OSDM Ships Manoeuverability Availabilty Study

Ship Manoeuverability Availability Study (OSDM)
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The belowshownequipmentbreakdowntree hasbeenmade onboardthe Ms Oosterdam,HAL’ssecondVista classvessel.
NB6076.
Lloydsnumber9221281.
Thisbreakdownneedstobe checkedandverifiedonboardthe Zuiderdam,WesterdamandNoordam.
A similarbreakdownhasbeenmade forthe Signature class(EurodamandNieuwAmsterdam).

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The goals andobjectivesare to:
1. Identifythose aspectsof propulsionandsteeringrelatedsystemsthatare not redundant.
2. Identifythe failuresassociatedwith the essential shipcontrol andmanoeuvringsystemsandsubsystems.
3. Evaluate the effectivenessof the existingredundancies.
4. Identifyviathe belowshownequipmentbreakdownliststhe highrisk(critical) areasbymeansof usingthe investigationreportsaswell
as the knowledge of HAL’sshipsandoffice personnel.
All isaboutreliability,of whichthere are 3variances:
Structural reliability(dependingonatree of all kindsof subsystems,asper below) →shouldbe anewbuilddecision,AZIPODSare
maybe a goodexample…).
Usage reliability(dependingonsubsystemsbasedonrunningtime) –shouldbe implementedinourmaintenance management.
Reliabilityandknowledge of shipspersonnel –presentnecessarytraining/keepexperiencedpersonnel.
Nowadaysmaintenancemanagementisbasedon“situationdependent (risingcoolingwatertemperatures,vibrationincrease),corrective (oil
change,replace filters/bearingsaftercertainrunninghours),preventive (planningengine overall,switchboardmaintenance,orderparts) &time
based(basedonexperience (studiesfrommanufacturers),increase of incidentcasesandadjustedaccordingly”, whichisall basedonsafety&
reliability.
Operatorsneedtoknowwhatthe specificincidentbehaviorof certainequipmentisandwhichcomponentsare the causes.
Statisticsare the keyparameterstoidentifythese,thisprojectisbasedonmodificationstoavoidincidentsordelaythe incidents.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:
CHAPTER NUMBERS CONTENTS PAGE NUMBERS
1 MAIN DIESEL ENGINES AND GTG 5-48
2 GENERATORS 49-51
3 MAIN SWITCH BOARDS 52-65
4 UPS / INVERTERS 66-67
5 PROPULSION 68-81
6 EMG SWITCHBOARD /GENERATOR 82-87
7 CASESTUDY FIRE IN AFT
ENGINEROOM
88-113
7 CASESTUDY FIRE IN FWD
ENGINEROOM
114-142
8 AUTOMATION 143-166
9 ESD SYSTEM 167-175
10 VENTILATION SYSTEM 176-179
11 BRIDGEAND NAVIGATION
EQUIPMENT
180-184
12 FIRESUPPRESSION SYSTEMS 185-196
13 SUMMARY 197-211

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NOTE:
Black textmeans:noneCritical.
Blue text means:tobe reviewed.
Red textmeans:Critical.
Green text means:Medium-high orcritical (Anchormode).
(xx) Amountof pastproblems.
Belowbreakdownisdependingonthe DG (OrGTG) / Switchboardconfigurationandthe nature of the fault.
Port-mode→ inmostcasesOne DG (OrGTG) configuration.
Manoeuvre-mode→ TwoDG’sor more.
Sea-mode→ TwoDG’s(OrGTG) or more.
Anchor-mode→ One DG(16 Cylinder) (See supporteddocuments).

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ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION:
1. MAINDIESEL ENGINES (DG’S) →Sulzer ZAV40S /GTG LM2500 GE.
1A: Main diesel engines(DG’s)
DG1, DG3 and DG4 are 16 Cylinder type DG’S.
DG2 and DG5 are 12 Cylinder type DG’S.
1B: One GTG (GasTurbine) (LM2500)
1A: Main diesel engines(DG’s)
1.1.1. Cooling Systems: cooling water – freshwater- HT(pressureand temperature).
1.1.2. Starting air system.
1.1.3. Fuel system.
1.1.4. Lubrication system(LO).
1.1.5. Exhaust gas.
1.1.6. Control and engine monitoring system(AC70 /S800).
1.1.7. Overspeed conditions.

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1.1.1. Cooling Systems: cooling water – freshwater- HT(pressureand temperature).
1.1.1. a→Cooling water DG combined system/ Coolers (cooler change over) (pressuredip).
1.1.1. b→Temperatureand PressureSensors.
1.1.1. c→Cooling water LT, HT, SW and pre-heat pumps and their supplies.
1.1.1. d→Nozzlecooling water system.
General indication:
Sub Group Trip DG Trip propulsion Loss ofpower Sea-mode Manoeuvre- Port-mode Anchor mode Past problems
1.1.1.a X possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-High yes
1.1.1.b medium critical Low risk Medium-High yes
1.1.1.c possible medium critical Low risk Medium-High yes
1.1.1.d none
Possiblemeans: Depends on the DG configuration(This configuration depends on how many
engines are connected in the AFT and FWD engine rooms) and nature of the fault,

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IndividualSub groups:
1.1.1. a→Cooling water DG combined system.
AFT engine room:
Systemconsists of a combined 2 LT cooler systemand 1 HT cooler system.
LT systemhas 2 combined regulators, HTsystem has 1 regulator.
Each DG has also its own HT regulator that could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vesselin
case of a single failure.
Description Supported
documents
available
Possible single
failure
Redundant
set-up
Awareness /
training crew
/ maintenance
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor mode Past problems
DD/GG 1-2-3 LT
COOLING WATER
COOLER XA/062C
yes yes yes Yes (see note) medium critical No risk Medium-high Yes (5)
DD/GG 1-2-3 LT
COOLING WATER
COOLER XA/062D
DD/GG 1-2-3 HT
COOLING WATER
COOLER XA/061B
yes yes no Yes (see note) medium critical No risk Medium-high Yes (2)
PastProblems: Clogged coolers, especially on the seawater side of the LT coolers.

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Note: Crew on board needs to be aware and instructed about the critical aspects of this combined cooling water
set-up, working on a single engine could affect the entire AFT engine room.
Incorrectoperation of the HT by-pass valveon the evaporator could cause high temperatures on the engine,
causing a direct shutdown of the DG’s. A modification needs to be made in order to monitor the HT by-pass valve
feedback signals in the ECR; this is not possibleon the OSDM (Itcan only be monitored on the evaporator).
A single component failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG
configuration.
The behavior of the control valves need to be reviewed in case of a loss of power.
Combined systems could be reviewed in order to reducethe risk of failures, specially the HT cooling system.
Recommendation:
The install of a second HT cooler and regulator needs to be taken into consideration.
HT cooling systemis a long enclosed single systemthat is easily affected by un-prevented leaks (mostof the time
on the HT line to the Evaporators).

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FWD engine room:
Systemconsists of a combined 2 LT cooler systemand 1 HT cooler system.
LT systemhas 2 combined regulators, HTsystemhas 1 regulator.
Each DG has also its own HT regulator that could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vesselin
case of a single failure.
documents
available
Possible single
failure
Redundant
set-up
Awareness /
training crew
/ maintenance
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
DD/GG 4-5 LT
COOLING WATER
COOLER XA/062A
DD/GG 4-5 LT
COOLING WATER
COOLER XA/062B
DD/GG 4-5 HT
COOLING WATER
COOLER XA/061A
yes yes no Yes (see note) Medium critical No risk Medium-high Yes (2)
PastProblems: Clogged coolers, especially on the seawater side of the LT coolers.

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Note: Crew on board needs to be aware and instructed about the critical aspects of this combined cooling water
set-up, working on a single engine could affect the entire FWD engine room (DG4 and DG5)
This also depends if the GTG is on line or not.
Incorrectoperation of the HT by-pass valveon the evaporator could cause high temperatures on the engine,
causing a direct shutdown of the DG’s. A modification needs to be made in order to monitor the HT by-pass valve
feedback signals in the ECR; this is not possibleon the OSDM (Itcan only be monitored on the evaporator).
A single component failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG
configuration.
The behavior of the control valves need to be reviewed in case of a loss of power.
Combined systems could be reviewed in order to reducethe risk of failures, specially the HT cooling system.
Recommendation:
The install of a second HT cooler and regulator needs to be taken into consideration.
HT cooling systemis a long enclosed single systemthat is easily affected by un-prevented leaks (mostof the time
on the HT line to the Evaporators).

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Sea water regulators AFT and FWD engine rooms.
2 regulators havebeen installed for the regulation of sea water for both engine rooms, a single failure of one the
regulators will affect the aft cross-over temperatures (and pressure) which willaffect the LT cooling systemfor
the DG’s.
Recommendation:
The below mentioned modification has been made on the Osdm, this modification needs to be checked and
verified on all other Vista class vessels:
Modification made on board the Osdm:
A cross connection has been made between the AFT and FWD cross-over in such a way that sea water can be
supplied to the LT coolers fromthe FWD cross-over in casethe AFT cross over is not available for somereason
(Think of cleaning of the AFT cross-over).
Items: Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems. Awareness /
training crew /
maintenance
Possible single
failure
Supported
documents
available
Sea water
temperature
control valve
VR01005_032
Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high Yes (3) yes yes yes
Sea water
temperature
control valve
VR01005_035
Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high Yes (3) yes yes yes

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1.1.1. b → Temperature and PressureSensors.
Automatic HT temperature and pressuresetpoints for the individual DG’s areset as per below:
Temperature:
Set point is 81 degrees Celsius.
H1 alarm is set to 93 degrees Celsius.
L1 alarmis set to 60 degrees Celsius.
60 seconds shutdown is set at 97 degrees Celsius.
Pressure:
H1 is set to 5.5 bar.
L1 is set to 4 bar.
60 seconds shutdown is set at 2.7 bar.
Single failure of cooling water HT temperature and pressureswitches could affectthe redundancy and
manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the engine configuration.

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1.1.1. c→Cooling water LT, HT, SW and Pre-heat pumps and their supplies.
AFT engine room:
Items Power supplies Redundant set-up Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor mode Past problems
DD/GG FW LT
PUMP N3, XB/046C
GSP FZ/432QF,
43211 AFT MSBD
YES NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)
DD/GG FW LT
PUMP N4, XB/046D
GSP FZ/442QF,
44211 AFT MSBD
AUX LT PUMP N1,
XB/037A
GSP FZ/428QF,
42810 AC
COMP.RM
DD/GG SW PUMP
N3, XB/045C
GSP FZ/432QF,
43210 AFT MSBD
DD/GG SW PUMP
N4, XB/045D
GSP FZ/442QF,
44211 AFT MSBD
AUX SW PUMP N1,
XB/039A
GSP FZ/428QF,
42811 AC
COMP.RM
HT PUMP
MECHANICAL –
DRIVEN BY ENGINE
N/A YES (3 DG IN AFT
ENGINE ROOM)
NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)
PRE-HEAT PUMP
XA/065B
FZ/QF482000 #
48227 AFT MSBD
NO NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)
Main LT from AFTengine roomis supplying the cooling for the PS Azipod / Cyclo and propulsion
transformers.
All motors havebeen replaced in the past, main issueis the excessiveheat generated insidethe
terminal connection supply boxwhich caused the motor to burn-out.

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FWD engine room:
Items Power supplies Redundant set-up Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor mode Past problems
DD/GG FW LT
PUMP N2, XB/046B
GSP FZ/341QF,
34111 FWD MSBD
DD/GG FW LT
PUMP N1, XB/046A
GSP FZ/331QF,
33113 FWD MSBD
AUX LT PUMP N2,
XB/037B
GSP FZ/331QF,
33110 FWD MSBD
DD/GG SW PUMP
N1, XB/045A
GSP FZ/331QF,
33112 FWD MSBD
DD/GG SW PUMP
N2, XB/045B
GSP FZ/341QF,
34110 FWD MSBD
AUX SW PUMP N2,
XB/039B
GSP FZ/331QF,
33111 FWD MSBD
HT PUMP
MECHANICAL –
DRIVEN BY ENGINE
N/A YES (2 DG IN FWD
ENGINE ROOM)
NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)
PRE-HEAT PUMP
XA/065A
FZ/QF385000
#38521 B-DK EVAP
ROOM
NO NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK NO RISK Yes (1)
Main LT from FWD engine roomis supplying the cooling for the STBD Azipod / Cyclo and
propulsion transformers.
All motors havebeen replaced in the past, main issueis the excessiveheat generated inside the
terminal connection supply boxwhich caused the motor to burn-out.

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General note:
Auxiliary LT and SW pumps and relevant coolers are all located in different compartments.
Auxiliary LTand Auxiliary SW pumps and coolers Location pumps
Auxiliary SW pump N1, XB/039A AC-Compressor room
Auxiliary SW pump N2, XB/039B D-deck PS evaporator room
Auxiliary LTpump N1, XB/037A AC-Compressor room
Auxiliary LTpump N2, XB/037B D-deck PS evaporator room
Auxiliary cooler XA/038A AC-Compressor room
Auxiliary cooler XA/038B D-deck PS evaporator room
AC seawater pump N3, XA/494C AC-Compressor room
Evaporator SW pump XD/107AA D-deck PS evaporator room
The following modifications have been made on board the OSDM.
1. A cross connection has been installed between the dischargeof AC seawater pump N3 (XA/494C) and the
inlet of the auxiliary cooler, this has been donein order to maintain the redundancy in caseof a failure
(Maintenance) of the auxiliary seawater pump XA/039A.
2. A cross connection has been made between the emergency main fire line and the seawater side of the
auxiliary cooler in case you would lose (Maintenance or failure) auxiliary seawater pump XA/039B
Note: Itis recommended to install a bigger cross connection mainly becauseit will not be possibleto run all DG’s
of this cross connection at the moment (See supported documents).

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3. A cross connection has been made between the suction of the evaporator SW pump XD/107AA and the
suction of the auxiliary SW pump XA/039B, this way the auxiliary LT SW side is connected via the shore
connection to the LT SW side.
(This is the cross connection between the AFT and FWD seawater cross-over) (LTcoolers can be supplied
with SW from the FWD cross-over in casethe AFT cross-over is unavailable)(See supporteddocuments).

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Auxiliary cooling is used for:
1. Stabilizers.
2. Bow Thrusters.
3. Air compressor F.W. coolers.
4. Boiler forced circulation feed water pumps.
5. Condensate drain cooler.
6. Water treatment unit.
7. Provision freezing condensers.
8. Propulsion excitation transformers.
9. Main transformers E.R. substations.
10. Main transformers accommodation substations.
11. Galley transformers.
12. ECR
13. AFT and FWD MSBD rooms.
14. PS and STBD Cyclo converter rooms.
15. Black-out pumps C.W. starting aircompressors (AFT and FWD).
16. Condensate sample cooler.
17. Power pack incinerator.

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Auxiliary SW can be connected to the main SW systemin both engine rooms by means of the use of the shore
connection.
Recommendations:
Itmight be wiseto install a cross-connection (Emergency) between the main LT and the auxiliary LT systems, to
ensurethat cooling will be available for essential equipment in case of an emergency such as fire / flooding /
leakages.
Main LT systemcan be isolated as this is not installed as one complete system(AFTand FWD engine rooms);
Auxiliary LT systemneeds to be reviewed as this is installed as one complete system.
Auxiliary LT systemwould not be available in case of let’s say a leakage at the lowest point(Systemwould drain
completely).
This would mean that complete systemneeds to be isolated in order to repair the leakage, resulting in the loss of
vital equipment needed to maintain the vessels redundancy and manoeuverability (Loss of excitation
transformers mightbe a good example) (Power might be available but propulsion will not be).
Itmight be wiseto install a cross-connection (Emergency) between main LT AFT engine room and main LT FWD
engine room.

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1.1.1. d→ Nozzlecooling water system.
AFT engine room: Systemconsists of a combined header tank, two redundantnozzlecooling water pumps and 3
nozzlecooling water coolers, one for each DG.
documents
available
Possible single
failure
Redundant
set-up
Awareness /
training crew
/ maintenance
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
DG1 NOZZLE CW
COOLER XA/069B
yes yes no Yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none
DG2 NOZZLE CW
COOLER XA/069E
DG3 NOZZLE CW
COOLER XA/069C
NOZZLE CW PUMP
XA/052C
yes yes yes yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none
NOZZLE CW PUMP
XA/052D
HEADER TANK
XA/081B
yes yes no yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none
DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLIES
NOZZLE COOLING WATER PUMP XA/052C GSP FZ/432QF # 43214 AFT MSBD
NOZZLE COOLING WATER PUMP XA/052D GSP FZ/442QF # 44214 AFT MSBD
Single failure of the nozzlecooling water systemor its components will not affect the redundancy
and manoeuverability of the vessel.
DG can run without nozzlecooling water for about 2 hours without damaging the DG (HFO) (Even
longer on MGO).

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FWD engine room: Systemconsists of a combined header tank, two redundant nozzlecooling water pumps and 2
nozzlecooling water coolers, one for each DG.
documents
available
Possible single
failure
Redundant
set-up
Awareness /
training crew
/ maintenance
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
DG4 NOZZLE CW
COOLER XA/069A
DG5 NOZZLE CW
COOLER XA/069D
NOZZLE CW PUMP
XA/052A
NOZZLE CW PUMP
XA/052B
HEADER TANK
XA/081A
yes yes no yes No risk No risk No risk No risk none
DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLIES
NOZZLE COOLING WATER PUMP XA/052A GSP FZ/331QF # 33114 FWD MSBD
NOZZLE COOLING WATER PUMP XA/052B GSP FZ/341QF # 34113 FWD MSBD
Single failure of the nozzlecooling water systemor its components will not affect the redundancy
and manoeuverability of the vessel.
DG can run without nozzlecooling water for about 2 hours without damaging the DG (HFO) (Even
longer on MGO).

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1.1.2. Starting air system:
General:
Starting air systemon board the OSDM consists of 4 starting air compressors.
2 Starting air compressors arelocated in the AFTengine room(B-deck PS AFTengine room, FR. 90-98).
2 Starting air compressors arelocated in the FWD engine room(B-deck SBevaporator room, FR. 138-146).
Systemhas been set-up as one combined systembetween the AFT and FWD engine rooms, butworks as well as
for the individual set-up in AFTand FWD engine rooms, in case you need to separatethe 2 engine rooms.
Systemhas been set-up with 2 starting air receivers, 1 for AFT and 1 for FWD engine rooms.
1.1.2. a→Power supplies Starting air compressors.
1.1.2. b→Power supplies (Emergency) cooling pumps.
1.1.2. c→Pressureswitches and logic.
1.1.2. d→Set-up Starting air vessels.

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1.1.2. a→Power supplies Starting air compressors.
AFT engine room:
Items Power supplies Redundant set-up Possible single failure Awareness / training
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Comp.N3 XM/228C FZ/QF482000, 48213 no yes yes yes none
Comp.N4 XM/228CA FZ/QZ942000, 94223 no yes yes yes none
FWD engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Comp.N1 XM/228AA FZ/QZ941000, 94114 no yes yes yes Yes (1)
Comp.N2 XM/228AB GSP FZ/341QF, 34123 no yes yes yes Yes (1)
Note: Starting air compressors 1 and 4 are fed fromthe emergency switchboard.
Recommendation: All starting air compressors need to havea redundantpower supply; this will be a low cost
modification and can be done by the crew on board.
Pastproblems:
Damaged fly-wheel on compressors1 and 2.
A single component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

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1.1.2. b→Power supplies (Emergency) cooling pumps.
AFT engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Cooling pump
XA/048C
GSP FZ/432QF #43212
AFT MSBD
Yes yes yes yes none
Cooling pump
XA/048D
GSP FZ/442QF #44212
AFT MSBD
yes yes yes yes none
(EMG)Cooling pump
XA/048F
FZ/QZ942000 #94217
EMG SWBD
FWD engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Cooling pump
XA/048A
GSP FZ/331QF #33135
FWD MSBD
Yes yes yes yes none
Cooling pump
XA/048B
GSP FZ/341QF #
34112 FWD MSBD
(EMG)Cooling pump
XA/048E
FZ/QZ941000 # 94110
EMG SWBD

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1.1.2. c→Pressureswitches and logic.
Supported documents are available.
Items Redundant set-up Possible single failure Awareness / training
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Pressure switches /
logic

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1.1.2. d→Set-up Starting air vessels.
Systemhas been set-up with 2 starting air receivers, 1 for AFT and 1 for FWD engine rooms.
Systemhas been set-up in such a way that it can be used as a combined system(normalset-up) or as an
individual engine roomspecific (AFTor FWD) if needed in case of an emergency.
Starting air vesselfor the AFTengine roomis located in the PS B-deck AFTengine room, FR. 86-94.
Starting air vesselfor the FWD engine roomis located in the SB B-deck evaporator room, FR. 138-146.
The following systems areconnected to the DD/GG starting air system:
1. Air receiver for AFT whistle.
2. Starting air receiver for emergency diesel generator.
3. Emergency starting air compressor for emergency dieselgenerator (See recommendation).
4. Control air system→serviceair system.
5. Emergency diesel fire pump.
6. Engines DG1-2-3-4-5starting air.
Recommendation: Installa separate compressor /air vesselin a technical space between D-deck and deck 10 that
will mainly serveas a general back-up for engine roomstarting air systems as well as for the emergency
generator starting air system, fed fromthe emergency switchboard (Air feedback).

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1.1.3. Fuel system:
General:
Fuel systems arein general an important factor and risk for the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.
Fuel systems could generate many single failures, simple because it is a large and complicated system.
Fuel pressures and temperatures need to be monitored at all times.
1.1.3. a→H.F.O. /D.O. services, AFT and FWD engine rooms.
1.1.3. b→Logic and power supplies Booster pumps and feeder pumps, AFT and FWD engine rooms.
1.1.3. c→Blackoutgravity valves, AFTand FWD engine rooms.
1.1.3. d→H.F.O.Transfer system.
1.1.3. e→H.F.O.Separation system.
1.1.3. f→D.O.Transfer /Separation system.
1.1.3. h→L.O.Purifier system.

E.v.W Page 27
1.1.3. a→H.F.O. /D.O. services, AFT and FWD engine rooms.
Systemhas been designed to run on either H.F.O. or on DO (M.G.O.).
Systemhas a redundant set-up; it can be used as a combined systembetween the AFT and FWD engine
rooms as well as for the independent engine roomset-up.
H.F.O. systemhas a redundantset-up, but:
 Each fuel module has only 1 suction pipe fromthe H.F.O. servicetank with only 1 quick closing
valve, if this quick closing valve would accidentally shutyou will lose the complete module.
Recommendation: Install2 separatesuction valves with 2 quick closing valves.
D.O. (M.G.O.) systemhas no redundant set-up.
 When running on M.G.O. both engine rooms takesuction from1 suction line with only 1 quick
closing valve, if this valvewould shuta blackout will be the result (Single failure).
 Regulations in certain areas like the Californian coast require the ship to change-over fromH.F.O.
to M.G.O. 3 miles beforethe end of the sea voyage, meaning that often the ship sails on 2 or 3
engines running on M.G.O.
 Tank capacity is way too small, maximum quantity of the M.G.O. servicetank 2S is only 37.4m3.
Recommendation: Installa bigger M.G.O. servicetank or combine the GTG M.G.O. servicetank with the DG
M.G.O. servicetank by means of a permanent connection between the 2 tanks or by means of opening both
suction valves on the suction line (Communicating vessels)(See supported documents)
Install2 separatesuction valves with 2 quick closing valves.

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1.1.3. b→Logic and power supplies Booster pumps and feeder pumps, AFTand FWD engine rooms.
AFT engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Feeder pump N3
XD/144BA
FZ/QF480000 # 48014
AFT ENGINE ROOM
no yes yes yes none
Feeder pump N4
XD/144BB
AS001QFB # Q52
AFT MSBD
Booster pump N3
XD/144BD
FZ/QF480000 # 48016
AFT ENGINE ROOM
no yes yes yes none
Booster pump N4
XD/144BE
AS001QFB # Q53
AFT MSBD
Pressure Switch for
Booster / Feeder
N/A no yes yes yes none
Feeder / Booster pumps N4 areequipment with a redundantpower supply set-up coming fromAS001QFB
located in the AFT MSBD.
Feeder / Booster pumps logic is only equipped with 1 pressureswitch.

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FWD engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Feeder pump N1
XD/144AA
FZ/QF381000 # 38114
NEXT TO GTG
no yes yes yes none
Feeder pump N2
XD/144AB
AS001QFA # Q52
FWD MSBD
Booster pump N1
XD/144AD
FZ/QF381000 # 38116
NEXT TO GTG
no yes yes yes none
Booster pump N2
XD/144AE
AS001QFA # Q53
FWD MSBD
Pressure Switch for
Booster / Feeder
N/A no yes yes yes none
Feeder / Booster pumps N2 areequipment with a redundant power supply set-up coming fromAS001QFA
located in the FWD MSBD.
Feeder / Booster pumps logic is only equipped with 1 pressureswitch.

E.v.W Page 30
AFT and FWD engine rooms:
Items: Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems.
Loss of Booster pumps Medium low-risk Medium-risk Low-risk Medium none
Loss of Feeder pumps Medium low-risk Medium-risk Low-risk Medium none
Loss of Pressure switch Medium low-risk Medium-risk Low-risk Medium none
Note:
There is no need to changethe logic of the booster / feeder pumps, nor is there a reason to combine the logic
with the logic for the D.O.black-outvalve.
A single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

E.v.W Page 31
1.1.3. c→Blackout gravity valves, AFTand FWD engine rooms.
 Each engine roomis equipped with a D.O. black-outvalvefor the D.O. supply by means of gravity to the
3 engines in the relevant engine room, coming fromthe D.O. tank GO06P.
 GO06P is located in the emergency generator room on Deck 10.
AFT engine room:
Item Power supplies Redundant set-up Possible single failure Awareness / training
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Black-out valve
NL/001DV
AU/821UE # Q7 YES (Valve by-pass
handle)
YES YES YES Yes (2)
Pastproblems due to leaking valve, this has been rectified (Valve installed incorrectly).
FWD engine room:
Item Power supplies Redundant set-up Possible single failure Awareness / training
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Black-out valve
NL/021DV
AU/836UE # Q7 YES (Valve by-pass
handle)
YES YES YES Yes (2)
Pastproblems due to leaking valve, this has been rectified (Valve installed incorrectly).

E.v.W Page 32
1.1.3. d→H.F.O.Transfer system.
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
H.F.O Transfer pump
N1 XA/501A
FZ/432QF # 43221
AFT MSBD
Yes yes yes yes Yes (1)
H.F.O Transfer pump
N2 XA/501B
FZ/442QF #44218
AFT MSBD
yes yes yes yes Yes (1)
Pastproblems were related to issues with the mechanical seal (Leaking).

E.v.W Page 33
1.1.3. e→ H.F.O.Separation system(Purifiers).
AFT engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
HFOElectric heater
XM/158BG
GSP FZ/442QF #44220
AFT 11KV MSBD
no yes yes yes Yes (1)
Purifier starter module
XM/158BC
FZ/QF480000 #48012
AFT ENGINEROOM
XM/158BD
FZ/QF484000 #48411
AFT ENGINEROOM
Pastproblems related to burned-outheating elements.
FWD engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
HFOElectric heater
XM/158AG
GSP FZ/341QF #34122
FWD 11KV MSBD
no yes yes yes Yes (7)
XM/158AC
FZ/QF381000 #38111
NEXTTO GTG
XM/158AD
FZ/QF383000 #38311
PS FWD PURF.ROOM
(Sludge purifier room)
Pastproblems related to burned-outheating elements.

E.v.W Page 34
1.1.3. f→D.O.Transfer /Separation system.
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
M.G.O. Transfer
pump XE/500
FZ/QZ942000 # 94213
EMG SWBD
M.G.O. Transfer
pump XB/502
FZ/341QF # 34117
FWD MSBD
Purifier starter
module XM/159C
FZ/QF381000 # 38113
NEXT TO GTG
no yes yes yes none
A single M.G.O. transfer pump failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.
A single failure with the purifier components system could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of
the vessel.
Recommendation:
The M.G.O. transfer pumps arethe only components that have a redundantset-up of the M.G.O. system.
Systemset-up needs to be reviewed and needs to be modified for any futurenew build HAL vessels.

E.v.W Page 35
1.1.4.→DG Lubeoil (L.O.) system.
Each DG is equipped with a single pre-lubepump; each pump is supplied fromthe emergency switchboard.
Each Pre-lube pump has a manually by-pass (DG can startwithout pre-lube pump).
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Pre-lube pump DG1
XE/274BC
FZ/QZ942000 # 94210
AFT MSBD
no yes yes yes Yes (1) related to
electrical overload
Pre-lube pump DG2
XE/274EC
FZ/QZ942000 # 94212
AFT MSBD
no yes yes yes none
Pre-lube pump DG3
XE/274CC
FZ/QZ942000 # 94211
AFT MSBD
no yes yes yes Yes (1) related to
electrical overload
Pre-lube pump DG4
XE/274AC
FZ/QZ941000 # 94111
FWD MSBD
no yes yes yes none
Pre-lube pump DG5
XE/274DC
FZ/QZ941000 # 94112
FWD MSBD
no yes yes yes none
DG LO Transfer pump
XA/185A
GSP FZ/432QF #
43218 AFT MSBD
no yes yes yes none
Note: There is only one DG LO transfer pump, Located in the PS AFT purifier room, AFT engine room.
This pump is for the transfer of the LO from the storagetanks to the DG’s sump. Normally the sumps are full but
it could happen that LO needs to be transferred in case of an emergency, meaning that this cannot be done as
this pump does not have an emergency supply (Think of the Rotterdam scenario).
Recommendation: Installa change over switch and emergency supply for clean LO transfer pump XA/185A.
Installa cross connection between the clean and dirty LO pumps, this way you will create a redundantset-up in
case the clean LO pump breaks down mechanically (See supported documents).

E.v.W Page 36
Each DG is equipped with a single L.O. temperature regulator, L.O. cooler, self cleaning filter, duplex filter, L.O.
inlet / outlet temperature sensor and LO pressureswitch.
The temperature sensor for each DG has the following temperature set-limits:
H1→60°C
L1→45°C
Set point is set to 55°C
60 seconds shutdown (AC70) is set to 65°C
Filters are equipped with an automatic generated alarm in casethe filter is clogged (No delay).
L.O. outlet temperatures alarms are monitored with no delay in the alarm.
LO pressure:
Each running DG has the following pressuresetlimits:
H1→8 bar
L1→4 bar (Alarmsetting).
60 seconds shutdown (AC70) is set to 3 bar.
Note: Crew on board needs to be aware and instructed about the critical aspects of the DG L.O. system.
A single failure of one of the components could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel,
depending on the DG configuration.

E.v.W Page 37
1.1.4.a →LO Purifier system.
AFT engine room L.O. purifier systemconsists of 3 purifier starter modules, 1 for each relevant DG.
FWD engine room L.O. purifier systemconsists of 2 purifier starter modules, 1 for each relevantDG.
AFT engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Purifier starter
module XM/199BC
FZ/QF 480000 # 48010
AFT ENGINE ROOM
Purifier starter
module XM/199BD
FZ/QF 480000 # 48011
AFT ENGINE ROOM
Purifier starter
module XM/199BE
FZ/QF 484000 # 48410
AFT ENGINE ROOM
FWD engine room:
crew / maintenance
Supported documents
available
Past problems
Purifier starter
module XM/199AA
FZ/QF 381000 # 38111
NEXT TO GTG
Purifier starter
module XM/199AB
FZ/QF 383000 # 38310
PS FWD SLUDGE
PURIFIER ROOM
A possiblesingle component failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.
Pastproblems were related to incorrect maintenance handlings (Human error).

E.v.W Page 38
1.1.5. Exhaust gas:
General:
Each DG is equipped with a cylinder exhaust gas temperature monitoring system.
The alarm set points for the cylinder exhaust gas temperatures are set as per below:
H1→500°C
L1→50°C
There is no alarm delay.
Exhaust gas is easily influenced by the following:
 Behavior of the turbo charger and its temperature.
 Injection valves.
 Set-up of the fuel pumps.
 Coolers.
Itis important that maintenance intervals are followed as per manufactures instructions (Turbo overhaul,
inspection / cleaning of the coolers, change of the fuel pumps at the correct interval.

E.v.W Page 39
Functionality of exhaustgas / turbo charger temperatures:
There is no 60 seconds shut-down implemented when these temperatures exceeds their limits.
Note: Cylinder / turbo charger exhaust temperatures can be blocked on the automation systemin caseof justa
sensor failure
Items: Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems. Awareness/
training crew /
maintenance
Possible single
failure
Supported
documents
available
Cylinder exhaust
temperatures
No risk No risk No risk No risk none yes yes Yes (10)
Turbo charger
exhaust temp.
No risk No risk No risk No risk none yes yes Yes (10)
Single failure will not affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.
Pastproblems were all related to sensor failures or wrong sensor indications.

E.v.W Page 40
1.1.6. Control and Engine Monitoring:
General:
Each DG is controlled and monitored by the following:
AC70: start/ stop and safeties of each DG individually.
S800: monitoring of each DG individually.
AC70 and S800 arelocated in the same cabinet, one control cabinet for each DG
Control cabinets for DG1, DG2 and DG3 are located in the AFTMSBD.
Control cabinets for DG 4 and DG5 are located in the FWD MSBD.

E.v.W Page 41
There are two conditions implemented for the shutdown of the relevant DG(s) in case of failures.
 60 seconds delayed shutdowns.
 Direct shutdowns.
60 seconds delayed shutdowns:
1. L.O. temperature >65°C.
2. L.O. pressure<3bar.
3. HT cooling water pressure<2.7bar.
4. Cylinder cooling water outlet temperature <97°C.
5. Main bearing temperature >95°C.
6. Generator bearing temperature >100°C.
7. Generator winding temperature >140°C.
8. Turbo charger (T/C) temperature >120°C.
How it works: PMS is starting the next DG in the sequence when any of the above mentioned 60 seconds delayed
shutdowns areactivated.
If any of the above mentioned 60 seconds shutdowns remain activefor the duration of 60 seconds the relevant
affected DG will shutdown.

E.v.W Page 42
Items: Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems. Awareness/
training crew /
maintenance
Possible single
failure
Supported
documents
available
1 Medium High No risk High Yes (5) yes yes yes
2 Medium High No risk High none yes yes yes
Note: Pastproblems were mainly caused by sensor failures or incorrectsensor monitoring.
Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

E.v.W Page 43
Direct shutdowns:
The below shown alarms will cause a direct shutdown of the relevant DG (s).
1. Earth switch on.
2. Mechanical over speed.
3. Pneumatic shutdown activated.
4. Governor critical failure.
5. ECR EM stop activated.
6. Electrical over speed.
7. Generator protection trip.
8. Mechanical LO stop.
9. Oil mist High.

E.v.W Page 44
Items: Sea-mode Manoeuvre-mode Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems. Awareness/ training
crew / maintenance
Possible single
failure
Supported
documentsavailable
1 Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high none yes yes yes
2 Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high Yes (1) yes yes yes
4 Medium risk High risk Low risk Medium-high Yes (1) yes yes yes
Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG
configuration as well as the alertness of the operators in the ECR.

E.v.W Page 45
1.1.6. a→Engine protection system(AC70).
1.1.6. b→DG Governor.
1.1.6. c→Woodward 723 digital governor (Hardware/Software/ Synchronizer).
1.1.6. a→Engine protection system (AC70).
Each DG is controlled and monitored by the following:
AC70: start/ stop and safeties of each DG individually.
S800: monitoring of each DG individually.
AC70 and S800 arelocated in the same cabinet, one control cabinet for each DG
Control cabinets are located in the AFT MSBD for DG1, 2, and 3.
Control cabinets are located in the FWD MSBD for DG4, 5.
1.1.6. b→DG Governors
Crew has the knowledgeand supported documents available in casea Governor needs to be changed.
configuration.

E.v.W Page 46
1.1.6. c→Woodward 723 digitalgovernor (Hardware/Software/ Synchronizer).
Knowledge(crew) and supported documents are available in case a digital governor needs to be changed.
Crew should not adjust any of the parameters.

E.v.W Page 47
1.1.7. Overspeed conditions.
1.1.6. a→Governor (major problem).
1.1.6. b→Fuelrack / Fuel pumps (major problem).
1.1.6. c→Emergency Stop.
Sub Groups Trip DG Trip
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
1.1.6.a x possible possible medium critical Low risk Critical Yes (1) yes yes yes
1.1.6.b x possible possible medium critical Low risk Critical none yes yes yes
1.1.6.c x possible possible medium critical Low risk Critical none yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: depending on the load and DG configuration.
configuration as well as the alertness of the operators in the ECR.
Pastproblems were related to the governor of DG4 and DG5 causing a blackoutof the vessel.

E.v.W Page 48
1B: One GTG (GasTurbine) (LM2500)
The OSDMhas been equipped with one GTG fromGE.
The GTG runs about 2 hours each week due to the high fuel cost (MGO) (70 liters per minute).
The GTG is available and is considered as DG6 during normaloperations, the GTG cannot be used in case of
emergencies such as brown-outs and blackouts.
AverageGTG start-up time is 20 minutes and none of its auxiliary equipment is fed fromthe EMG switchboard.
 All auxiliaries are supplied from two GSP panels in the FWD MSBD.
 Motors A and heaters are fed from GSP FZ/331QF.
 Motors B are fed from GSP FZ/341QF.
EQUIPMENT FED FROM BREAKER NUMBER
ENCLOSURE VENT FAN A GSP FZ/331QF 33121
GENERATOR LO PUMP A GSP FZ/331QF 33122
FUEL FWD PUMP A GSP FZ/331QF 33120
TURBINE LO HEATER GSP FZ/331QF 33128
GENERATOR LO HEATER GSP FZ/331QF 33129
HYDRAULIC STARTER HEATER GSP FZ/331QF 33130
ENCLOSURE VENT FAN B GSP FZ/341QF 34121
GENERATOR LO PUMP B GSP FZ.341QF 34120
FUEL FWD PUMP B GSP FZ/341QF 34119

E.v.W Page 49
2. GENERATORS:
2.1.1. Bearings (temperature).
2.1.2. Air cooler.
2.1.3. Excitation (brushless).
2.1.4. Neutralpoint.
2.1.5. Voltageregulator (AVR) (Individualand 2 master AVR’s).
2.1.6. Voltagetransformers (Excitation / Actual value measurements).
2.1.7. ControlSystem/ Sensors /Detectors / winding temperature.
2.1.8. Current transformers(Differential/ Actual value measurements).
2.1.9. Diodes.

E.v.W Page 50
Sub Groups Trip DG /
generator
Trip
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
2.1.1. >100°C X possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
2.1.2. none yes yes yes
2.1.3. X possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
2.1.4. none yes yes yes
2.1.6. possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
2.1.8. possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
2.1.9. X (short) possible possible medium critical Low risk critical Yes (2) yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: depending on the DG and load configuration.
Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the DG and
configuration.
Pastproblems were related to issues with the diodes of DG1 and DG4 (2004)
Diodes were exchanged before it became an issue(Good PM practice)

E.v.W Page 51
3. MAINSWITCHBOARD(S) 11KV (AFTAND FWD).
3.1.1. Protection Devices switchboards.
3.1.2. Auxiliary supplies.
3.1.3. Interconnectors (Bus-tie).
3.1.4. Breakers and Contactors.
3.1.5. Protections Switchboard users.
3.1.6. Switchboard Users(Only main E.R. / propulsion transformersatthe moment).
General:
Training of the crew is a vital key element for the understanding and the safe operations of the 11KV main switch
board(s).
Training is available, but training intervals need to be reviewed as there aremany electricians that have not been
to any of the training courses.

E.v.W Page 52
3.1.1. Protection Devices switchboards.
3.1.1. a→Key interlock system.
3.1.1 .b→Power Transducers.
3.1.1. c→Arc detection.
3.1.1. d→Voltage and Current transformers.
3.1.1. e→ Bus riser and VT set-up (See 3.1.5. Protections switchboard users).
3.1.1. f→Non-preferential trips.
Possiblemeans: depending on the DG (load) and switchboard configuration.
Single failure could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the
switchboard and DG configuration.
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
3.1.1.a none yes no yes
3.1.1.b none yes yes yes
3.1.1.c x possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
3.1.1.d none yes yes yes
3.1.1.e x x Affected
swbd
medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
3.1.1.f none yes yes yes

E.v.W Page 53
3.1.2. Auxiliary supplies.
3.1.2. a→UPS / Battery back-up and change over principle (See 4.1.1Battery and UPS supplies).
3.1.3. Interconnectors(Bus-tie).
3.1.3. a→Switching procedureand logic.
Sub Group Trip DG Trip
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
3.1.3.a possible X (half) possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
Interconnectors willopen in case of excessive Overcurrent/unbalance Overcurrent/ over and Under
voltage as well as Overfrequency (depends on the severity, level 1 / 2 or in somecases 3) (With levels we
refer to the different REF / Synpoltrip settings).
This is done via the generator protection devices.
Possiblemeans: depending on the DG (load) and switchboard configuration.
switchboard and DG configuration.

E.v.W Page 54
3.1.4. Breakers and Contactors.
3.1.4. a→Mechanical interlocks.
3.1.4. b→Opening / Closing / Under voltage coils (Single critical failure).
3.1.4. c→Sparebreakers and Contactors (Availableand tested with testing date) (See recommendation).
propulsion
Lossof power Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-mode Past
problems
Awareness/
training crew
/
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
3.1.4.a none yes yes yes
3.1.4.b x possible possible medium critical Low risk critical Yes (1) yes yes yes
3.1.4.c yes yes
Possiblemeans: depending on the DG configuration / affective user breaker(s) as well the nature of the
fault.
switchboard /affective user breaker(s) and the DG configuration.
Pastproblem were related to DG1 11KV breaker.
Recommendation:
The following sparebreakers should be available (and tested) at both switchboards:
1 DG breaker (Available on Osdm).
1 Propulsion breaker (Mostimportantbreaker to have available at both switchboards)
(Two propulsion breakersavailable on the Osdm).
(Think of a fire / flooding in AFT or FWD engine room in combination with a faulty breaker)
(OneContactor available on the Osdm).

E.v.W Page 55
3.1.5. Protection Switchboard users.
3.1.5. a→Ref unit for VT cubical (Single critical failure, opening of all switchboard users, possibleBO).
3.1.5. b→Ref units for switchboard users (Obsoleteproduct, failureof individual REF unit could cause
possibleBO).
BO means black-out.
REF means microprocessor based protection and control unit.
3.1.5. c→SynpolGenerator protection units (Alternator protection / Diesel control unit / PMS).
3.1.5. d→Communication Bus Configurations (Modbus RS485 RTU).
3.1.5. e→Selectivity Relay Study (XX) means the number of the REF protection relay, (50) means relay
50.
Possiblemeans: depending on the DG and switchboard configuration / affected user(s) breaker and nature
of the fault.
Selectivity relay study: fault depends on the correct systemparameters.
propulsion
Loss of
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training crew
/
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
3.1.5.a x x x medium critical Low risk critical Yes (1) yes yes yes
3.1.5.b possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical Yes (2) yes yes yes
3.1.5.c x possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
3.1.5.d possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
3.1.5.e possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes

E.v.W Page 56
switchboard /affective user breaker(s) and the DG configuration.
Failure of the REF unit of the VT cubicle was related to human error which opened all the users of the AFT
11KV MSBD (Wood ward serviceengineer tripped the REF unit of the VT cubicle).
Selectivity of the protections:
All feeders are equipped with shortcircuit protections (Overcurrentrelays or differential).Below shown summary
of protection devices and their equipment has been (Lloyds / ABB) reviewed for a better understanding of the
protection used as well as for possiblemodifications needed in order to minimize the loss of power / propulsion.

E.v.W Page 57
Generator protections: (REF / Synpol).
1. Differential protection (87)→trip.
2. Overcurrent(overload) protection (51)→trip.
3. Shortcircuit protection (50)→trip.
4. Currentnegative sequence(46)→trip.
5. Under voltage protection (27)→trip.
6. Overvoltageprotection (59)→trip.
7. Loss of excitation protection (32R)→trip.
8. Reverseactive power protection (32)→trip.
9. Underfrequency (81<)→trip atlevel 2.
10.Overfrequency (81>)→trip atlevel 2.
11.Ground overvoltage(59N)→alarm.
12.Stator ground fault protection (67N)→trip.
Note: Lock-outrelay (86) is always activated when the generator CB trips.
Neutral point :(REF)
1. Zero sequenceOvercurrentprotection (51N)→alarm.

E.v.W Page 58
Bus Bars: (REF).
1. Under voltage protection (27) →trip propulsion and E.R.transformers.
2. Overvoltage(59) →alarm.
3. Ground overvoltage(59Vo) →alarm.
4. Underfrequency (81) →alarm.
Inter Connector FWD MSBD: (REF) #107.
1. Cable thermal Overcurrentprotection (49) →alarm.
2. Overcurrentprotection (51) →trip.
3. Shortcircuit protection (50) →trip.
4. Ground Overcurrentprotection (51N)→trip.
Inter Connector AFT MSBD: (REF)#208.
1. Overcurrentprotection (51)→trip.
2. Shortcircuit protection (50)→trip.
3. Differential protection (87)→trip of both 107 and 208 interconnectors.
4. Ground Overcurrentdifferentialprotection (87N) →alarm.

E.v.W Page 59
Propulsion Transformer Feeders: (REF) (4 in total).
3. Ground Overcurrentprotection (51N) →trip.
4. Unbalanced load protection (46) →alarm.
5. Differential protection (87) →trip.
FWD and AFTE.R.transformer feeders: (REF) (3 in total, 3 on line, 2 on load).
1. Thermal Overcurrentprotection (49) →alarm.
3. ShortCircuit protection (50) →trip.
4. Ground Overcurrentprotection (51N) →trip.

E.v.W Page 60
Accommodation transformer feeders: (REF) (6 in total, all on line).
4. Directional ground Overcurrentprotection (67N) →trip.
5. Unbalanced load protection (46) →trip.
6. Under voltage protection (27) →trip.
7. Shortcircuit protection (breaker fuses).
Galley transformer feeder: (REF) (1 in total, on line).
5. Unbalanced load protection (46) →trip.
6. Under voltage protection (27) →trip.
7. Shortcircuit protection (breaker fuses).

E.v.W Page 61
Thruster motor feeders: (REF) (3 in total).
2. Shortcircuit Overcurrent(50) →trip.
3. Locked rotor protection (start-up) (51LR) →trip.
4. Too long starting Overcurrent(48) →trip.
5. Start too long starting Overcurrent(51) →trip.
6. Locked rotor protection, during running (51) →trip.
9. Under voltage motor shedding (27-1) →trip.
10.Under voltage lockoutmotor starting (27-2) →lock motor contactor.

E.v.W Page 62
AC Compressor motor feeders: (REF) (4 in total).
2. Shortcircuit Overcurrent(50) →trip.
3. Locked rotor protection (start-up) (51LR) →trip.
4. Too long starting Overcurrent(48) →trip.
5. Start too long starting Overcurrent(51) →trip.
6. Locked rotor protection, during running (51) →trip.
9. Under voltage motor shedding (27-1) →trip.
10.Under voltage lockoutmotor starting (27-2) →lock motor contactor.
Note: Protection Relay Study has been reviewed by Ronald Jansen (ABB).
New settings have been approved by Lloyds.
New settings have to be uploaded on the OSDMin 2009.
Supported documents are available and on file.

E.v.W Page 63
3.1.6. Switchboard users:
3.1.6. a→Main E.R.transformers(3 in total).
3.1.6. aa→Buchholz relays: Single failure that could causeto lose partof the switchboard /propulsion.
Items Supplied from Feeding Affected switchboard
Main E.R transformer FZ/003 TFA FWD MSBD # 131 FWD 690V MSBD FWD 690V MSBD USERS
Main E.R transformer FZ/003 TFB AFT MSBD # 232 AFT 690V MSBD AFT 690V MSBD USERS
Main E.R transformer FZ/003 TFC AFT MSBD / FWD MSBD # 133 OR 234 AFT OR FWD 690V MSBD AFT 0R FWD 690V MSBD USERS
FZ/003TFA and FZ/003TFBare normally on line.
FZ/003TFCis considered as back-up transformer thatsupplies either the AFTor FWD 690V
MSBD.
3.1.6. ab→Faulty secondary main E.R. transformer breaker: Opening of the secondary transformer
breaker in case of breaker failure (users) without the opening of the primary breaker will
causea loss of power of the 690V relevantswitchboard / Propulsion.
Switchboard logic prevents the automatic changeover to the sparetransformer (this is good practice and should
not be changed (training on board).
3.1.6. ac → Transformer logic and switching procedures (training on board).
3.1.6. ad → Transformer safeties.
3.1.6. ae→ Oil leakages.

E.v.W Page 64
propulsion
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single
failure
Supported
documents
available
3.1.6.aa possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
3.1.6.ab x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
3.1.6.ac possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
3.1.6.ad possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
3.1.6.ae possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: depending on the DG and switchboard configuration and nature of the fault.
Single failure could (will) affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.
Pastproblems were related to oil leakages on transformers FZ/003TFA and FZ/003TFB.

E.v.W Page 65
3.1.6. b→Propulsion transformers(4 in total).
3.1.6. ba → Buchholz relays.
3.1.6. bb → Transformer safeties.
3.1.6. bc → Oil leakages.
Items Supplied from Affected Azipod PS / STBD
Ps propulsion transformer FZ/001TFA FWD 11KV MSBD # 121 PS
Ps propulsion transformer FZ/001TFB AFT 11KV MSBD # 222 PS
Sb propulsion transformer FZ/001TFC FWD 11KV MSBD # 123 STBD
Sb propulsion transformer FZ/001TFD AFT 11KV MSBD # 224 STBD
propulsion
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single
failure
Supported
documents
available
3.1.6.ba x possible medium critical No risk Critical none yes yes yes
3.1.6.bb possible possible medium critical No risk Critical none yes yes yes
3.1.6.bc possible possible medium medium No risk medium Yes (2) yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: depending on the DG and load configuration.
Single failure will affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.
Pastproblems were related to oil leakages on both FWD PS and SB propulsion transformers.

E.v.W Page 66
4. UPS / Inverters and Battery back-up systems.
General:
Battery back-up could be vital in caseof loss of propulsion / power.
4.1.1. a→Logic and change-over procedures UPS /Inverters (training on board).
4.1.1. b→Battery dischargeprocedures.
Each vesselneeds to be supplied with adequate rated battery dischargebanks in order
to dischargethe batteries while the UPS / inverter is on line (Available on OSDM).
4.1.1. c→Preventivemaintenance.
4.1.1. ca→Ensurethat Battery tests / UPS, Inverter digital readings PM (Preventive
Maintenance) is done is in a correct way (Training on board).
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
4.1.1.a possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
4.1.1.b possible possible possible medium critical Low risk critical none yes yes yes
4.1.1.c yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: depending on the DG, switchboard and propulsion configuration as well as the
nature of the fault.
Single failure (s) could affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the
No work should be performed on the UPS / Inverter / Batteries at sea or during manoeuvering and anchor
mode, unless it is an absolute emergency.

E.v.W Page 67
Power Supplies UPS / Inverters:
Items Supplied from Redundant Power Supplies
FZ/901QB→EDG starting battery charger. EMG SWBD XA/873A#929 NO
FZ/919QB→Bridge battery charge panel. EMG SWBD XA/873 #919 NO
FZ/009QB→Emergency lightinverter. EMG SWBD XA/873 #903 NO
XM/001QBB→SB propulsion converter. FZ/313QF STBD AZIPOD ROOMGSP –
FZ/424QF PS AZIPOD ROOMGSP
YES
XM/001QBA→PS propulsionconverter. FZ/313QF STBD AZIPOD ROOMGSP –
FZ/424QF PS AZIPOD ROOMGSP
YES
GH/002CO→Hotel management system 2. FZ/004QFASUBSTATION 4 #D51 -EMG SWBD XA/873A#924 YES
FZ/003QB→FWD MSBD 110VDC battery charger. FWD 690V MSBD #399 - FZ/QZ94100 #94123 FWD MSBD YES
FZ/004QB→AFTMSBD 110VDC battery charger. AFT 690V MSBD #498 –FZ/QZ94200 #94220 AFT MSBD YES
GH/001COA→Hotel management system1. FZ/003QFASUBSTATION 3 #C50 -EMG SWBD XA/873 #923 YES
GH/001COB→Hotelmanagementsystem1. FZ/004QFASUBSTATION 4 # D50 -FZ/QZ947000 #16 EMG POWER PANELUNDER BOAT9 YES
GB/001CO→PAsystem1. FZ/QFE30000 #13, ELEC LOCKER OPP. CABIN 8031 -
EMG SWBD XA/873A#921
YES
GB/002CO→PAsystem2. FZ/002QFASUBSTATION 2 #B50 –EMG SWBD XA/873 #922 YES
NI/001CO→Bridge equipment. FZ/QFE30000 #12, ELEC LOCKER OPP. CABIN 8031 –
EMG SWBD XA/873A#912
YES
AS/001QFA→FWD MSBD distributionpanel. FWD 690V SWBD #391 -EMG SWBD #910 YES
AS/001QFB→AFTMSBD distributionpanel. AFT 690V MSBD #490 - EMG SWBD #911 YES
AS/002QBA→FWD MSBD UPS 2. AS/001QFA FWD MSBD – AS/001QFB AFT MSBD YES
AS/002QBB→AFTMSBD UPS 1. AS/001QFA FWD MSBD – AS/001QFB AFT MSBD YES
AS/002QBC→ECR UPS 5. AS/001QFA FWD MSBD – AS/001QFB AFT MSBD YES

E.v.W Page 68
5. Propulsion Systems (Azipod).
5.1.1. ControlSystems.
5.1.2. Hydraulic Systems.
5.1.3. Steering Control Systems.
5.1.4. Cooling Systems.
5.1.5. Lubrication Systems.
General:
Azipods arevital for the manoeuverability of the vessel.
Note:
Complete PS Azipod has been replaced on the OSDMdue to damaged windings (2006).
Training of the crew regarding the Azipod control and sub systems is a must(Training intervals need to be
reviewed, especially for the crew that never sailed with the Azipod system).
Azipod isolation and entrance procedures need to be followed at all times, failure of doing so could endanger the
safeworking situation as well as the manoeuverability of the vessel.
5.1.1. Control Systems.
5.1.1.a→Cyclo Converter.
5.1.1.b→Azipod Information Unit(AIU).
5.1.1.c→Azipod Data Transmission System.
5.1.1.d→Excitation.
5.1.1. e→Propulsion motor monitoring system.

E.v.W Page 69
5.1.1. a→Cyclo Converter.
5.1.1. aa→High Speed Breakers
5.1.1. ab→Thyristor Bridges (Phaseunits).
5.1.1. ac→Cooling system.
5.1.1. ad→Excitation Bridge.
5.1.1. ae→Auxiliary Supplies (UPS) (See chapter 4).
5.1.1. af→Controland monitoring unit.
5.1.1. ag→ Propulsion transformers.
5.1.1. ah→Interlocks.
5.1.1. ai→Cyclo converter roomventilation.
5.1.1. aj→AC800 modules (Software).
5.1.1. ak→Feedback of Azipod encoder signals.
 GRB units (Cyclo converter cubical R2).
 Bechoff receivers (Cyclo converter cubical R2).
 Fiber optical / serial data transmission (FromAzipod to Cyclo).
 CMC and ZMC computers.

E.v.W Page 70
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
5.1.1.aa possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (4) yes yes yes
5.1.1.ab possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.ac Yes (2) yes yes yes
5.1.1.ad possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes
5.1.1.ae possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.af possible possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.ag possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.ah none yes yes yes
5.1.1.ai possible possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.aj possible x medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.ak possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (4) yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: Depends on the load reduction of the network in case of loss of propulsion load.
Single failure could (will) affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the
Keep in mind that in caseof failure of one (or more) of these components that this will only trip one
Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vesselwill still have 50% of its manoeuvre capacity.

E.v.W Page 71
Single failures:
Items Nature of the fault Redundant set-up Partial Loss of propulsion
5.1.1. aa Openingof the high speed breaker due to
intermittent encoder signals
yes no
5.1.1. ac Broken cooling pumponPS and SB A-side
Cyclo converter
yes no
5.1.1. ad Loss ofexcitationdue to fault on the PS
Azipod rotor / loss of excitation on SB
yes yes
5.1.1. ak Encoder failure on PS and SB Azipod yes no
Note: Items descriptunder 5.1.1.ak areindeed the weakestlink of the Azipod / Cyclo converter control.
Set-up is redundantbut needs to be reviewed.

E.v.W Page 72
5.1.1. b→Azipod Information Unit(AIU).
5.1.1. ba→AC800 Modules (Software).
A hard reset for more than 3 seconds on the AC800 module will erase the
softwareprogram.
5.1.1. bb→Cabinet Cooling.
5.1.1. bc→LCON(Optical / Serial converter) (loss of propulsion).
Note: 5.1.1. ba→Backup softwareneeds to be available on board at all times (On dedicated laptop).
Crew on board needs to be familiar with the procedure to upload the software
(Upload instructions and softwareare not available on OSDM).
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
5.1.1.ba possible x medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.bb depends medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.bc possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
Single failure could (will) affect the redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel.

E.v.W Page 73
5.1.1. c→Azipod Data Transmission System.
5.1.1. ca→Auxiliary slip ring.
5.1.1. cb→CMCand ZMC
There are two CMC and two ZMC computers for each Azipod.
5.1.1. cc→Profibus and Ethernet lines (independent).
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
5.1.1.ca possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.cb possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes
5.1.1.cc possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
Single failure could (will) affect redundancy and manoeuverability of the vessel, depending on the
Pastfailures related to PEP modules on the PS Azipod and ZMC failure on the STBD side Azipod.

E.v.W Page 74
5.1.1. d→Excitation.
5.1.1. da→Excitation transformers.
5.1.1 .db→IndependentSupplies.
5.1.1. dc→Automatic change-over in case of loss of power supply.
5.1.1. dd→Excitation Bridge inside Cyclo converter.
5.1.1. de→Transformer cooling / room ventilation.
5.1.1. df→Transformer safeties.
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
5.1.1.da possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.db possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.dc possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.dd possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (1) yes yes yes
5.1.1.de possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.1.df possible x possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: Depends on the load reduction of the network in case of loss of propulsion load as well
as the nature of the fault.

E.v.W Page 75
5.1.1. e→Propulsion motor monitoring system.
5.1.1. ea→RDS (Remote Diagnostic System).
Working on OSDM.
There have been many issues with the RDS systemin the past, the hard drivehas been replaced 8 times.
5.1.1. eb→GOP panels.
5.1.1. ec→ Bearing conditioning monitoring (DtectX1 / Swantech).

E.v.W Page 76
5.1.2. Hydraulic Systems.
5.1.2. a→Hydraulic motors (4 in total)
5.1.2. b→In case of hydraulic leakage (Faultseparation block).
5.1.2. c→Flushing pump.
5.1.2. d→Hydraulic power pack.
Sub Groups Trip
propulsion
mode
Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems Awareness/
training crew
/
maintenance
Possible single
failure
Supported
documents
available
5.1.2.a possible possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.2.b Yes (1) yes yes yes
5.1.2.c none yes yes yes
5.1.2.d possible possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: Depends on the nature of the fault as well as on the load reduction of the network in case
of a failure.
Fault separation block has been completely changed on the PS due to internal componentfailure.
Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have50% of its manoeuvrecapacity.

E.v.W Page 77
5.1.3. Steering controlsystem.
5.1.3. a→Steering pumps.
5.1.3. b→Steering motors.
5.1.3. c→Steering motor starters.
5.1.3. d→Steering gear control panels (Local / ECR / Bridge).
5.1.3. e→ Power supplies.
5.1.3. f→Steering Locking / brakesystem
5.1.3. g→Emergency steering.
5.1.3. h→Emergency Emergency steering.
5.1.3. i→ Room ventilation.
5.1.3. j→Control and monitoring.
5.1.3. k→Faststeering mode (Only possiblein Manoeuvremode, 2 pumps).
5.1.3. l→ Steering mechanical set-up.
5.1.3. m→Slewing bearing and sealing system.

E.v.W Page 78
propulsion
Loss of
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness /
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single
failure
Supported
documents
available
5.1.3.a x medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.b x medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes
5.1.3.c x medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (5) yes yes yes
5.1.3.d medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.e possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.f medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.g medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.h medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.i medium critical No risk Medium-H Yes (2) yes yes yes
5.1.3.j possible medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.k medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.l medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
5.1.3.m medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: depends on the nature of the fault.
Pastproblems: 2 faulty steering motors and 5 steering controlsoft starters havebeen replaced.

E.v.W Page 79
5.1.3.J→Controland Monitoring.
5.1.3. Ja→EMRI system.
General:
The complete EMRI control systemis build up as 2 independent systems, onefor PORTand one similar for the
STBD Azipod.
Each control systemis governed by one of 2 redundant PLC’s. One active and one in hot standby mode.
Systemwould still function in case of PLC’s failure (NFU and hand steering modes).
Systemhas an independent cable routing.
Keep in mind that in caseof a failure of one (or more) of the EMRI components that this could (will) affect
only 1 Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vesselwill still have 50% of its manoeuvrecapacity.
The situation will be different in case of a fire in the electrical locker on deck 8, oppositecabin 8010, as
most of the EMRI equipment is centrally located in that electrical locker.
Redundancy and manoeuverability will be affected in such a case, keep in mind that even than you can still
locally control the steering system (s).
EMRI SYSTEMS Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-mode Past problems Awareness /
training crew /
maintenance
Possible single
failure
Supported
documents
available
PS EMRI SYSTEM medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
SB EMRI SYSTEM medium critical No risk Medium-H none yes yes yes

E.v.W Page 80
5.1.4 Cooling systems.
5.1.4. a→Cooling air unit.
5.1.4. b→Heatexchanger.
5.1.4. c→Suction / Pressurechamber.
5.1.4. d→Roomventilation.
5.1.4. e→Fan logic / Starters / Power supplies.
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
5.1.4.a No risk none yes yes yes
5.1.4.b No risk none yes yes yes
5.1.4.c No risk none yes yes yes
5.1.4.d Low Low No risk Low Yes (2) yes yes yes
5.1.4.e Low Low No risk Low none yes yes yes
Note item 5.1.4.d: inadequateAzipod roomcooling when the vesselset sail fromthe yard, this has been
resolved.

E.v.W Page 81
5.1.5 Lubrication Systems.
5.1.5. a→Thrustbearing.
5.1.5. b→Propeller bearing.
5.1.5. c→Seal Oil.
5.1.5. d→Drainagesystem.
5.1.5. e→Shaft seal arrangement.
5.1.5. f→Purifiner.
propulsion
Lossof
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single failure
Supported
documents
available
5.1.5.a No risk none yes yes yes
5.1.5.b No risk none yes yes yes
5.1.5.c No risk none yes yes yes
5.1.5.d No risk none yes yes yes
5.1.5.e No risk none yes yes yes
5.1.5.f No risk Yes (2) yes yes yes
Azipod / Cyclo converter, meaning that the vessel will still have50% of its manoeuvrecapacity.

E.v.W Page 82
6. Emergency Switchboard / Emergency Generator.
6.1.1. Emergency switchboard.
6.1.2. Emergency generator.
General:
Emergency facilities such as emergency switchboard, its users and the emergency generator are vital for the
overall vessels safeand redundantoperation.
Failure of one of the components will affect the redundancy and could affect the manoeuverability of the vessel.
Note: The Complete EMG has been replaced on OSDM(March 2006)
6.1.1. Emergency switchboard.
6.1.1. a→Switchboard description / logic.
6.1.1. b→Inverter and Battery set-up.
6.1.1. c→Switchboard Safeties.
6.1.1. d→Transfer line and breakers.
6.1.1. e→ Switchboard users.
6.1.1. f→Room set-up / Ventilation.
6.1.1. g→Auxiliary transformers.
6.1.1. h→Masterpack breakers / sparebreakers.

E.v.W Page 83
Sub Groups Trip EMG Trip
transfer
line
Preferential
trip
Lossof emg
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single
failure
Supported
documents
available
6.1.1.a none yes yes yes
6.1.1.b Yes (20) yes yes yes
6.1.1.c possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.1.d medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.1.e none yes yes yes
6.1.1.f none yes yes yes
6.1.1.g medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.1.h possible possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
Possiblemeans: Depends on the nature of the failure.
Single failure will affect the redundancy and could affect the manoeuverability of the vessel.
Pastproblems were all related to internal component failures of the inverter (Fan sensors area good
example).

E.v.W Page 84
6.1.2. Emergency generator.
6.1.2. a→Safeties.
6.1.2. b→Radiator fan / Cooling (Modification made, in case of damper feedback failure).
6.1.2. c→Starting batteries / UPS (See chapter 4).
6.1.2. d→Fuel set-up.
6.1.2. e→ Starting air set-up / starting air receiver.
6.1.2. f→Control cabinet.
6.1.2. g→Mechanical set-up.
transfer
line
Preferential
trip
Lossof emg
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single
failure
Supported
documents
available
6.1.2.a possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.b x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H Yes (1) yes yes yes
6.1.2.c none yes yes yes
6.1.2.d possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.e Yes (1) yes yes yes
6.1.2.f possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.g medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
Medium risk (sea-mode), critical risk (Manoeuvre-mode) and medium-high risk (Anchor mode) with faulty
transfer line to 690V MSBD (Running (on line) EMG feeding the EMSB users).
Pastproblems: air starter motor has been replaced / EMG cooler has been replaced (Leakage).

E.v.W Page 85
Automatic starting controlselection should always be selected to “electric start” and not to “pneumatic start”
during the normalsailing configuration.
Recommendation:
Sourcea different manufactory of an emergency generator for futurenew HAL vessels.
Consider the install of a second emergency generator / switchboard for futurenew HAL vessels.
6.1.2. d→ Fuel set-up:
Note: Fuel supply to EMG is done via a single feeder line with 1 quick closing valve and 1 manualvalve fromthe
DO tank in the EMG room, single failure of one of these valves will cut-off the fuel supply to the EMG.
There is no by-pass lineon the EMG fuel system.

E.v.W Page 86
6.1.2. a→ Safeties
6.1.2. aa→Overspeed (maxspeed setting + 15%).
6.1.2. ab→Lube-oil preheating high temp.
6.1.2. ac→Lube-oil low / very low pressure.
6.1.2. ad→Lube-oil high temperature >115°C.
6.1.2. ae→Speed governor (Major failure).
6.1.2. af→Combustion air / Exhaust gas (ambient room, temp).
6.1.2. ag→Cooling (fresh) water >100°C.
6.1.2. ah→Bearings (temperature).

E.v.W Page 87
transfer
line
Preferential
trip
Lossof emg
power
Sea-mode Manoeuvre-
mode
Port-mode Anchor-
mode
Past
problems
Awareness/
training
crew /
maintenance
Possible
single
failure
Supported
documents
available
6.1.2.aa x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.ab x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.ac none yes yes yes
6.1.2.ad x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.ae x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.af possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.ag x x medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
6.1.2.ah possible possible medium critical Low risk Medium-H none yes yes yes
Medium risk (sea-mode), critical risk (Manoeuvre-mode) and medium-high risk (Anchor mode) with faulty
transfer line to 690V MSBD (Running (on line) EMG feeding the EMSB users).
Recommendation:
Common alarms to automation need to be reviewed; there should be no common alarms, justindividual
alarms.

E.v.W Page 88
7. Case study using chapters 1-6.
Scenario A:
1. Vessel is at sea, enroute to Hawaii, 2 dayssailing (away) from the Californian coast.
2. Complete loss of power and propulsion.
3. Fire in the AFTengine room.
4. Emergency DieselGenerator did notstart.
5. AFT engine room equipmentcannotbe used.
6. AFT 11KV / 690V SWBD usersand equipmentcannotbe used.
Scenario B:
3. Fire in the FWD engine room.
5. FWD engine room equipmentcannotbe used.
6. FWD 11KV / 690V SWBD usersand equipmentcannotbe used.

E.v.W Page 89
Goals for scenarios A and B:
1. Restore power / propulsion and Manoeuverability of the Vessel (Vital).
2. Restore vacuumsystems /galley and kitchen equipment / AC / drinking water (evaps) /potable
water / cabin power / Chiller and Freezer compressor /other passenger and crew facilities.
These scenarios will indicate the redundancy / non-redundancy of the ships systems in caseof an
emergency and the possiblechanges that need to be implemented in order to maintain the redundancy of
the ships systems.
Scenario A:
3. Fire in the AFTengine room.
5. AFT engine room equipmentcannotbe used.
6. AFT 11KV / 690V SWBD usersand equipmentcannotbe used.
Below facts are based on one of the worstpossiblescenarios.

E.v.W Page 90
1. No access to the AFTengine room.
2. No access to the AFTMSBD (both entrance doorsto the AFTMSBD are located in the AFT engine room).
3. Emergency generatortransfer line wasselected to the AFT690V MSBD (410) before the fire / blackout.
4. No starting air available, air vessel only has a pressure of 8 bar (Not enough to start DG).
5. Essential equipmentto start the first DG on the FWD MSBD is available, but only via the normal690V
supplies and not via the 690V emergency supplies.
 Booster pump (pump overhaul).
 Starting air compressor (change bearingsof the motor).
 Combined set-up from AFTto FWD engine is not available due to the fire.
6. DO gravity valve FWD engine is notopening, no gravity feed to the DG.
7. DO gravity valve by-passline hasa broken handle, no gravity feed to the DG.
8. Only way to restore the power atthis point is by meansof the “ELECTRICAL FEEDBACK” procedure, pending
if EMG will start.
9. Soon you will find out that this will notwork because of the following reasons:
Important:
The release of CO² in the affected engine room could be of vital importance, it is importantthat the decision to
release CO² is made in a timely matter.
It is equally importantthatthe engineerswill isolate the combined systems between AFTand FWD engine rooms
as soon as possible in order to preventfurther damage (Think of combined starting air system as an example).

E.v.W Page 91
Emergency generator transfer line was selected to the AFT690V MSBD (410) beforethe fire / blackout.
This means that breaker 410 in the AFT MSBD is closed, breaker 410 does not have an under voltage coil,
meaning that this breaker can only be opened manually which is not possible (No access to AFT MSBD).
Note: EMG transfer line 410 (AFT) and 309 (FWD) are mechanically and electrically interlocked (See SWBD
description and explanation) (Sparebreaker keys arelocated in the Elec Workshop on theOSDM) (if needed).
We basically need to have 410 open and 309 closed beforewe can commence the “FEEDBACK” -
procedure.
Breaker number Under voltage coil MN Opening shunt MX Closing coil XF Modification needed
410 AFT MSBD X possible
309 FWD MSBD X possible
909 EMG SWBD X X X No
901 EMG SWBD X X X No
Conclusion: Not possible to restorepower and propulsion at this point with the abovementioned
conditions.
Modifications needed:
Item Needed modification Nature of modification Revise plan approval Outside contractor
Breaker 410 Possible solution** Install under voltage coil yes yes
Breaker 309 Possible solution** Install under voltage coil yes yes
AFT MSBD X Install a small manhole **
(SEE NOTE)
yes yes
FWD MSBD X Install a small manhole **
(SEE NOTE)
yes yes

E.v.W Page 92
Note: A small entrance / exit manhole needs to be installed for both AFT and FWD MSBD, in order to
access or escape fromthe MSBD’s in caseof an Engine room fire (Currentaccess doors areall
installed on the engine room side).
These access / exit manholes need to be installed at the back wall of the 690V SWBD’s.
This should be a relatively easy as well as a low cost modification.
AFT MSBD → manhole access via Engine workshop on B-deck.
FWD MSBD → manhole access via B-deck stairway behind the ECR.
** The implementation of under voltage coils could complicate the installation; this could be a high-cost
solution.
Other solution:
There is also the possibility to physicalremove(disconnect) the transfer line feeder cable (410) to the AFT
MSBD from the EMG SWBD, keep in mind that this would be a timely exercise.
Transfer feeder lines (410-309) areboth connected to the top bus bar of cubical 1A of the EMG SWBD
XA/873A (Cables are painted with fire resistantpaint and not marked).

E.v.W Page 93
Knowing the above, but in order to continue with the scenario A: We say that the machinistmade a hole in
order to access the AFT MSBD fromthe engine workshop on B-deck (At this point we are tampering with
the integrity of the areas).
Proceed with the “FEEDBACK” operation.
1. Go to the AFTMSBD (Protected with BA set, fire (CO² RELEASE) on the other side of the A60 bulkhead)
(MSBD should not be affected in case of release of CO² in the ENGINEroom as this is classified as a
different area of CO²release).
2. Performthe below necessary shown actions.
690V MSBD Open breaker / set to manual Rack-out breaker Take key (interlock with 309)
410 X X X
402 X
504 X
3. Open the following breakers ( time and safety permitted)
690V MSBD Open breaker / set to manual Rack-out breaker Comments
570 Already open X
512 Already open X
514 Already open X
454 Already open X
All other users 690V MSBD X
11KV MSBD
208 Already open X
234 Already open X If not racked out already
232 Already open X
248 Already open X

E.v.W Page 94
4. Go to FWD MSBD room.
5. Performthe below shown actions.
690V MSBD Close breaker Insert key Open breaker (set to manual) Rack-out breaker Comments
309 X X
301 Set to manual
All 690V users X
11KV MSBD
107 Already open X
133 Already open X If not racked out already
6. Go to ECR.
7. Performthe below shown actions (If notdone already).
Supply / Feeder / other Supply from AFT
11KV MSBD
Breaker # EMG stop ECR Fuel shut down Off position
EGP panel
Select rolling-
mode(autom.)
DG 1 XA/872B 202 X X
DG 2 XA/872B 204 X X
DG 3 XA/872B 206 X X
Substation 1 XA/872B 246 X
Galley Substation XA/872B 248 X
Transformer FZ/003TFB XA/872B 232 X
Transformer FZ/003TFC XA/872 A - B 133-234 X
All elevators X
8. Go to EMG room (or send somebody).
9. Open breaker 942 for the supply of FZ/QZ942000located in the AFT MSBD.

E.v.W Page 95
10.Select the selector switch in cabinet 1G located in XA/873A to “FEEDBACK”.
11. Start EMG, following the procedurefor “DEAD” - ship scenario.
12.Make sureEMG is running (stable condition, voltage and frequency).
13.Close breaker 901 by pushing “CLOSING” on cubicle1E, or directly on the breaker (on button).
14.Close breaker 909 by pushing “CLOSING” on cubicle1G, or directly on the breaker (on button).
15.EMG is now feeding the FWD 690V SWBD via breaker 309.
16. Go to FWD MSBD room.
17.Close the following essential (GSP’s) breakers in order to havethe auxiliary equipment available to startthe
firstDG (DG 4, 5).

E.v.W Page 96
Necessary Equipment: Supply from 690VMSBD CLOSE BREAKER # CHECK IF RUNNING / POWER
XD/144AD booster pump 1 FZ/QF381000#38116 381 X
XD/144AA feeder pump 1 FZ/QF381000#38114 381 X
Starting air compressor XM/228AB
(N2)
GSP FZ/341QF#34123 341 X
Coolingpump startingair compressor
XA/048A - XA/048B
GSP FZ/331QF#33135 for XA/048A
GSP FZ/341QF#34112 for XA/048B
331
341 (ALREADY CLOSED)
X
X
Secondary Equipment:
Seawater cooling pump N2 - XE/045B GSP FZ/341QF#34110 341 (ALREADY CLOSED)
LT FW cooling pump N1 - XE/046A GSP FZ/331QF#33113 331 (ALREADY CLOSED)
LT FW cooling pump N2 -XE/046B GSP FZ/341QF#34111 341 (ALREADY CLOSED)
Combustion air fan GSP FZ/325QF
#32516 DG5
#32517 DG4
325
Emergency power available
for the following users:
Supply from EMG SWBD/
AS/001QFA (FWD MSBD ROOM)
Breaker number remarks
Starting air compressor XM/228AA
(N1)
FZ/QZ941000 FWD E.R.EMG power panel 94114 Compressor cannot be used
(change bearings)
Emergency cooling pump for starting
air compressor (XE/048E)
FZ/QZ941000 FWD E.R.EMG power panel 94110 Can be used
XE/144AE Booster pump N2 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q52 Booster pump cannot be used (pump
overhaul)
XE/144AB Feeder pump N2 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q53 Can be used
DG4 AC70/S800 CABINET AU604 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q19 – Q20 Can be used
DG5 AC70/S800 CABINET AU605 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q21 – Q22 Can be used
GTG S800 CABINET AU606 AS/001QFA FWD MSBD Q23 Can be used

E.v.W Page 97
18. Start starting air compressor N2.
Start DG (on the DG) once required starting air pressureis available to start the DG. (Minimum 12 bars, nominal
27bar) (DG should always bestarted fromengine room, minimum useof air).
19. Go to the FWD MSBD room.
20. Connect (Manually) the DG to the 11KV MSBD (Oncethe DG is stabilized, voltage / frequency)(Following
available procedure).
21. Close manually the primary transformer breaker 131 for FZ/003TFA fromthe11KV MSBD. **
22.Go to the EMG roomor send somebody (somebody should bepresent already).
23.Select the selector switch in cabinet 1G located in XA/873A from“FEEDBACK” to “AUTO” position.
24.Go to the FWD 690V SWBD (somebody should bepresent) in order to select breaker 301 to auto.
25.Breaker 301 should close automatically, if not close manually.
26. At this point the logic of 301/909 and 901 willopen breaker 901.
27.EMG will not stop automatically, this needs to be stopped manually (it is advisable not to stop the EMG).
28. Close all 690V SWBD user breakers.
29. Power has been restored to the FWD MSBD.
30. EMG SWBD is powered via the FWD MSBD.
31.Go to ECR.
32. Start next DG and connect this to the FWD MSBD (this should be possibleby means of auto
synchronization or manualsynchronization fromFWD MSBD /ECR).
33. At this point wehave enough power to start the propulsion.

E.v.W Page 98
Equipment needed / things we need to do before we can startthe propulsion:
Necessary equipment Supply from Breaker number # Supply Available Blocking of high-
speed breakers on
Cyclo conv.
Remarks
PS propulsion transformer
FZ/001TFA
FWD MSBD 121 YES Depends on the cable
routing (FIRE AFT E.R.)
PS propulsion transformer
FZ/001TFB
AFT MSBD 222 NO YES (AQ2) No users AFT MSBD are
available
SB propulsion transformer
FZ/001TFC
SB propulsion transformer
FZ/001TFD
AFT MSBD 224 NO YES (BQ2) No users AFT MSBD are
available
PS Excitation transformer
FZ/002TFA
AFT MSBD 406 NO Select excit. transformer
to FWD MSBD
PS Excitation transformer
FZ/002TFA
FWD MSBD 305 YES Select excit. transformer
to FWD MSBD
SB Excitation transformer
FZ/002TFB
AFT MSBD 408 NO Select excit. transformer
to FWD MSBD
SB Excitation transformer
FZ/002TFB
FWD MSBD 307 YES Select excit. transformer
to FWD MSBD
GSP FZ/424QF auxiliary
equipment for SB propulsion
AFT MSBD 424 NO GSP 424 can be fed from
GSP 313
GSP FZ/313QF auxiliary
equipment for PS propulsion
PS Steering pumps
Via FZ/001CTA
GSP FZ/313QF -
EMG SWBD
31310
913
YES (fed via 424)
YES
Depends on the cable
SB steering pumps
Via FZ/001CTB
GSP FZ/424QF -
EMG SWBD
42410
914
YES
YES

E.v.W Page 99
Equipment needed / things we need to do before we can startthe propulsion:
1. See above shown table.
2. Go to both Cyclo converter rooms.
3. Open the permission switches on the high-speed breakers as indicated in the table.
4. Supply GSP FZ/424QF (SB) fromGSP FZ/313QF (PS) (INTERLOCK VIA PADLOCK).
5. Padlock key located on breaker 42401 on GSP FZ/424QF.
6. Open breaker 42401 on GSP FZ/424QF (SBCyclo-converter room).
7. Remove padlock and close breaker 42402 on GSP FZ/424QF (SBCyclo-converter room).
8. Remove padlock and close breaker 31302 on GSP FZ/313QF (PS Cyclo-converter room).
9. Clear alarms on Cyclo-converter GOP screens.
10.Go to B-deck transformer room.
11. Select both excitation transformers supply to the FWD MSBD by means of switching the selector
switch on the transformer (1 excitation transformer is already selected to the FWD MSBD).
12.Go to the ECR.
13. Clear alarms on the ECR GOP screens.
14.The “PM READY START”light starts flashing (on GOP).
15. Start the propulsion.
16.Transfer propulsion controlto the bridge, once stable and running.
You will only have half a winding available on each Azipod.

E.v.W Page 100
17.The below shown bow thrusters areavailable if needed.
Bow thruster number Supply from breaker # Available
BT1 YA/764A 161 YES
BT2 YA/764B 262 NO
BT3 YA/764C 163 YES
At this point the ships manoeuverability has been restored (Depending on the routing of the cables!!!).
Suggested (needed) modifications / changes.
Items Suggested modification Nature of modification Revise plan approval Outside contractor
Starting air compressors Yes (low-cost) Normal and EMG supply X X (ships crew)
Cable runs yes Re-routing / reviewing of
vital supply cables from
switchboard.
X X
Electricians / engineers need to be trained for emergency scenarios becauseit could happen 1 day.
2nd
/3rd
electricians should all be BA trained, although they may not be assigned to a fire team.

E.v.W Page 101
IMPORTANT FACTS FOR SCENARIO“A”:
At this point the ships manoeuverability has been restored (Depending on the routing of the cables!!!).
But:
Both HFOtransfer pumpsare located in the AFT PS purifier room; these pumpswill not be available due to fire in
the AFT engine room.
Running DG’sin the FWD engine room have therefore a limited HFO supply in service and settling tanks.
Approximate 1 or 2 daysdepending on the engine configurationsand load.
System could be changed over to M.G.O. after the HFO FWD tanksare emptied, M.G.O. tanksare located fwd of
the fwd engine room on the OSDM
M.G.O. service tank hasa limited capacity of 37.4m3 (high level at 30m3), butthere is a way to combine the GTG
M.G.O. service tank by meansof communicating vessels which will increase the total amountof M.G.O.
availability as descripton page 23
Knowing thatone 16 cylinder DG is using 48m3 per day and thatone 12 cylinder DG is using 36m3 per day it is
safe to assumethat vessel will have the capability to sail with this configuration pending if the M.G.O transfer
pump located in the FWD STBD purifier room is available.
Note: One M.G.O. transfer pump is located in the AFTPS purifier room (Notavailable due to fire).
One M.G.O. transfer pump islocated in the FWD STBD purifier room (Should be available).

OSDM Ships Manoeuverability Availabilty Study

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