Sanjay pradhan

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Course, page ‹#›
Improving Governance in
Developing Countries
Presented by:
Sanjay Pradhan
Director
Public Sector
Governance Board
The World Bank
Governance & Anticorruption
Core Course
Presented to:

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Focus for Today: Outline
 Importance of Good
 Governance: Framework &
Measurement
 Priority Areas for Improving
Governance
 Operational Strategy on
Anticorruption

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Governance – Good and Bad
Lessons from the last 50 years
 Some governments have helped deliver
substantial improvements in income, health
and education outcomes (East Asia)
 In other countries, governmental action has
resulted in wasted resources, weak
investment and growth, and entrenched
corruption

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Good Governance matters for
investment and growth
10%
15%
20%
High Medium Low
% Investment share in GDP
High Medium Low
-1.5%
0%
1%
2%
1.5%
-0.5%
-1.0%
0.5%
Income per capita Growth Rate
Governance Quality
Governance Quality measured by perception of 4000 firms in 67 countries on: (i) protection of property rights; (ii) judicial
reliability; (iii) predictability of rules; (iv) control of corruption. World Development Report Survey 1997

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
The direction of causality …
 Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) found
that while higher per capita incomes
foster democracy, democracy in turn
does not foster higher incomes
 B. Friedman (2005) argues that higher
living standards encourage more open,
tolerant and democratic societies
Growth causes governance to
improve ...
… and better governance causes
growth
 Using measures of rule of law, bureaucratic
quality and corruption, Chong and Calderon
(2000) found significant causality from good
governance to growth and vice versa – i.e.
“good governance” both contributes to and
results from strong economic performance
 Other studies have dealt with the potential for
reverse causation by using exogenous
instruments for the governance indicators and
concluded that good governance has a
significant and strong causal impact on
economic performance …
… but the debate on causality continues …

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Bangladesh
Governance – Growth Conundrum
 Moderate growth rates and high corruption coexist
 Need to unbundle governance – not all bad news
 State allowed civil society to step in and deliver key services
 Is Bangladesh’s governance ‘good enough’?
 Bangladesh needs to move to a higher growth path of 6-7% a year to
achieve the PRSP’s poverty reduction objectives and related MDGs
 Growth rates may not be sustainable – growth is driven largely by garment
exports and phase out of the MFA quota system puts this growth at risk
 Fiduciary and reputational risk to Bank significant
 Improving governance is key to unlocking other sources of growth
 According to the 2005 ICA, corruption is now the greatest obstacle to doing
business, overtaking power
 Bangladesh remains fairly isolated from the world economy and is unable
to capitalize on the growth dividend that globalization might bring. Trade
openness is very low (Bangladesh ranks 175 out of 182 countries), as is
FDI (Bangladesh ranks 137 out of 141 countries). Attracting FDI would
require significant improvements in the investment climate
 Improving critical infrastructure, especially power and ports, requires
solving fundamental governance problems in each sector

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
 Governance: Framework
Governance
Anticorruption

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Governance & Corruption – Not the same thing!
The manner in which the State
acquires and exercises its
authority to provide public
goods and services
Using public office for
private gain
Governance
Corruption
Corruption is an outcome – a consequence of the failure of
accountability relationships in the governance system

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Governance Systems: Supply and Demand
 Supply-side: Capacities and organizational
arrangements – leadership, skills, human resource
and financial management systems – embodied in
state institutions to deliver public goods and
services
 Demand-side: Institutions and accountability
arrangements – elections, political parties,
parliaments, judicial systems, free press, civil
society organizations, accountable local
governments – that enable citizens and firms to
hold state institutions to account

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Governance Systems:
Actors, Capacities and Accountability
Outcomes:
Services,
Regulations,
Corruption
Political Actors & Institutions
• Political Parties
• Competition, transparency
Executive-Central Govt
Service Delivery &
Regulatory Agencies
Subnational Govt &
Communities
Check &
Balance
Institutions
• Parliament
• Judiciary
• Oversight
institutions
Civil Society
& Private
Sector
•Civil Society
Watchdogs
•Media
•Business
Associations
Cross-cutting Control
Agencies (Finance, HR)
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Governance Systems:
When Accountability Breaks Down
Outcomes:
Services,
Regulations,
Corruption
Political Actors & Institutions
• Political Parties
• Competition, transparency
Executive-Central Govt
Service Delivery &
Regulatory Agencies
Subnational Govt &
Communities
Check &
Balance
Institutions
• Parliament
• Judiciary
• Oversight
institutions
Civil Society
& Private
Sector
•Civil Society
Watchdogs
•Media
•Business
Associations
Cross-cutting Control
Agencies (Finance, HR)
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms
State
Capture
Patronag
e &
nepotis
m
administrati
ve
corruption

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Governance Problems: Some Examples
 Grand Corruption: State Capture
 Leaders plundering state assets (Mobutu, Abacha)
 Powerful “oligarchs” buying state officials (CIS)
 Corrupt leaders colluding with corrupt investors: non-
competitive, non-transparent award of contracts (oil & gas)
 Nepotism and Patronage in Public Service
 Political pressure for award of contracts, appointments
 Politicized transfers (South Asia)
 Administrative (Petty) Corruption & Inefficiency:
 Bribes for licenses, permits, government services
 Diversion of funds for public programs
 Inefficient and ineffective service delivery

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Two Governance Patterns
 Good (enough) governance: Developmental
orientation of political leadership, functional check
& balances, system not highest performing but
mutually reinforcing and self-correcting
 Clientelist: Political leaders use authority to
maintain their power base or are captured by
powerful private interests. Leaders bypass check
and balance institutions and use bureaucracy for
patronage.

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Political Accountability
• Political competition, broad-based political parties
• Transparency & regulation of party financing
• Disclosure of parliamentary votes
Checks & Balances
• Independent,
effective judiciary
• Legislative oversight
(PACs, PECs)
• Independent
oversight institutions
(SAI)
• Global initiatives:
UN, OECD
Convention, anti-
money laundering
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms
Decentralization and Local Participation
• Decentralization with accountability
• Community Driven Development (CDD)
• Oversight by parent-teacher associations & user groups
• Beneficiary participation in projects
Civil Society & Media
• Freedom of press, FOI
• Civil society watchdogs
• Report cards, client surveys
Private Sector Interface
• Streamlined regulation
• Public-private dialogue
• Extractive Industry
Transparency
• Corporate governance
• Collective business
associations
Effective Public
Sector Management
• Ethical leadership: asset
declaration, conflict of
interest rules
• Cross-cutting public
management systems:
meritocracy, public
finance, procurement
• Service delivery and
regulatory agencies in
sectors
Good Governance has many dimensions

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Political Accountability
• Political competition, broad-based political parties
• Transparency & regulation of party financing
• Disclosure of parliamentary votes
Checks & Balances
• Independent,
effective judiciary
• Legislative oversight
(PACs, PECs)
• Independent
oversight institutions
(SAI)
• Global initiatives:
UN, OECD
Convention, anti-
money laundering
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms
Citizens/Firms Citizens/Firms
Local Participation & Community Empowerment
• Decentralization with accountability
• Community Driven Development (CDD)
• Oversight by parent-teacher associations & user groups
• Beneficiary participation in projects
Civil Society & Media
• Freedom of press
• Freedom of information
• Civil society watchdogs
• Public hearings of draft laws
• Report cards, client surveys
• Participatory country
diagnostic surveys
Private Sector Interface
• Streamlined regulation
• Public-private dialogue
• Break-up of monopolies
• Extractive Industry
Transparency
• Corporate governance
• Collective business
associations
Effective Public
Sector Management
• Ethical leadership: asset
declaration, conflict of
interest rules
• Cross-cutting public
management systems:
meritocracy, public
finance, procurement
• Service delivery and
regulatory agencies in
sectors
The Bank operations focus only on some
Primary focus
of WB
operations in
governance

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Operational Implication: Unpack Governance
 What are the specific governance problems of
concern?
 Corruption? If so, where is it concentrated? Health? Education? Financial
sector? Procurement?
 Poor delivery of public services? If so, which one?
 Weak credibility for private investment?
 What are the specific drivers of poor outcomes?
 Powerful interests purchasing state policy for private interest
 Kick-backs in public procurement
 Lack of citizen voice to influence service delivery
 Weak checks and balances to constrain arbitrary action
 What are the priorities for governance reform?
 Public regulation and financing of political parties
 Transparent, competitive procurement
 Strengthened legislative oversight, independent judiciary
 Meritocracy in public administration

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
 Governance: Measurement
Governance
Anticorruption

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Two Approaches to Measuring Governance
 Broad and Aggregated: Broad
measures to measure governance at more
aggregated levels. Help reveal systematic
patterns – and basis for monitoring trends
over time.
 Specific and Disaggregated: Specific
measures of quality of key governance
subsystems, including using “actionable
indicators” to benchmark and track reforms.

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Control of Corruption: one Aggregate Indicator
(selected countries from 204 worldwide, for illustration, based on 2004 research data)
-2.5
0
2.5
EQUATORIALGUINEA
KOREA,NORTH
TURKMENISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
BANGLADESH
VENEZUELA
ZAMBIA
RUSSIA
KOREA,SOUTH
MAURITIUS
SOUTHAFRICA
GREECE
ITALY
BOTSWANA
SLOVENIA
CHILE
FRANCE
SPAIN
UNITEDKINGDOM
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
NEWZEALAND
FINLAND
Poor Gov-
ernance
Governance
Level
Margins
of ErrorGood
Governance
Source for data: : 'Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi,
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light
Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Comprehensive Fiscal
oversight:
Are the aggregate fiscal
position and risks are
monitored and managed?
Information:
Is adequate fiscal, revenue and expenditure
information produced and disseminated to meet
decision-making and management purposes?
Comprehensive,
Policy-based, budget:
Does the budget
capture all relevant
fiscal transactions, and
is the process, giving
regard to government
policy?
Budget Realism:
Is the budget
realistic, and
implemented as
intended in a
predictable manner?
Control:
Is effective control and
stewardship exercised
in the use of public
funds?
Accountability and
Transparency:
Are effective external
financial accountability
and transparency
arrangements in place?
PEFA’s Performance
Measurement Framework
Six PFM
System
Aspects

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
The “Bribe Fee” List
Unofficial payments by firms in Ukraine
Enterprises
Type of License/Service/”Favor” Average fee required admitting need to pay
(1996) “unofficially”
Enterprise registration $176 66%
Each visit by fire/health inspector $42 81%
Tax inspector (each regular visit) $87 51%
Telephone line installation $894 78%
Lease in state space (square ft. per month) $7 66%
Export license/registration $123 61%
Import license/registration $278 71%
Border crossing (lump sum) $211 100%
Border crossing (percent of value) 3% 57%
Domestic currency loan from bank on 4% 81%
preferential terms (percent of value)
Hard currency loan on preferential 4% 85%
terms (percent of value)

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Citizen Report Card of Government Services:
Latvia
0 10 20 30 40
Percent giving favorable rating
Post Office
State Educational Institutions
Office of Social Benefits
Polyclinic/Health Services
Agency of Immigration &
Citizenship
Prosecutor
Customs Service
Courts
Local Housing Authority
Police

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
5
10
15
20
25
30
Proportion of firms
affected by capture of …
Hungary Estonia Russia Ukraine
Parliamentary Votes
Presidential Admin. Decrees
Civil Court Decrees
The Challenge of State Capture

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Priority Areas for Improving Governance
 Strengthening Public Management Systems
 Strengthening public finance management & accountability
 E-procurement for greater transparency and competition
 Improving front-line service provision
 Instituting citizen report cards and monitoring
 Strengthen community monitoring and oversight
 Strengthening Leadership & Ethics for good
governance
 Strengthening global checks and balances:
 Instituting transparency in extractive industries
 Strengthening global initiatives to curb transnational corruption

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
The new
international aid
architecture
emphasizes the
principle of mutual
accountability
Scaling up of donor
assistance requires
sound PFM systems
and reduced
corruption in partner
countries
Strengthening PFM Systems a key priority
Increasing
recognition that
"ringfencing"
projects will not work
Important benefits from
using country's own
systems -- but need to
strengthen capacity and
accountability of PFM

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Budget realism Tanzania MTEF
Budget
Comprehensiveness
Oversight by CSOs &
Professional groups
Information
AAA support merging planning and budgeting in
Lesotho
Control
IFMIS in Sierra Leone, accounting training in
Africa
Civil society monitoring of Chad Oil Fund,
Professional Accountancy Institutions in DRC,
Mali, Guinea and Kenya
Internal control and audit support in HIPCs
Bank interventions to build capacity:
multiple targets and tools (AFR)
Parliamentary
Oversight
Support for Parliamentary oversight in Ghana,
Kenya and Zambia; Supreme Audit Institutions in
Cape Verde, Sierra Leone and Senegal

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
‘Demand-side’ interventions to
strengthen accountability in PFM
Participatory
Budgeting,
Puerto Alegra
(Brazil)
Civil Society Oversight;
transparent, competitive
procurement
(Slovakia)
Strengthening Supreme
Audit Institutions
(Hungary)
Public Expenditure Tracking & Information Campaigns
(Cambodia, Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Papua New
Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia and on-going in
Azerbaijan and Yemen)
Procurement
oversight by
CSOs
(Philippines)
Strengthening Public
Accounts Committees of
Parliament
(India)
Transparent,
competitive e-
procurement
(LAC)
Strengthening Public
Accounts Committees
of Parliament
(Kenya, Ghana, Zambia --
AFR)

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
All supplier companies register, indicating areas
of business (e.g., IT, construction, furniture)
 Public agencies submit tenders through internet
 Automatic e-mail to all companies in selected area
 Online information on name, position of official in-charge
 Online information on results: who participated,
proposals made, scores received, who won bid, historical
record of agency’s purchases and contracts
Chile’s Internet-based Public Procurement:
Transparency and Competition

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Civil Society Monitoring for Improved
Service Provision: Bangalore
5 6 4
9
25
1
14
41
47
42
67
34 34
16
32 32
73
94
73
92
73
78
85
96
77
n/a n/a
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
C
ity
council
ElectricityW
atersupply
Telephones
Public
hospitals
PoliceLand
authorityPublic
buses
Transportauthority
Agencies
%satisfied
1994 1999 2003
Source : Public Affairs Center, India

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Transparency & Community Monitoring:
Primary Education in Uganda
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
1990 1991 1993 1994 1995
US$ per
Student
Intended Grant Amount Received by School (mean)
1999
Public info campaign

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
“BIR Officials Amass Unexplained Wealth”
By Tess Bacalla , Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism
CAR MODEL BENEFICIAL OWNER REGISTERED OWNER
Nissan Patrol Edwin Abella
BIR Reg'l Director,
Quezon City
Sulpicio S. Bulanon Jr.
1817 Jordan Plains Subd.,
Quezon City (listed address of
Abella in his SALs)
Suzuki Grand
Vitara
Ditto Merrick Abella (son of Abella)
24 Xavierville, Loyola Heights,
Q uezon City
Nissan Cefiro Ditto Elizabeth S. Buendia
152 Road 8, Pag-asa, Quezon City
BMW Lucien E. Sayuno
BIR Reg'l Director,
Makati City
Limtra Dev. Corp.
Zone 4, Dasmariñas, Cavite
BMW Ditto Marie Rachel D. Meneses
c/o Metrocor and Holdings, G&F,
Makati City
Honda Accord Danilo A. Duncano
BIR Reg'l Director,
Quezon City
Daniel Anthony P. Duncano
2618 JP Rizal, New Capital Estate,
Quezon City
Mitsubishi L200 Corazon P. Pangcog
Asst.Reg'l Director,
Valenzuela City
Alberto P. Pangcog (husband)
B2 L23 Lagro Subd., Quezon City
Honda CR-V Ditto Alberto P. Pangcog
9 Ricardo St., Carmel 1 Subd.,
Quezon City
Honda CR-V Ditto Ditto
BMW Flordeliza P.Villegas
Revenue District Of’cer
Cabanatuan City
Charito P. Sico
8 Ma.Elena St., Carmel 1 Subd.,
Quezon City
Owner: Regional Director in the Bureau of Internal Revenue; forced to resign;
currently facing corruption charges; other officials suspended, also facing charges
Media,Transparency, and Combating Corruption

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Leadership & Ethics
 Beyond accountability systems, leadership and
ethics in public service shape standards of
governance and anticorruption
 Leaders set standards for integrity, catalyze
politically difficult change
 Way forward is to empower and develop critical
mass of reform-minded leaders committed to
integrity
 Innovative pilots in transformational leadership to
engender paradigm shift: Madagascar, Burundi,
Kenya
 Global Integrity Alliance: Peer support network of
public officials committed to ethics in public
service

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Strengthening Public Service Ethics
5 Cs to Counter Corruption
Strengthen
Values & Ethics:
Counter
Corruption
Commitment to
Contribute
Connectedness
Courage Cosmology
Care & Compassion
Overcoming insecurity &
incessant quest for
material acquisitions
Creating a sense of
belonging to society Creating a sense of
Compassion to care for the
more needy in society
Creating a commitment to public
service – to give v/s take
Broaden vision by seeing
life in the context of
the huge universe
Source: H.H. Sri Sri Ravishankar (Founder, IAHV) @ The International Anticorruption Conference, Korea

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Recent global initiatives to curb
transnational corruption
 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials (1997)
 UN Convention Against Corruption Treaty (2003) – 94
countries join
 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)
(1989) -- 40 Recommendations (2003)
 Recovery of proceeds from corruption (Nigeria 2005)
 Publish What You Pay, Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative
 World Bank blacklists corrupt firms
 Transparency International Principles for countering
bribery
 Governance Network of OECD DAC (GOVNET)
 Norway’s ‘Doers’ Network on Anticorruption (2004)

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative: Key Principles
Independent review of payments made to the
government by oil, gas and mining companies and
of revenues received by government from those
companies by a reputable third party (i.e. audit firm).
Publication in a readily accessible form of payments
made by the companies and of revenues received by
government.
Extension of all of the above to companies including
state owned enterprises.
Active engagement of all stakeholders in the design,
monitoring, and implementation process.
Commitment to a work plan and timelines for
implementation.

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Fiduciary Risk
That donor
resources will not
be used for the
purposes intended
Reputational Risk
That large amounts of
aid in countries with
corrupt leaders will
tarnish donors’
reputation
Development
Effectiveness Risk
That poor governance-
corruption will undermine
the impact of
development efforts in
general and in donor-
supported projects
Corruption pose three significant risks

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
1 Afghanistan
2 Angola
3 Azerbaijan
4 Bangladesh
5 Belarus
6 Cambodia
7 Central African. Rep.
8 Chad
9 Comoros
10 Congo, Dem. Rep.
11 Cote D'Ivoire
12 Djibouti
13 Equatorial Guinea
14 Gambia, The
15 Guinea
16 Guinea-Bissau
17 Haiti
18 Iraq
19 Kazakhstan
20 Korea, North
21 Kyrgyz Rep.
22 Lao, PDR
23 Lebanon
24 Liberia
25 Libya
26 Myanmar
27 Nigeria
28 Paraguay
29 Sierra Leone
30 Somalia
31 Sudan
32 Swaziland
33 Tajikistan
34 Togo
35 Turkmenistan
36 Uzbekistan
37 Venezuela
38 Yemen, Rep.
39 Zimbabwe
(Countries in blue are inactive
WB borrowers)
Notes: Data on left: Countries listed in alphabetical order using 2004 data. These countries scored in the bottom quartile on the main corruption question in the World Bank’s 2004
CPIA which covered 135 countries AND scored in the bottom quartile on the 5 questions on broader governance issues in the 2004 CPIA OR scored in the bottom quartile on the 2004
Control of Corruption component of the WBI/DEC Kaufmann-Kraay Aggregate Governance Indicator. Countries not included in the 2004 CPIA but included in the WBI/DEC index are
here if they fell in the bottom quartile of that index (Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Liberia, Libya, Myanmar, and Somalia). This list includes inactive borrowers and ineligible countries.
Inactive countries are defined as those with no lending/grants in SAP for FY04-06.
Challenges in Identifying High-Risk
Countries
Country
Rank
Country
Source: TI Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) 2005
2005
CPI
Score
117 Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador
Guatemala, Guyana, Libya
Nepal, Philippines, Uganda
2.5
126 Albania, Niger, Russia, Sierra
Leone
2.4
130 Burundi, Cambodia, Congo
(Republic), Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Papua New Guinea
2.3
137 Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Ethiopia,
Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia, Uzbekistan
2.2
144 Congo (Democratic Republic),
Kenya, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan
2.1
151 Angola 2.0
152 Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea,
Nigeria
1.9
155 Haiti, Myanmar, Turkmenistan 1.8
158 Bangladesh, Chad 1.7

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Help countries that
request support in
their efforts to
reduce corruption
Prevent fraud and
corruption in
donor-financed
projects
Anticorruption as
key filter in design
of country
assistance
strategies
Support international
efforts to reduce
corruption
Anti-Corruption Strategy
World Bank

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Addressing Corruption in CAS’s
Systematic diagnosis of the nature & drivers of corruption
Aid amount linked to level of corruption
Actions to address the most significant development risks
posed by corruption:
Reducing corruption in key sources of growth, service delivery
Actions to mitigate reputational risk from grand corruption:
Transparency in major procurement deals, asset declaration,
Actions to mitigate fiduciary risk:
Enhanced fiduciary safeguards in projects, PFM assessment for
using budget support
Political economy assessments to identify feasible actions
Coordinated donor action for complementarities and collective
impact

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Russia
(customs/treasury)
Colombia
(diagnostics
& civil society)
Jordan
(civil society)
Major programs launched…
Pakistan
(devolution)
Ghana (PE
accountability)
Albania
(public admin.)
Guatemala
(diagnostic
to action
program)
Tanzania
(PSR) Ethiopia
(decentralization)
Cambodia
(PE; forestry)
Ukraine
(tax admin)
Gabon
(water/electricity)
Kyrgyz Republic
(governance reform)
Latvia
(inspections)
India – Andra Pradesh
(power; e-gov); Karnataka
(right to info)
Indonesia
(local
governance)
Uganda
(education)
Philippines
(procurement)
Bangladesh
(NGOs in
social sectors)
…with some evidence of success

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Lessons learned:
Deeper challenges in high-risk countries
These appear to be working when the
underlying environment is conducive:
 Committed leadership
 Coalition for reform
 Capacity
 State capture and corrupt leadership in clientelistic states
 Powerful vested interests and political obstacles
 Weak ‘demand’ pressures for reform – limited voice, media freedoms, civil rights, etc.
 Political drivers of corruption (e.g., lack of political competition, party financing)
Strong on PFM
diagnostics
Emphasis on core public
management reforms
Good at technocratic
solutions and design
Deeper underlying challenges

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Reducing corruption in high-risk countries:
Priorities for action in the next stage
Better understanding and management of
political economy of reforms
Tackling political corruption (e.g. party finance,
electoral corruption, etc. ) with partners
Partnerships and new instruments to support
demand-side initiatives: working with civil
society, media, parliamentarians
Tackle political drivers of governance challenges
in sectors (e.g., power, ports, EI)
Develop operational strategies to engage with
corrupt leadership in clientelist, captured states

The World Bank
Governance &
Anticorruption Core
Q&A

Sanjay pradhan

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