1. “Could you do that?”
Differences in artistic expertise and creative expertise
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2. “Could you do that?”
Differences in artistic expertise and creative expertise
“I could have done that,” is a common phrase tossed around in art galleries by lay-
people when encountering modern art. Over the past century there has been a shift away from
content driven art (e.g. landscapes, still life, and portraiture) towards art movements
exploring aesthetic elements (e.g. cubism, expressionism, and minimalism). Recently the
trend is towards individual artists developing unique styles and focusing on concepts over
content (Augustin & Leder, 2006). As art shifts towards concept and style the division
between experts and non-experts becomes wider. So the questions arises: How does one
become an expert in interpreting modern art?
Kahneman and Klein (2009) explain the process of acquiring expertise involves an
environment that is regular enough to be predictable combined with sufficient practice at
learning these regularities. As pieces of artwork belong to a particular art movement, which
are reliably located within a particular period of time the domain of art history does meet the
requirement of a regular environment. Though artists may develop different styles and can
produce very different bodies of work throughout their career, overall they maintain unique
and reliable markers that signal an individual style. Therefore it is a realistic assumption that
people can study these artworks, receive almost immediate feedback as to the accuracy of
their judgements and develop expertise in this field.
Researchers into artistic expertise have investigated the difference between experts and
non-experts in terms of categorising artworks. They found that non-experts were more likely
to use personal experiences, emotions, and content to group paintings while experts relied on
the elements of style (Augustin & Leder, 2006; Hekkert & Wieringen, 1996; Hershler &
Hochstein, 2009; Mulas, Troffa, & Caddeo, 2012). Arts experts may not be able to explain
exactly why one picture is dada and the other surrealism – they just know. In explaining
3. expertise Kahneman and Klein (2009) speak about intuition and the role it plays. In his book
‘Thinking, fast and slow’ Kahneman applies an anthropomorphic description to the mind,
describing two characters: System 1 and System 2. System 1 is automatic and effortless. It
does not require a conscious decision to be activated and is responsible for much of what we
call “intuition”. System 2 is more effortful. It is what we think of when we think of
“ourselves” and our subjective experiences. (Kahneman , 2011, p. 20). He explains the
development of expertise within this System framework. By repeated exposure of judgment
and feedback pairings, memories are formed. System 1 locates these memories automatically
upon seeing a stimulus (an artwork) and presents a response (a judgement of the artwork).
Kahneman also describes the bias of System 1 to substitute easier questions for harder ones
(Kahneman, 2011, pp. 97-99). In the case of judging art (especially modern art, where
content falls secondarily to style and concept) a non-expert can substitute the easier question
of ‘how does this make me feel?’ while an expert who has the background of many years
studying the differences between artists styles and techniques does not.
In terms of specific aesthetic judgements, Leder, Belke, Oeberest, and Augustin (2004)
proposed a five stage process of cognitive analysis which non-experts and experts engage
differentially. The first stage is Perceptual Analysis where people focus on what they can
perceive. This includes taking in aesthetic elements such as contrast, colour, and symmetry.
The second stage is Implicit Memory Integration which happens beneath consciousness and
involves scanning for associative memories. These first two stages are carried out by System
1 and any judgements made here can be affected by biases such as the mere-exposure effect
(we like things we are more familiar with) (Kahneman, 2011, p66) and cognitive ease (we
like things that are easier to process) (Kahneman, 2011, p60). Experts will have different
associative memories collected from years of feedback within art history and will be able to
recognise prototypical pieces that fall within a category. The third stage is the deliberate
4. System 2 process of Explicit Classification which is affected by the differential categorisation
techniques used be experts compared to non-experts. The final stages are Cognitive
Mastering and Evaluation. These two function within a feedback loop, as fully evaluating the
artwork requires a deeper understanding which in turn affects evaluation. It is at these stages
that non-experts use substitution to replace the complex questions involved in deeper
interpretation with easier questions based on personal experience. In terms of modern art this
difference is very important, as it requires conceptual interpretation, not just affective
interpretation, which only experts engage in.
In order to explain the differences between experts and non-experts there have been
several fMRI studies showing art experts have different activation in neural structures
compared to non-experts during art judgement tasks. These structures are primarily related to
perception and memory (Kirk, Skov, Christensen, & Nygaard, 2009; Panga, Nadalb, Müller-
Paulc, Rosenbergd, & Kleine, 2013). Kirk et al., (2009) compared architecture experts to
non-experts revealing that experts had greater activation in particular areas of the brain
(subcallosal cingulate gyrus and medial orbito-frontal cortex (OFC)) when making
judgements of buildings. Previous research suggests that the OFC is engaged when decision
making based on stimulus reward is required – i.e. when making aesthetic judgements about
something that gives you pleasure (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000, as cited in Kirk et
al., 2009).
Other research into expert versus non-expert categorisation of artworks have confirmed
that there is a difference between experts and non-experts in this domain (Augustin & Leder,
2006; Hekkert & Wieringen, 1996; Hershler & Hochstein, 2009; Mulas et al., 2012). Yet this
is looking at art from one side; from the side of the viewer. It is a specific type of expertise
that can be taught. Most of the research into art-expertise has been carried out on art
academics who have studied the facts about art movements and artists. Within the same
5. realm, there is a completely different type of expertise; that of the visual artist themselves.
This comes back to the common overheard statement of ‘I could do that’. Could you? Is
visual art technique considered expertise? Is the artist who can paint photo-realistically more
of an expert than the artist who executes a complex idea in a simple visual form? These
questions are more difficult to answer within the framework of existing expertise research.
If expertise is a product of a stable predictable environment and sufficient opportunities
to practice it should follow that to become an expert in a creative field you would simply
need to practice being creative while receiving reliable feedback. However, creative pursuits
aren’t nearly this simple. Simonton (2000) analysed creative expertise and described how
while it is acceptable for an athlete to hone a performance again and again, for an artist to
produce the same work multiple times would not result in favourable feedback.
Does this mean that you cannot be a creative expert? Or is creative expertise somehow
different to other kinds of expertise? His research into opera composers addresses how much
experience leads to expertise, whether this experience needs to be domain specific, and what
the developmental progression to creative expertise entails (Simonton, 2000). Simonton
found that previous musical experience did account for the level of artistic expertise
composers possessed. However it didn’t appear to make a difference how prolific a composer
was. This suggests it is not the number of operas written, but the amount of time put into
creative musical endeavour (practicing music, listening to music, thinking about music etc)
that leads to expertise. He suggests that experience does not need to be domain specific and
that by tackling different disciplines the artist broadens their scope of thinking and problem
solving. From Kahneman’s System perspective, this is likened to seeing alternative outcomes
and thus avoiding the common bias of ‘what you see is all there is’ (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 85-
88). Simonton suggests the progression of creative expertise is an inverted U shape where
creativity declines at a certain point. It appears that creativity increases if a composer has
6. been working for a number of years, but a greater number of operas composed can have a
negative impact. This is opposite to what we find in other areas of expertise where expertise
is cumulative. Simonton suggests it is the number of years the artists has had to think about
past successes and failures, and not the actual number of successes that is important. This
could be an outcome of the long time required to ponder an idea creatively before acting upon
it. Another explanation is that the artist has had the opportunity to gather more feedback from
the last artistic endeavour. Further research into the inverted U progression of creativity is
needed.
Simonton’s findings suggest that there is the ability to become a creative expert; at least
in the realm of opera composers. However other researchers have not found significant
differences between experts and non-experts in artistic expertise. For example Lazreg and
Mullet (2006) explored what rules people used to judge the aesthetic pleasantness of colour
and form combinations and what differences arise between experts and non-experts. They
used the Functional Theory of Cognition (Anderson, 1981, as cited in Lazreg & Mullet,
2006) which involves two processes: valuation and integration. During valuation perceptions
of the stimulus are transformed into a psychological representation. This process is impacted
by the goal of the participant. If the goal is to take pleasure in the aesthetic form then the
information will be transformed into a “subjective representation” of that pleasure. In terms
of System theory this is akin to intensity matching where System 1 will automatically replace
one scale with another (Kahneman, 2011, p. 94). The second process is integration, where the
participant uses the information from valuation to generate a response. So a participant will
perceive a colour and react based on their subjective interpretation.
Lazreg and Mullet were expecting experts to make more complex judgements about
form and colour than non-experts who would make simple additive judgements involving one
element (either form or colour). However, they found little differences between experts and
7. novices. Both made equally complex judgements and, when prompted, were unable to
articulate how they made these judgements, suggesting intuition in the task. Other studies
have found that humans generally have levels of expertise simply from repeated experience
in our daily lives (McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007). Experiencing colour and form
may be a global human type of expertise and not one restricted to those who have artistic
training.
Another study into artistic ability explored expertise in relation to photo-cropping as
this task involves a complex understanding of composition (McManus et al., 2011). The
study compared the cropping abilities of experts and non-experts and found differences in the
way the two groups approached the task. Experts took longer to crop the images and were
more likely to keep the cropping window still while non-experts moved it around searching
for the best composition. Experts also spoke more while doing the task and were more likely
to refer to the formal rules of composition while non-experts commented on the content of
the photograph. There was also a noticeable difference in the outcomes of the cropped
images, with experts choosing more dynamic compositions. However, these differences had
no effect on the aesthetic ratings of the photographs. So while this study reveals a difference
between the way experts and non-experts engage in photo-cropping it does not suggest they
gained any advantage from a creative perspective.
The area of research into creative expertise is still small, and currently has contrasting
results. It is clear there is a difference in the way experts and non-experts make judgements
about art. This has arisen in both behavioural and neurological studies. What isn’t clear is
whether it is possible to develop expertise in creativity. The subjective and fluctuating nature
of creativity makes it a difficult environment to predict and therefore may not be suitable for
developing expertise. An artist may have technique and artistic skill in order to become an
expert, in photo-cropping for example. Yet being an expert in these skills does not appear to
8. predict how creatively a piece will be interpreted. Returning to our indignant gallery-goer,
scoffing at the piece of modern art. Could they have done that? Probably not. The artist who
created it has spent years learning the skills to put it together. But a new question arises, is
this artwork the result of creative expertise? The current research does not have an answer yet
and further investigation is encouraged.
9. References
Augustin, M. D., & Leder, H. (2006). Art expertise: A study of concepts and conceptual
spaces. Psychology Science, 48(2), 135-156.
Hekkert, P., & Wieringen, P. C. W. v. (1996). The impact of level of expertise on the
evaluation of original and altered versions of post-impressionistic paintings. Acta
Psychologica, 94(2), 117-131. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(95)00055-0
Hershler, O., & Hochstein, S. (2009). The importance of being expert: Top-down attentional
control in visual search with photographs. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics,
71(7), 1478-1486. doi: 10.3758/APP.71.7.1478
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree.
American Psychologist, 64(6), 515-526. doi: 10.1037/a0016755
Kirk, U., Skov, M., Christensen, M. S., & Nygaard, N. (2009). Brain correlates of aesthetic
expertise: A parametric fMRI study. Brain and Cognition, 69(2), 306-315. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2008.08.004
Lazreg, C. K., & Mullet, É. (2001). Judging the Pleasantness of Form-Color Combinations.
The American Journal of Psychology, 114(4), 511-533. doi: 10.2307/1423608
Leder, H., Belke, B., Oeberst, A., & Augustin, D. (2004). A model of aesthetic appreciation
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10.1348/0007126042369811
McKone, E., Kanwisher, N., & Duchaine, B. C. (2007). Can generic expertise explain special
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10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.002
McManus, C., Zhouô, F. A., l'Anson, S., Waterfield, L., Stover, K., & Cook, R. (2011). The
psychometrics of photographic cropping: The influence of colour, meaning, and
expertise. Perception, 40(3), 332-357. doi: 10.1068/p6700
Mulas, V., Troffa, R., & Caddeo, P. (2012). Differences between Experts and Non-experts in
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10.1007/s10339-012-0456-x
Panga, C. Y., Nadalb, M., Müller-Paulc, J. S., Rosenbergd, R., & Kleine, C. (2013).
Electrophysiological correlates of looking at paintings and its associationwith art
