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ST. ANSELM’S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN
PROSLOGION
Jose Kuruvachira
Anselm of Canterbury1
(1033-1109), known also as Anselm of Aosta and Anselm of Bec, was one
of the most influential and seminal thinkers of the earlier Middle Ages, and foremost among the
medieval philosophers and theologians. He was a Benedictine monk and abbot of Bec in Normandy,
and Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109. He was an original scholar whose writings have
been of profound importance to the development of philosophy and theology, especially in the West.
Some consider him as the most gifted Christian thinker between Augustine (354-430) and Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274)2
which won him the appellation of being the ‘second Augustine’, the ‘father of
scholasticism’ and a ‘philosopher for all time’. Anselm in his celebrated treatise Proslogion
(1077/1078) first formulated the famous (and controversial) ‘ontological argument’ for the existence
of God, and ever since it has fascinated both philosophers and theologians. This article examines the
ontological argument, as found in Proslogion chapters 2 and 3, with some critical observations.
1. Works of Anselm
Anselm wrote two treatises on the existence of God, the Monologion (Latin Monologium, 1077)3
and the more famous Proslogion (Latin Proslogium, 1077/1078), which was further supported by the
Reply to Gaunilo.4
The Proslogion is probably the best and the most famous of Anselm’s works. It is
somewhat an extension of Monologion. Originally he had given it the title “Faith seeking
understanding”5
but later he called it Proslogion (meaning ‘a speech made to another’).6
Anselm
wrote extensively on theological subjects.7
He was also the author of nineteen prayers, three
mediations and a large body of letters.8
Some fragments of his spoken comments which were
remembered and recorded exist in a volume called Memorials of St. Anselm.9
Some ascetical works
are also erroneously attributed to him.
1
St. Anselm (Anselmus Candiae Genavae) was born in 1033 in a family of noble lineage in the Burgundian town of
Aosta (now in Northern Italy). In 1060 (1059?) he became a monk in the Benedictine monastery of Bec, Normandy,
France and rapidly rose to prominence. In 1063 he became prior, in 1078 abbot of the monastery, and in 1093
Archbishop of Canterbury. He died in Canterbury in 1109 at the age of seventy-five. Anselm was canonised in 1494 and
declared Doctor of the Church (Doctor Magnificus) in 1720 by Pope Clement XI. Cfr. Karl Jaspers, Anselm and Nicholas
of Cusa, Hannah Arendt (ed.), Ralph Manheim (tr.), London, A Harvest Book, 1966, p.3; Benedicta Ward, Anselm of
Canterbury. A Monastic Scholar, Oxford, SLG Press, 2003, pp.1-2; Id., Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy,
London, SPCK, 2009, pp.1, 79; G.R. Evans, Anselm, London, Continuum, 1989, pp.2-25.
2
Cfr. Brian Davies, Saint Anselm of Canterbury, London, CTS Publications, 1992, p.3.
3
Initially, Anselm called Monologion “Example of meditating about the substance of faith”. Then he called it a
“Monoloquium on the substance of faith”. In the end he settled on the simple title Monologion (‘Monologue’ or
‘Soliloquy’). Cfr. Brian Davies, Saint Anselm of Canterbury, p.6.
4
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.2. Anselm’s other philosophical treatises are:
On Grammar, On Truth and On Free Will. Cfr. Ibid.
5
Cfr. Anselm, Proslogion, in Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Thomas
Williams (tr.), Cambridge, Hacket Publishing Company, 1996, Prologue, p.93. The Proslogion has 26 chapters with a
prologue. (All references to Proslogion are from this edition)
6
Cfr. Anselm, Proslogion, Prologue, p.94.
7
For his theological works see Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.2; Karl Jaspers,
Anselm and Nicholas of Cusa, p.3; Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Brian Davies and Gillan R. Evans (eds.),
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, Introduction, pp.viii-xx.
8
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, p.xx.
9
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.2.

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2. Influences on Anselm
As far as influences on Anselm are concerned, he had at his disposal the Bible, the textbooks of
secular arts, and the writings of the Western Fathers of the Church, especially Augustine.10
There
was almost no direct influence of ancient Greek Philosophy on Anselm because he lived at a period
before even a complete set of the works of Aristotle on Logic, let alone those on scientific subjects,
was available in Latin, and he had no opportunity to learn Greek. There was almost no direct access
to the other fundamental source of ancient Greek philosophy, Plato, except Calcidius’ commentary
on the Timaeus, and it is far from certain Anselm can have read that.11
However, he knew something
of Aristotle’s logic through the reading of Boethius,12
and was well acquainted with Platonism
through the ideas transmitted by Augustine.13
Frederick Van Fleteren affirms that Augustine directly
influenced Anselm.14
In the introduction to Monologion, Anselm himself acknowledges his debt to
the Fathers of the Church, especially Augustine.15
3. The ontological argument in Proslogion chapters 2 and 3
Proslogion is the source for Anselm’s famous and controversial ‘ontological argument’16
for the
existence of God. He proposed this argument fundamentally in chapters 2 and 3 of Proslogion and
partially in chapter 4. It was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who first called Anselm’s argument
‘ontological argument’, but in the context of his criticism of Descartes’s version of the argument.17
3.1 Anselm’s search for a ‘master argument’
Anselm wrote Monologion for his brother monks at Bec. But Proslogion was written at the
prompting of his own curiosity.18
When he looked back over the Monologion he was struck by how
complicated a chain of argument it involved, he felt the need to simplify its key ideas. So he began to
search for a single ‘master argument’ or just one argument (unum argumentum) that would prove
everything he wanted to prove in Monologion, without any need for additional supporting arguments
for each different conclusion.19
Anselm says: “I began to wonder, […] whether it might be possible
to find a single argument that needed nothing but itself alone for proof, that would by itself be
enough to show that God really exists.”20
Thus, the quest for the ‘master argument’ became
something of an obsession with him, and it finally came to him while he was at prayer.21
10
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, p.xxi; G.R. Evans, Anselm and Talking about God,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, p.6.
11
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, p.xxi.
12
Cfr. F.S. Schmitt, “Anselm of Canterbury”, New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol.1, William J. McDonald (ed.), New
York, McGraw-Hill, 1967, p. 582.
13
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, p.xxi.
14
Cfr. Frederick Van Fleteren, “Augustine’s Influence on Anselm’s Proslogion”, in Anselm Aosta, Bec and
Canterbury, D.E. Luscombe and G.R. Evans (eds.), Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1996, p.63. This article is an
excellent analysis of Augustine’s influence on Anselm.
15
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion, in Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm,
Thomas Williams (tr.), Cambridge, Hacket Publishing Company, 1996, Prologue, pp.3-4.
16
An ontological argument is an argument for the existence of God from reason alone, without appeal to revelation
through scripture or observation of the world. It is an argument from an analytic, a priori and necessary premise to the
conclusion that God exists.
17
Cfr. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, London, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1950, p.352.
18
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, pp.vii-viii.
19
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Thomas Williams (tr.),
Cambridge, Hacket Publishing Company, 1996, Introduction, p.xviii.
20
Anselm, Proslogion, Prologue, p. 93.
21
Benedicta Ward says that at Bec abbey, suddenly one night during matins, Anselm received an illumination and the
whole matter became clear to him, and this experience provided the starting point for his argument. Cfr. Benedicta Ward,
Anselm of Canterbury. A Monastic Scholar, p.9.

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3.2 The argument in Proslogion chapter 2
The chapter 2 of Proslogion is given the title “That God truly exists”. The basic idea of this
chapter is amazingly simple. According to Anselm, God is by definition ‘that than which nothing
greater can be thought’ (‘id quo maius cogitari non potest’). He says: “Now we believe that you are
something than which nothing greater can be thought.”22
In introducing the ontological argument,
Anselm refers to the psalmist’s ‘fool’ who says in his heart “There is no God.” (Ps 14:1; 53:1).23
In
the Bible, someone is said to be foolish for saying there is no God. For Anselm, the fool represents
someone who would agree with the argument that God logically would exist, but still insists that God
does not exist in reality. Anselm argues that, even the fool possess the idea of God as the greatest
conceivable being, as ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’.24
The implications of this
conception is that the fool certainly understands what he hears (the term ‘God’), and what he
understands exists in his mind, even if he does not understand that it exists in reality. Anselm further
says that it is one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and quite another to understand that the
object exists in reality.25
Here, Anselm is making a distinction between two types of existence,
existence of something in the mind and existence of it in reality.
Anselm illustrates his argument using the example of a painter and his painting. When a painter
thinks out in advance what he is going to paint, he has the paining in his mind. But once he has
painted it, he has it in his mind and knows that it exists in reality because he has now painted it. So
Anselm says that, even the fool must admit that ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’
exists at least in his mind, since he understands this when he hears the word ‘God’, and whatever is
understood exits in the mind. Then he goes on to argue that, ‘that than which a greater cannot be
thought’ cannot exist only in the mind. For if it exists only in the mind, it can be thought to exist in
reality as well, which is greater. So, if ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ exists only in the
mind, then the very thing ‘than which a greater cannot be thought’ is something than which a greater
can be thought. But that is clearly impossible and involves a contradiction. Therefore, there is no
doubt that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ exists both in the mind and in reality.26
A formal statement of this argument can be presented as follows:
(1) God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.
(2) If God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, then there is nothing greater than
God that can be thought.
Therefore: (3) There is nothing greater than God that can be thought.
(4) If God does not exist, then there is something greater than God that can be thought.
Therefore: (5) God exists.
According to Anselm, from the simple definition of God as ‘that than which nothing greater can
be thought’ we can conclude that God does indeed exist. He argues that it is greater to exist in reality
than to exist merely in the mind. Therefore, if we say that God exists only in the mind, but not in
reality, we must say that we can think of something greater than God. But God is by definition ‘that
than which nothing greater can be thought’, and consequently, we cannot think of something greater
than ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ (God).27
According to Anselm, anyone who
examines this idea will have to admit that to exist in reality would be greater than to exist in the mind
alone.28
Hence, Anselm argues that, ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ must therefore
exist in reality as well as in the mind. Further, a reflection on the meaning of the word ‘God’ shows
22
Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 2, p.99.
23
Cfr. Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 2, p.99.
24
Cfr. Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 2, pp.99-100.
25
Cfr. Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 2, p.100.
26
Cfr. Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 2, p.100.
27
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Introduction, p.xviii.
28
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, p.xii.

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that, God cannot fail to exist not only in the minds of those who have an idea of him, but also in
reality, and that someone who says ‘there is no God’, the fool, is ultimately advocating what must
necessarily be a falsehood.29
3.3 Argument in Proslogion chapter 3
Proslogion chapter 3 is not a separate argument, but is built on the ideas of chapter 2. Chapter 3 is
given the title “That he cannot be thought not to exist”. As this title suggests, the emphasis of the
chapter is the necessary existence of God (‘quod Deus non possit cogitari non esse’). In this chapter,
Anselm states his argument of chapter 2 again, however, here he is not interested in merely the
existence of God, but in the absolute necessity of God’s existence. This necessity is rooted in the self-
existence of God, which leads Anselm to the notion that, a lack of existence is impossible for God.
He says: “This [being] exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist.”30
God is a being of
such perfection that nothing more perfect can be conceived; God can neither be understood as having
come into existence or as destined to cease to exist. To entertain such thoughts would make God a
contingent being, and this is ruled out by God’s nature as a being of self-existence. What Anselm is
actually saying here is that, the greatest possible thing we can imagine about God is not only that
God exits, but also that God has and will always exist, and God’s non-existence is impossible. In
other words, God not only exists but has necessary existence. Anselm says: “So that than which a
greater cannot even be thought exists so truly that it cannot be thought not to exist.”31
We can formally formulate this argument as follows:
1. By definition, God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.
2. A being that necessarily exists in reality is greater than a being that does not necessarily
exist.
3. Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind, but does not necessarily exist in
reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.
4. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God.
5. Thus, if God exists in the mind as an idea, then God necessarily exists in reality.
6. God exists in the mind as an idea.
7. Therefore, God necessarily exists in reality.
In Monologion Anselm argued that God is the cause, and therefore the creator of everything. But
in order to be creator, God would logically need to exist prior to anything else existing. The
statement that God exists in Proslogion chapter 2 requires an additional premise that God existed
prior to everything else, and Anselm’s argument in Proslogion chapter 3 is just this. It logically
argues for a God who exists all the time and even prior to time. In other words, God is an infinite
being.
An infinite God is also important for Anselm’s ontological argument because a finite deity would
beg the question as to whether God actually exists. A finite god may have existed at some point in
the past, might exist now, and might even exist at some point in the future. All these are possible for
a finite god. But what is not possible for such a god is to have always existed. With this in mind,
Anselm conceives of something greater than a finite God, namely, an infinite God. By saying that
God cannot not to exist, Anselm is assured that God is not only the creator of the world but also God
exists now, that God is eternally present throughout the ages, past, present and future. Anselm says:
“You exist so truly, O Lord my God, that you cannot even be thought not to exist. And rightly so, for
if some mind could think something better than you, a creature would rise above the Creator […]
which is completely absurd. Indeed, everything that exists, except for you alone, can be thought not
29
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, p.xiii.
30
Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 3, p.100.
31
Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 3, p.100.

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to exist. So you alone among all things have existence most truly, and therefore most greatly.”32
Some scholars, like Norman Malcom, maintain that the argument in chapter 3 is a second version of
the ontological argument in Anselm’s Proslogion.33
3.4 Interconnection between Proslogion chapters 2 and 3
In Proslogion chapters 2 and 3 one finds two stages in the argument, which while separate, both
clearly support and rely upon each other for their common argument. In the first stage of his
argument, Anselm addresses the difference between the two forms of existence: in mind and reality,
and concludes that God truly exists. In chapter 3 he argues that God exists as a necessary being. It is
clear, however, that the argument in chapter 3 has a stronger conclusion in that, in chapter 2, Anselm
concludes simply that God exists, but in chapter 3 he concludes that God cannot be thought not to
exist (i.e God exists necessarily). Some scholars claim that, the chapter 3 argument is not vulnerable
to the objections brought against the chapter 2 argument.34
3.4 Derivation of divine attributes from the argument
Anselm uses the ontological argument to prove the divine attributes. He attributes to God such
qualities as, creator, omniscient, omnipotent, merciful, supremely just, simple, inaccessible, limitless,
eternal, not in place or time, and so on. To prove that all of these attributes do indeed belong to God,
Anselm simply uses the ontological argument repeatedly in the different chapters of the Proslogion.
Thus Anselm’s so-called ‘master argument’, if it works, really does generate a whole host of
conclusions without any need for other arguments.35
4. The characteristics of the ontological argument
The ontological argument of Anselm, in itself is simple, but its implications are not.36
In order to
understand the full import of the argument, it is necessary that one understands its special
characteristics. This is important also for understanding its positive aspects, as well as its
weaknesses.
4.1 ‘Faith seeking understanding’
Anselm deliberately announces in the prologue to the Proslogion that he seeks to know what he
already believes by faith.37
It may be remembered that, ‘faith seeking understanding’ (fides quaerens
intellectum) was the original title of the work, which he later renamed Proslogion.38
The idea of
‘faith seeking understanding’ means that, Anselm begins by believing in God. But merely believing
in God does not satisfy him. God is rational, and what he does is rational, and we ourselves are
blessed with reason. Thus, we should be able to discover the rationality of God’s actions, at least to
some extent. In other words, he wants to understand what he believes, and needs reasons to believe
it.39
Anselm says: “Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to faith, grant that, insofar as you
know it is useful for me, I may understand that you exist as we believe you exist.”40
When ‘faith seeking understanding’ is interpreted in this way, it is clear that Anselm is not hoping
to believe on the basis of understanding. “For I do not seek to understand in order to believe; I
believe in order to understand. For I also believe that ‘Unless [sic] I believe, I shall not
32
Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 3, p.101.
33
Cfr. Jasper Hopkins, “Anselm of Canterbury”, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.1, Edward Craig
(ed.), London, Routledge, 1998, p.288.
34
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Introduction, p. xix, footnote 1.
35
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Introduction, p.xix.
36
Cfr. G.R. Evans, Anselm and Talking about God, p.43.
37
Anselm, Proslogion, Prologue, p.93.
38
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Introduction, p.xiii.
39
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Introduction, p.xiii.
40
Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 2, p.99.

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understand.’”41
So, faith is the passion that sets Anselm on the arduous road to understanding, and
understanding, far from replacing that passion, feeds it, focuses it, and makes it all the more
powerful.42
Richard Southern says: “And even his ‘proof’ of God’s existence did not make
superfluous the necessity of faith; the proof itself was after all the first and greatest achievement of
‘faith seeking understanding.’”43
4.2 Unity of life, thought and prayer
Anselm was not a secular thinker or academic theologian or philosopher, but a monk in search of
God. And on that basis, he found himself to be someone who needed to pray and contemplate. The
Proslogion is cast in the form of a prayer. It is also remarkable among Anselm’s treatises for the way
in which it alternates between passages of prayer and philosophical arguments. He also meant it to be
a devotional work, and that has a bearing on the question of what he was hoping to achieve in the
ontological argument.44
Richard Southern commenting on the ontological argument says that,
Anselm’s method is reflective rather than dialectical; it is an act of prayer than of debate.45
It was
also no accident that he received the ‘illumination’ regarding the ontological argument during
matins.46
Thus, a true reading of the Proslogion shows a deep unity between prayer, life and thought
in Anselm.47
Thus, as Benedicta Ward observes, in Proslogion there is no divorce between theology
and prayer, faith and understanding, thought and life, and the Proslogion is the test case for this point
of view.48
4.3 An argument that has theological and mystical value
For many centuries, there seems to have been a general agreement to regard the Proslogion as
containing a ‘proof’ of the existence of God based on a series of logical propositions.49
However, in
1931, Karl Barth (1886-1968) discussed the ontological argument as being theological and not
rationalist. He called it not an argument for, but a demonstration of the existence of God.50
Two
years later, Dom Anselm Stolz (1900-1942) went further and argued that the Proslogion is a mystical
affirmation of a personal experience of God, and therefore a text of mystical theology, and not an
argument intended to convince. Both these views were challenged by Etienne Gilson (1884-1978),
who preferred the older approach of rationalism. But Benedicta Ward holds that, Barth’s thesis
stands, and forms an important stage in reinterpreting the Proslogion. She also adds that both Barth
and Stolz formed their conclusions about Anselm from reading the Proslogion as a whole, and seeing
it in the form in which it was written, as a prayer, rather than concentrating on isolated parts of the
chapters two, three and four only.51
4.4 A realism founded on platonic metaphysics
In Proslogion there is a movement from the idea of God in the mind to the conclusion of God’s
existence in reality. For Anselm, what is ‘real’ is not what is tangible but what is infinite.52
He had a
41
Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 1, p.99.
42
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Introduction, p.xiv.
43
Richard Southern, “St. Anselm of Canterbury: His Mission of Reconciliation”, in Anselm Aosta, Bec and
Canterbury, D.E. Luscombe and G.R. Evans (eds.), Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1996, p. 31.
44
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, p.xiv.
45
Cfr. Richard Southern, “St. Anselm of Canterbury: His Mission of Reconciliation”, p. 31.
46
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. A Monastic Scholar, p.9.
47
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.5.
48
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, pp.7,24.
49
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.7.
50
Cfr. Karl Barth, Fides quaerens intellectum. Anselms Beweis der Existenz Gottes im Zusammenhang seines
theologischen Programms, Zollikon, Evangelischer Verlag, 1958, pp. 14-68; Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His
Life and Legacy, p.7.
51
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.7.
52
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.8.

7. 7
platonic sense of what ‘reality’ is. In the Platinic tradition, what is in thought, in intellect, in idea, is
more ‘real’ than what is concrete and measureable by the senses. So to move from having an idea in
the mind to saying that there is a reality to which it corresponds is an altogether different kind of shift
from that which would be made by saying that whenever I think of the ‘best possible’ of any kind of
thing, it must follow that it really exists.53
In chapters 2 and 3 of the Proslogion Anselm wants to
understand that God exists as we think and believe him to exist, and that he is what we think and
believe him to be. But God cannot just be an aspect of our thought alone. He must exist outside our
minds (in re) as well as in our minds (in intellectu).54
4.5 An apophatic way of knowing
Benedicta Ward argues that, Anselm’s ontological argument can be considered as a way of
knowledge that is apophatic (negative way). It is often said that the ‘proofs’ of the Proslogion would
never convince an unbeliever. Anselm uses every kind of concept available to him, from the
Scriptures, dogma, creed and secular philosophy, and finally defines God as ‘that than which nothing
greater can be thought’, and affirms the impossibility of proving the unknowable essence of God by
human reasoning. According to Ward, this way of knowledge is apophatic. Hence the ontological
argument is not a proof, but a demonstration of God’s existence, and from it Anselm explores
whatever can be said or thought about God.55
This means that, a negative way of knowing God runs
through the argument.
4.6 An a priori proof
Anselm’s ontological argument is generally categorised as an a priori proof of God’s existence.
An a priori proof is a proof without recourse to empirical experience, and the conclusion is drawn
that God exists, since existence is simply involved in its perfection and necessity. In other words,
Anselm starts with premises that do not depend on experience for their justification, and then
proceeds by purely logical means to the conclusion that God exists. Anselm is frequently criticised
for the a priori nature of his argument.
4.7 A case of ‘circular logic’
Some scholars are of the opinion that the argument of Anselm involves a ‘circular logic’. Stephen
Richards maintains that, the argument seems to be logically sound, which Proslogion chapter 3
building on Proslogion chapter 2. But it does not automatically prove God’s existence, though
Anselm seems to think it does. It only appears to do so, because one begins with the assumption that
God exists. And if that is the case, the ontological argument is guilty of circular logic, assuming the
existence of that which it is trying to prove. Of course, one might say that, this is nothing new as any
argument for the existence of God cannot avoid starting with the assumption that God exists.56
4.8 A form of reasoning reductio ad absurdum
According to some scholars, Anselm employs a form of reasoning called reductio ad absurdum (
‘reduction to absurdity’).57
It is a kind of argument which seeks to demonstrate that a statement is
true by showing that a false, untenable, or absurd result follows from its denial. One begins by
assuming the opposite of what one wants to prove. Then one derives a contradiction or an absurdity
from this supposition. And from this, one concludes that the original assumption was false.58 In the
case of Anselm’s ontological argument, he begins with the assumption that God does not exist: ‘The
53
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, pp.xii-xiii.
54
Cfr. Brian Davies, Saint Anselm of Canterbury, p.12.
55
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. A Monastic Scholar, p.10.
56
Cfr. Stephen Richards, 2012 in http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=riV09AcYXAQ Accesed on 9 January 2013.
57
Cfr. Alvin Plantinga, “God, Arguments for the Existence of”, in Routledge Encycopedia of Philosophy, Vol.4,
Edward Craig (ed.), London, Routledge, 1998, p.87.
58
http://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/ontological.html Accesed on 9 January 2013.

8. 8
fool has said in his heart there is no God.’ Anselm’s argument rests upon the conception of God as
‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’. It is this conception of God with which the
hypothesis that God does not exist, is supposed to conflict, and to show that what the fool believes is
absurd.
5. Some major critics of the ontological argument
Anselm’s ontological argument has sparked controversy from the time it was formulated to the
present day. Since it would be impossible to undertake a complete review of all the criticism of the
argument, here I shall limit myself to a brief analysis of four major criticisms of the argument by
Gaunilo of Maramoutiers, Thomas Aquinas, David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and conclude this
section with a reference to the names of some of the other critics of modern and contemporary times.
5.1 Gaunilo of Maramoutiers
Criticism of the ontological argument began with Gaunilo (Gaunilion) of Maramoutiers, a
Benedictine monk and contemporary of Anselm, who wrote Reply on Behalf of a Fool (Liber pro
Insipiente). Anselm had argued in Proslogion that even the fool would have to admit that God exists,
once he thought seriously enough about the concept of ‘that than which nothing greater can be
thought’. Gaunilo did not write his Reply as a fellow Christian who believes, rather, he pretended to
be a rational non-believer. He, arguing on behalf of the fool, insisted that the fool would not have to
admit any such thing.59
Guanilo’s criticisms were powerful, and raised a number of objections to the ontological
argument. According to him, Anselm had begged the question by assuming the definition of God,
and then formulating a proof based on the hypothetical character of the definition. Anselm in his
reply called on his faith and conscience to deny the arbitrariness of the definition.60
The second
objection was that the argument of Anselm moves without warrant from ideas to realities. He cited
the example of the concept of a Perfect Island (or Lost Island) – by far the best known argument of
Gaunilo – and argued that, on Anselm’s grounds, such an island ought to exist.61
According to him,
the ontological argument of Anselm could be used to prove the existence of anything, doubtful or
even false things62
, like the Perfect Island which does not exist in reality but only in the mind of the
one who narrates about it.63
But the concept of a Perfect Island in the mind does not thereby prove
the existence of such an island in reality. Perfection in this case does not imply ‘existence’. Hence
Gaunilo says that there is simply no reason for him to conclude that the Perfect Island exists in
reality until it is proved to him that it undoubtedly exits and not something false.64
Anselm wrote his Reply to Gaunilo (Liber apologeticus) as a response to the above criticisms. The
second stage of the ontological argument that discusses the necessary existence of God, provided him
with the response. The idea lacking in the concept of a Perfect Island was its necessary existence.
Any material object, including the most Perfect Island, is part of the contingent world, rooted in time
and space, having a beginning and end and made up of parts. Being part of the physical world, the
island is by definition, a dependent reality which can, without contradiction, be thought not to exist.
Anselm says: “whatever does not exist as a whole in all places and at all times, even if does exist,
59
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Introduction, p.xx.
60
Cfr. Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, in Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm,
Thomas Williams (tr.), Cambridge, Hacket Publishing Company, 1996, p.129. (All references to Anselm’s Reply to
Gaunilo are from this edition).
61
Cfr. Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool, in Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo
and Anselm, Thomas Williams (tr.), Cambridge, Hacket Publishing Company, 1996, Prologue, pp.124-125. (All
references to Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool are from this edition).
62
Cfr. Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool, pp.121-122.
63
Cfr. Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool, p.125.
64
Cfr. Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool, p.125.

9. 9
can be thought not to exist.”65
Therefore, the ontological argument does not apply to the island
parallel, or to any object other than the divine; it only applies to the most perfect conceivable being,
which is defined as having eternal and independent, or necessary existence.66
In other words, the
ontological argument would work only for God because God has a reality of a unique kind. Referring
to God Anselm says: “The only thing that cannot be thought not to exist is that which has neither
beginning nor end, and is not made up of parts, and which no thought discerns except as wholly
present always and everywhere”.67
Hence there is no contradiction in denying the existence of a
Perfect Island, but there is contradiction in denying God’s existence.
Scholars are of the opinion that Gaunilo’s criticisms of Anselm’s argument were well-thought out
and they succeed in raising doubts about the logical structure of Anselm’s proof. Some of his
criticisms were later re-formulated by other critics of the ontological argument.68
5.2 Thomas Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) in his Summa Theologiae (Ia. 2-11) objected to Anselm’s
ontological argument. His rejection of the argument hinges on the view that the existence of God is
not self-evident to us.69
First, Aquinas maintained that not everyone who hears the word ‘God’
understands it to signify ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ in the way Anselm
proposed. Even if we grant that everyone understands that by the word ‘God’ is signified ‘that than
which nothing greater can be thought’, it does not follow that they understand that what the word
signifies exists actually, but only that it exists in the mind.70
Secondly, God is unlike any other reality
known to us. Our finite concepts are far from being an adequate description of God who is infinite in
nature. Hence it is fair to say that they do not help us to have a detailed idea of what God is.
Therefore, the ontological argument would be meaningful only to someone who understands the
essence of God completely, and only God can completely know his essence, and therefore only he
could use the argument. Since we do not know the essence of God or what it is to be God, the
proposition that God exists is not self-evident to us, though of itself it is self-evident, and needs to be
made evident. Hence the existence of God needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known
to us, namely, by God’s effects.71
Thirdly, to know that God exists in a general and confused way is
implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man’s beatitude, for man naturally desires happiness,
and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This does not mean that man
knows with absolute certainty that God exists. There are many who think that man’s perfect good
which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.72
Fourthly, Aquinas considered a posteriori proofs as more convincing way of proving God’s
existence than a priori proofs, as he has effectively demonstrated this in his famous ‘five ways’.73
Aquinas realised that the Anselm’s ontological argument has it foundation on the argument that
God’s existence is self-evident. Hence it falls into a different category from arguments for the
65
Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, p.131.
66
Cfr. Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, pp.129-130.
67
Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, p.133.
68
Brian Davies says that the debate between Anselm and Gaunilo was a very polite affair, conducted with mutual
regard and identity of purpose. Cfr. Brian Davies, Saint Anselm of Canterbury, p.8. Anselm was delighted to have so
intelligent a criticism from Gaunilo that he himself directed that his Proslogion should be published together with
Gaunilo’s reply to him and his reply to Gaunilo, which serves as a commentary on the Proslogion. Cfr. Anselm of
Canterbury, The Major Works, p.xiv.
69
Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Vol. 2, Existence and Nature of God (Ia.2-11), Tomothy McDermott
(tr.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, Ia. 2.1.c, p. 7; Ia. 2.1.ad 3, p.9.
70
Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia. 2.1.ad 2, pp. 7-9.
71
Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia. 2.1.c, p. 7.
72
Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia. 2.1.ad 1, p.7.
73
Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia. 3. c. pp. 13-17: Appendices 5-10, pp.188-208.

10. 10
existence of God which depend on looking at his creation and drawing the conclusion that someone
or something must have brought it into being.74
5.3 David Hume
David Hume (1711-1776) in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion offered an empirical
objection to the ontological argument, criticising its lack of evidential reasoning and rejecting the
idea that anything can exist necessarily.75
Hume being an empiricist believed that ‘our ideas reach no
farther than our experience’76
and consequently, affirmed that nothing can be proven to exist using
only a priori reasoning.77
He also suggested that, as we have no abstract idea of existence, and we
cannot claim that the idea of God implies his existence. In addition, he denied that existence (being)
is a quality (or perfection), and therefore cannot be known.78
Consequently, the concept of a
completely perfect being need not exist. Further, any conception of God we may have, we can
conceive either of existing or of not existing.79
Thus, Hume claimed that it is not a contradiction to
deny God’s existence. In short, the argument of Hume is a strong criticism against Anselm’s
ontological argument at least for three reasons: first, he does not accept any a priori argument as a
valid form of reasoning; second, he denies the necessary existence of any being; and third, he does
not accept existence (being) as a perfection.80
5.4 Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) put forward, probably, the most famous and influential objection to
the ontological argument in his Critique of Pure Reason.81
The critique was primarily and explicitly
directed at Descartes, but also attacked Leibniz. Kant claimed that ontological arguments are vitiated
by their reliance upon the implicit assumption that ‘existence’ (or being) is a predicate (or perfection
or quality). But existence is not a predicate, because it does not add anything to the essence of a
being.82
Hence in actual fact, nothing at all is said in the argument, and therefore the assertion is a
mere tautology. Even if the word ‘existence’ is substituted by ‘reality’ it is of no avail in meeting this
objection.83
In other words, the ontological argument works only if existence is a predicate.
Consequently a supremely perfect being cannot be conceived to exist. Secondly, according to Kant,
ontological arguments are those which are founded on a priori reasoning.84
Thirdly, Kant claimed
that the concept of God is not a product of practical experience but an ‘object of pure thought’. He
asserted that God exists outside the realm of experience and nature. Since we cannot know God
through experience, it is impossible to verify God’s existence. But God may exist, and it is a
hypothesis, the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.85
Today Philosophers are still
divided as to whether or not existence is a predicate.
74
Cfr. Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Introduction, p.xxii.
75
Cfr. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, New York, Hafner Publishng Company, 1959, pp.58-
59.
76
Cfr. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p.16.
77
Cfr. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p.60.
78
Cfr. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p.16.
79
Cfr. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p.58.
80
Although Hume’s criticism was directed mainly against a cosmological argument, it has been applied also to
ontological arguments.
81
Cfr. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp.346-352.
82
Cfr. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 349-351.
83
Cfr. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.349.
84
Cfr. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 351.
85
Cfr. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 351-352.

11. 11
5.5. Other critics
John Locke (1632-1704) rejected the ontological argument for roughly the same reason as
Thomas Aquinas.86
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) thought it a ‘charming joke’87
Bertrand
Russell (1872-1970) during his early Hegelian phase accepted the argument, but later criticised it in
his famous essay On denoting (1905)), claiming that the essence of a person can be described, but the
existence still remains in question.88
Davis Lewis (1941.2001) in his “Anselm and Actuality” (1970)
claimed that all ontological arguments are either invalid or question-begging.89
Richard Dawkins
(1941-) in his The God Delusion rejected the argument as ‘infantile’.90
The list of those who are
aggressively opposed to the argument is long.
A. Nemetz observes that the contemporary secular scholarly opinion considers the ontological
argument as logically invalid and metaphysically suspect. There is no consensus among Christian
scholars about the proper interpretation and evaluation of the argument. Interpretations vary from
seeing the argument as rigorously demonstrative to finding it an adequate mystical theology or
regarding it as a rough but solid beginning of a systematic natural theology.91
6. Some ‘defenders’ of the argument
Ever since Anselm first proposed the ontological argument for the existence of God, it has also
had ‘defenders’. But most of them presented (or present) the argument with their own emphasis or
new interpretations or ramifications. Among the ‘defenders’ of the argument we may mention such
scholars as, Alexander of Hales (ca. 1185-1245), Bonaventure (1221-1274), Duns Scotus (ca.1265-
1308), Mulla Sadra (c.1571–1640), René Descartes (1596–1650), Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677),
Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz (1646- 1716), Maurice Blondel (1861-1949), Kurt Gödel (1906-1978),
Charles Hartshorne, (1897-2000), Norman Malcolm (1911-1990) Alvin Plantinga (1932-),92
William
Lane Craig (1949-)93
and so on. At present, the versions of the ontological argument by Hartshorne,
Malcolm, Plantinga and Craig have acquired a certain general acceptance among the scholars who
favour the ontological argument.
7. A some general observations on the argument
Ian Logan, in his paper “’Whoever understands this’: On translating the Proslogion”94
has offered
some serious criticisms on the present day state of the study of the ontological argument of Anselm.
According him, the interpreters of Proslogion can be divided into five overlapping categories: 1)
Those interested in it as an instance of one or more ontological arguments; 2) those who make the
same kind of objection to the argument as Gaunilo; 3) those who argue that Proslogion is a
theological work which does not seek to deliver a philosophical proof; 4) those who seek to defend
86
Cfr. A. Nemetz, “Ontological Argument”, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 10, Washington, Gale, 2nd
edition,
2003, p.603.
87
Cfr. Alvin Plantinga, “God, Arguments for the Existence of”, p.87.
88
Cfr. Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting”, in Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901-1950, Robert Charles March (ed.),
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1956, p.56.
89
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ Accesed on 10 January 2013.
90
Cfr. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, Boston, Houghton Miffin Company, 2006, p.104.
91
Cfr. A. Nemetz, “Ontological Argument”, p.603.
92
For a brief summary of the arguments of Hartshorne, Malcolm and Plantinga, see Anthony C. Thiselton, A Concise
Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oneworld, 2006, p.217.
93
Many of Craig’s lectures on the Ontological Argument are available on YouTube. See for instance,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr36HID62wM Accesed on 10 January 2013.
94
http://www.academia.edu/2229245/Whoever_understands_this_on_translating_the_Proslogion Accesed on 9
January 2013.

12. 12
an improved version of the argument; and 5) those for whom the argument is imply the starting point
of their own arguments or proofs. None of the above groups can claim universal acceptance.95
The first category consists of an influential group of interpreters, and concentrate only on chapters
2-4 of Proslogion and neglect the reading of the text as whole, and arrive at, as Logan says, many
‘unanselmian’ arguments. The second group, like Gaunilo, misunderstand or distort Anselm’s
argument, and see no problem in re-wording the argument. The third group try to rescue Anselm
from the grip of philosophers and reinforce the anti-philosophical element in the argument by
emphasizing prayer, theology and mysticism, and therefore, not a proof for God’s existence. The
fourth group consists of a group that defends Anselm in some form, but they are philosophers with
their own philosophical agenda. According to Logan, much of the recent scholarship, such as that of
Hartshorne, Malcolm and Plantinga which attempt to put Anselm straight, are not directly relevant to
the ontological argument as Anselm envisaged it. Thus, according to him, much has gone wrong with
Anselmian scholarship, and many were and are using Anselm as channel to pass their own ideas, and
in this sense, they have done disservice to students of Anselm.96
It is to be admitted that the ontological argument is not persuasive enough to bring a non-believer
to belief. It may not succeed as a solid proof of God’s existence. Probably, very few people have
been brought to theism by means of this argument, and it may not have played any significant role in
strengthening and confirming religious faith. Nevertheless, it could demonstrate, to some extent, the
rationality of belief in God. This is perhaps the real strength of the argument.
Today, the ontological argument comes in an enormous variety of versions, and they enjoy
varying degrees of acceptance or rejection. In general, the current criticisms of the argument leave
much to be desired. Jasper Hopkins observes that, in the last analysis, Anselm’s proof is unsound,
but the reasons for its unsoundness are difficult to formulate accurately.97
At times, the critics forget
this fact, and even parody and ridicule the argument, which is certainly an unscholarly way of
dealing with a philosophical problem, to say the least.
At present, the ontological argument is not very popular in most Christian circles. Yet the
argument is not without value. A. Nemetz maintains that Anselm did not intend to make a formal
proof for the existence of God. He only intended his argument to exemplify a method through which
the understanding can find an expression for the certitude of faith or through which reason can find a
way to articulate the reasonable solidity of truth. From this perspective his argument can be regarded
as valid.98
Anselm shows a greater confidence in the powers of reason than many other Christian
philosophers. Though he agrees that God is incomprehensible, he is also sure that God wants us to
seek him using the abilities he has given us. Yet he does not think that our acceptance of Christian
truths should wait until we can prove them or understand them fully. Anselm’s thought is that of a
devout Christian believer confident that his belief is ultimately something that makes sense. In fact, it
has been observed that, the phrase ‘faith seeking understanding’ which Anselm coined to describe
the Proslogion, is applicable to all his works and encapsulates his entire approach to reality.99
95
http://www.academia.edu/2229245/Whoever_understands_this_on_translating_the_Proslogion Accesed on 9
January 2013.
96
http://www.academia.edu/2229245/Whoever_understands_this_on_translating_the_Proslogion Accesed on 9
January 2013.
97
Cfr. Jasper Hopkins, “Translators Preface”, in Anselm of Canterbury, Vol. 1, Jasper Hopkins (tr. and ed.), New
York, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1974, p.vii.
98
Cfr. A. Nemetz, “Ontological Argument”, p.603.
99
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.7.

13. 13
8. Conclusion
Anselm’s fame as a thinker rests primarily on his ontological argument. As Jasper Hopkins says,
his ontological argument has, through the centuries, vexed or dazzled the greatest of minds.100
It is
also a fact that, over the centuries, the argument has become very ‘complicated’ with variant
interpretations, criticisms, rebuttals, reconstructions and ramifications of it by philosophers and
theologians. Whether Anselm’s argument is a good one of not, undoubtedly, it has been very
influential in the history of thought. Notwithstanding the problems, many major philosophers still
continue to work on this ‘unusual’ form of argument, and as Benedicta Ward has rightly observed,
Anselm is a philosopher who is perennially new and always discussed.101
The literature on his
argument is vast, and not a year goes by without the appearance of a few more scholarly articles on
the subject.102
In this sense, Anselm is someone who has left an intellectual legacy from which
people still benefit.103
Abstract
St. Anselm of Canterbury’s ontological argument has sparked controversy from the time it was
formulated in the 11th
century to the present day. Today there are scholars who argue that much has
gone wrong with Anselmian scholarship, and many were and are using Anselm as channel to pass
their own ideas, and in this sense, they have done and are doing disservice to students of Anselm. In
the light of this criticism, the author re-examines the ontological argument as found in Proslogion
chapters 2 and 3 along with its classical criticisms, and makes some general observations on some of
the merits and demerits of the same.
100
Cfr. Jasper Hopkins, “Translators Preface”, p.vii.
101
Cfr. Benedicta Ward, Anselm of Canterbury. His Life and Legacy, p.4.
102
Cfr. Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, Introduction, p.xxi.
103
Cfr. Brian Davies, Saint Anselm of Canterbury, p.15.