1. Ian Tunnell
Causes of War case study 2
3/28/2015
Introduction:
Beginning in 1856, John Brown led a force of anti-slavery men in what is known as
“Bleeding Kansas” in an attempt to end the spread of slavery into the territories of the United
States. Brown and his followers employed terror tactics and guerilla warfare to try to influence
an ending of slavery in the United States until his eventual capture and death in 1859. Browns’
use of terror tactics and brutality eventually lost him the support of the people he was attempting
to free, resulting in his and his followers’ isolation at a critical moment, and their downfall. This
essay will examine the background of John Browns campaign of terror as well as the nature of
Browns actions in Kansas and Virginia, and analysis of these events and terror tactics in order to
determine possible parallels between the actions and outcomes pertaining to Brown and his
followers and the possible outcomes of the terror tactics employed by the Islamic State.
Background:
John Brown, born May 9, 1800, became an ardent anti-slavery agitator in Springfield,
Massachusetts in the mid 1840’s and in 1850 formed the League of Gileadites in order to protect
freed and escaped slaves from being returned to captivity in response to the Fugitive Slave Act.1
This is notable as the first militant anti-slavery group founded by Brown, with the clear intention
of ending the institution of slavery in the United States. Brown later moved to Kansas in
1 In His Own Words

2. response to pleas of help from his family living there, as pro-slavery groups had become militant
and many anti-slavery families were unprepared for attack. There, Brown drew upon local
abolitionist men as well as his many sons to create his own small anti-slavery militia with which
to defend anti-slavery homesteads and towns, and with which to strike at those in Kansas who
supported slavery. Brown would later attempt to draw upon recruits from across the Northern
states, Canadian abolitionists, and the slave population of the South. Unfortunately, in many
cases support failed to appear.2
Brown was particularly affected by the sacking of Lawrence in 1856, in which pro-
slavery forces also known as Border Ruffians destroyed multiple buildings in the town. This
appears to have cemented the notion that the struggle of the anti-slavery forces also would need
to operate outside of the law. Three days after the attack on Lawrence, Brown and other anti-
slavery forces attacked and killed five pro-slavery Border Ruffians in the Pottawatomie
massacre, which in turn sparked the series of guerilla violence which is now known as Bleeding
Kansas.3 Brown participated in several more notable clashes in Kansas during his time as a
guerilla leader there, including the defense of Palmyra and the battle at Osawatomie, in which
Brown led a force of just 38 against a band of over 300 Missourian Border Ruffians intent on
marching on Topeka and Lawrence. Although defeated, Brown inflicted casualties
disproportional to the number of men under his command on the Border Ruffians, earning him a
name as a respected military commander amongst northern abolitionists. Brown and his men
continued to operate in Kansas until 1858, in which he left Kansas to begin preparing for his raid
into Virginia.
2 Landon
3 John Brown and the Pottawatomie Killings

3. This preparation allowed Brown to recruit more followers and accumulate a large amount
of money, firearms, and pikes with which to institute the next stages of his campaign against
slavery: a raid into Virginia to ignite a large scale slave rebellion. This funding and support
allowed for a relative change in the groups capabilities, although did little to effect the size of
Browns followers, especially in the long term. The capabilities of Browns followers theoretically
increased dramatically, with outside funding from wealthy donors in New England who pledged
both money and arms to the group. This could have allowed for a semi-successful slave
rebellion; however it is unlikely that an untrained force of former slaves would have been able to
sustain an insurrection for long, especially armed mainly with pikes. After this period of
preparation, Brown initially entered Harpers Ferry in July of 1859 and bought a farm house from
which to launch his attack. Over the course of the next few months, Browns followers arrived,
although in numbers far less than had originally been hoped for. Abolitionist Frederick Douglass,
who had been an ally of Brown’s, quietly undercut his efforts to create a slave rebellion by
discouraging slaves from joining with Brown. This was due to Douglass’ opinion that Brown and
his followers were “‘going into a perfect steel trap, and that once in he would not get out alive.”4
All told, John Brown led a force of only 22 men on his raid.5
Brown and his men attacked the Harpers Ferry on 16 October, 1859 with the intention of
securing its thousands of rifles with which to arm slaves in the region in order to overthrow the
institution of slavery. However, support for the raid never materialized, and Brown and his men
were left holed up in Harpers Ferry without support from the local slave population. Local
militiamen, farmers, and townsmen surrounded the armory and cut off any attempt at escape,
forcing Brown and his men to take cover in an engine house, where they were eventually
4 Admiration and Ambivalence
5 John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid

4. assaulted and either killed or captured by U.S Marines under the command of Colonel Robert E.
Lee. Brown was taken captive, tried, and hung for treason, murder, and conspiring with slaves to
rebel. All together, the raid cost the lives of four militiamen, wounding nine others while Brown
lost a total of ten men during the fighting.
Over the course of Brown’s career as a militant abolitionist, his adversaries ranged from
pro-slavery militia forces in Kansas, pro-slavery Border Ruffian forces from Missouri, and the
Federal Government, as well as local Virginia militiamen in the region of Harpers Ferry.
However, Browns objectives remained steady and clear throughout the years of his militancy,
with only the targets of his guerilla operations changing over time. Brown’s use of terror tactics
to bring about his goals, while ultimately unsuccessful, can certainly be counted as having been a
factor in the Civil War, which ultimately brought about the changes Brown had hoped to
accomplish through his use of violence.
Analysis:
John Brown and his supporters were eventually compelled to disband and discontinue
their militant by the outside military power of the United States government and local
nonmilitary allies during Browns’ failed raid on Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Brown waged a guerilla
campaign against and in response to pro-slavery groups in Kansas in 1856 before moving on to
plan his raid on Harpers Ferry. In all, Brown and his followers were effectively operational for
only three years, however; they were able to make a lasting impression in the United States,
sparking severely heightened animosity in both Northern abolitionists and those in the Southern
pro-slavery camp.

5. The external force applied to Brown and his followers resulting in the collapse of the
group resulted primarily from the U.S government, however it also came from the local
opponents of Brown in the region of Harpers Ferry. Expecting a much greater force to bolster his
small band, Brown was wholly unprepared to adapt his methods of coercion, refined in the
comparatively sparsely populated Kansas territory, to the more populated regions of what is now
a West Virginia township. This effort to collapse Brown’s group was initiated because of what
Brown himself described as his intent to continue “Kansas work” in the South.6 Wholly illegal
and arguably treasonous due to the attack on a Federal building, the United States government
had little choice but to array military forces against Brown.
The group was not replaced or ousted by a rival ideology; however they were in constant
conflict with those in the pro-slavery camp. It may also be considered that there was a rival
ideology within the abolitionist movement that preferred peaceful nonviolent agitation to end
slavery as opposed to Browns methods of violence. This group was headed by men such a
Frederick Douglass, who was instrumental in the downfall of Brown and his followers. Because
support was discouraged by those who adhered to the less violent method of abolition, Brown
and his group were left in an untenable defensive situation from which there was no escape.
Although the group was primarily compelled to collapse by force, a crucial secondary cause of
collapse was the lack of anticipated support by the slave population of Virginia.
Brown and his men were well financed, and were equipped with 200 rifles and around
1000 pikes.7 Their downfall had nothing to do with a loss of resource control or a lack of
6 "John Brown (1800-1859)."
7 Ibid.

6. resource control. Had Brown succeeded in his efforts to incite a rebellion, wealthy anonymous
donors were able to very nearly fund one of the most dramatic events in American history.
Although at times there was internal dissent, the group was not collapsed due to a power
struggle or split within the group. The men that were loyal to Brown and his cause stayed with
him to the end; many of whom died fighting at Harpers Ferry or were hung with him afterword.
These included Brown’s sons, two of whom died in the fighting at the armory.
It is important to note that Brown and his group collapsed from a serious misjudgment on
the level of effort and commitment it would take to end the institution of slavery in the U.S.
Brown believed a force of armed former slaves would be able to march through the South,
attracting slaves as it went, and thus wrecking the economic utility of slavery, therefor ending the
institution. However, we know that only one year later the Civil War began, which became about
the question of slavery. It took five years, many thousands of lives, and countless dollars in
damage to end slavery, which was not a calculation Brown had apparently made. The institution
was too well embedded to have been driven out without a major war, which was not something
Brown was prepared to begin. Thus, Brown and his groups collapse is as much a symptom of
misjudgment as it is one of external pressure. Brown attempted to apply tactics that had proven
effective in the territory of Kansas to an area with the institution of slavery well entrenched, and
consequently failed in his attempted campaign.
Conclusion:
John Brown and his followers were ultimately forced to collapse through a joint effort of
the United States government and local non-military allies only three years after the beginnings
of their guerrilla campaign against the supporters of slavery. Although largely successful in his

7. efforts to keep Kansas free, Brown’s use of violence alienated him from crucial backers such as
Frederick Douglass, who could have ensured that Brown was able to recruit a larger number of
men to his cause. Similarly, Brown attempted to apply inapplicable tactics to a different
situation, resulting in his followers and himself being cut off and surrounded during their raid on
Harpers Ferry, ending the group.
The fate of Brown and his followers could potentially be applied to a possible ending of
the modern day Islamic State. Support at a crucial moment could be lost due to the groups’
inherently or perhaps escalated levels of violence, or for various other reasons. However, loss of
crucial manpower during a time of crisis and vulnerability could ensure a collapse of the Islamic
States’ forces and a rolling back of their territorial control. Additionally, an attempt to apply
tactics out of date or ineffective in a new environment, without an appropriate estimation of the
level of resistance expected, could lead to a disaster for the Islamic State. ISIL may, if
confronted with an objective deemed to be vitally important, over extend its forces or commit to
a precarious position without adequate plans for either extraction or retreat, ensuring that forces
arrayed against ISIL will be able to possibly collapse the group externally, just as John Brown
and his followers were collapsed when faced with a numerically superior opposition in a
strategically vulnerable position.

8. Bibliography
"John Brown - In His Own Words." John Brown: In His Own Words. Accessed March 28, 2015.
Landon, Fred. "Canadian Negroes and the John Brown Raid." The Journal of Negro History 6,
no. 2 (1921): 174-82.
"John Brown and the Pottawatomie Killings." John Brown and the Pottawatomie Killings.
Accessed March 28, 2015.
"Admiration and Ambivalence: Frederick Douglass and John Brown." Admiration and
Ambivalence: Frederick Douglass and John Brown. Accessed March 28, 2015.
"John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid." John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid. January 1,
2014. Accessed March 28, 2015.
"John Brown (1800-1859)." John Brown (1800-1859). Accessed March 28, 2015.