Blast Resistant Door Design and Mitigation

DESIGN AND MITIGATION OF BLAST RESISTANT
DOORS
A PROJECT REPORT
Submitted by
AVHISHEK SINGH [Reg No-11UEME0034]
In partial fulfilment for the award of the degree
Of
BACHELOR OF TECHNOLOGY
IN
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
VEL TECH DR.RR & DR.SR TECHNICAL
UNIVERSITY: CHENNAI 600062
APRIL 2015

Defence Research & Development Organization
Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India
BONAFIDE CERTIFICATE
Certified that this project report “DESIGN AND MITIGATION OF
RESISTANT DOORS” is the bonafide work of “AVHISHEK SINGH
(11UEME0034)”, who carried out the project work under my supervision
SIGNATURE SIGNATURE
Mr. Herbans Lal Mr. Ashok Kumar
Scientist ‘G’ Group Head Scientist ‘D’ (CFEES) DRDO
New Delhi New Delhi

AKNOWLEDGEMENT
The internship opportunity I had with Defence research and Development
Organization (DRDO), was a great chance for learning and professional
development. Therefore I consider myself as a very lucky individual to be
considered a part of it.
I’m pleased to bring out our project “Deaign & Mitigation of Blast Resistant
Doors” for the field of Engineering and Technology.
I would take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to Mr. Ashok
Kumar (Scientist D) who in spite of being extraordinarily busy with his duties,
took time to hear, guide and keep me on the correct path and allowing me to
carry out my project work on this esteemed organization.
I’m extremely grateful to honorable Dr. Chitra Rajagopal, Director of
CFEES for immediate approval, constant encouragement and for giving me the
opportunity to do internship in this esteemed orginisation.
My Special thanks to Mr. Rajender Singh for Constant encouragement and
moral support. I chose this moment to acknowledge his contribution gratefully.
I sincerely express my deepest thanks to Mr. Harbans Lal (Group Head) for
taking useful decision and giving me necessary advices. I would further like to
express my gratitude for his carefull and precious guidance which was
extremely helpful for my studies.
My sincere thanks to Mr. Jayavelu. S, M.E., Head of Department, School of
Mechanical, Vel Tech Dr. RR & Dr. SR Technical University, Chennai, for his
involvement to make this project successful.
I express my deepest thanks to Mr. Awahedesh Kumar for taking useful
decisions & giving me necessary advices and guidance. I choose this moment to
acknowledge his contribution gratefully.

I perceive this opportunity as a big milestone with regard to my career
development. I will strive to use the gained knowledge in the best possible way
and I will continue to work on their improvement in order to attain desired
career objectives.
Any omission in this brief acknowledgment does not mean lack of gratitude.
Avhishek Singh
Vel Tech DR.RR & DR.SR Technical University,
Chennai

Abstract:
The increase in the number of terrorist attacks especially in the last few years
has shown that the effect of blast loads on buildings, doors and walls is a serious
matter that should be taken into consideration in the design process. The main
objective of this study is to shed light on blast resistant door design theories, the
enhancement of doors against the effect of explosives in both architectural and
structural process and the design techniques that should be carried out. Firstly
explosives and explosion types have been discussed briefly. In addition, the
general aspects of explosives process have been presented to clarify the effects
of explosives on blast doors. To have the better understanding of explosives will
enable us to make blast resistant doors much more efficiently. Essential
technique for increasing the capacity of door to provide protection against
explosives effect is discussed both with architectural and structural approach.
Keywords: Blast Doors, Design, Enhancement, Explosives, Explosives Effects,

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Organization profile Page No:
2. Introduction 1
3. Blast doors 2
4. Shock waves and Over pressure 3-7
5. Design of blast doors 7-11
6. Type of blastdoors- 12-29
 SO-1 type
 SO-3 type
 SO- double wing
 SO-3 doublewing
 SO-6 doublewing
7. Blast Hatch 30-34
 Specification, Application, Design criteria
 SL-1 hatch protective capability
 Customdesign protective doors
8. Blast door on the basis of position 34-41
 Horizontalshelther doors
 Vertical shelther door

 Types on the based on Pensher
 Series-1 aluminium blast resistancedoors
 Series-2 steel blast resistantdoors
 Series-2a steel blast resistantdoors
 Series-3b steel blast resistantdoors
 Series-4 steel security doors
9. Problem of 5A-7 design of doors for Pressure-timeloading 42-50
 Problem
 Procedure
 Required
10.Conclusion 51
11.Reference 52

List of Figures
Fig no:
1. Typical Blast door
2. Variation of pressure with distance
3. Formation of shockfront in shockwaves.
4. Variation of over pressure with distance
5. Variation of over pressure with at a given
6. Variation of over pressure with distance at a time
7. Variation of dynamic pressure with a distance at the
8. Door of light civil defence shelter in Finland.
9. SO-1 type door.
10. SO-2 type door.
11. SO-3 type door.
12. SO-6 type door.
13. SO-1 double wing door.
14. SO-3 double wing door.
15. Custom design protective door.
16. Horizontal shelter door.
17. Vertical shelter door.
18. Series-1 aluminium blast door.
19. Series-2 steel blast door.
20. Series-3A steel blast door.
21. Series-3B steel blast door.
22. Series-4 steel blast door.

23. doorconfiguration and loading.
24. detail of composite angle /plate supporting element.

Organization profile:-
About DRDO
The Defence Researchand DevelopmentOrganisation (DRDO) is an agency
of the Republic of India, responsible for the development of technology for use
by the military, headquartered in New Delhi, India.
With a network of 52 laboratories, which are engaged in developing defence
technologies covering various fields, like aeronautics, armaments, electronics,
land combat engineering, life sciences, materials, missiles, and naval systems,
DRDO is India's largest and most diverse research organisation. The
organisation includes around 5,000 scientists belonging to the Defence Research
& Development Service (DRDS) and about 25,000 other scientific, technical
and supporting personnel.
History
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was established in
1958 by amalgamating the Defence Science Organisation and some of the
technical development establishments. A separate Department of Defence
Research and Development was formed in 1980 which later on administered
DRDO and its 50 laboratories/establishments. Most of the time the Defence
Research Development Organisation was treated as if it was a vendor and the
Army Headquarters or the Air Headquarters were the customers. Because the
Army and the Air Force themselves did not have any design or construction
responsibility, they tended to treat the designer or Indian industry at par with
their corresponding designer in the world market. If they could get a MiG-21
from the world market, they wanted a MiG-21 from DRDO. DRDO started its
first major project in surface-to-air missiles (SAM) known as Project Indigo in
1960s. Indigo was discontinued in later years without achieving full success.

Project Indigo led to Project Devil, along with Project Valiant, to develop short-
range SAM and ICBM in the 1970s. Project Devil itself led to the later
development of the Prithvi missile under the Integrated Guided Missile
Development Programme (IGMDP) in the 1980s. IGMDP was an Indian
Ministry of Defence programme between the early 1980s and 2007 for the
development of a comprehensive range of missiles, including the Agni missile,
Prithvi ballistic missile, Akash missile, Trishul missile and Nag Missile. In
2010, then defence minister A K Antony ordered the restructuring of the
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to give 'a major
boost to defence research in the country and to ensure effective participation of
the private sector in defence technology'. The key measures to make DRDO
effective in its functioning include the establishment of a Defence Technology
Commission with the defence minister as its chairman. The programmes which
were largely managed by DRDO have seen considerable success with many of
the systems seeing rapid deployment as well as yielding significant
technological benefits.DRDO has achieved many successes since its
establishment in developing other major systems and critical technologies such
as aircraft avionics, UAVs, small arms, artillery systems, EW Systems, tanks
and armoured vehicles, sonar systems, command and control systems and
missile systems.
Centre for Fire, Explosive and Environment Safety (CFEES)
The Centre for Fire, Explosive and Environment Safety (CFEES) is an
Indian defence laboratory of the Defence Research and Development
Organization (DRDO). Located in Timarpur, Delhi, its main function is the
development of technologies and products in the area of explosive, fire and

environmental safety. CFEES is organized under the Armaments Directorate of
DRDO. The present director of CFEES is Dr Chitra Rajagopal.
History
The Centre for Explosive and Environment Safety (CEES) was established in
1992 by merging three DRDO establishments; DRDO Computer Centre, Delhi,
The Directorate of Explosives Safety, DRDO HQ, and the Fire Adviser’s
Office, DRDO HQ. In 2000 another DRDO lab, “Defence Institute of Fire
Research (DIFR)” was merged with CEES. In order to emphasize the
importance of fire science, the Government renamed CEES as CFEES in 2003.
Areas of Work
CFEES works in the area of Explosive safety, Fire protection and environmental
safety. In addition to developing technologies to protect against these threats, it
also trains personnel in these areas, and enforces safety standards in the use of
hazardous materials- toxic, explosive and flammable. CFEES also designs and
develops sensors to detect these threats.
Explosive Safety
CFEES helps in the Siting of explosive processing and storage dumps and the
design, testing and evaluation of safe explosive storage houses. Additionally, it
trains armed forces personnel and DRDO scientists in the safe use of explosives
and ordnance, and enforces compliance of safety rules. Simulation and risk
modelling is also carried out, in order to aid in Disaster Management.

Environment Safety
CFEES develops treatment and disposal techniques for hazardous Heavy Metal
Wastes, as well as Photodegradable Polyethylene for use as packaging material
at high altitudes, which prevents the pollution in mountainous areas where the
Indian Army operates, such as Kargil and Siachen.
CFEES also plays an active role in formulating the phase-out strategy for halon
and other ozone layer threatening gases. The National Halon Management
Programme, funded under bilateral programme, is implemented by CFEES,
supported by Ozone Cell, India. Halons are one of the six categories of
chemicals that are covered under the phase-out programme of the Montreal
Protocol. The Montreal Protocol, to which India is a signatory, has called upon
the parties to phase out the CFCs, halons and other man-made ozone-depleting
chemicals. In this regard, the lab is researching into alternative chemicals for
fire suppression and other uses.
Fire Safety
CFEES is involved in the development of automatic fire and explosion
detection and suppression systems for armoured vehicles, and water mist based
fire protection Systems for various applications. It also develops lightweight fire
protection clothing. A smoke test tunnel for creating fire signatures under
various conditions has been installed.
Specialized Training for armed forces personnel in fire protection, safety,
prevention and firefighting is also conducted by CFEES. The lab has also
developed a software package for virtual firefighting and fire training
simulation.

Projects
Fire Detection and Suppression Systems
CFEES has successfully designed and operationalized Integrated Fire Detection
and Suppression Systems for Armoured vehicles like the Arjun MBT, T-72
"Ajeya" and AbhayICV.The system is based on infra-red detectors for the
detection of fire/explosion in the crew compartment, and is capable of
suppressing fuel-fire explosions resulting from an enemy hit or due to any
malfunction of the engine, transmission or electrical short circuit. The system is
capable of detection and suppression of fires in the crew compartment within
200 milliseconds and in the engine compartment within 15s.
Water Mist based Fire Protection
Water Mist based Fire Protection Systems have been developed. This includes
new nozzles for the generation of water mist, working at low pressure of 12 bars
and above to facilitate the proper atomization of water droplets under high
pressure. This system is used for the following applications:
 IR signature suppression of plume emitted by exhaust of Naval
ships
 Air cargo bay
 Electronic cabinet fires
 Fuel –air explosion suppressions
Intelligent Fire Sensor
CFEES has developed an Intelligent Fire Sensor with software based
on a fire signature database that allows its fire detection system to
accurately identify true fire situations in a few seconds while rejecting

false alarms. The sensor is a highly sensitive detection system coupled
with powerful intelligent analysis, which allows fire detection even in
dusty environment. The use of laser diode source and multiple
reflection increases the sensitivity of smoke detection.
The sensors sense the temperature and smoke, making the fire
detector sensitive to both slow-smouldering and fast-burning fires.
The system can be installed on board the ships, offshore machinery
rooms, aircraft cargo compartments, industries, chemical plants,
warehouses, etc. Production of this sensor is being carried out by
Southern Electronics Pvt. Ltd., a Bangalore based private
manufacturer.
Environment protection
 Technology for the treatment and stabilization of Heavy metals (Pb, Cr,
Hg, Cd, Zn etc.) from effluents being generated by Ordnance Factories
and other manufacturing plants. The technology uses a cement/polymer-
based solid matrix, and is being license-produced by Quality Water
Management Systems Pvt. Ltd., Chennai.
 Technology for removal of nitro bodies (HMX, RDX) from HMX plant
effluents (based on neutralization and alkaline hydrolysis).
 CFEES has also built up expertise in the area of establishing ground
water monitoring networks for any project site.
 CFEES has developed processes for producing Coal Pitch based
Activated Carbon Spheroids for adsorption of harmful chemical vapours
by the protective gears. This is used for protection against nuclear,

biological and chemical warfare. The powder has good mechanical
strength, low ash content and is eco-friendly.
 A National Halon banking and management facility has been set up,
where impure halon can be purified to acceptable levels and stored.

1
Introduction
Damage to the assets, loss of life and social panic are factors that have to be
minimized if the threat of terrorist action cannot be stopped. Designing the
structures to be fully blast resistant is not an realistic and economical option,
however current engineering and architectural knowledge can enhance the new
and existing buildings to mitigate the effects of an explosion.
The main target of this study is to provide guidance to engineers and architects
where there is a necessity of protection against the explosions caused by
detonation of high explosives. The guidance describes measures for mitigating
the effects of explosions, therefore providing protection for human, structure
and the valuable equipment inside. The paper includes information about
explosives, blast loading parameters and enhancements for blast resistant door
design both with an architectural and structural approach. Only explosions
caused by high explosives (chemical reactions) are considered within the study.
High explosives are solid in form and are commonly termed condensed
explosives. TNT (trinitrotoluene) is the most widely known example.
In this paper, material tests were conducted to derive typical material models of
Steel (A588).The derived models were verified through the explicit analyses of
the foam panels by ANSYS. Performance of the panels with different scaled
distances was evaluated by blast tests. Numerical simulations considering the
parameters provided basic design guidelines for the protective structures with
sacrificial foam panels. Tests and simulations verified the proposed concept that
properly designed panels for the required blast loads can control the transmitted
pressure to the target structure under a certain pressure on the yield strength of
the Steel (A588).

2
BLAST DOORS
A blast Door is a place where people can go to protect themselves from bomb
blasts. It differs from a fallout shelter, in that its main purpose is to protect from
shock waves and overpressure, instead of from radioactive precipitation, as a
fallout shelter does. It is also possible for a shelter to protect from both blast and
fallout.

3
SHOCK WAVE AND OVER PRESSURE
The sudden release of energy initiates a pressure wave in the surrounding
medium, known as a shock wave. When an explosion takes place, the expansion
of the hot gases produces a pressure wave in the surrounding air. As this wave
moves away from the centre of explosion, the inner part moves through the
region that was previously compressed and is now heated by the leading part of
the wave. As the pressure waves moves with the velocity of sound, the
temperature is about 3000o-4000oC and the pressure is nearly 300 kilobar of the
air causing this velocity to increase. The inner part of the wave starts to move
faster and gradually overtakes the leading part of the waves. After a short period
of time the pressure wave front becomes abrupt, thus forming a shock front
somewhat similar to.
The maximum overpressure occurs at the shock front and is called the peak
overpressure. Behind the shock front, the overpressure drops very rapidly to
about one-half the peak overpressure and remains almost uniform in the central
region of the explosion.
Variation of Pressure with Distance

4
Formation of Shock Front in Shock Wave
Variation of overpressure with distance from centre of explosion at various
times
An expansion proceeds, the overpressure in the shock front decreases steadily;
the pressure behind the front does not remain constant, but instead, fall off in a
regular manner. After a short time, at a certain distance from the centre of
explosion, the pressure behind the shock front becomes smaller than that of the
surrounding atmosphere and so called negative-phase or suction.

5
The front of the blast waves weakens as it progresses outward, and its velocity
drops towards the velocity of the sound in the undisturbedatmosphere. This
sequence of events is shown in Fig.3.1(c), the overpressure at time t1, t2…..t6
are indicated. In the curves marked t1 to t5, the pressure in the blast has not
fallen below that of the atmosphere. In the curve t6 at some distance behind the
shock front, the overpressure becomes negative.
The variation of overpressure with distance at a given time from centre of
explosion

6
Variation of overpressure with distance at a time from the explosion
Variation of dynamic pressure with distance at a time from the explosion
The time variation of the same blast wave at a given distance from the explosion
to indicate the time duration of the positive phase and also the time at the end of
the positive phase.Another quantity of the equivalent importance is the force
that is developed from the strong winds accompanying the blast wave known as
the dynamic pressure; this is
Proportional to the square of the wind velocity and the density of the air behind
the shock front. Its variation at a given distance from the explosion

7
Mathematically the dynamic pressure pd expressed as.
Pd= ½ ρu2
Where u is the velocity of the air particle and ρ is the air density.
The peak dynamic pressure decreases with increasing distance from the centre
of explosion, but the rate of decrease is different from that of the peak
overpressure. At a given distance from the explosion, the time variation of the
dynamic Pd behind the shock front is somewhat similar to that of the
overpressure Ps, but the rate of decrease is usually different. For
design purposes, the negative phase of the overpressure in Fig.3.2 (b) is not
important and can be ignored.
DESIGNING OF BLAST DOOR
Blast door deflect the blast wave from nearby explosions to prevent ear and
internal injuries to people sheltering in the bunker. While frame buildings
collapse from as little as 3 psi (20 kPa) of overpressure, blast shelters are
regularly constructed to survive several hundred psi. This substantially
decreases the likelihood that a bomb can harm the structure.
The basic plan is to provide a structure that is very strong in compression. The
actual strength specification must be done individually, based on the nature and
probability of the threat. A typical specification for heavy civil defense shelter
in Europe during the Cold war was an overhead explosion of a 500 kiloton
weapon at the height of 500 meters. Such a weapon would be used to attack soft
targets (factories, administrative centers, and communications) in the area.

8
Only the heaviest bedrock-shelters would stand a chance of surviving. However,
in the countryside or in a suburb, the likely distance to the explosion is much
larger, as it is improbable that anyone would waste an expensive nuclear device
on such targets. The most common purpose-built structure is a steel-reinforced
concrete vault or arch buried or located in the basement of a house.
Most expedient blast shelters are civil engineering structures that contain large
buried tubes or pipes such as sewage or rapid transit tunnels. Even these,
nonetheless, require several additions to serve properly: blast doors, air-
filtration and ventilation equipment, secondary exits, and air-proofing.
Improvised purpose-built blast shelters normally use earthen arches or vaults.
To form these, a narrow (1-2 meter-wide) flexible tent of thin wood is placed in
a deep trench (usually the apex of the tent is below grade), and then covered
with cloth or plastic, and then covered with 1–2 meters of tamped earth.
Shelters of this type are approved field expedient blast shelters of both the U.S.
and China. Entrances are constructed from thick wooden frames. Blast valves
are to be constructed from tire-treads laid on thick wooden grids.
Nuclear bunkers must also cope with the under pressure that lasts for several
seconds after the shock wave passes, and prompt radiation. The overburden and
structure provide substantial radiation shielding, and the negative pressure is
usually only 1/3 of the overpressure.
The doors must be at least as strong as the walls. The usual design is a trap-
door, to minimize the size and expense. In dual-purpose shelters, which have a
secondary peace time use, the door may be normal. To reduce the weight, the
door is normally constructed of steel, with a fitted steel lintel and frame welded
to the steel-reinforcement of the concrete. The shelter should be located so that
there is no combustible material directly outside it.

9
If the door is on the surface and will be exposed to the blast wave, the edge of
the door is normally counter-sunk in the frame so that the blast wave or a
reflection cannot lift the edge. If possible, this should be avoided, and the door
built so that it is sheltered from the blast wave by other structures. The most
useful construction is to build the door behind a 90°-turn in a corridor that has
an exit for the overpressure.
Door of a light civil defence shelter in Finland
A bunker commonly has two doors, one of which is convenient, and in peace
time use, and the other is strong. Naturally, the shelter must always have a
secondary exit which can be used if the primary dooris blocked by debris. Door
shafts may double as ventilation shafts to reduce the digging, although this is
unadvisable.
A large ground shock can move the walls of a bunker several centimeters in a
few milliseconds. Bunkers designed for large ground shocks must have sprung
internal buildings, hammocks, or bean-bag chairs to protect inhabitants from the
walls and floors. However, most civilian-built improvised shelters do not need

10
these as their structure cannot stand a shock large enough to seriously damage
the occupants.
Earth is an excellent insulator. In bunkers inhabited for prolonged periods, large
amounts of ventilation or air-conditioning must be provided to prevent heat
prostration. In bunkers designed for war-time use, manually operated ventilators
must be provided because supplies of electricity or gas are unreliable. The
simplest form of effective fan to cool a shelter is a wide, heavy frame with flaps
that swings in the shelter's doorway and can be swung from hinges on the
ceiling.
The flaps open in one direction and close in the other, pumping air. (This is a
Kearny Air Pump, or KAP, named after the inventor Cresson Kearny.) Kearney
asserts, based on field testing, that air filtration is not normally needed in a
nuclear shelter. He asserts that fallout is either large enough to fall to the
ground, or so fine that it will not settle and thus has little bulk to emit radiation.
However, if possible, shelters of soldiers have air-filtration to stop chemical,
biological and nuclear impurities which may abound after an explosion.
Ventilation openings in a bunker must be protected by blast valves. A blast
valve is closed by a shock wave, but otherwise remains open. If the bunker is in
a built-up area, it may include water-cooling or an immersion tub and breathing
tubes to protect inhabitants from fire storms. In these cases, the secondary exit
is also most useful.
Bunkers must also protect the inhabitants from normal weather, including rain,
summer heat and winter cold. A normal form of rain proofing is to place plastic
film on the bunker's main structure before burying it. Thick (5-mil or 125 µm),
inexpensive polyethylene film serves quite well, because the overburden
protects it from degradation by wind and sunlight. Naturally, a buried or

11
basement-situated reinforced-concrete shelter usually has the normal appearance
of a building.
When a house is purpose-built with a blast shelter, the normal location is a
reinforced below-grade bathroom with large cabinets. In apartment houses, the
shelter may double as storage space, as long as it can be swiftly emptied for its
primary use. A shelter can easily be added in a new basement construction by
taking an existing corner and adding two poured walls and a ceiling.
Some vendors provide true blast shelters engineered to provide good protection
to individual families at modest cost. One common design approach uses fiber-
reinforced plastic shells. Compressive protection may be provided by
inexpensive earth arching. The overburden is designed to shield from radiation.
To prevent the shelter from floating to the surface in high groundwater, some
designs have a skirt held-down with the overburden. A properly designed,
properly installed home shelter does not become a sinkhole in the lawn. In
Switzerland, which requires shelters for private apartment blocks and large
private houses, the lightest shelters are constructed of stainless steel.

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TYPES OF BLAST DOOR :-
FROM TEMET
SO-1 type
Applications
The SO-1 blast doors are designed to stop the advance of blast waves through
the passage ways into the protected area of blast hardened Civl Defence and
military shelters. The SO-1 blast dors are possible to open and close manually
from both sides. The latching device tightens the door plate against the frame so
that the maximum clearance between the load bearing surfaces of the door plate
and the frame is 2.0 mm. Design of the door enables opening by disassembly
even if the door plate has undergone permanent deformations. The door plate
can be dismounted from either side without any special emergency opening
devices.

13
Specification
Manufacturer of SO-1 blast doors is Temet, Helsinki Finland.
The SO-1 blast doors are fabricated from structural steel with a door plate of
solid homogenous steel plate. The door fame is of flush design for easy
installation in the reinforced concrete wall, and the door plate / frame assembly
has an optimized pattern for transfer of the blast forces into the surrounding
wall.
Design Criteria
The SO-1 blast door is made in accordance with specific provisions issued by
the Finnish Ministry of Interior. The SO-1 blast doors are approved for use on

14
the basis of structural calculations approved by the Technical Research Centreof
Finland / VTT Building Technology, an Independent Testing Authority
mandated to perform type inspection for shelter equipment and systems by the
Ministry of Interior.
SO-1 Door Protection Capability
The SO-1 doors are designed and tested to withstand multiple long duration blast
loads having peak reflected overpressure of 2.0 bar in the elastic range of the
materials used. In rebound direction the doors resist negative blast forces
equivalent to 0.25 bar static pressure. The door fame design enables uniform
distribution of the positive blast load into the surrounding wall. Rebound load is
received by latching system and hinges.

15
The SO-1 doors also resist a mechanical shock transmitting through the installation
wall with a rapid change in velocity of 1.5 m/s corresponding to acceleration
force of 30 g. r
The doors are designed to function within the operating temperature range of -
20 …+80 ºC.
SO-3 type
Applications
the passage ways into the protected area of blast hardened Civil Defence and
military shelters. The SO-3 blast doors are possible to open and close manually
from both sides. The latching device tightens the door plate against the frame so
that the maximum clearance between the load bearing surfaces of the door plate
and the frame is 2.0 mm. Design of the doors enables opening by disassembly
even if the door plate has undergone permanent deformations. The door plate
can be dismounted from either side without any special emergency opening
devices.

16
Specification
Manufacturer of SO-3 blast doors is Temet, Helsinki Finland.
The SO-3 doors are fabricated from structural steel with a door plate of solid
homogenous steel plate. The door frame is of flush design for easy installations
in the reinforced concrete wall, and the door plate / frame assembly has an
optimized pattern for transfer of the blast forces into surrounding wall.
Design Criteria
The SO-3 blast doors are made in accordance with specific provisions issued by
the basis of structural calculations approved by the Technical Research Centre

17
of Finland / VTT Building Technology, an Independent Testing Authority
The SO-3 doors are designed to withstand multiple long duration blast loads having
peak reflected overpressure of 8.0 bar within the elastic range of the materials
used. The resistance of the doors for rebound load is dependent on the basic
natural period of the door plate and varies between 0.8 bar and 4.0 bar
equivalent static pressure. The door fame design enables uniform distribution of

18
the positive blast load into the surrounding wall. Rebound load is received by
the latching system.
The SO-3 doors also resist a mechanical shock transmitting through the installation
wall with a rapid change in velocity of 1.5 m/s corresponding to acceleration
force of 30 g.
The SO-3 doors are designed to function within the operating temperature range
of -20 …+80 ºC.
SO-6 Type
Applications
the passage ways into the protected area of blast hardened Civil Defence and
military shelters. The SO-6 blast doors are possible to open and close manually
from both sides. The latching device tightens the door plate against the frame
so that the maximum clearance between the load bearing surfaces of the door
plate and the frame is 2.0 mm. Design of the doors enables opening by
disassembly even if the door plate has undergone permanent deformations.
The door plate can be dismounted from either side without any special
emergency opening devices

19
Specification
Manufacturer of SO-6 blast doors is Temet, Helsinki Finland. The SO-6 doors
are fabricated from structural steel with a door plate of solid homogenous steel
plate. The door frame is of flush design for easy installations in the reinforced
concrete wall, and the door plate / frame assembly has an optimized pattern for
transfer of the blast forces into surrounding wall.
Design Criteria

20
The SO-6 doors provide the highest level of protection against blast effects.
Their resistance against multiple long duration blast load ranges from 9.0 bar up
to 18 bar peak reflected overpressure. The SO-6 doors are designed to function
within the elastic range of the materials used. The resistance of the doors for
rebound load is dependent on the basic natural period of the door plate and
varies between 0.1 and 0.5 times the maximum positive blast load. The door
frame design enables uniform distribution of the positive blast load into the
surrounding wall. Rebound load is received by the latching system. The SO-6
doors also resist a mechanical shock transmitting through the installation wall

21
with a rapid change in velocity of 1.5 m/s corresponding to acceleration force of
30 g.
The SO-6 doors are designed to function within the operating temperature
range of -20 …+80 ºC.
SO-1 DOUBLE WING
Applications
The SO-1 double wing blast doors are designed to stop the advance of blast
waves through the passage ways into the protected area of blast hardened Civil
Defence and military shelters. The SO-1 blast doors are possible to open and
close manually from both sides. The latching device tightens the door plate
against the frame so that the maximum clearance between the load bearing
surfaces of the door plate and the frame is 2.0 mm. Design of the door enables
opening by disassembly even if the door plate has undergone permanent
deformations. The door plate can be dismounted from either side without any
special emergency opening devices.

22
Specification
Manufacturer of SO-1double wing blast doors is Temet, Helsinki Finland.
The SO-1double wing blast doors are fabricated from structural steel with a
door plate of solid homogenous steel plate stiffened by a structural steel centre
beam. The door fame is designed for easy installation into the reinforced
concrete wall, and the door plate / frame assembly has an optimized pattern for
transfer of the blast forces into the surrounding wall.

23
DesignCriteria
The SO-1 blast door is made in accordance with specific provisions issued by

24
The SO-1 doors are designed and tested to withstand multiple long duration blast
loads having peak reflected overpressure of 2.0 bar in the elastic range of the
materials used. In rebound direction the doors resist negative blast forces
equivalent to 0.25 bar static pressure. The door fame design enables uniform
received by latching system and hinges.
The SO-1 doors also resist a mechanical shock transmitting through the
installation wall with a rapid change in velocity of 1.5 m/s corresponding to
acceleration force of 30 g. r
The doors are designed to function within the operating temperature range of -
20 …+80 ºC.
SO-3 DOUBLE WING
Applications
surfaces of the door plate and the frame is 2.0 mm. Design of the doors enables

25
Specification
Manufacturer of SO-3 blast doors is Temet, Helsinki Finland. The SO-3 double
wing blast doors are fabricated from structural steel with a door plate of solid
homogenous steel plate stiffened by a structural steel centre beam. The door
frame is designed for easy installations in the reinforced concrete wall, and the
door plate / frame assembly has an optimized pattern for transfer of the blast
forces into surrounding wall.

26
DesignCriteria
The SO-3 doors are designed to withstand multiple long duration blast loads
having peak reflected overpressure of 8.0 bar within the elastic range of the

27
materials used. The resistance of the doors for rebound load is dependent on the
basic natural period of the door plate and varies between 0.8 bar and 4.0 bar
equivalent static pressure. The door frame design enables uniform distribution
of the positive blast load into the surrounding wall. Rebound load is received by
the latching system. The SO-3 doors also resist a mechanical shock transmitting
through the installation wall with a rapid change in velocity of 1.5 m/s
corresponding to acceleration force of 30 g.
The SO-3 doors are designed to function within the operating temperature range
of -20 …+80 ºC.
SO-6 DOUBLE WING
Applications
surfaces of the door plate and the frame is 2.0 mm. Design of the doors enables

28
Specification
The SO-6 double wing blast doors are fabricated from structural steel with a
door plate of solid homogenous steel plate stiffened by I-beams spanning
between the door sill and head. The door fame is designed for easy installation
in the reinforcedconcrete wall, and the door plate / frame assembly has an
optimized pattern for transfer of the blast forces into surrounding wall.

29
Design Criteria

30
BLAST HATCH
Applications
The SL-1 hatches are designed to stop the advance of blast waves into protected
area of Civil Defence and military shelters through the emergency exit passage
ways. The SL-1 hatches are possible to open and close manually from both
sides. The latching device tightens the hatch plate against the frame so that the
maximum clearance between the load bearing surfaces of the hatch plate and the
frame is 2.0 mm. Design of the hatch enables opening by disassembly even if
the hatch plate has undergone permanent deformations. The hatch plate can be
dismounted from either side without any special emergency opening devices.

31
Specification
Manufacturer of SL-1 hatches is Temet, Helsinki Finland. The SL-1 hatches are
fabricated from structural steel with a solid homogenous door plate. The hatch
frame is designed for easy installations in the reinforced concrete wall, and the
hatch plate / frame assembly has an optimized pattern for transfer of the blast
forces into surrounding wall
Design Criteria
The SL-1 hatch is made in accordance with specific provisions issued by the
Finnish Ministry of Interior. The SL-1 hatches are approved for use on the basis
of structural calculations approved by the Technical Research Centre of Finland
/ VTT Building Technology, an Independent Testing Authority mandated to
perform type inspection for shelter equipment and systems by the Ministry of
Interior.

32
SL-1 Hatch Protection Capability
The SL-1 hatches are designed and tested to withstand multiple long duration
blast loads having peak reflected overpressure of 2.0 bar in the elastic range of
the materials used. In rebound direction the hatch resist negative blast forces
equivalent to 0.25 bar static pressure. The door frame design enables uniform
received by latch and hinge systems. The SL-1 hatch also resists a mechanical
shock transmitting through the installation wall with a rapid change in velocity
of 1.5 m/s corresponding to acceleration force of 30 g.
The hatches are designed to function within the operating temperature range of -
20 …+80 ºC.
Custom designed protective doors
Temet custom designs protective doors in strict accordance with the client’s
specification. Typical structural custom requirements are design for short
duration impulsive blast load, high resistance for primary figment and air-
tightness at high pressure difference across the doors. Typical functional custom
requirements are power operation of the door and latching mechanism as well as
electrical door locking and connection to the door system interlocking.

33
Structural configuration of Temet custom doors may be steel door with
homogenous steel plate or I-beam stiffened steel plate structure. Concrete arch
doors are recommended for high pressure load for large door openings in
applications where the door jambs are capable of receiving the reaction forces
from the door arch. Sliding blast resistant and gas tight doors can be provided
for applications where space constraints prevent the use of swing doors.
Temet has over 20 years’ experience in supplying custom doors with extremely
demanding requirements. Projects successfully completed incorporate doors
with triangular bilinear impulse load up to 50 bar with 100 per cent
reboundresistance, combined blast resistant and air-tight doors providing zero
leakage up to 2000 Pa pressure difference across the door as well as very large
hinged concrete arch doors all having numerous additional functional
requirement.

34
Successful undertaking of a special door project implies that the door
manufactures capable of working together with the architect and structural
designer of the facility from the very beginning. This is imperative in order to
reserve sufficient space for the door and its embedded components and to
design the wall reinforcement properly to receive the substantial reaction forces
transmitted from the door. An important part of Temet’ services are the
capability to consult with the structural engineers on the issue of door interface
with the surrounding concrete structure.
ON THE BASIS OF POSITION
Horizontal Shelter Doors
The steel hatch is designed to be installed horizontally and surrounded with a
concrete collar. Opening and closing are assisted by spring-loaded shock
absorbers to prevent uncontrolled descent. The frame is 12 inches deep, with the
inside opening dimensions of 31” X 31”. The door leaf is 3/8 inches thick with a
1 ½” overlap all around the opening and is re-enforced with 3 inch square
tubing for stiffness. Hinges are hand made from ¾” steel plate and are mounted
internally to avoid damage from blast, flying debris, and vandals. The lock hasp
is removable from the inside for self-rescue

35
Because of its horizontal orientation to a blast wave and debris, this design
avoids reflected overpressure and direct insult from flying debris. (Doors of
vertical orientation must be made several times stronger to resist the reflected
overpressure they attract). An armored protective pocket is welded to the
outside of the leaf to protect the external lock from weapons effects and folks
with undesirable social skills. [Door leaf can be ordered in stainless steel to
prevent torching at greatly increased cost.] Weight: 600lbs.
Vertical Shelter Doors
For concrete shelters, the Swiss PT Armored Door series is an excellent choice.
These vertical configured doors are available in single-leaf and double-leaf
formats, and in several sizes. They are all designed to be cast into the wall
during construction (they cannot be bolted in later as a retro-fit). The door leaf
is approximately 8 inches thick with two curtains of re-enforcement rod welded

36
inside. The door/frame assembly must be cast into the concrete wall and
allowed to cure for two weeks. After the cure time has expired, a wooden frame
is placed over both sides of the leaf and the interior is then filled with concrete.
The door leaf may be opened and stripped after 3 days of cure.
The door leaf has concrete fill holes in both ends to permit right/left hand
placement. Be sure to block holes in the bottom of the door leaf before filling
with concrete. The supporting wall must have a minimum thickness of 10-
inches. Please allow 4 weeks shipping time to avoid impacting your
construction schedule. Blast protection rating: 3 bar [nuclear], 30 bar
[conventional HE ordnance]. These doors will defeat a 500lb. MK82 demolition
bomb exploding 12 feet away.

37
Types based on pensher
Series 1 Aluminium Blast Resistant Door
The Series 1 Aluminium Blast Resistant Door is designed and manufactured by
PensherSkyech to provide an Aluminium blast resistant door solution for
construction, civil engineering, aerospace, defence and petrochemical industries
– or any environment requiring a blast resistant door design and product.
Examples of applications for our Aluminium blast resistant door range include:
critical infrastructure sites, key assets, densely populated areas and buildings,
and environments or sites at potential risk of physical or natural attack.

38
Series 2 Steel Blast Door
The Series 2 Steel Blast Door is designed and manufactured by PensherSkytech
to provide a steel blast resistant door solution for construction, civil
engineering, aerospace, defence and petrochemical industries – or any
environment requiring a blast door design and product.
Applications for this steel blast door range can vary depending upon your
project specifications. In addition to blast, the Series 2 Steel Blast Door can be
adapted to incorporate fire resistant door and security door systems.
Examples of blast door applications include critical infrastructure sites, key
assets, densely populated areas and buildings, and environments or sites at
potential risk of physical or natural attack

39
Series 3a Steel Blast Resistant Door
The Series 3a Steel Blast Resistant Door is designed and manufactured by
PensherSkytech to provide a steel blast resistant door solution for construction,
civil-engineering, aerospace, defence and petrochemical industries – or any
environment requiring a blast resistant door design and product. The Series 3a
also has US DoS approval.
Applications for our high level steel blast resistant door range can vary based
upon your project specifications. In addition to blast, the Series 3a can also
incorporate a ballistic rating to be adapted into a bullet resistant door product.

40
Examples of applications include critical infrastructuresites, key assets, densely
populated areas and buildings, and environments or sites at potential risk of
physical or natural attack
Series 3b Steel Blast Resistant Door
The Series 3b Steel Blast Resistant Door is designed and manufactured by
PensherSkytech to provide a steel blast resistant door solution to construction,
civil engineering, aerospace, defence and petrochemical industries – or any
environment requiring a blast resistant door design and product.
Applications for our high level steel blast resistant door range can vary based
upon your project specifications. In addition to blast, the Series 3a can also
incorporate a fire door rating to be adapted into a fire resistant door product.

41
Examples of applications include critical infrastructure sites, key assets, densely
populated areas and buildings, and environments or sites at potential risk of
natural or physical attack.
Series 4 Steel Security Door
The Series 4 Steel Security Door is designed and manufactured by
PensherSkytech to provide a steel security door solution to construction, civil
engineering, aerospace, defence and petrochemical industries – or any
environment requiring a security door design and product.
Examples of applications for our steel security door range include: critical
infrastructure sites, key assets, environments or sites at potential risk of physical
attack.
PROBLEM 5A-7 DESIGN OF DOORS FOR PRESSURE-TIME LOADING

42
Problem: Design a steel-plate blast door subjected to a pressure-time
loading.
Procedure:
Step 1. Establish the design parameters.
a. Pressure-time load
b. Design criteria: Establish support rotation, Θmax, and whether seals
and rebound mechanisms are required
c. Structural configuration of the door including geometry and support
Conditions
d. Properties of steel used:1
Minimum yield strength, fy, for door components (Table 5-1)
Dynamic increase factor, c (Table 5-2)
Step 2. Select the thickness of the plate.
Step 3. Calculate the elastic section modulus, S, and the plastic section
modulus,
Z, of the plate.
Step 4. Calculate the design plastic moment, Mp, of the plate (Equation 5-7)
Step 5. Compute the ultimate dynamic shear, Vp(Equation 5-16)
Step 6. Calculate maximum support shear, V, using a dynamic load factor of
1.25
and determine V/Vp. If V/Vpis less than 0.67, use the plastic design

43
moment as computed in Step 4 (Section 5-31). If V/Vpis greater than 0.67,
use Equation 5-23 to calculate the effective Mp.
Step 7. Calculate the ultimate unit resistance of the section (Table 3-1), using
the
equivalent plastic moment as obtained in Step 4 and a dynamic load factor
of 1.25.
Step 8. Determine the moment of inertia of the plate section.
Step 9. Compute the equivalent elastic unit stiffness, KE, of the plate section.
(Table 3-8)
Step 10. Calculate the equivalent elastic deflection, XE, of the plate as given by
XE = ru/KE.
Step 11. Determine the load-mass factor KLM and compute the effective unit
mass,
me.
Step 12. Compute the natural period of vibration, TN.
Step 13. Determine the door plate response using the values of P/ruand T/TN
and
the response charts of Chapter 3. Determine Xm/XE and TE.
Step 14. Determine the support rotation,
tanΘ = (Xm) / (L/2)
Compare Θ with the design criteria of Step 1b.

44
Step 15. Determine the strain rate, ε, using Equation 5-1. Determine the
dynamic
increase factor using Figure 5-2 and compare with the DIF selected in
Step 1d.
If the criteria of Step 1 is not satisfied, repeat Steps 2 to 15 with a new
plate thickness.
Step 16. Design supporting flexural element considering composite action with
the
plate (if so constructed).
Step 17. Calculate elastic and plastic section moduli of the combined section.
Step 18. Follow the design procedure for a flexural element as described in
Section 5A-1.
EXAMPLE 5A-7 (A) DESIGN OF A BLAST DOOR FOR
PRESSURE-TIME LOADING
Required:
Design a double-leaf, built-up door (6 ft by 8 ft) for the given pressure-time
loading.
Step 1.Given:
a. Pressure-time loading (Figure 5A-7)
b. Design criteria: This door is to protect personnel from exterior
loading. Leakage into the structure is permitted but the maximum
end rotation of any member is limited to 2° since panic hardware
must be operable after an accidental explosion.
c. Structural configuration (Figure 5A-7)
Note:

45
This type of door configuration is suitable for low-pressure range
applications.
d. Steel used: A36
figure
Figure 5A-7(a) Door Configuration and Loading, Example 5A-7(a)
Yield strength, fy= 42 ksi (Table 5-1)
Dynamic increase factor, c = 1.24 (Table 5-2)
Average yield strength increase factor, a = 1.1 (Section 5-12.1)
Hence, the dynamic design stress,
fds= 1.1 × 1.24 × 42 = 57.3 ksi (Equation 5-2)
and the dynamic yield stress in shear,
fdv= 0.55 fds= 0.55 × 57.3 = 31.5 ksi (Equation 5-4)
Step 2. Assume a plate thickness of 5/8 inch.

46
Step 3. Determine the elastic and plastic section moduli (per unit width).
S = (bd2/6) = [1× (5/8)2]/6 = 6.515 × 10-2 in3/in
Z = bd2/4= [1× (5/8)2]/4 = 9.765×10-2 in3/in
Step 4. Calculate the design plastic moment, Mp.
Mp= fds(S + Z)/2 = 57.3 [(6.515 × 10-2) (Equation 5-7)
+ (9.765 × 10-2)]/2 = 57.3 × 8.14 × 10-2 = 4.66 in-k/in
Step 5. Calculate the dynamic ultimate shear capacity, Vp, for a 1-inch width.
Vp= fdvAw= 31.5 × 1 × 5/8 = 19.7 kips/in (Equation 5-16)
Step 6. Evaluate the support shear and check the plate capacity. Assume
DLF = 1.25
V = DLF ×P ×L/2= (1.25×100×54×1)/2 = 3.375 kips/in
V/Vp= 3.375/19.7 = 0.171 < 0.67 (Section 5-31)
No reduction in equivalent plastic moment is necessary.
Note:
When actual DLF is determined, reconsider Step 6.
Step 7. Calculate the ultimate unit resistance, ru, (assuming the plate to be
simplysupportedat both ends).
ru = 8Mp/L2 = (8×4.16×103)/542 = 12.8 psi (Table 3-1)
Step 8. Compute the moment of inertia, I, for a 1-inch width.
I = bd3/12= 1×(5/8)3 = 0.02035 in4/in
Step 9. Calculate the equivalent elastic stiffness, KE.
KE = 384EI/5bl2 = (384×45×106×0.02035)/5×1×544 = 5.59 ksi/in

47
Step 10. Determine the equivalent elastic deflection, XE.
XE = ru/KE = 12.8/5.59 = 2.28 inch
Step 11. Calculate the effective mass of element.
a. KLM (average elastic and plastic)
= (0.78 + 0.66)/2 = 0.72
b. Unit mass of element, m
c. m=w/g=228 psi-ms2/ in
c. Effective unit of mass of element, me
me= KLMm= 0.72 × 228.0
= 164 psi-ms2/in
Step 12. Calculate the natural period of vibration, TN.
TN = 2π (164/5.59)1/2 = 34 ms
Step 13. Determine the door response.
Peak overpressure P = 100 psi
Peak resistance ru= 12.8 psi
Duration T = 30 ms
Natural period of vibration TN = 34 ms
P/ru= 100/12.8 = 7.81
T/TN = 30/34 = 0.88
From Figure 3-64a of Chapter 3,
Xm/XE < 5
Since the response is elastic, determine the DLF from Figure 3-49 of
Chapter 3.
DLF = 1.35 for T/TN = 0.88
Step 14. Determine the support rotation.
Xm = (1.35x100x2.28)/12.8 = 24.04 inch

48
tanΘ = Xm/(L/2) = 24.04/(54/2) = 0.89
Θ = 24° > 20° N.G.
Step 15. Evaluate the selection of the dynamic increase factor.
Since this is an elastic response, use Figure 3-49 (b) of Chapter 3 to
determinetm. For T/TN = 0.88, tm/T = 0.0.5 and tm = 15 ms. The strain rate
is:
Since the response is elastic,
ε= fds/EstEt (Equation 5-1)
Fds =57.3x[Xm/XE] = 57.3x[24.04/2.28] = 604.1 ksi
And tE= tm = 0.015 sec. Hence,
ε=604.1/45x0.015=0.894 in/in/sec
Using Figure 5-2, DIF = 1.31. The preliminary selection of DIF = 1.29 is
acceptable.
Since the rotation criterion is not satisfied, change the thickness of the
plate and repeat the procedure. Repeating these calculations, it can be
shown that a 3/4-inch plate satisfies the requirements.
Repeat:
Step 2. Assume a plate thickness of ¾ inch
Step 3. Determine the elastic and plastic section moduli (per unit width)
S= bd2/12= 1 x (3/4)2/12=9.37x10-2 in3/in
M=bd2/4= 1 x (3/4)2/4 =14.06x10-2 in3/in
Step 4. Calculate the design plastic moment, Mp
Mp=fds(S+Z)/2=57.3((9.37x10-2)+(14.06x10-2)/2=6.7 in-k/in
Step 5. Calculate the dynamic ultimate shear capacity, Vp for a 1- inch width
Vp=fdvAw=31.5x1x3/4=23.62 kips/in (Equation 5-16)
Step 6. Evaluate the support shear and check the plate capacity. Assume
DLF=1.25

49
V=DLF x P x L/2= 1.25 x 100 x 54 x 1/2 = 3.375 Kips/in
V/Vp=3.375/23.6= 0.67 (Section 5-31)
No reduction in equivalent plastic moment is necessary .
Note:
When actual DLF is determined, reconsider step 6.
Step 7. Calculate the ultimate unit resistance, ru, (assuming the plate to be
simply supported to both ends)
Ru=8Mp/I2 (Table 3-1)
8 x 6.77 x 103/542=18.41 psi
Step 10. Calculate moment of inertia I, for a 1 inch width
I=bd3/12=1 x (3/4)3/12= 0.0104 in4/in
Step 9. Calculate the equivalent elastic stiffness, KE
KE=384EI/5bl4
384 x 45 x 106 x 0.0104 / 5 x 546= 6.22 Ksi/in
Step 10. Determine the equivalent elastic deflection XE
XE= Ru/ KE= 18.41/5.92= 3.01 inch
Step 11. Calculate the effective mass of element.
KLM (average elastic and plastic)
=(0.78+0.66)/2=0.72
Unit mass of element, M
M= w/g=3 x 1 x 243 x 106/1728 x 32.2 x 12 x 4 = 272 psi-ms2/in
Effective unit of mass of element me,
Me= KLmM= 0.72 x 272.0=196.5 psi-ms2/in
Step 12. Calculate the natural period of vibration TN,
TN=2 x 3.14 x (196.5 / 4.22)1/2=42.9 ms
Step 13. Determine the door pressure
Peak overpressure P=100
Peak resistance Ru=18.41 psi
Duration T= 30 ms

50
Natural period of vibration TN= 42.9 ms
P/Ru=100/18.41=5.43
T/TN=30/42.9=0.699
From the fig 3-64a of chapter 3,
Xm/XE<5
Since the response is elastic, determine the DLF from fig 3-49 of chapter 3.
DLF=1.20 for T/TN=0.699
Step 14. Determine support rotation.
Xm=1.20 x 100 x 3.02/18.41= 19.68 inch
TanΘ = Xm/(L/2) = 19.68/(54/2)= 0.728
Θ=20.050>200 N.G.
Step 15. . Evaluate the selection of the dynamic increase factor.
Since this is an elastic response, use Figure 3-49 (b) of Chapter 3 to
determinetm. For T/TN = 0.699, tm/T = 0.03 and tm = 9 ms. The strain rate
is:
Since the response is elastic,
ε= fds/EstEt (Equation 5-1)
Fds =57.3x[Xm/XE] =57.3 x 19.68/3.02= 373.40 ksi
ε = 373.40/45 x 103 x 0.009= 0.921 in/in/sec
Using fig 5-2, DLF=1.20
The primary selection of DLF= 1.25 is Acceptable

51
Conclusion
In this study the current status for the design of blast doors particularly for the
stainless steel (A588 grade b) profiled barrier is reviewed. The distinctive
response behaviour of various sections (plastic, compact and slander) has been
presented and some analysis tools for the assessment of the blast barrier has
been discussed. The study highlights several limitations inherent to single
degree of freedom method. Validation study on the design guidance given by
TN5 has also been discussed. Where the details study of blast door is required
the study is carried by finite element study. Some recommendations pertaining
to the numeric technique are given so the accurate response of blast door can be
obtained.

52
Reference:
[1] Koccaz Z. (2004) Blast Resistant Building Design, MSc Thesis, Istanbul
Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey.
[2] Yandzio E., Gough M. (1999). Protection of Buildings Against Explosions,
SCI Publication, Berkshire, U.K.
[3] Hill J.A., Courtney M.A. (1995). The structural Engineer’s Response to
Explosion Damage.The Institution of Structural Engineer’s Report, SETO Ltd,
London.
[4] Mays G.C., Smith P.D. (1995). Blast Effects on Buildings, Thomas Telford
Publications, Heron Quay, London.
[5] Hinman E. (2008) Blast Safety of the Building Envelope, WBDG, US
[6] MALO, K.A. and Ilstad, H. Response of corrugated steel doors due to
pressure loads
[7] Punch S. (1999) Blast Design of Steel Structures to Prevent Progressive
Collapse, Structural Engineers Association Convention Proceedings, Santa
Barbara, California, U.S.A.
[8] STEC-21, Defense research and development organization, Ministry Of
defense, India
[9] UFC- Unified Criteria Facilities 3-340-02

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