3. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
About Bhopal Gas
Tragedy
WHAT WAS IT
The Bhopal gas tragedy (commonly referred
to as Bhopal disaster) was a gas leak
incident in India, considered one of the
worlds worst industrial catastrophes.
5. BHOPAL
It is the state capital of
Madhya Pradesh is
geographically at the center
of India. About one third of
its one million inhabitants
live in tightly packed, shanty
housing in its northern and
central districts.
7. About
Bhopal Gas
Tragedy
WHEN DID IT HAPPEN
It occurred on the night of 2nd–3rd
December 1984 at the Union Carbide India
Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal,
Madhya Pradesh. A leak of methyl
isocyanate (MIC) gas and other chemicals
from the plant resulted in the exposure of
hundreds of thousands of people.
8. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
PLANT PRODUCTION PROCESS
U N I O N C A R B I D E C O R P O R A T I O N ( U C C ) P R O D U C E D
C A R B A R Y L U S I N G M E T H Y L I S O C Y N A T E ( M I C ) A S A N
I N T E R M E D I A T E .
A F T E R T H E B H O P A L P L A N T W A S B U I L T , O T H E R
M A N U F A C T U R E R S I N C L U D I N G B A Y E R P R O D U C E D
C A R B A R Y L W I T H O U T M I C , T H O U G H A T A G R E A T E R
M A N U F A C T U R I N G C O S T .
H O W E V E R , B A Y E R A L S O U S E S T H E U C C P R O C E S S
A T T H E C H E M I C A L P L A N T O N C E O W N E D B Y U C C
A T I N S T I T U T E , W E S T V I R G I N I A , U S A A N D M A N Y
O T H E R S T A T E S .
9. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
PLANT PRODUCTION PROCESS
M E T H Y L A M I N E ( 1 ) R E A C T S W I T H P H O S G E N E ( 2 ) P R O D U C I N G M E T H Y L
I S O C Y A N A T E ( 3 ) W H I C H R E A C T S W I T H 1 - N A P H T H O L ( 4 ) T O Y I E L D C A R B A R Y L ( 5 )
10. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
HISTORY.
11. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Warren Anderson
CEO
B A C K G R O U N D
(November 29, 1921 – September 29, 2014)
He was an American businessman who served
as Chairman and CEO of the UCC at the time of the Bhopal
disaster.
Anderson was born in 1921 in the Bay Ridge section
of Brooklyn, New York, to Swedish immigrants. He was named
after the American president Warren Harding. He died at a
nursing home in Vero Beach, Florida on September 29, 2014.
13. Bhopal Plant History
A BRIEF TIMELINE
1 9 6 9
Union Carbide India Ltd. (UCIL)
opens a facility in Bhopal,
producing insecticides for the
agricultural market in India. The
formulations are made with
importedchemicals.
Construction of a full-
scale chemical plant
begins in Bhopal.
TheBhopalplant,withacapacityof
more than 5,000 tonnes, starts
making Sevin. While carbaryl is
formulated on site, MIC is still
imported from the plant in West
Virginia.
Production of MIC commences
in Bhopal in February, negating
the need for imports from the
U.S.facility.
1 9 8 4
1 9 8 3
1 9 8 0
1 9 7 7
1 9 7 2
Severe drought contributes
to rapidly declining Sevin
sales in India. Production at
the Bhopal plant falls to
1,600 tonnes.
With the plant under-performing,
the MIC unit is shut down.
Operators switch the unit from
“operating mode” to “standby
mode.”
14. BACKGROUND
1970s
In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated
policies to encourage foreign companies to
invest in local industry. Union Carbide
Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a plant
for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide
commonly used throughout Asia.
15. BACKGROUND
The company built the plant in Bhopal
because of its central location and access to
transport infrastructure.
The specific site within the city was zoned for
light industrial and commercial use, not for
hazardous industry.
The plant was initially approved only for
formulation of pesticides from component
chemicals, such as MIC imported from the
parent company, in relatively small quantities.
16. BACKGROUND
In 1984, the plant was manufacturing
Sevin at one quarter of its production
capacity due to decreased demand for
pesticides.
Local managers were directed to close
the plant and prepare it for sale in July
1984 due to decreased profitability, but
no ready buyer was found.
17. BACKGROUND
In the meantime, the facility continued to
operate with safety equipment and
procedures far below the standards
found in its sister plant in Institute, West
Virginia.
The local government was aware of safety
problems but was reticent to place heavy
industrial safety and pollution control
burdens on the struggling industry
because it feared the economic effects of
the loss of such a large employer.
18. Earlier Leaks in
Bhopal Plant
1 9 7 6
Two local trade unions
complained of pollution within
the plant.
A worker was accidentally
splashed with phosgene as he
was carrying out a maintenance
job of the plant's pipes. In a
panic, he removed his gas
mask and inhaled a large amount
of toxic phosgene gas, leading to
his death just 72 hours later.
A phosgene leak exposed 24
workers, all of whom were
admitted to a hospital. None of
the workers had been ordered to
wear protective masks.
J A N U A R Y
1 9 8 2
1 9 8 1
19. Earlier Leaks in
Bhopal Plant
F E B R U A R Y
1 9 8 2
One month later, an MIC leak
affected 18 workers.
A chemical engineer came into
contact with liquid MIC, resulting
in burns over 30 percent of his
body.
Later that same year, there was
another MIC leak. In attempting
to stop the leak, the MIC
supervisor suffered severe
chemical burns and two other
workers were severely exposed
to the gases.
O C T O B E R
1 9 8 2
A U G U S T
1 9 8 2
21. V E N T G A S
S C R U B B E R
On standby since
MIC not in active
production but
could be activated
by plant operators
in event of need.
Condition of Plant Safety Systems
R E F R I G E R A T I O N
S Y S T E M
Shut down June
1984 and coolant
(Freon) drained for
use elsewhere in
plant.
F L A R E T O W E R
Insufficient capacity
to burn large
volumes of escaping
gas; shut down in
November for
replacement of a
corroded pipe; MIC
process vents
rerouted to the vent
gas scrubbers while
repairs proceed.
W A T E R C U R T A I N
Functional but
insufficient height to
reach top of vent
stack.
S A F E T Y V A L V E
Operational;
designed to hold MIC
in at normal
pressures and
release it if pressure
too high.
22. B
h
o
p
a
l
G
a
s
T
r
a
g
e
d
y
|
D
e
c
.
1
9
8
4
Rajkumar
Keswani
BACKGROUND
Keswani was the first journalist to
bring attention to the safety lapses
and impending Bhopal disaster that
eventually came to pass at the
town's Union Carbide pesticides plant
overnight on 2–3 December 1984.
Keswani had written several articles,
from 1982 through 1984, detailing
that safety standards at the plant were
inadequate and that a catastrophic
leak could result.
24. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
HISTORY
The
Release.
25. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
HISTORY
At 11:00 PM on December 2, 1984, while
most of the one million residents of
Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant
noticed a small leak of MIC gas and
increasing pressure inside a storage tank.
The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device
designer to neutralize toxic discharge from
the MIC system, had been turned off three
weeks prior.
26. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
HISTORY
Pressure and heat from the vigorous
exothermic reaction in the tank continued
to build. The gas flare safety system was
out of action and had been for three
months.
At around 1:00 AM, December 3, loud
rumbling reverberated around the plant as
a safety valve gave way sending a plume of
MIC gas into the early morning air. Within
hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered
with human corpses and the carcasses of
buffaloes, cows,dogs and birds.
27. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
HISTORY
Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed
with the injured, a crisis further
compounded by a lack of knowledge of
exactly what gas was involved and what its
effects were.
It became one of the worst chemical
disasters in history and the name Bhopal
became synonymous with industrial
catastrophe.
28. The
Release.
SHARED ACCOUNT
OF RESPONSES TO
DETECTION OF
PROBLEMS
D E C E M B E R 2 , 1 9 8 4
1 1 : 0 0 P M
Third shift control room operator notices pressure gauge connected to Tank
E610 has risen from a reading of about about 2 psi at the start of the shift to
10 psi. This is within the normal 2-25 psi range, so arouses no concern.
Control room lacks any reliable way of monitoring tanktemperatutre.
A B O U T 1 1 : 3 0 P M
Workers in area notice MIC smell, see MIC leak near the scrubber. Find MIC
and dirty water coming out a branch of the relief valve pipe on the
downstream side of the safety valve, away from the tank area. They set up a
water spray to neutralize the leaking MIC and inform control room personnel
of situation and their actions. They then take their regular tea break,
continuing to discuss the situation and what they should do next.
D E C E M B E R 3 , 1 9 8 4
A B O U T 1 2 : 1 5 A M
Control room operator notices that control room pressure indicator for Tank
E610 reads 25-30 psi
29. The
Release.
SHARED ACCOUNT
OF RESPONSES TO
DETECTION OF
PROBLEMS
A B O U T 1 2 : 3 0 A M
Control room operator notices that needle on pressure indicator for Tank
E610 is pinned to the maximum reading of 55 psi. Control room operator
goes out to tank area to check gauges on tank. While in tank area he hears a
safety valve pop, hears rumbling in tank, and feels heat emanating from it.
Returns to control room to engage the gas vent scrubber. Caustic soda does
not flow as it should. A cloud of gas escapes from the scrubber stack.
B Y 1 2 : 4 0 A M
Plant supervisor suspends operation of the MIC plant, turns on the in-plant
and external toxic gas sirens. External sirens audible in nearby
neighborhoods are turned off after about five minutes. Operators turn on
the fire water sprayers but water cannot reach the gas cloud forming at the
top of the scrubber stack. Efforts to cool Tank E610 with the refrigeration
system fail because the Freon had been drained. Gas escapes for about 2
hours.
B E F O R E 1 : 0 0 A M
Plant supervisor realizes that tank E619, the designated spare, is not empty,
so workers cannot relieve the pressure in E610 by transferring any MIC to
E619.
30. The
Release.
SHARED ACCOUNT
OF RESPONSES TO
DETECTION OF
PROBLEMS
B Y 1 : 0 0 A M
Gas smell is obvious outside the plant; nearby residents awake at the time or
awakened by noise and smelling the gas odor start fleeing in panic.
1 : 3 0 A M
Bhopal police chief informed of leak and panic by an on-duty officer who ran
to his house; no significant police mobilization follows.
A B O U T 2 : 3 0 A M
Bhopal plant external siren for warning the neighborhood is turned on again
A B O U T 3 : 0 0 A M
Army engineer units with trucks are mobilized after a retired brigadier
general requests help evacuating workers from his factory near the UCIL
plant (but not under the strongest gas concentrations). Army unit then
expands operations to assist general populace by transporting injured to
hospitals and clinics. Some mobilization of city ambulances. Medical
personnel hearing of situation head to hospitals and clinics.
31. The
Release.
SHARED ACCOUNT
OF RESPONSES TO
DETECTION OF
PROBLEMS
B E F O R E 8 : 0 0 A M
Madhya Pradesh governor orders closure of plant plus arrest of plant
manager and 4 other employees.
A F T E R N O O N
Head of India Pollution Control Board informed of accident. Efforts to learn
details from Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board fail because phone
calls cannot get through. Phone conversation with UCIL office in New Delhi
(also unable to get phone calls through to the plant) provides some
information about possible causes.
L A T E A F T E R N O O N
Indian Central Bureau of Investigation takes control of plant and UCIL
records there. CBI agents begins interviewing plant supervisors and workers;
bar entry by anyone else, including other UCIL employees.
33. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Causes of the
Disaster.
34. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
CAUSES
There are two
main lines of
argument
involving the
disaster.
35. CORPORATE
NEGLIGENCE
This point of
view argues
that the
disaster was
caused by a
potent
combination
of under-
maintained
and
decaying
facilities.
EMPLOYEE
SABOTAGE
This point of
view argues
that it was
not
physically
possible for
the water to
enter the
tank without
concerted
human
effort.
36. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Corporate
Negligence
This point of view argues that management
under-invested in safety, which allowed for a
dangerous working environment to develop.
Factors cited include the filling of the MIC tanks
beyond recommended levels, poor
maintenance after the plant ceased MIC
production at the end of 1984, allowing several
safety systems to be inoperable due to poor
maintenance, and switching off safety systems
to save money— including the MIC tank
refrigeration system which could have
mitigated the disaster severity, and non-
existent catastrophe management plans.
37. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Corporate
Negligence
Other factors identified by government
inquiries included undersized safety devices
and the dependence on manual operations.
Specific plant management deficiencies that
were identified include the lack of skilled
operators, reduction of safety management,
insufficient maintenance, and inadequate
emergency action plans.
38. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Impossibility
of the
"Negligence
Argument"
- ARTHUR D. LITTLE
Valve MIC Tank
Pipes
39. Impossibility of the "Negligence"
P I P E S
The pipes being used by the
nearby workers were only 1/2
inch in diameter and were
physically incapable of producing
enough hydraulic pressure to
raise water the more than 10 feet
that would have been necessary
to enable the water to "backflow"
into the MIC tank.
In order for water to have reached
the MIC tank from the pipe-
cleaning area, it would have had to
flow through a significant network
of pipes, before rising into the MIC
tank. Had this occurred, most of
the water would have remained in
those pipes, as there was no drain
for them. Investigation by the
Indian government in 1985
revealed that the pipes were bone
dry.
The valve was "tagged" closed,
meaning that it had been
inspected and found to be
closed. While it is possible for
open valves to clog over time, the
only way a closed valve allows
penetration is if there is leakage,
and 1985 tests carried out by the
government of India found this
valve to be non-leaking.
M I C
T A N K
V A L V E
40. Employee
Sabotage
Now owned by Dow Chemical
Company, Union Carbide maintains a
website dedicated to the tragedy and
claims that the incident was the result
of sabotage, stating that sufficient
safety systems were in place and
operative to prevent the intrusion of
water.
41. Employee
Sabotage
The Union Carbide-commissioned
Arthur D. Little report concluded that it
was likely that a single employee
secretly and deliberately introduced a
large amount of water into the MIC
tank by removing a meter and
connecting a water hose directly to the
tank through the metering port.
42. Employee
Sabotage
UCC claims the plant staff falsified
numerous records to distance
themselves from the incident and
absolve themselves of blame, and that
the Indian government impeded its
investigation and declined to prosecute
the employee responsible, presumably
because it would weaken its allegations
of negligence by Union Carbide.
43. The methyl isocyanate supervisor on duty during the
second shift of Dec. 2. He had arrived two months before
from a Calcutta battery factory owned by Union Carbide
India Ltd., which also owns the Bhopal plant.
GORI SHANKAR
45. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Weather
Conditions
T H E H I G H M O I S T U R E C O N T E N T I N T H E D I S C H A R G E
W H E N E V A P O R A T I N G , G A V E R I S E T O A H E A V Y G A S
W H I C H R A P I D L Y S A N K T O T H E G R O U N D .
A W E A K W I N D W H I C H F R E Q U E N T L Y C H A N G E D
D I R E C T I O N , W H I C H I N T U R N H E L P E D T H E G A S T O
C O V E R M O R E A R E A I N A S H O R T E R P E R I O D O F T I M E
( A B O U T O N E H O U R ) .
T H E W E A K W I N D A N D T H E W E A K V E R T I C A L
T U R B U L E N C E C A U S E D A S L O W D I L U T I O N O F G A S
A N D T H U S A L L O W E D T H E P O I S O N O U S G A S T O
S P R E A D O V E R C O N S I D E R A B L E D I S T A N C E S .
47. Victims
Over 500,000 people were exposed
to methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas. The
highly toxic substance made its way
into and around the small towns
located near the plant.
Estimates vary on the death toll. The
official immediate death toll was 2,259.
The government of Madhya
Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787
deaths related to the gas release.
48. Victims
A government affidavit in 2006 stated
that the leak caused 558,125 injuries,
including 38,478 temporary partial
injuries and approximately 3,900
severely and permanently disabling
injuries.
Others estimate that 8,000 died within
two weeks, and another 8,000 or more
have since died from gas-related
diseases.
50. In a settlement mediated by the
Indian Supreme Court, UCC accepted
moral responsibility and agreed to
pay $470 million to the Indian
government to be distributed to
claimants as a full and final
settlement.
By the end of October 2003,
according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy
Relief and Rehabilitation Department,
compensation had been awarded to
554,895 people for injuries received
and 15,310 survivors of those killed.
The average amount to families of the
dead was $2,200.
51. At every turn, UCC has attempted to
manipulate, obfuscate and withhold
scientific data to the detriment of
victims. Even to this date, the
company has not stated exactly
what was in the toxic cloud that
enveloped the city on that
December night.
When MIC is exposed to 200° heat,
it forms degraded MIC that contains
the more deadly hydrogen cyanide
(HCN). There was clear evidence that
the storage tank temperature did
reach this level in the disaster.
52. UCC initially recommended use of sodium
thiosulfate but withdrew the statement later
prompting suggestions that it attempted to
cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The
presence of HCN was vigorously denied by
UCC and was a point of conjecture among
researchers .
As further insult, UCC discontinued operation
at its Bhopal plant following the disaster but
failed to clean up the industrial site
completely. The plant continues to leak
several toxic chemicals and heavy metals that
have found their way into local aquifers.
Dangerously contaminated water has now
been added to the legacy left by the company
for the people of Bhopal.
54. Health
care
The Government of India
had focused primarily on
increasing the hospital-
based services for gas
victims thus hospitals had
been built after the
disaster. When UCC
wanted to sell its shares in
UCIL, it was directed by
the Supreme Court to
finance a 500-bed hospital
for the medical care of the
survivors.
Bhopal Memorial Hospital
and Research Centre
(BMHRC) was inaugurated
in 1998 and was obliged
to give free care for
survivors for eight years.
BMHRC was a 350-bedded
super specialize hospital
where heart surgery and
dialysis were done. There
was a dearth of
gynecology, obstetrics and
pediatrics
55. Health
care
Eight mini-units
(outreach health
centers) were started
and free health care
for gas victims were
to be offered until
2006. The
management had
also faced problems
with strikes, and the
quality of the health
care being disputed.
Sambhavna
Trust is a
charitable trust,
registered in
1995. It
gives modern as
well
as ayurvedic treat
ments to gas
victims, free of
charge.
56. Environmental
Rehabilitation
TIMELINE
1 9 8 5
When the factory was closed in 1985–1986, pipes,
drums and tanks were sold. The MIC and the Sevin
plants are still there, as are storage of different
residues. Isolation material is falling down and
spreading.
1 9 8 6
The area around the plant was used as a dumping area
for hazardous chemicals.
1 9 8 9
Tubewells in the vicinity of the UCC factory had to be
abandoned. UCCs laboratory tests in 1989 revealed
that soil and water samples collected from near the
factory and inside the plant were toxic to fish.
57. Environmental
Rehabilitation
TIMELINE
D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 8
The Madhya Pradesh High Court decided that the
toxic waste should be incinerated at Ankleshwar in
Gujarat.
O C T O B E R 2 0 1 1
The Institute of Environmental Management and
Assessment published an article and video by two
British environmental scientists, showing the current
state of the plant, landfill and solar evaporation ponds
and calling for renewed international efforts to
provide the necessary skills to clean up the site and
contaminated groundwater
1 9 8 9
In order to provide safe drinking water to the
population around the UCC factory, there is a scheme
for improvement of water supply.
58. 1
33 of the 50 planned
work-sheds for gas
victims started. All
except one was
closed down by
1992.
Occupational Rehabilitation
3
In 2000, 16 out of
152 built work-sheds
were partially
functioning.
2
1986, the MP
government
invested in the
Special Industrial
Area Bhopal. 152 of
the planned 200
work-sheds were
built.
4
It is estimated that
50,000 persons
need alternative
jobs, and that less
than 100 gas victims
have found regular
employment under
the governments
scheme.
59. H a b i t a t
Rehabilitation
2,486 FLATS IN TWO-
AND FOUR-STORY
BUILDINGS WERE
CONSTRUCTED IN THE
"WIDOWS COLONY"
OUTSIDE BHOPAL.
T H E W A T E R D I D
N O T R E A C H T H E
U P P E R F L O O R S .
I T W A S N O T
P O S S I B L E T O
K E E P C A T T L E .
I N F R A S T R U C T U R E
L I K E B U S E S ,
S C H O O L S , E T C .
W E R E M I S S I N G
F O R A T L E A S T A
D E C A D E .
60. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Economic Rehabilitation.
I M M E D I A T E R E L I E V E S W E R E D E C I D E D T W O D A Y S A F T E R T H E T R A G E D Y .
R E L I E F M E A S U R E S C O M M E N C E D I N 1 9 8 5 W H E N F O O D W A S D I S T R I B U T E D
F O R A S H O R T P E R I O D A L O N G W I T H R A T I O N C A R D S .
M A D H Y A P R A D E S H G O V E R N M E N T ' S F I N A N C E D E P A R T M E N T A L L O C A T E D ₹ 8 7 4
M I L L I O N ( U S $ 1 3 M I L L I O N ) F O R V I C T I M R E L I E F I N J U L Y 1 9 8 5 .
W I D O W P E N S I O N O F ₹ 2 0 0 ( U S $ 2 . 9 0 ) / P E R M O N T H ( L A T E R ₹ 7 5 0 ( U S $ 1 1 ) )
W E R E P R O V I D E D .
61. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Economic Rehabilitation.
T H E G O V E R N M E N T A L S O D E C I D E D T O P A Y ₹ 1 , 5 0 0 ( U S $ 2 2 ) T O F A M I L I E S
W I T H M O N T H L Y I N C O M E ₹ 5 0 0 ( U S $ 7 . 2 0 ) O R L E S S .
A S A R E S U L T O F T H E I N T E R I M R E L I E F , M O R E C H I L D R E N W E R E A B L E T O
A T T E N D S C H O O L , M O R E M O N E Y W A S S P E N T O N T R E A T M E N T A N D F O O D ,
A N D H O U S I N G A L S O E V E N T U A L L Y I M P R O V E D .
F R O M 1 9 9 0 I N T E R I M R E L I E F O F ₹ 2 0 0 ( U S $ 2 . 9 0 ) W A S P A I D T O E V E R Y O N E I N
T H E F A M I L Y W H O W A S B O R N B E F O R E T H E D I S A S T E R .
62. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Economic Rehabilitation.
T H E F I N A L C O M P E N S A T I O N , I N C L U D I N G I N T E R I M R E L I E F F O R P E R S O N A L
I N J U R Y W A S F O R T H E M A J O R I T Y ₹ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ( U S $ 3 6 0 ) .
F O R D E A T H C L A I M , T H E A V E R A G E S U M P A I D O U T W A S ₹ 6 2 , 0 0 0 ( U S $ 9 0 0 ) .
E A C H C L A I M A N T W E R E T O B E C A T E G O R I Z E D B Y A D O C T O R . I N C O U R T , T H E
C L A I M A N T S W E R E E X P E C T E D T O P R O V E " B E Y O N D R E A S O N A B L E D O U B T "
T H A T D E A T H O R I N J U R Y I N E A C H C A S E W A S A T T R I B U T A B L E T O E X P O S U R E .
I N 1 9 9 2 , 4 4 P E R C E N T O F T H E C L A I M A N T S S T I L L H A D T O B E M E D I C A L L Y
E X A M I N E D .
63. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Warren Anderson
CEO
L I T I G A T I O N
Anderson was charged with manslaughter by Indian authorities. He
flew to India and was promptly placed in custody by Indian
authorities, but was allowed to return to the United States.
He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate of Bhopal on February 1, 1992, for failing to appear at
the court hearings in a culpable homicide case.
64. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Warren Anderson
CEO
A formal extradition request was issued in 2003. The United
States declined to extradite him citing a lack of evidence.
The chief judicial magistrate of Bhopal issued an arrest
warrant for Anderson on July 31, 2009.
65. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Warren Anderson
CEO
In August 2009, a UCC spokesperson said Union Carbide
had no role in operating the plant at the time as the factory
was owned, managed and operated by employees of Union
Carbide India Limited.
Eight former senior employees of the subsidiary were found
guilty on June 7, 2010. After these convictions, a UCC
spokesperson said, "All the appropriate people from UCIL –
officers and those who actually ran the plant on a daily basis
– have appeared to face charges."
66. KESHUB MAHENDRA
(CHAIRMAN UCIL)
VIJAY GOKHALE
(MANAGING DIRECTOR)
KISHORE KAMDAR
(VICE PRESIDENT)
J MUKUND
(WORKS MANAGER)
S P CHOUDHARY
(PRODUCTION MANAGER)
K V SHETTY
(SUPERINTENDENT)
S I QUERSHI
(PRODUCTION ASSISTANT)
Convicted Indian
Officials from Bhopal
Plant under Section
304-A (Causing death
by negligence)
67. 1986
The Environment Protection
Act was passed in 1986,
creating the Ministry of
Environment and Forests
(MoEF) and strengthening
India's commitment to the
environment.
B
h
o
p
a
l
G
a
s
T
r
a
g
e
d
y
|
D
e
c
.
1
9
8
4
68. How did the
Bhopal Disaster
affect the
environment?
GROUNDWATER
FOUND NEAR THE
SITE OF THE
WORLD'S WORST
CHEMICAL
INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT
IN BHOPAL IS STILL
TOXIC AND
POISONING
RESIDENTS A
QUARTER OF A
CENTURY AFTER A
GAS LEAK THERE
KILLED THOUSANDS,
TWO STUDIES HAVE
REVEALED.
B
h
o
p
a
l
G
a
s
T
r
a
g
e
d
y
|
D
e
c
.
1
9
8
4
69. How did the
Bhopal Disaster
affect the
environment?
DELHI'S CENTRE FOR
SCIENCE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT SAID
THAT WATER FOUND
TWO MILES FROM
THE FACTORY
CONTAINED
PESTICIDES AT
LEVELS 40 TIMES
HIGHER THAN THE
INDIAN SAFETY
STANDARD.
B
h
o
p
a
l
G
a
s
T
r
a
g
e
d
y
|
D
e
c
.
1
9
8
4
70. How did the
Bhopal Disaster
affect the
environment?
IN A SECOND STUDY,
THE UK-BASED
BHOPAL MEDICAL
APPEAL (BMA)
FOUND A CHEMICAL
COCKTAIL IN THE
LOCAL DRINKING
WATER – WITH ONE
CARCINOGEN,
CARBON
TETRAFLUORIDE,
PRESENT AT 2,400
TIMES THE WORLD
HEALTH
ORGANISATION'S
GUIDELINES.
B
h
o
p
a
l
G
a
s
T
r
a
g
e
d
y
|
D
e
c
.
1
9
8
4
71. C
O
N
C
L
U
S
I
O
N
Local governments clearly cannot
allow industrial facilities to be
situated within urban areas,
regardless of the evolution of land
use over time.
Existing public health infrastructure
needs to be taken into account
when hazardous industries choose
sites for manufacturing plants.
Industry and government need to
bring proper financial support to
local communities so they can
provide medical and other
necessary services to reduce
morbidity, mortality and material
loss in the case of industrial
accidents.
Legislation and regulation needs to
evolve in active consultation with all
stakeholders laying emphasis on
emerging requirements, and
increasing standards with
appropriate emphasis on actual
functioning of safety mechanisms.
72. C
O
N
C
L
U
S
I
O
N
Some moves by the Indian
government, including the
formation of the The Union Ministry
of Environment and Forests (MoEF),
have served to offer some
protection of the public's health
from the harmful practices of local
and multinational heavy industry
and grassroots organizations that
have also played a part in opposing
rampant development.
The Indian economy is growing at a
tremendous rate but at significant
cost in environmental health and
public safety as large and small
companies throughout the
subcontinent continue to pollute.
Far more remains to be done for
public health in the context of
industrialization to show that the
lessons of the countless thousands
dead in Bhopal have truly been
heeded.
73. Those who lived are the
unlucky ones - the lucky
ones are those who died on
that night.
R A S H I D A B I
( G A S S U R V I V O R )
74. B h o p a l G a s T r a g e d y | D e c . 1 9 8 4
Group
Members
R I C A M A E
C A S A B U E N A
M A . A N G E L A
F R A N C I S C O
J A Z L I N
J A C O B
E J
H I D A L G O
K I E R R U S T I N
R A M O S
