will do this.
- #58 This is his med kit.
- #59 In his ETH pouch he has equipment as above.
- #60 This is the only personal equipment he had. Recently we found a student of PSBC with an iPad on battle camp.
- #61 Here we see a Section in Normandy carrying the kit as modelled by Fus Payne. Note they are from a different Division, but still have the same load configuration. (Note that they have 1 x automatic weapon in the Section – the Bren Gun. This was an accurate magazine fed weapon - more akin to the LSW or Sharpshooter than an LMG or GPMG.)
- #62 Here we see Infantry in the FUP ready for an attack during Op Charnwood – the break in to Caen. Note that they have stripped their webbing down to ammunition pouches and a bayonet only. (Also note how calm the Pl Sgt looks!)
- #63 Here we see troops fighting through one of the villages in the approach to Caen. Between the two men they have 1 x ammunition bandolier. These men are engaged in high intensity fighting against a capable and fanatical near peer enemy. In the next slide we see a PSBC student: He is on a Platoon clearance patrol from a Coy tactical base that was planned to last an hour. The patrol deployed at 1000 hrs; night vision would not be required. He had eaten breakfast and was fully hydrated. The patrol was going no more than 500m from the tactical base. The enemy was operating in no more than fire team size and would engage and then withdraw.
- #64 This is him trying to run in contact.
- #65 In WW2 the British Infantry had scalable equipment – they could tailor their load to match the situation. They trusted their CSS to get forward what they require when they required it. During the fighting around Hill 112 the 43rd Wessex Div took 40% casualties. Their history describes the fighting as so intense that “the CSgts couldn’t get forward with hot food until after last light.” They packed lean – Tom Payne was willing to be cold and wet for periods of time. For all the fighting in Normandy was over Jun, Jul and Aug the weather was atypically bad. The Mulberry harbours were damaged in a storm and close air support was often unavailable due to the weather. For much of the time it was cold and wet. They had appropriate weapons in the Pl. They had considerable indirect fire support and direct fire support from MG Bns (which could attach Coys – much like modern FSGs – to Units or Bdes). This allowed the Pl weapon mix to be optimised for the assault.
- #66 This summarises well how we have gone off the rails. Some QMs may still remember going on recce patrols in Army daps, a soft hat and a magazine in the pocket. No-one would consider this now for a recce patrol.
- #67 These are aide memoirs currently used at Brecon to drive risk management with what is carried.
- #68 There are two approaches to load carriage. The modular approach allows the load to be altered before deploying – deciding what to take, stripping webbing etc. The scalable approach allows the load to be managed during deployment. This is of more utility to us as it allows the troops to flex to task without returning to a base.
- #69 The scalable approach sees: An irreducible minimum on the body. Immediate sustainability. Longer term sustainability Currently we can only scale our load by dropping the daysac. If we are wearing PLCE with a yoke this is fixed to us by our Osprey. I have witnessed on PSBC men in the final bounds of an assault with belt kit with 5 utility pouches containing an jetboil, TAM, model kit and 3 x boil in the bag meals. Are these really required when assaulting a bunker?
- #70 The proposed solution sees kit broken down as stated here.
- #71 This is the I1 load. This is what is required in the final assault – the final bounds, entering a building etc.
- #72 It has an empty pouch to allow an additional item to be carried in the assault. It has a stripped down, immediate trauma kit.
- #73 If the commander’s radio is in his daysac he cannot drop the pack and reduce to I1. If it is in his belt kit it means he cannot drop his I2. By putting it in a hydration pack pouch he can wear the radio when he is in I1. When he is carrying his daysac the radio in its pouch goes in the daysac. (As an aside – this makes it much easier to access and insert/remove the radio.)
- #74 This is the belt kit – I2. The rifle cleaning kit is stripped to a combi tool and oil – enough to keep the weapon working.
- #75 The soldier must be able to drop his belt order without removing Osprey. Several solutions have been trialled: Not using a yoke works for some, but the belt can slip. A yoke over the Osprey is not comfortable. With the Osprey CES come four T bars with fastex (trident) clips. If these are used to attach the belt to the Osprey then the Osprey acts as the yoke, but with a few quick clips the belt can be dropped.
- #76 The daysac has what is required, not “what might be required”. Warm kit is as dictated by the weather – no softy in the Summer etc. This is where the TAM etc belongs if it is to be carried.
- #77 Emergency rations are true emergency rations – not 24hrs worth of boil in the bag. Hexi is light and compact. Gas or multi fuel stoves don’t belong in the daysac. Normal rations are carried as dictated by the duration of the task. This may just be biscuits and sweets. It may be 1 x boil in the bag.
- #78 With this load a single jetpack will suffice for a rifleman A commander can use a 45 l pack, but the sides should be routinely zipped up. The ETH is carried as directed by the IDF threat. If high, it may go on I2. If low it may go in S1 (the bergen). If intermediate it will go in I3.
- #80 This is the bergen. Note: Routinely the individual would not expect to carry the bergen. He will see it when it is required. Night vision when not required by the individual is kept in S1. This is where additional warm kit is, to mitigate the risk of carrying less in I3; by the time you are in a harbour you will have a softy/down jacket. If the individual wants a gas stove, this is where it should be for use in a tactical base.
- #81 The last bullet is critical here. If a soldier must carry his S1, then it should be pared down to bare minimum weight, with the remainder going into S2. Spare clothes, wash kit, house wife, boot cleaning kit etc is not required for one night. If it not too cold the jungle sleeping bag can be taken, with the large sleeping back put in S2.
- #82 This is for additional equipment not required every night. Soldiers should expect to see this at least once every 3 days. The jungle sleeping bag is to swap with the large sleeping bag if S1 is to be carried.
- #83 Soft bags allow some equipment to be moved backwards and forwards in small capacity lift as required. The prime example would be night vision, brought forward for last light and collected again after first light.
- #85 The aim should always be to move kit, where possible, up the chain, i.e. I2 to I3, I3 to S1, S1 to S2. Plans must be put in place to support these efforts. If a Coy HQ accepts that a pl is deploying without night vision it must bear this in mind. If they need to re-task this Pl to stay out after last light they must accept that they can only use NVGs, accept that they must get their soft bags with night vision forward to them or replace them with a suitably equipped Pl. To leave the risk with them alone and then grip them if they cannot stay out will mean that next time they deploy they will carry night vision as a rule and the load will grow. If a Pl Comd decides that he does not want to take, for example, night vision, Coy HQ should work to support this. This may mean getting a veh forward to them to collect soft bags of night vision and then having someone in Coy HQ (signaller?) stag on the serial numbered items. Without this support and acceptance of risk from Coy and BG HQ then this system will fail and people will revert to carrying everything all the time. Finally, we should avoid “surprise overnighters” where we tell troops they will see their bergens but then they don’t see them for days. This will undermine confidence in the system and lead to soldiers once more packing for every eventuality. No-one needs to practice being cold that often; when required to do so you will have no choice anyway.
- #87 At the very core of this is a mindset. Whether the system can be put in place etc does not impact upon the basic principle: we should carry no more than we require (be it clothing, ammunition, weapons etc) and we should carry it in the right place (no jetboils in the assault).
- #88 On the left is a patrol in Normandy in 1944, looking for Waffen SS. On the right is a PSBC student wearing Osprey with pouches, belt order, a grab bag and a daysac. We have clearly drifted.