MECHANISM EXPERIMENTS
Existing and proposed mechanical experiments in BRACC
Jan Duchoslav
Malawi Strategy Support Program
International Food Policy Research Institute
Lilongwe | 12 February 2020
Components of BRACC IE
 WHAT? Was there an impact? How big was it?
 Randomized Control Trial
 HOW? How was the impact achieved?
 Qualitative investigations
 Ask people why they behave in a certain way
 Mechanism experiments
 Manipulate aspects of an intervention to verify/quantify particular mechanisms in the theory of change
Mechanism experiments in BRACC
Mechanism experiments in BRACC
Mechanism experiments in BRACC
 In place
 Testing the demand for funeral and health insurance
 Proposed
 Testing the demand for weather index insurance
 Does predictability matter for humanitarian assistance?
Demand for health and funeral insurance
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1200 900 600 300 0
Coupon value
Offered
Purchased
Demand for health and funeral insurance
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 30 600 900 1200
Price of annual insurance policy
Offered
Purchased
Demand for health and funeral insurance
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 30 600 900 1200
Price of annual insurance policy
Offered
Purchased
Demand for health and funeral insurance
[CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 30 600 900 1200
Price of annual insurance policy
Offered
Purchased
Demand for health and funeral insurance
[CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 30 600 900 1200
Price of annual insurance policy
Offered
Purchased
Demand for health and funeral insurance
[CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 30 600 900 1200
Price of annual insurance policy
Offered
Purchased
Demand for health and funeral insurance
[CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 30 600 900 1200
Price of annual insurance policy
Offered
Purchased
Demand for health and funeral insurance
[CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 30 600 900 1200
Price of annual insurance policy
Offered
Purchased
Proposed mechanism experiments
 Testing the demand for weather index insurance
 Same idea as funeral and health insurance
 Does predictability matter for humanitarian assistance?
 Use UBR to preselect HHs eligible for transfers should the need arise
 Randomly split intervention sample into two
 One half: Households find out just before transfers begin who was pre-selected (status quo)
 One half: Households are told in advance who was preselected
 Effects on:
 Consumption smoothing
 Food security
 On-farm and business investment
 Savings
Other possible mechanism experiments
 Implementation timelines
 Timing of insurance premium payments
 Information spread
 Farmer field schools vs lead farmers
 Framing
 Technology adoption in return for ‘incentives’ vs because of its benefits
 Watershed management in return for ‘incentives’ vs because of its benefits
 Pitching
 Health insurance in its own right vs compared to funeral insurance
 Different explanations of weather index insurance

Mechanism Experiments_presented by Jan Duchoslav_BRACC resilience learning event_12 Feb 2020

  • 1.
    MECHANISM EXPERIMENTS Existing andproposed mechanical experiments in BRACC Jan Duchoslav Malawi Strategy Support Program International Food Policy Research Institute Lilongwe | 12 February 2020
  • 2.
    Components of BRACCIE  WHAT? Was there an impact? How big was it?  Randomized Control Trial  HOW? How was the impact achieved?  Qualitative investigations  Ask people why they behave in a certain way  Mechanism experiments  Manipulate aspects of an intervention to verify/quantify particular mechanisms in the theory of change
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
    Mechanism experiments inBRACC  In place  Testing the demand for funeral and health insurance  Proposed  Testing the demand for weather index insurance  Does predictability matter for humanitarian assistance?
  • 6.
    Demand for healthand funeral insurance 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 1200 900 600 300 0 Coupon value Offered Purchased
  • 7.
    Demand for healthand funeral insurance 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 30 600 900 1200 Price of annual insurance policy Offered Purchased
  • 8.
    Demand for healthand funeral insurance 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 30 600 900 1200 Price of annual insurance policy Offered Purchased
  • 9.
    Demand for healthand funeral insurance [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 30 600 900 1200 Price of annual insurance policy Offered Purchased
  • 10.
    Demand for healthand funeral insurance [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 30 600 900 1200 Price of annual insurance policy Offered Purchased
  • 11.
    Demand for healthand funeral insurance [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 30 600 900 1200 Price of annual insurance policy Offered Purchased
  • 12.
    Demand for healthand funeral insurance [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 30 600 900 1200 Price of annual insurance policy Offered Purchased
  • 13.
    Demand for healthand funeral insurance [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 30 600 900 1200 Price of annual insurance policy Offered Purchased
  • 14.
    Proposed mechanism experiments Testing the demand for weather index insurance  Same idea as funeral and health insurance  Does predictability matter for humanitarian assistance?  Use UBR to preselect HHs eligible for transfers should the need arise  Randomly split intervention sample into two  One half: Households find out just before transfers begin who was pre-selected (status quo)  One half: Households are told in advance who was preselected  Effects on:  Consumption smoothing  Food security  On-farm and business investment  Savings
  • 15.
    Other possible mechanismexperiments  Implementation timelines  Timing of insurance premium payments  Information spread  Farmer field schools vs lead farmers  Framing  Technology adoption in return for ‘incentives’ vs because of its benefits  Watershed management in return for ‘incentives’ vs because of its benefits  Pitching  Health insurance in its own right vs compared to funeral insurance  Different explanations of weather index insurance