1. Men and Machines: The Survivability Balance
Mike Edwards MSc BSc RCNC David Carr BSc MErgS
Ministry of Defence, Ships Support Agency, BAeSEMA,
ME225, Room 34, Block K, 1 Atlantic Quay, Bromielaw,
Foxhill, Bath BA1 5AB. Glasgow, G2 8JE
david.carr@baesema.co.uk
Abstract
The workload required for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence, Fire Fighting, and Damage
Control is a major driver on warship complements. There is considerable interest in means of reducing
manpower requirements while retaining the necessary levels of effectiveness. There are a trade-offs in
both cost and effectiveness of personnel versus automation. Traditionally the issues of warship design
and personnel have been considered separately. There is a need for methodologies which at the whole
“man-machine system” under a single umbrella. and hence support objective, open decisions about the
impact and cost-effectiveness of design options. Since personnel requirements must be known early, this
discussions supported by the methodology must commence in the earliest phases.
This paper describes a study to develop such a methodology. The technique of task analysis is used to
model design options. All platforms share similar damage control goals. Task Analysis models how
human and technical resources can be combined to meet these. The methodology provides a picture of
resource usage over time and allows designers to focus on the high workload activities which would most
benefit from design attention.
In the course of the study, the methodology was validated by comparing its predictions to what is known
about damage control manning on a current platform. Subsequent use to assess a putative future warship
design proved straightforward. The methodology clearly has great potential to contribute to the debate on
how to achieve a cost effective balance between personnel and technology.
Introduction
This paper reports work commissioned by the Ships Support Agency and carried out by BAeSEMA Ltd
to develop an objective methodology, capable of being applied to new designs during the
concept/feasibility phase, by which the balance between personnel and technology for Nuclear, Biological
and Chemical Defence, Fire Fighting, and Damage Control may be optimised.
The Problem
The complement of a warship is a significant factor in determining both the Unit Production Costs, in
providing accommodation space and hotel services, and the Through Life Costs of owning and manning
the vessel. Pressures on warship designers to reduce Life Cycle Costs inevitably lead them to seek
opportunities to reduce complement requirements.
Historically, the regular, normal activities of a warship, such as ship control and safety, machinery and
weapons control, rounds, patrols and maintenance have been the dominant factor in complementing to the
extent that there was an adequate pool of manpower available to deal with the unscheduled, emergency
tasks such as damage control and fire fighting. However, the increasing use of automation and remote
operation in more recent designs together with reducing maintenance requirements has resulted in leaner
manning with the attendant risk that some emergency situations will stretch personnel beyond their
capacity to maintain control of the incident.
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2. Emerging Damage Control Technologies
The natural reaction to this overstretch has been to propose an expansion of automation and remote
operation into the emergency tasks. Various technologies, both passive and active, are either emerging
or are currently available which have the potential to reduce some of the emergency workload.
Measures such as fixed, automatic firefighting systems, improvements to damage control
communications, information exchange and decision support, self re-configuring systems, flood
control systems and fixed boundary cooling all undoubtedly have benefits.
There are a trade-offs in both cost and effectiveness of personnel versus automation. Robert Bost, of
NavSea, has proposed the model shown in Figure 1 and suggests that the balance is possibly sub-optimal
at present - i.e. technology is under-exploited. This under-exploitation places increased workload
demands on the crew and indicates that automation could reduce manpower requirements. However,
there is an exponential growth in investment required as the effectiveness and reliability of systems
increases to meet the demands of this safety-critical function. Conversely, lower spending on automation
requires increased manning, with consequent increases in platform Unit Production Costs and Through
Life Costs. Leaving aside the desirability of reducing the numbers of personnel placed in harm’s way, it
is clearly desirable to seek the appropriate levels of technology which will bring about a net reduction in
expenditure on personnel, platform and systems. The question is, within the aim of minimising Life
Cycle Costs, which of the available options or combinations of options will yield the most effective
solution without compromising survivability.
The Need for a Methodology
Traditionally, the impact of design on complement, whilst accepted as an important issue, has not been
a major focus for designers. The disciplines of design and complement prediction have not been well
integrated. There are few tools and techniques to support the complement implications of design
options.
It is clearly necessary to be able to evaluate the impact of design options on damage control
effectiveness and manpower requirements. Principally, ways are needed to assess the impact of design
options on manning, in order to inform reasoned decisions about the trade-off between costs of
automation and cost savings delivered through manning reduction. However, design options, particularly
those which are aimed at reducing staff numbers or require changes to current procedures, must be
justified against whether they are able to deliver effective capability. Ways are needed of assessing the
implications of design on damage control performance. Where acceptable levels are not provided, then
risks must be highlighted and quantified. Methods are required which allow assessments to be made at
the earliest stages of design, the better to inform the decision of whether to proceed down a particular
route.
Complements have previously only been validated at relatively late stages of design, since it is only then
that hard data on equipment, performance and workload are available. At earlier stages, methods for
2
Current
Manning?
Manning
Automation
Optimal
Manning
Costtomeetmission
Number of CrewSmall Crew
Responsive
Large Crew
Flexible
Figure 1: Trade-off between manning and
technology costs to meet mission objectives

3. determining manning requirements have tended to be largely subjective. With such methods it can be
difficult to argue the case for a particular design option.
To overcome this limitation, a methodology is needed which supports objective, open decisions about the
impact and cost-effectiveness of design options. Since the methodology is to be applied at early stages of
design, it must inevitably rely heavily on engineering judgement. However, if reasoned, objective
arguments are to be made, then such judgements must be exposed to scrutiny. Therefore the
methodology must support an objective, systematic process of determining whether proposed design
options are likely to contribute towards optimising levels of expenditure between personnel and
equipment while maintaining appropriate levels of effectiveness.
The purpose of the study reported here was to provide such a tool: a methodology which will contribute
to debate on how alternative design options contribute to achieving an optimum balance of expenditure
between personnel and automation.
Methodology Requirements: Making the trade-off
Many factors influence the effectiveness of damage control. There must be enough, properly trained
manpower. They must have the necessary equipment. These human and technical resources must be
properly deployed, with effort concentrated on priorities. Those wishing to optimise effectiveness must
consider personnel, technology, practice and procedures - and even the very ‘philosophy’ for damage
control.
There are many interested parties. The engineers who design ships, systems and equipment, the
personnel organisation which provides each ship with its crew, the experts who look for the best
procedures for tackling fires, the policy makers who determine whether they can afford for a warship to
be incapacitated after a single missile hit - these all have a say. But they tend to work in different
departments, they come from different backgrounds and look at problems in different ways.
Engineers, for example, are not usually used to considering the implications their designs will have on the
overall workload of the ship’s crew. At best, they may be confident that their new design of pump will be
operable by one man instead of two. But they may lack the big picture. Is pump manning important?
Does a one-man pump mean that a man is freed up for some other essential activity? Or are there plenty
of people standing idle? As such, engineers can find it difficult to give cost justifications of their designs
based on overall increases in effectiveness or reductions in crew size.
The warships themselves have a different picture. They are concerned with organising the available
manpower to achieve the objectives of damage control. Some things they can do in slow time, and
resources are not a problem. But in the thick of battle they will inevitably be stretched. They are
interested in any design measure which will reduce the risk of overload. Their difficulty is pinpointing
the areas where affordable measures can be taken which will give them genuine benefits. For example,
casualty handling is manpower intensive, but is unlikely helped much by automation. So can manpower
be freed up elsewhere? Say by reducing the numbers needed for boundary cooling? Or do they simply
need more men?
The personnel planners have yet a third picture. They are concerned with “designing” the complement so
that viable branch and career structures are maintained. This may impose overriding constraints, in
which case technology must be optimised to support the available crew. However, it is important to
know whether these constraints are driving up equipment costs. It is recognised that the worlds of
manning and design are not well integrated at present. The Royal Navy’s warship complementing
process requires manpower budgets to be set very early in the design of a new class. Training and
recruitment are long lead items - and in any case accommodation requirements must be known early in
design. There are thus few opportunities to discuss how best to balance expenditure on men and
machines. Because discussions have to take place early, starting from Concept phases, complementers
are forced to make assumptions about the impact of technology. To date, it has been difficult to test
these assumptions, which are not necessarily clear to design teams or open to debate.
There is a clear need for approaches to the problem which allow all parties to engage in constructive
debate. A methodology is needed which can look at the whole “man-machine system” under a single
umbrella. Such a methodology would have to:
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4. • allow objective assessment and discussion of the impact of design options on the Damage Control
complement.
• provide a focus on the risks associated with a non-optimal balance between personnel and technology.
• be applicable to current and future vessels, and in particular allow comparisons of new designs from
concept/ feasibility design.
• have the sensitivity to assess different future options, with rapid turnaround.
Developing a methodology
BAeSEMA developed a methodology to address these needs. Trial use has shown it to provide a
useful tool for focusing on the manpower implications of options for damage control.
The need was recognised to achieve the essence of simplicity. The intention was to provide a
methodology which would facilitate discussion between a range of disciplines. It would have to be
easy to apply and give clear, meaningful results. Ideally, it’s use would require the minimum of
specialist expertise.
The methodology would also have to be demonstrably objective. It would have to provide a
systematic means of collecting all the necessary information and yield quantitative assessments which
could be validated against real-world data. And yet, at the same time, it was recognised that at early
stages, design data may well amount to assumptions, based on ‘engineering judgement’ The
methodology would have to work with these data and expose them to objective scrutiny.
As a practical vehicle for development, an assessment was made of damage control arrangements on
an existing warship. The methodology was used to generate a picture of personnel requirements over
the course of typical damage scenarios. Confidence was gained in the methodology by demonstrating
that it gave results which tallied well with real world experience.
Following this study, the methodology was used to assess a small range of ‘concept level’ options for
a putative future warship. This demonstrated that the methodology can be applied straightforwardly
and with quick turnaround. It has sufficient sensitivity and flexibility to show the impact of changes
to platform design, equipment fit design and operating philosophy.
Task Analysis: The Core of the Methodology.
The methodology is based on the technique of Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA). Originating from
the field of Human Factors, HTA provides a straightforward and flexible way of providing
descriptions of systems which include both their human and technical components.
The starting point for HTA is to identify the goals to be achieved by the system, and to build up a
picture of the tasks carried out to achieve them. Tasks are activities carried out either by humans,
fully automatically, or by humans using equipment. Tasks can be broken down into sub-tasks, on if
necessary to the fine detail of individual actions or components.
All warships share similar Damage Control goals , and at higher levels of description, it can be said
that their crews carry out the same generic tasks (e.g. fire control, flood control, NBC control.) The
differences are due to the different human and technical resources that are applied to these tasks. For
a given design, it is possible to identify the “building blocks” of tasks which are required to meet a
goal. Figure 1 illustrates this with three design options.
4

5. Option A describes how a fire is attacked
with conventional equipment. One member
of the attack party provides a waterwall
from one hose, while another attacks the fire
by spraying through with another hose.
Option B shows a putative design which
combines waterwall and attack spray in a
single nozzle. The tasks of providing the
waterwall and attacking the seat of fire are
achievable by a single firefighter. However,
operational considerations may dictate that
the “spare” firefighter should still be used in
a backup role. In both of these options, fire
detection, first aid firefighting and main
attack are separate tasks, supported by
separate resources (e.g. Fire sensors
monitored from Damage Control HQ;
Extinguishers used by whoever first
discovers the fire; Hoses used by the main
attack party). Option 3, assumes a 100% reliable fire detection and automatic spray system. The tasks
of detection and extinguishing are combined. Since the system always works first time, there is no
distinction between first aid and main attack. There is only one building block, since the goal is achieved
by a single resource. However, if the system were less reliable, there would be strong operational
arguments for providing a manual backup. Appropriate building blocks could be added, as in Options A
and B.
Given this sort of description, it is possible to make judgements about the amount of human resources
needed for each task. Some design options may reduce demand. For example, one might judge that
thermal images reduce the time and workload demanded by compartment searches, without entirely
removing it.
To gain an overall picture, demands
can be collated for each task or goal
and across the warship as a whole.
Clearly, though, demands and therefore
resource requirements depend on the
damage situation and vary over the
course of an incident. It is necessary to
add a time element. The methodology
is used to describe the progress of an
incident scenario. Indications can be
given of which tasks will be done at
each stage of the scenario. By
collating across tasks, a profile of
resource demands can be built up. The
peak indicates the total manpower
required to deal with the incident.
Suitable scenarios may be chosen as
“design cases:” the type of damage
incident that the warship and its crew will be expected to cope with.
The methodology described can be used as a paper-and-pen exercise. In the course of the study,
however, BAeSEMA found it convenient to use an Access database to capture and collate data. This
proved a highly effective means of handling the large amount of information gathered. It provided the
facility to “query” the data in a variety of ways, to focus on different questions.
5
Waterw all
Attack
spray
Detect Extinguish
First Aid
Attack
Party
etc.
etc.
Firefighting
?
etc.
Hose Reserve
Firefighting
Automatic
detect and
spray
O p tio n A :
S e p ara te n o zzle s
O p tio n B :
C o m b in e d n o zzle
O p tio n C :
A u to m atio n
Figure 2: Task analysis is constructed from "building
blocks" representing different options
Resource Requirements (4)
Activities


 




 




 


Phase/Time/State/Condition
Resource Requirements (1)
Resource Requirements(2)
Resource Requirements (3)
Select Greatest ‘Need’
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4


 


Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Scenario A
Stage 1 Stage 2
Stage 4
Stage 3
Stage 5
Scenario B
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Phase
Men
Resource Profile
Figure 3: Resource demands depend on the scenario and vary
over time: Peak demand for the “design case” determines the
overall requirement.

6. Effectiveness and workload: What questions can be answered?
A virtue of the methodology and its supporting database tool is in its flexibility to look at a range of
issues. On the one hand, it is not pretended that the methodology will deliver all the answers on how to
optimise personnel and technology. It does, on the other hand, aid discussion of whether one’s answers
are right or wrong. Users of the methodology can choose to apply it in different ways. The type,
quantity and precision of data collected is up to the user. The power of the methodology is that it
provides a systematic link between information or assumptions about a design and the damage control
goals for which that design has to provide effective support.
The methodology supports objective discussions from a number of viewpoints:
(Before a design has been proposed) “Where is design effort needed?……”
“What are the high workload tasks?”
Design measures aimed at reducing the workload imposed by these have the greatest potential for
reducing manpower requirements.
“Which activities over-stretch the crew?”
Personnel limitations may present a risk to Damage Control effectiveness. High-workload, critical tasks
for which there are insufficient personnel can be identified. These indicate a suitable focus for design.
(If a design option is proposed) “How does the design option affect Damage Control operations?
…..”
“How will a design option affect workload?”
Designers can home in on the activities for which a system or equipment will potentially decrease (or
increase) workload.
“Will complement size be affected?”
Reducing workload for one particular activity will not necessarily lead to a reduction in complement.
The person responsible for the activity may be needed for other duties. All the demands on each member
of the Damage Control complement to be collated to indicate the overall manpower requirement.
“How do options compare?….”
Comparisons can be made between two design proposals, or between a future and current platform.
What are the risks to Damage Control effectiveness posed by a design option?.
Damage Control effectiveness will be at risk if there are insufficient personnel or technical resources to
meet the demands of a critical activity, e.g.:
• Personnel numbers are reduced, but no additional automation is provided.
• Personnel numbers have been determined for a particular design solution, but this has been changed.
(e.g. fixed firefighting systems were assumed but are no longer in the design).
The methodology identifies which tasks are supported by which resources (e.g. “If we replace
equipment X with Y, then which tasks are affected?”).
What design features can be assessed
The methodology is not limited assessing the impact of automation on Damage Control personnel. It
can also be used to assess the impact of factors, such as:
• Other aspects of technical design, e.g:
• Non-automatic systems design (e.g. types of mobile equipment)
• Platform (e.g. size and type of platform; zoning policy; vulnerability; personnel distribution;
integrity of subdivisions; etc.)
6

7. • Manpower limitations (e.g. the impact of fewer personnel being available in reserve).
• Changes to manpower organisation (e.g. re-organisation of firefighting teams).
• Changes to procedures (e.g. if it were to be proposed that fire sensors did not require verbal
confirmation).
• Changes to “philosophy” (e.g. if it were to be proposed to abandon ship rather than repair damage).
Some Warship Damage Incidents
In the course of developing the methodology, an assessment was made of damage control arrangements
on an existing warship. To test out the approach, assessment initially focused on a relatively simple
scenario: Fire in harbour. Although simple, this scenario is of interest because of the special constraints
it imposes on the damage control organisation. While alongside, a warship is likely to be manned by a
skeleton crew, without specialist damage control experience. In such situations, the assumption is that
support will be required at some stage from the Local Fire Authority (LFA).
The methodology requires indications to be given of which tasks are carried out at particular times in a
scenario. A simple “script” was written (Figure 4) representing the progress of a typical harbour fire
incident. The incident contains all the major ingredients that are usually considered as comprising a fire
incident. The small embellishment of a free surface flood has been added to give an extra sense of
realism. The results obtained after compiling the database and running the script are displayed in Figure
5
The general shape of the curve is as might be expected. The work load increases until the fearnought suit
men enter the scene of the fire. The effort then tails off as they are beaten back, only to increase again
with the re-entry and the discovery of free surface water. After reaching another peak the effort tails off
as the Local Fire Authority assumes responsibility for tackling the fire.
Confidence in the modelling technique can established by noting that the two peaks when lopped equate
with the manpower estimates shown in BR4007 - the “bible” for RN damage control manning levels - for
the normal and reduced manpower estimates for the standing fire and emergency party in harbour.
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1. routine watchkeeping - ‘calm before the storm’
2. fire detected
3. immediate response by Duty Party
4. fearnought suits arrive at scene of fire
5. fearnought suits beaten back
6. fearnought suits effect a re-entry
7. free surface water adjacent to the scene of the fire
8. local fire authority arrive to deal with the fire
Figure 4: A harbour fire scenario
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Phase
Men
Activity
BR4007
Reduced
Figure 5: Harbour Fire. As the incident
progresses, manpower demands outstrip
supply.

8. To examine a more
complicated Damage
Control incident, a script
was written which
involved a number of
different groups
responding to different or
similar incidents, either
simultaneously or
consecutively. The
script employed for the
two incident scenario is shown at Figure 6. It is based on a major machinery space fire (aft) and a flood
forward. Again, additional realism is provided by the inclusion of the requirement to remove free surface
water adjacent to the fire. The incident was designed to over-stretch the crew. It is typical of those used
in the FOST “Thursday war”.
The resource profile for this scenario is shown in Figure 7. The activity levels are seen to peak shortly
after the second ‘hit’ and this is to be expected. The group known as ‘others’ includes contributions by
the Mobile Repair Party and the small WE team advising the Command in the OPS Room and liaising
with respect to weapon hazards.
The examples ‘worked’ here are based on engineering judgement and are not authoritative. However, the
initial study did provide a degree of confidence, to the extent that results appear believable in the light of
experience. It was therefore concluded that the methodology could be applied to the assessment of future
design options.
Assessing a future design
Having employed the methodology with success to simulate a known arrangement, it was time to apply it
to a real design situation and to examine its potential as a tool for enabling designers to explore and
experiment with the NBCD options, and then subsequently allowing them to integrate their selections into
the final design solution.
An assessment was made of a putative future warship design. Obviously a great deal of effort would be
required to define a detailed design. But in this case, the interest lay in assessing the value of the
methodology to assess concept-level designs, where great reliance is placed on engineering judgement.
8
ID Task Name
1 Defence Watches
2 Control and Surveillance
3 Patrols
4 Ship Receives Hit No.1
5 Boundary Search
6 Fire Reported in AMS
7 Fire Containment
8 Fearnought F/F to AMS
9 ASB F/F Team & Support
10 Ship Hit Second Time
11 Flood Alarm
12 Flood Containment & Leak Stop
13 FSB Pumping Party
14 Restore Power Supplies Aft
15 ASB Cable Party
16 Restore Lighting Aft
17 ASB Emergency Lighting Party
18 AMS Fearnought Beaten Back
19 Free Surface Above AMS
20 Portable Eductor & Drain Down
21 Operate F/F 1
22 Monitor AMS
23 Operate F/F 2
24 Monitor AMS
25 Shoring commences
26 FSB Shoring Party
27 Re-Enter AMS
28 ASB F/F & Support Re-Enter
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
07
Figure 6: A typical two 'major incident' scenario,
designed to overstretch resources
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Phase
Men
Total ASB
Total FSB
Total Others
Total HQ1
Figure 7: In the two incident scenario, manpower
is stretched by the activity necessary to contain a
main machinery space fire.

9. The problem with future designs is that may factors are open to change at the same time. For instance, a
complement cap may be imposed, in which case creative design solutions must be found to maintain
Damage Control effectiveness with the available manpower. On the other hand, new technological
solutions may enable changes in Damage Control procedure, organisation and philosophy. For the
purposes of this study, a concept design was produced which encapsulates developments in all of these
areas. While it was not intended that the design should be taken as a recommendation, the options were
considered realistic in that they represent feasible options which might currently be under consideration.
The design comprised the following features:
• Integrated Full Electric Propulsion A DC electrical ring main supplying power to Zonal Power
Supply Units (ZPSU’s). A generator or battery is located in each zone in order to ensure that the
zone can remain self sufficient.
• A policy for zonal segmentation. The warship will consists of three segmented NBCD zones, each
capable of sustaining full NBC protection for those members of the ships company contained
within. The intention is to ensure that an undamaged zone will remain fully operational even if one
or more adjacent zones receive damage. The warship may be likened to being ‘ three ships in one’
linked together in line astern. Each segmented zone will be separated from the adjacent zone by a
coffer dam bulkhead and be independent in terms of all the normal services including ventilation,
main service, chilled water etc.
• Each segmented zone contains an identical NBCD Control (and Surveillance) Node, linked by a
super-redundant data highway and capable of acting independently or assuming the central role of
HQ1. Each node is capable of transmitting and receiving incident data, and this on the basis that it
need only be ‘entered’ once. In addition to providing displays of the NBCD picture, there are sufficient
controls to allow remote operation of doors, hatches, ventilation, flaps, pumps, eductors and other
fixed installations, including isolation of electrical supplies.
• Compartment write-off. The zoning policy allows a departure from current practice it will be
assumed that a compartment that has been damaged is irrecoverable within the time frame of the
enemy action. Equipments, fittings, cables and pipes are assumed to be fractured and inoperable.
The policy will be to isolate the compartment and contain the incident in order to prevent it from
spreading. The adjacent compartments, which are referred to as the Intermediate Zone, may have
some damage and must rely upon some human intervention to make good. Activity in this zone will
be the major task of the NBCD teams. In the undamaged areas it will be assumed that equipment
continues to function normally and that the opening and shutting of valves and flaps, and the
starting and stopping of equipment will be conducted from the remote NBCD Control Node.
• By way of exception to the above, it is assumed that a single dedicated team specialising in fire
fighting and Damage Control is maintained to provide the command with the option of getting to the
9
POLICY OF SHIP SEGMENTATION FOR NBCD
- NBCD CONTROL NODE
- SHIP SEGMENTATION BOUNDARY
Figure 8: Any of the NBCD Control
Nodes can act as HQ1
Damage Zone
Intermediate Zone
Undamaged Zone
Figure 9: Zoning policy allows manual
intervention restricted to the Intermediate
Zone

10. seat of a fire and extinguishing it in the shortest possible time. It is not thought likely that the Royal
Navy would ever wish to relinquish this possibility.
The results again show the level of activity increasing to peak shortly after the second ‘hit’. In the first
example, The availability of the specialist party tempts the MEO into deploying it, which he does with
gusto. In fact, manpower is almost the same as that required for the current warship. This emphasises
the point that the NBCD complement is not sized to operate things that ‘work’ but to recover the
situation when they don’t. In the second example, the MEO does not deploy his specialist parties in the
damage zone and he restricts himself to containing the incident by only considering manual intervention
in the intermediate zone. As might be expected, the manpower requirements drop markedly, thus
demonstrating a potential benefit that could be obtained by following a rigorous adoption of the zoning
policy. Already, it is apparent that the policy for restricting activities to the intermediate zone is in
conflict with the ‘fall back’ option of maintaining a large specialist party.
Some Conclusions
We feel that the methodology described hear offers great potential benefits to the debate on what is the
optimum balance of spending between personnel and technology. It has proved straightforward to use, its
results are easy to interpret and it is capable of assessing even the earliest, concept level designs. In the
course of the study, some initial progress was made in developing database tools to facilitate handling of
the large amounts of data and obtaining the various perspectives required for the debate. We consider
that it has the potential to develop into a “packaged” technique, to be applied by non-specialist users.
Admittedly, the methodology is in its infancy. While it has been partially validated through assessment
of a current warship, it is not pretended that the data collected were authoritative. It would certainly be
worthwhile conducting further studies of existing platforms. Besides giving greater confidence in the
validity of outputs, this would serve two purposes. Firstly, it would provide confirmation that a complete
range of ‘generic’ damage control goals has been captured. Secondly, it would provide a body of
reference data on current resource requirements. Future designs are likely to have many features in
common with current arrangements. Current task information will provide some of the “building blocks:
for future analyses. Where tasks differ, current tasks will provide a point of comparison.
10
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Phase
Men
Total ND3
Total ND1
Total Others
Total ND2
Figure 10: The MEO needs the points. A firefighting
team is deployed at the seat of fire.
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Phase
Men
Total ND3
Total ND1
Total Others
Total ND2
Figure 11: The MEO's got the points. Zoning
policy allows the compartment to be written off

11. The aim of this methodology was to assess how design options might benefit the personnel responsible
for Damage Control. The cost of any design must be justified against these benefits. We believe that the
methodology helps to provide a missing link between the nature of technology and its impact on
personnel. It will give warship designers a necessary focus on the extent to which their designs will
benefit the crew.
11