Uk combat load

Editor's Notes

• #4 The above quote summarises the issue well: it is difficult to soldier well with a heavy burden. It also shows that this is not a new issue and the presentation will use historical examples of how this issue has been addressed in the past.
• #5 This shows the load average load on Op HERRICK, averaged across the multiple. Survivability is 25% of the burden; not inconsiderable, but not the largest. However, it tends to be where we focus when looking at the burden. CIED – ECM, VALLON etc – is only 11% of the average burden. Even if removed (in another theatre with a different IED threat for example) the base load remains above 50kg. It has long been accepted, following significant scientific study, that over 25 kg performance begins to more rapidly decline. Over 40 kg it declines exponentially. Therefore it is accepted that the ideal load is 25kg or less and that it should never be over 40kg. Larger than Survivability is Sustainability; food, water, clothes etc. Larger still is lethality; weapons and ammunition combined makes up 33% of the burden. Lethality and sustainability are areas we can influence without EP driven change.
• #6 The British Army mule pamphlet stated that a mule cannot carry more that 25% of its body weigh. Current accepted practice is that a mule cannot carry more that 20% of its body weight and that for long periods it should carry no more than 10% of body weight.
• #7 We currently expect our young soldiers to carry 82% of their body weight – in CEFO. They are expected to fight with this load.
• #8 At the IBS we do not conduct MST, we conduct HFT and we are therefore well placed to see what happens when this load – which has developed in theatre – comes into contact with HFT. In OBUA ladders bend or snap, men cannot climb into lofts without ladders, they cannot climb through windows, cross fences, safely cross country in the dark etc etc. The impact is not just sore shoulders.. There has been much scientific work into the impact of the burden on performance. USMC research has shown that cognitive ability – the ability to think, remember, make decisions, notice thing around you – is significantly degraded as the weight of the load climbs. Partly this is physical; as the load rises the head cants more; the individual looks at the ground, not around them. Also, as the core temperature rises our speed of thought drops. Discomfort also fills more and more of the individuals thoughts. Marksmanship standards fall as the burden climbs. A DSTL study had 8 men fire an ACMT. 6 passed, those that failed both only failed one of the five elements of the test and one of them only failed by one round. They were then given the current theatre load. They did not move anywhere, simply put on the load and returned to the firing point. Only one soldier passed the ACMT; the rest failed all 5 elements. During field firing those carrying 30kg hit 75% of targets, those carrying 50kg and more hit only 50%. Recent work has also shown that exposure times – the time you are up and moving – during contact increase exponentially with weight. At loads similar to our current theatre burden exposure time was almost doubled from baseline. Equally, under heavy loads maximum speeds were never reached. Ultimately, this means that by overloading our soldiers we not only cause them physical discomfort, we make them worse soldiers less likely to succeed. All of this deals with CEFO only. What of CEMO?
• #9 This is a student on PSBC carrying CEMO. It has almost become unrealistic, with some soldiers carrying more than their own body weight.
• #10 The following vignette illustrates how the burden issue can impact on realistic infantry tasks.
• #11 A Pl during battle camp on PSBC deployed with CEFO only and conducted a dawn strike op onto a building. During the contact TES showed that they had received two casualties, one walking and one a stretcher case. These casualties were recovered by stretcher to the Coy PB 2 km away. The move was solely on roads.
• #12 The Pl was down to 7 man sections. This is entirely normal. Large lozenges show individuals, The smaller lozenge next to it is their daysac.
• #13 First we add weapons and ready ammunition. Rifles have 6 x mags. In theatre some units have been carrying up to 11 mags per man
• #14 Then we add UGL rounds, additional link (routinely 1,000 rounds link are carried per belt fed weapon – here we just have 800). Pl Sgt and Sec 2ICS are given an ammo reserve. Each man has an HE grenade.
• #15 Each section carries an ASM.
• #16 Radios are added.
• #17 The soldiers were wearing helmets and Osprey BUT THE OSPREY ONLY HAD SMALL ECBA PLATES NOT LARGE PLATES OR SIDE PLATES.
• #18 Each section had a Talon stretcher.
• #19 Add 12 hrs rations (not a 24 hr ration pack) and 2 x litres water (less than a full camelback).
• #20 FIST kit and command kit (TAM, model kits etc) are added.
• #21 This is still not the full load a man would have. The weight of his load carriage equipment, his warm and water proof clothing, torches, stoves etc is not included. None of the strike equipment – ladders etc – are included. The average load is around 40kg.
• #22 The GPMG gunner in 1 Sec became a stretcher case. A UGL gunner in 2 Sec was walking wounded.
• #23 Two Talon stretchers (8 kg each) were deployed. The GPMG gunner (for illustrative purposes weighing 70kg) was put on one.
• #24 The GPMG gunners personal kit was put on the stretcher with him. The personal equipment of the UGL gunner was put on the second stretcher, as was the 60mm mortar.
• #25 Where possible, those carrying stretchers gave their daysacs to anyone not carrying a stretcher.
• #26 This left only the Pl Comd, Pl Sgt and 1 x GPMG gunner without additional equipment.
• #27 6 men were carrying stretchers, but had no one to give their daysac to, so they carried both.
• #28 One man had two ASMs.
• #29 One man had 2 x daysacs and a folded Talon stretcher.
• #30 This left one man giving protection – 3 Sec GPMG gunner.
• #31 This is a photograph from this serial. This man has his own rifle, an LMG, a section of ladder attached to his Osprey with a plasticuff, a thumper (a heavy item) on his shoulder and a daysac with radio. He has no hands on a weapon. He is looking at the ground ahead of him. He cannot fight and has no situational awareness; he is purely moving a heavy load from A to B.
• #34 The bullets here explain the situation at Long Tan. The Australians, albeit with significant artillery support (which is not cheating) fought a hugely more numerous enemy for over 2.5 hrs with 60 rnds per rifle and did not run out of ammunition. They also had 1 x M60 MG per Pl, with 500rnds link.
• #35 Weapons suppress of kill. Suppression is physiological incapacitation; it is a substitute for physical incapacitation – killing or injuring the enemy. Suppression is made up of volume of fire, accuracy and the KE of the round – how big the round is. If there is less volume this can be compensated for with accuracy or size of round etc. Within the DCC Pl we have three types of direct fire weapons; area suppression (characterised by throwing down a beaten zone), point suppression weapons capable of accurate aimed fire and assault weapons which can easily be carried during the assault (jumping fences, crawling, entering buildings etc).
• #37 The GPMG is a long range area suppression weapon.
• #38 The LMG a short range area suppression weapon.
• #39 The sharpshooter (a UOR weapon) gives point suppression.
• #40 The LSW gives long range point suppression.
• #41 The 40mm UGL gives short range area suppression.
• #42 The rifle gives short range point suppression, but is also a true assault weapon.
• #43 We have a propensity of belt fed weapons in the rifle Pl.
• #44 The current section weapon mix – informed by theatre experience and used at the IBS – is as above.
• #46 The current weapon mix is optimised for suppression, not assault. This is a product of theatre experience, where we rarely assault, but hold enemy at arms length and either extract or call in joint fires. Equally, frustrations with locating the enemy have driven us to use high volumes of area suppression fire. Few men in this Section can go through a window or crawl up to a bunker.
• #47 Eugene Sledge fought with the USMC in the pacific in WW2. He states that they considered the ammunition required by a rifleman for a day of heavy fighting was 100 rounds. For a .30 MG it was 1,500 rounds. This was fighting the Imperial Japanese Army, who had similar equipment capabilities and were fanatical. They required significant suppression and always required an assault to clear their position.
• #48 The USMC Rifle Coy of the time has 3 x Rifle Pls with rifles only and a Support Pl with 3 x 0.30 MGs and 3 x 60mm Mortars. If the MGs and Mortars are given to the Rifle Pls we end up with something not dissimilar to the current British Rifle Pl.
• #49 In 1944 the USMC were fighting a determined near peer enemy in high intensity, heavily contested close combat. In Afghanistan were are conducting influence Ops and demonstrating courageous restraint.
• #50 The USMC Pl had 3 x 12 man Sections. With 100 rnds per man this is 3,600 ball. The Current British Pl has 15 men with magazine fed weapons (Rifle and UGL Rifle) in the Sections. If each carries 8 mags (remember – in theatre up to 11 mags have been carried) and there is no Pl Sgt’s or Sec 2ICs’ reserve then these men have 3,600 rounds of ball. THIS IS THE SAME AS MORE THAN TWICE THE NUMBER OF USMC RIFLEMEN. The single MG in the USMC Pl (one from the Support Weapons Pl) has 1,500 link. Routinely an MG Gunner in the current British Rifle Pl will carry 1,000 rnds link. There are 6 x LMG and 3 x GPMG in the Pl, so the Pl has 9,000 rnds link. THE MODERN BRITISH RIFLE PL CONDUCTING COUNTER INSURGENCY CARRIES 6 TIMES MORE LINK THAN A USMC PL FIGHTING THE JAPANESE.
• #51 At Brecon we will: Return to the core weapon mix, with 1 x GPMG per Pl and with the LSW back in the fire team. Teach the principles of suppression – how people are suppressed and how much of what type of fire it takes – so that more effective use can be made of ammunition and informed fire control (not just “get some fucking rounds down”) can be conducted. Teach what weapons are suitable for what task. There is not often a need to manoeuvre a GPMG to 100 m of the objective. A lone rifleman can be suppressed with deliberate fire from one rifle etc. This will include assessing fire effect on the enemy and managing the fire accordingly. This will counter the following situation occurring again: During a pl attack with TES a Pl on PSBC grouped their 3 x GPMG as a fire support group. The first objective was an open fire pit with 2 x enemy in it. At H Hr the GPMGs began to engage at a rapid rate, The first Section then launched. It dropped off a Fire Team (with an LMG) as a point of fire. It then dropped off another pair (with an LMG) as a point of fire. The final pair then assaulted. This meant that at one point there were 9 men, with 5 belt fed weapons, engaging the enemy position. When the TES data was interrogated it showed that the first two rounds fired on H Hr had hit and killed the two enemy. The enemy had then neither moved nor fired for the rest of the attack. Therefore for approx 5 mins the Pl had fired several thousand rounds at two dead bodies.
• #53 The British Army in Normandy in 1944 saw some of the heaviest fighting of the second world war. This was a very capable Army. Several Division had fought in North Africa and Sicily before landing on D Day. Other Divisions had trained hard for years and by the final break-out most had been in heavy contact for 6 weeks. These were experienced soldiers. The British faced 2 x Waffen SS Corps around Caen. Several enemy divisions were fresh from the Eastern front. These Divisions were the best equipped the Germans had, they received the best recruits and they were fanatical. This was a capable near peer (and at times more than near peer) enemy. The human body in 1944 was the same as today, it still got cold, hungry, needed hydration etc. Equally it still took the same suppression; because most men had bolt action rifles this didn’t mean that both sides agreed to be more readily suppressed.
• #54 This is Fusilier Tom Payne in the fighting order of 1944. (Tom Payne was a regular soldier before the war. Here he is 33. He survived the war.)
• #55 On his belt is a respirator. This was not routinely carried in Normandy, so the pouch was removed; it wasn’t filled with other stuff. He also had a 2 pint water bottle.
• #56 In his 37 pack he carried the items above. Note – he has no food other than emergency rations and chocolate. He would routinely expect food to be brought forward to him. His gas cape is waterproofs, warm kit (ish) and shelter all in one. He has no sleeping kit; this would be brought forward to him when there was the opportunity for sleep. The 37 pack has an 8 litre capacity. The current issue daysac is 45l. The issue grab bag is 8 litres.
• #57 These are British Army emergency rations from WW2. They have a block of chocolate, matches and sugar and instant tea. It was for use in emergencies only. Now we tend to talk of “24 hrs emergency ration” and this is interpreted as a 24 hr ration pack. No British soldier has starved to death in recent history. In an emergency hydration, energy and warmth are critical. A few energy bars and a packet of hot chocolate will do this.
• #58 This is his med kit.
• #59 In his ETH pouch he has equipment as above.
• #60 This is the only personal equipment he had. Recently we found a student of PSBC with an iPad on battle camp.
• #61 Here we see a Section in Normandy carrying the kit as modelled by Fus Payne. Note they are from a different Division, but still have the same load configuration. (Note that they have 1 x automatic weapon in the Section – the Bren Gun. This was an accurate magazine fed weapon - more akin to the LSW or Sharpshooter than an LMG or GPMG.)
• #62 Here we see Infantry in the FUP ready for an attack during Op Charnwood – the break in to Caen. Note that they have stripped their webbing down to ammunition pouches and a bayonet only. (Also note how calm the Pl Sgt looks!)
• #63 Here we see troops fighting through one of the villages in the approach to Caen. Between the two men they have 1 x ammunition bandolier. These men are engaged in high intensity fighting against a capable and fanatical near peer enemy. In the next slide we see a PSBC student: He is on a Platoon clearance patrol from a Coy tactical base that was planned to last an hour. The patrol deployed at 1000 hrs; night vision would not be required. He had eaten breakfast and was fully hydrated. The patrol was going no more than 500m from the tactical base. The enemy was operating in no more than fire team size and would engage and then withdraw.
• #64 This is him trying to run in contact.
• #65 In WW2 the British Infantry had scalable equipment – they could tailor their load to match the situation. They trusted their CSS to get forward what they require when they required it. During the fighting around Hill 112 the 43rd Wessex Div took 40% casualties. Their history describes the fighting as so intense that “the CSgts couldn’t get forward with hot food until after last light.” They packed lean – Tom Payne was willing to be cold and wet for periods of time. For all the fighting in Normandy was over Jun, Jul and Aug the weather was atypically bad. The Mulberry harbours were damaged in a storm and close air support was often unavailable due to the weather. For much of the time it was cold and wet. They had appropriate weapons in the Pl. They had considerable indirect fire support and direct fire support from MG Bns (which could attach Coys – much like modern FSGs – to Units or Bdes). This allowed the Pl weapon mix to be optimised for the assault.
• #66 This summarises well how we have gone off the rails. Some QMs may still remember going on recce patrols in Army daps, a soft hat and a magazine in the pocket. No-one would consider this now for a recce patrol.
• #67 These are aide memoirs currently used at Brecon to drive risk management with what is carried.
• #68 There are two approaches to load carriage. The modular approach allows the load to be altered before deploying – deciding what to take, stripping webbing etc. The scalable approach allows the load to be managed during deployment. This is of more utility to us as it allows the troops to flex to task without returning to a base.
• #69 The scalable approach sees: An irreducible minimum on the body. Immediate sustainability. Longer term sustainability Currently we can only scale our load by dropping the daysac. If we are wearing PLCE with a yoke this is fixed to us by our Osprey. I have witnessed on PSBC men in the final bounds of an assault with belt kit with 5 utility pouches containing an jetboil, TAM, model kit and 3 x boil in the bag meals. Are these really required when assaulting a bunker?
• #70 The proposed solution sees kit broken down as stated here.
• #71 This is the I1 load. This is what is required in the final assault – the final bounds, entering a building etc.
• #72 It has an empty pouch to allow an additional item to be carried in the assault. It has a stripped down, immediate trauma kit.
• #73 If the commander’s radio is in his daysac he cannot drop the pack and reduce to I1. If it is in his belt kit it means he cannot drop his I2. By putting it in a hydration pack pouch he can wear the radio when he is in I1. When he is carrying his daysac the radio in its pouch goes in the daysac. (As an aside – this makes it much easier to access and insert/remove the radio.)
• #74 This is the belt kit – I2. The rifle cleaning kit is stripped to a combi tool and oil – enough to keep the weapon working.
• #75 The soldier must be able to drop his belt order without removing Osprey. Several solutions have been trialled: Not using a yoke works for some, but the belt can slip. A yoke over the Osprey is not comfortable. With the Osprey CES come four T bars with fastex (trident) clips. If these are used to attach the belt to the Osprey then the Osprey acts as the yoke, but with a few quick clips the belt can be dropped.
• #76 The daysac has what is required, not “what might be required”. Warm kit is as dictated by the weather – no softy in the Summer etc. This is where the TAM etc belongs if it is to be carried.
• #77 Emergency rations are true emergency rations – not 24hrs worth of boil in the bag. Hexi is light and compact. Gas or multi fuel stoves don’t belong in the daysac. Normal rations are carried as dictated by the duration of the task. This may just be biscuits and sweets. It may be 1 x boil in the bag.
• #78 With this load a single jetpack will suffice for a rifleman A commander can use a 45 l pack, but the sides should be routinely zipped up. The ETH is carried as directed by the IDF threat. If high, it may go on I2. If low it may go in S1 (the bergen). If intermediate it will go in I3.
• #80 This is the bergen. Note: Routinely the individual would not expect to carry the bergen. He will see it when it is required. Night vision when not required by the individual is kept in S1. This is where additional warm kit is, to mitigate the risk of carrying less in I3; by the time you are in a harbour you will have a softy/down jacket. If the individual wants a gas stove, this is where it should be for use in a tactical base.
• #81 The last bullet is critical here. If a soldier must carry his S1, then it should be pared down to bare minimum weight, with the remainder going into S2. Spare clothes, wash kit, house wife, boot cleaning kit etc is not required for one night. If it not too cold the jungle sleeping bag can be taken, with the large sleeping back put in S2.
• #82 This is for additional equipment not required every night. Soldiers should expect to see this at least once every 3 days. The jungle sleeping bag is to swap with the large sleeping bag if S1 is to be carried.
• #83 Soft bags allow some equipment to be moved backwards and forwards in small capacity lift as required. The prime example would be night vision, brought forward for last light and collected again after first light.
• #85 The aim should always be to move kit, where possible, up the chain, i.e. I2 to I3, I3 to S1, S1 to S2. Plans must be put in place to support these efforts. If a Coy HQ accepts that a pl is deploying without night vision it must bear this in mind. If they need to re-task this Pl to stay out after last light they must accept that they can only use NVGs, accept that they must get their soft bags with night vision forward to them or replace them with a suitably equipped Pl. To leave the risk with them alone and then grip them if they cannot stay out will mean that next time they deploy they will carry night vision as a rule and the load will grow. If a Pl Comd decides that he does not want to take, for example, night vision, Coy HQ should work to support this. This may mean getting a veh forward to them to collect soft bags of night vision and then having someone in Coy HQ (signaller?) stag on the serial numbered items. Without this support and acceptance of risk from Coy and BG HQ then this system will fail and people will revert to carrying everything all the time. Finally, we should avoid “surprise overnighters” where we tell troops they will see their bergens but then they don’t see them for days. This will undermine confidence in the system and lead to soldiers once more packing for every eventuality. No-one needs to practice being cold that often; when required to do so you will have no choice anyway.
• #87 At the very core of this is a mindset. Whether the system can be put in place etc does not impact upon the basic principle: we should carry no more than we require (be it clothing, ammunition, weapons etc) and we should carry it in the right place (no jetboils in the assault).
• #88 On the left is a patrol in Normandy in 1944, looking for Waffen SS. On the right is a PSBC student wearing Osprey with pouches, belt order, a grab bag and a daysac. We have clearly drifted.