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Mobile Communications
Chapter 8: Network Protocols/Mobile IP
• Motivation
• Data transfer , Encapsulation
• Security, IPv6, Problems
• Micro mobility support
• DHCP
• Ad-hoc networks, Routing protocols
Motivation for Mobile IP
• Routing
• based on IP destination address, network prefix (e.g.
129.13.42) determines physical subnet
• change of physical subnet implies change of IP address to
have a topological correct address (standard IP) or needs
special entries in the routing tables
• Specific routes to end-systems
• change of all routing table entries to forward packets to the
right destination
• does not scale with the number of mobile hosts and frequent
changes in the location, security problems
• Changing the IP-address?
• adjust the host IP address depending on the current location
• almost impossible to find a mobile system, DNS updates
take to long time
• TCP connections break, security problems
Requirements for Mobile IPv4
• Transparency
• mobile end-systems keep their IP address
• continuation of communication after interruption of link
possible
• point of connection to the fixed network can be changed
• Compatibility
• support of the same layer 2 protocols as IP
• no changes to current end-systems and routers required
• mobile end-systems can communicate with fixed systems
• Security
• authentication of all registration messages
• Efficiency and scalability
• only little additional messages to the mobile system required
(connection typically via a low bandwidth radio link)
• world-wide support of a large number of mobile systems in
the whole Internet
Terminology
• Mobile Node (MN)
• system (node) that can change the point of connection
to the network without changing its IP address
• Home Agent (HA)
• system in the home network of the MN, typically a router
• registers the location of the MN, tunnels IP datagrams to the COA
• Foreign Agent (FA)
• system in the current foreign network of the MN, typically a router
• forwards the tunneled datagrams to the MN, typically also the
default router for the MN
• Care-of Address (COA)
• address of the current tunnel end-point for the MN (at FA or MN)
• actual location of the MN from an IP point of view
• can be chosen, e.g., via DHCP
• Correspondent Node (CN)
• communication partner
Example network
mobile end-system
Internet
router
router
router
end-system
FA
HA
MN
home network
foreign
network
(physical home network
for the MN)
(current physical network
for the MN)
CN
Data transfer to the mobile system
Internet
sender
FA
HA
MN
home network
foreign
network
receiver
1
2
3
1. Sender sends to the IP address of MN,
HA intercepts packet (proxy ARP)
2. HA tunnels packet to COA, here FA,
by encapsulation
3. FA forwards the packet
to the MN
CN
Data transfer from the mobile system
Internet
receiver
FA
HA
MN
home network
foreign
network
sender
1
1. Sender sends to the IP address
of the receiver as usual,
FA works as default router
CN
Overview
CN
router
HA
router
FA
Internet
router
1.
2.
3.
home
network
MN
foreign
network
4.
CN
router
HA
router
FA
Internet
router
home
network
MN
foreign
network
COA
Network integration
• Agent Advertisement
• HA and FA periodically send advertisement messages into their
physical subnets
• MN listens to these messages and detects, if it is in the home or a
foreign network (standard case for home network)
• MN reads a COA from the FA advertisement messages
• Registration (always limited lifetime!)
• MN signals COA to the HA via the FA, HA acknowledges via FA to
MN
• these actions have to be secured by authentication
• Advertisement
• HA advertises the IP address of the MN (as for fixed systems), i.e.
standard routing information
• routers adjust their entries, these are stable for a longer time (HA
responsible for a MN over a longer period of time)
• packets to the MN are sent to the HA,
• independent of changes in COA/FA
type = 16
length = 6 + 4 * #COAs
R: registration required
B: busy, no more registrations
H: home agent
F: foreign agent
M: minimal encapsulation
G: GRE encapsulation
r: =0, ignored (former Van Jacobson compression)
T: FA supports reverse tunneling
reserved: =0, ignored
Agent advertisement
preference level 1
router address 1
#addresses
type
addr. size lifetime
checksum
COA 1
COA 2
type = 16 sequence number
length
0 7 8 15 16 31
24
23
code
preference level 2
router address 2
. . .
registration lifetime
. . .
R B H F M G r reserved
T
Registration
t
MN HA
t
MN FA HA
Mobile IP registration request
home agent
home address
type = 1 lifetime
0 7 8 15 16 31
24
23
T x
identification
COA
extensions . . .
S B DMG r
S: simultaneous bindings
B: broadcast datagrams
D: decapsulation by MN
M mininal encapsulation
G: GRE encapsulation
r: =0, ignored
T: reverse tunneling requested
x: =0, ignored
Mobile IP registration reply
home agent
home address
type = 3 lifetime
0 7 8 15 16 31
code
identification
extensions . . .
Example codes:
registration successful
0 registration accepted
1 registration accepted, but simultaneous mobility bindings unsupported
registration denied by FA
65 administratively prohibited
66 insufficient resources
67 mobile node failed authentication
68 home agent failed authentication
69 requested Lifetime too long
registration denied by HA
129 administratively prohibited
131 mobile node failed authentication
133 registration Identification mismatch
135 too many simultaneous mobility bindings
Encapsulation
original IP header original data
new data
new IP header
outer header inner header original data
Encapsulation I
• Encapsulation of one packet into another as payload
• e.g. IPv6 in IPv4 (6Bone), Multicast in Unicast (Mbone)
• here: e.g. IP-in-IP-encapsulation, minimal encapsulation or
GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation)
• IP-in-IP-encapsulation (mandatory, RFC 2003)
• tunnel between HA and COA
Care-of address COA
IP address of HA
TTL
IP identification
IP-in-IP IP checksum
flags fragment offset
length
DS (TOS)
ver. IHL
IP address of MN
IP address of CN
TTL
IP identification
lay. 4 prot. IP checksum
flags fragment offset
length
DS (TOS)
ver. IHL
TCP/UDP/ ... payload
Encapsulation II
• Minimal encapsulation (optional)
• avoids repetition of identical fields
• e.g. TTL, IHL, version, DS (RFC 2474, old: TOS)
• only applicable for non fragmented packets, no space left for
fragment identification
care-of address COA
IP address of HA
TTL
IP identification
min. encap. IP checksum
flags fragment offset
length
DS (TOS)
ver. IHL
IP address of MN
original sender IP address (if S=1)
S
lay. 4 protoc. IP checksum
TCP/UDP/ ... payload
reserved
Generic Routing Encapsulation
original
header
original data
new data
new header
outer header
GRE
header
original data
original
header
Care-of address COA
IP address of HA
TTL
IP identification
GRE IP checksum
flags fragment offset
length
DS (TOS)
ver. IHL
IP address of MN
IP address of CN
TTL
IP identification
lay. 4 prot. IP checksum
flags fragment offset
length
DS (TOS)
ver. IHL
TCP/UDP/ ... payload
routing (optional)
sequence number (optional)
key (optional)
offset (optional)
checksum (optional)
protocol
rec. rsv. ver.
CRK S s
RFC 1701
RFC 2784 (updated by 2890)
reserved1 (=0)
checksum (optional)
protocol
reserved0 ver.
C
Optimization of packet forwarding
• Problem: Triangular Routing
• sender sends all packets via HA to MN
• higher latency and network load
• “Solutions”
• sender learns the current location of MN
• direct tunneling to this location
• HA informs a sender about the location of MN
• big security problems!
• Change of FA
• packets on-the-fly during the change can be lost
• new FA informs old FA to avoid packet loss, old FA now
forwards remaining packets to new FA
• this information also enables the old FA to release resources
for the MN
Change of foreign agent
CN HA FAold FAnew MN
MN changes
location
t
Data Data Data
Update
ACK
Data Data
Registration
Update
ACK
Data
Data Data
Warning
Request
Update
ACK
Data
Data
Reverse tunneling (RFC 3024, was:
2344)
Internet
receiver
FA
HA
MN
home network
foreign
network
sender
3
2
1
1. MN sends to FA
2. FA tunnels packets to HA
by encapsulation
3. HA forwards the packet to the
receiver (standard case)
CN
Mobile IP with reverse tunneling
• Router accept often only “topological correct“ addresses
(firewall!)
• a packet from the MN encapsulated by the FA is now topological
correct
• furthermore multicast and TTL problems solved (TTL in the home
network correct, but MN is to far away from the receiver)
• Reverse tunneling does not solve
• problems with firewalls, the reverse tunnel can be abused to
circumvent security mechanisms (tunnel hijacking)
• optimization of data paths, i.e. packets will be forwarded through
the tunnel via the HA to a sender (double triangular routing)
• The standard is backwards compatible
• the extensions can be implemented easily and cooperate with
current implementations without these extensions
• Agent Advertisements can carry requests for reverse tunneling
Mobile IP and IPv6 (RFC 3775)
• Mobile IP was developed for IPv4, but IPv6 simplifies the
protocols
• security is integrated and not an add-on, authentication of
registration is included
• COA can be assigned via auto-configuration (DHCPv6 is one
candidate), every node has address auto-configuration
• no need for a separate FA, all routers perform router
advertisement which can be used instead of the special
agent advertisement; addresses are always co-located
• MN can signal a sender directly the COA, sending via HA not
needed in this case (automatic path optimization)
• „soft“ hand-over, i.e. without packet loss, between two
subnets is supported
• MN sends the new COA to its old router
• the old router encapsulates all incoming packets for the MN and
forwards them to the new COA
• authentication is always granted
Problems with mobile IP
• Security
• authentication with FA problematic, for the FA typically
belongs to another organization
• no protocol for key management and key distribution has
been standardized in the Internet
• patent and export restrictions
• Firewalls
• typically mobile IP cannot be used together with firewalls,
special set-ups are needed (such as reverse tunneling)
• QoS
• many new reservations in case of RSVP
• tunneling makes it hard to give a flow of packets a special
treatment needed for the QoS
• Security, firewalls, QoS etc. are topics of research and
discussions
Security in Mobile IP
• Security requirements (Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol, RFC 4301, was: 1825, 2401)
• Integrity
any changes to data between sender and receiver can be
detected by the receiver
• Authentication
sender address is really the address of the sender and all
data received is really data sent by this sender
• Confidentiality
only sender and receiver can read the data
• Non-Repudiation
sender cannot deny sending of data
• Traffic Analysis
creation of traffic and user profiles should not be possible
• Replay Protection
receivers can detect replay of messages
IP Micro-mobility support
• Micro-mobility support:
• Efficient local handover inside a foreign domain
without involving a home agent
• Reduces control traffic on backbone
• Especially needed in case of route optimization
• Example approaches (research, not products):
• Cellular IP
• HAWAII
• Hierarchical Mobile IP (HMIP)
• Important criteria:
Security Efficiency, Scalability, Transparency,
Manageability
Cellular IP
• Operation:
• “CIP Nodes” maintain routing
entries (soft state) for MNs
• Multiple entries possible
• Routing entries updated
based on packets sent by MN
• CIP Gateway:
• Mobile IP tunnel endpoint
• Initial registration processing
• Security provisions:
• all CIP Nodes share
“network key”
• MN key: MD5(net key, IP
addr)
• MN gets key upon
registration
CIP Gateway
Internet
BS
MN1
data/control
packets
from MN 1
Mobile IP
BS
BS
MN2
packets from
MN2 to MN 1
Cellular IP: Security
• Advantages:
• Initial registration involves authentication of MNs
and is processed centrally by CIP Gateway
• All control messages by MNs are authenticated
• Replay-protection (using timestamps)
• Potential problems:
• MNs can directly influence routing entries
• Network key known to many entities
(increases risk of compromise)
• No re-keying mechanisms for network key
• No choice of algorithm (always MD5, prefix+suffix mode)
• Proprietary mechanisms (not, e.g., IPSec AH)
HAWAII
• Operation:
• MN obtains co-located COA
and registers with HA
• Handover: MN keeps COA,
new BS answers Reg.
Request
and updates routers
• MN views BS as foreign
agent
• Security provisions:
• MN-FA authentication
mandatory
• Challenge/Response
Extensions mandatory
BS
1
2
3
Backbone
Router
Internet
BS
MN
BS
MN
Crossover
Router
DHCP
Server
HA
DHCP
Mobile IP
Mobile IP
1
2
4
3
4
HAWAII: Security
• Advantages:
• Mutual authentication and C/R extensions mandatory
• Only infrastructure components can influence routing entries
• Potential problems:
• Co-located COA raises DHCP security issues
(DHCP has no strong authentication)
• Decentralized security-critical functionality
(Mobile IP registration processing during handover)
in base stations
• Authentication of HAWAII protocol messages unspecified
(potential attackers: stationary nodes in foreign network)
• MN authentication requires PKI or AAA infrastructure
Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (RFC 4140)
• Operation:
• Network contains mobility
anchor point (MAP)
• mapping of regional COA
(RCOA) to link COA (LCOA)
• Upon handover, MN informs
MAP only
• gets new LCOA, keeps RCOA
• HA is only contacted if MAP
changes
• Security provisions:
• no HMIP-specific
security provisions
• binding updates should be
authenticated
MAP
Internet
AR
MN
AR
MN
HA
binding
update
RCOA
LCOAold
LCOAnew
Hierarchical Mobile IP: Security
• Advantages:
• Local COAs can be hidden,
which provides at least some location privacy
• Direct routing between CNs sharing the same link is possible
(but might be dangerous)
• Potential problems:
• Decentralized security-critical functionality
(handover processing) in mobility anchor points
• MNs can (must!) directly influence routing entries via binding
updates (authentication necessary)
DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol
• Application
• simplification of installation and maintenance of networked
computers
• supplies systems with all necessary information, such as IP
address, DNS server address, domain name, subnet mask,
default router etc.
• enables automatic integration of systems into an Intranet or
the Internet, can be used to acquire a COA for Mobile IP
• Client/Server-Model
• the client sends via a MAC broadcast a request to the DHCP
server (might be via a DHCP relay)
client relay
client
server
DHCPDISCOVER
DHCPDISCOVER
DHCP - protocol mechanisms
server
(not selected)
client server
(selected)
initialization
collection of replies
selection of configuration
initialization completed
release
confirmation of
configuration
delete context
determine the
configuration
DHCPDISCOVER
DHCPOFFER
DHCPREQUEST
(reject)
DHCPACK
DHCPRELEASE
DHCPDISCOVER
DHCPOFFER
DHCPREQUEST
(options)
determine the
configuration
DHCP characteristics
• Server
• several servers can be configured for DHCP, coordination not
yet standardized (i.e., manual configuration)
• Renewal of configurations
• IP addresses have to be requested periodically, simplified
protocol
• Options
• available for routers, subnet mask, NTP (network time
protocol) timeserver, SLP (service location protocol)
directory, DNS (domain name system)
Mobile ad hoc networks
• Standard Mobile IP needs an infrastructure
• Home Agent/Foreign Agent in the fixed network
• DNS, routing etc. are not designed for mobility
• Sometimes there is no infrastructure!
• remote areas, ad-hoc meetings, disaster areas
• cost can also be an argument against an infrastructure!
• Main topic: routing
• no default router available
• every node should be able to forward
A B C
Solution: Wireless ad-hoc networks
• Network without infrastructure
• Use components of participants for networking
• Examples
• Single-hop: All partners max. one hop apart
• Bluetooth piconet, PDAs in a room,
gaming devices…
• Multi-hop: Cover larger distances,
circumvent obstacles
• Bluetooth scatternet, TETRA police network,
car-to-car networks…
• Internet: MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Networking) group
Manet: Mobile Ad-hoc Networking
Fixed
Network
Mobile
Devices
Mobile
Router
Manet
Mobile IP,
DHCP
Router End system
Problem No. 1: Routing
• Highly dynamic network topology
• Device mobility plus varying channel quality
• Separation and merging of networks possible
• Asymmetric connections possible
good link
weak link
time = t1 time = t2
N1
N4
N2
N5
N3
N1
N4
N2
N5
N3
N6
N7
N6
N7
Traditional routing algorithms
• Distance Vector
• periodic exchange of messages with all physical neighbors
that contain information about who can be reached at what
distance
• selection of the shortest path if several paths available
• Link State
• periodic notification of all routers about the current state of
all physical links
• router get a complete picture of the network
• Example
• ARPA packet radio network (1973), DV-Routing
• every 7.5s exchange of routing tables including link quality
• updating of tables also by reception of packets
• routing problems solved with limited flooding
Routing in ad-hoc networks
• THE big topic in many research projects
• Far more than 50 different proposals exist
• The most simplest one: Flooding!
• Reasons
• Classical approaches from fixed networks fail
• Very slow convergence, large overhead
• High dynamicity, low bandwidth, low computing power
• Metrics for routing
• Minimal
• Number of nodes, loss rate, delay, congestion, interference …
• Maximal
• Stability of the logical network, battery run-time, time of
connectivity …
Problems of traditional routing
algorithms
• Dynamic of the topology
• frequent changes of connections, connection quality,
participants
• Limited performance of mobile systems
• periodic updates of routing tables need energy without
contributing to the transmission of user data, sleep modes
difficult to realize
• limited bandwidth of the system is reduced even more due
to the exchange of routing information
• links can be asymmetric, i.e., they can have a direction
dependent transmission quality
DSDV (Destination Sequenced
Distance Vector, historical)
• Early work
• on demand version: AODV
• Expansion of distance vector routing
• Sequence numbers for all routing updates
• assures in-order execution of all updates
• avoids loops and inconsistencies
• Decrease of update frequency
• store time between first and best announcement of a path
• inhibit update if it seems to be unstable (based on the stored
time values)
Dynamic source routing (DSR)
• Reactive routing protocol
• 2 phases, operating both on demand:
• Route discovery
• Used only when source S attempts to to send a packet to
destination D
• Based on flooding of Route Requests (RREQ)
• Route maintenance
• makes S able to detect, while using a source route to D, if it can
no longer use its route (because a link along that route no
longer works)
DSR: Route discovery (1)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
DSR: Route discovery (2)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
(S)
DSR: Route discovery (3)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
(S,A)
(S,E)
DSR: Route discovery (4)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
(S,E,G)
(S,B,C)
DSR: Route discovery (5)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
(S,E,G,J)
(S,A,F,H)
DSR: Route discovery (6)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
(S,A,F,H,K)
DSR: Route discovery (7)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
(S,A,F,H,K,P)
DSR: Route discovery (8)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
RREP(S,E,G,J,D)
DSR: Route Discovery (9)
• Route reply by reversing the route (as illustrated) works
only if all the links along the route are bidirectional
• If unidirectional links are allowed, then RREP may need a
route discovery from D to S
• Note: IEEE 802.11 assumes that links are bidirectional
DSR: Data delivery
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
DATA(S,E,G,J,D)
DSR: Route maintenance (1)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
DATA(S,E,G,J,D)
X
DSR: Route maintenance (2)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
X
RERR(G-J)
When receiving the Route Error message (RERR),
S removes the broken link from its cache.
It then tries another route stored in its cache; if none,
it initializes a new route discovery
DSR: Optimization of route discovery: route
caching
• Principle: each node caches a new route it learns by any
means
• Examples
• When node S finds route (S, E, G, J, D) to D, it also learns
route (S, E, G) to node G
• In the same way, node E learns the route to D
• Same phenomenon when transmitting route replies
• Moreover, routes can be overheard by nodes in the
neighbourhood
• However, route caching has its downside: stale caches
can severely hamper the performance of the network
DSR: Strengths
• Routes are set up and maintained only between nodes
who need to communicate
• Route caching can further reduce the effort of route
discovery
• A single route discovery may provide several routes to the
destination
DSR: Weaknesses
• Route requests tend to flood the network and generally
reach all the nodes of the network
• Because of source routing, the packet header size grows
with the route lengh
• Risk of many collisions between route requests by
neighboring nodes  need for random delays before
forwarding RREQ
• Similar problem for the RREP (Route Reply storm
problem), in case links are not bidirectional
Note: Location-aided routing may help reducing the number
of useless control messages
Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing
(AODV)
• As it is based on source routing, DSR includes source
routes in data packet headers
• Large packet headers in DSR  risk of poor performance
if the number of hops is high
• AODV uses a route discovery mechanism similar to DSR,
but it maintains routing tables at the nodes
• AODV ages the routes and maintains a hop count
• AODV assumes that all links are bi-directional
AODV : Route discovery (1)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
AODV : Route discovery (2)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
Note: if one of the intermediate nodes (e.g., A)
knows a route to D, it responds immediately to S
: Route Request (RREQ)
AODV : Route discovery (3)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
: represents a link on the reverse path
AODV : Route discovery (4)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
AODV : Route discovery (5)
E G
M
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
D
S
K
N
L
P
J
Q
AODV : Route discovery (6)
M
D
K
L
P
J
E G
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
S
N
Q
AODV : Route discovery (7)
M
D
K
L
P
J
E G
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
S
N
Q
AODV : Route reply and setup of the forward
path
M
D
K
L
P
J
E G
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
S
N
Q
: Link over which the RREP is transmitted
: Forward path
Route reply in AODV
• In case it knows a path more recent than the one
previously known to sender S, an intermediate node may
also send a route reply (RREP)
• The freshness of a path is assessed by means of
destination sequence numbers
• Both reverse and forward paths are purged at the
expiration of appropriately chosen timeout intervals
AODV : Data delivery
M
D
K
L
P
J
E G
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
S
N
Q
Data
The route is not included in the packet header
AODV : Route maintenance (1)
M
D
K
L
P
J
E G
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
S
N
Q
Data
X
AODV : Route maintenance (2)
M
D
K
L
P
J
E G
H
R
F
A
B
C
I
S
N
Q
X
RERR(G-J)
When receiving the Route Error message (RERR),
S removes the broken link from its cache.
It then initializes a new route discovery.
AODV: Destination sequence
numbers
• If the destination responds to RREP, it places its
current sequence number in the packet
• If an intermediate node responds, it places its
record of the destination’s sequence number in the
packet
• Purpose of sequence numbers:
• Avoid using stale information about routes
• Avoid loops (no source routing!)
AODV : Avoiding the usage of stale routing
tables
S D
A
B
DSN(D) = 5
: Forward path
S
D
A
B
DSN(D) = 5
… …
DSN(D) = 8
1.
2.
S
D
A
B
DSN(D) = 5
…
DSN(D) = 8
3.
RREQ
S
D
A
B
DSN(D) = 5
…
DSN(D) = 8
RREP
4.
AODV : Avoiding loops
A B S D
C
: Forward path
• Assume there is a route between A and D; link S-D breaks; assume A is not aware of this, e.g. because
RERR sent by S is lost
• Assume now S wants to send to D. It performs a RREQ, which can be received by A via path S-C-A
• Node A will reply since it knows a route to D via node B
• This would result in a loop (S-C-A-B-S)
• The presence of sequence numbers will let S discover that the routing information from A is outdated
• Principle: when S discovers that link S-D is broken, it increments its local value of DSN(D). In this way,
the new local value will be greater than the one stored by A.
X
AODV (unicast) : Conclusion
• Nodes maintain routing information only for routes that
are in active use
• Unused routes expire even when the topology does not
change
• Each node maintains at most one next-hop per
destination
• Many comparisons with DSR (via simulation) have been
performed  no clear conclusion so far

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C08-Network_Protocols (1).ppt

  • 1. Mobile Communications Chapter 8: Network Protocols/Mobile IP • Motivation • Data transfer , Encapsulation • Security, IPv6, Problems • Micro mobility support • DHCP • Ad-hoc networks, Routing protocols
  • 2. Motivation for Mobile IP • Routing • based on IP destination address, network prefix (e.g. 129.13.42) determines physical subnet • change of physical subnet implies change of IP address to have a topological correct address (standard IP) or needs special entries in the routing tables • Specific routes to end-systems • change of all routing table entries to forward packets to the right destination • does not scale with the number of mobile hosts and frequent changes in the location, security problems • Changing the IP-address? • adjust the host IP address depending on the current location • almost impossible to find a mobile system, DNS updates take to long time • TCP connections break, security problems
  • 3. Requirements for Mobile IPv4 • Transparency • mobile end-systems keep their IP address • continuation of communication after interruption of link possible • point of connection to the fixed network can be changed • Compatibility • support of the same layer 2 protocols as IP • no changes to current end-systems and routers required • mobile end-systems can communicate with fixed systems • Security • authentication of all registration messages • Efficiency and scalability • only little additional messages to the mobile system required (connection typically via a low bandwidth radio link) • world-wide support of a large number of mobile systems in the whole Internet
  • 4. Terminology • Mobile Node (MN) • system (node) that can change the point of connection to the network without changing its IP address • Home Agent (HA) • system in the home network of the MN, typically a router • registers the location of the MN, tunnels IP datagrams to the COA • Foreign Agent (FA) • system in the current foreign network of the MN, typically a router • forwards the tunneled datagrams to the MN, typically also the default router for the MN • Care-of Address (COA) • address of the current tunnel end-point for the MN (at FA or MN) • actual location of the MN from an IP point of view • can be chosen, e.g., via DHCP • Correspondent Node (CN) • communication partner
  • 5. Example network mobile end-system Internet router router router end-system FA HA MN home network foreign network (physical home network for the MN) (current physical network for the MN) CN
  • 6. Data transfer to the mobile system Internet sender FA HA MN home network foreign network receiver 1 2 3 1. Sender sends to the IP address of MN, HA intercepts packet (proxy ARP) 2. HA tunnels packet to COA, here FA, by encapsulation 3. FA forwards the packet to the MN CN
  • 7. Data transfer from the mobile system Internet receiver FA HA MN home network foreign network sender 1 1. Sender sends to the IP address of the receiver as usual, FA works as default router CN
  • 9. Network integration • Agent Advertisement • HA and FA periodically send advertisement messages into their physical subnets • MN listens to these messages and detects, if it is in the home or a foreign network (standard case for home network) • MN reads a COA from the FA advertisement messages • Registration (always limited lifetime!) • MN signals COA to the HA via the FA, HA acknowledges via FA to MN • these actions have to be secured by authentication • Advertisement • HA advertises the IP address of the MN (as for fixed systems), i.e. standard routing information • routers adjust their entries, these are stable for a longer time (HA responsible for a MN over a longer period of time) • packets to the MN are sent to the HA, • independent of changes in COA/FA
  • 10. type = 16 length = 6 + 4 * #COAs R: registration required B: busy, no more registrations H: home agent F: foreign agent M: minimal encapsulation G: GRE encapsulation r: =0, ignored (former Van Jacobson compression) T: FA supports reverse tunneling reserved: =0, ignored Agent advertisement preference level 1 router address 1 #addresses type addr. size lifetime checksum COA 1 COA 2 type = 16 sequence number length 0 7 8 15 16 31 24 23 code preference level 2 router address 2 . . . registration lifetime . . . R B H F M G r reserved T
  • 12. Mobile IP registration request home agent home address type = 1 lifetime 0 7 8 15 16 31 24 23 T x identification COA extensions . . . S B DMG r S: simultaneous bindings B: broadcast datagrams D: decapsulation by MN M mininal encapsulation G: GRE encapsulation r: =0, ignored T: reverse tunneling requested x: =0, ignored
  • 13. Mobile IP registration reply home agent home address type = 3 lifetime 0 7 8 15 16 31 code identification extensions . . . Example codes: registration successful 0 registration accepted 1 registration accepted, but simultaneous mobility bindings unsupported registration denied by FA 65 administratively prohibited 66 insufficient resources 67 mobile node failed authentication 68 home agent failed authentication 69 requested Lifetime too long registration denied by HA 129 administratively prohibited 131 mobile node failed authentication 133 registration Identification mismatch 135 too many simultaneous mobility bindings
  • 14. Encapsulation original IP header original data new data new IP header outer header inner header original data
  • 15. Encapsulation I • Encapsulation of one packet into another as payload • e.g. IPv6 in IPv4 (6Bone), Multicast in Unicast (Mbone) • here: e.g. IP-in-IP-encapsulation, minimal encapsulation or GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) • IP-in-IP-encapsulation (mandatory, RFC 2003) • tunnel between HA and COA Care-of address COA IP address of HA TTL IP identification IP-in-IP IP checksum flags fragment offset length DS (TOS) ver. IHL IP address of MN IP address of CN TTL IP identification lay. 4 prot. IP checksum flags fragment offset length DS (TOS) ver. IHL TCP/UDP/ ... payload
  • 16. Encapsulation II • Minimal encapsulation (optional) • avoids repetition of identical fields • e.g. TTL, IHL, version, DS (RFC 2474, old: TOS) • only applicable for non fragmented packets, no space left for fragment identification care-of address COA IP address of HA TTL IP identification min. encap. IP checksum flags fragment offset length DS (TOS) ver. IHL IP address of MN original sender IP address (if S=1) S lay. 4 protoc. IP checksum TCP/UDP/ ... payload reserved
  • 17. Generic Routing Encapsulation original header original data new data new header outer header GRE header original data original header Care-of address COA IP address of HA TTL IP identification GRE IP checksum flags fragment offset length DS (TOS) ver. IHL IP address of MN IP address of CN TTL IP identification lay. 4 prot. IP checksum flags fragment offset length DS (TOS) ver. IHL TCP/UDP/ ... payload routing (optional) sequence number (optional) key (optional) offset (optional) checksum (optional) protocol rec. rsv. ver. CRK S s RFC 1701 RFC 2784 (updated by 2890) reserved1 (=0) checksum (optional) protocol reserved0 ver. C
  • 18. Optimization of packet forwarding • Problem: Triangular Routing • sender sends all packets via HA to MN • higher latency and network load • “Solutions” • sender learns the current location of MN • direct tunneling to this location • HA informs a sender about the location of MN • big security problems! • Change of FA • packets on-the-fly during the change can be lost • new FA informs old FA to avoid packet loss, old FA now forwards remaining packets to new FA • this information also enables the old FA to release resources for the MN
  • 19. Change of foreign agent CN HA FAold FAnew MN MN changes location t Data Data Data Update ACK Data Data Registration Update ACK Data Data Data Warning Request Update ACK Data Data
  • 20. Reverse tunneling (RFC 3024, was: 2344) Internet receiver FA HA MN home network foreign network sender 3 2 1 1. MN sends to FA 2. FA tunnels packets to HA by encapsulation 3. HA forwards the packet to the receiver (standard case) CN
  • 21. Mobile IP with reverse tunneling • Router accept often only “topological correct“ addresses (firewall!) • a packet from the MN encapsulated by the FA is now topological correct • furthermore multicast and TTL problems solved (TTL in the home network correct, but MN is to far away from the receiver) • Reverse tunneling does not solve • problems with firewalls, the reverse tunnel can be abused to circumvent security mechanisms (tunnel hijacking) • optimization of data paths, i.e. packets will be forwarded through the tunnel via the HA to a sender (double triangular routing) • The standard is backwards compatible • the extensions can be implemented easily and cooperate with current implementations without these extensions • Agent Advertisements can carry requests for reverse tunneling
  • 22. Mobile IP and IPv6 (RFC 3775) • Mobile IP was developed for IPv4, but IPv6 simplifies the protocols • security is integrated and not an add-on, authentication of registration is included • COA can be assigned via auto-configuration (DHCPv6 is one candidate), every node has address auto-configuration • no need for a separate FA, all routers perform router advertisement which can be used instead of the special agent advertisement; addresses are always co-located • MN can signal a sender directly the COA, sending via HA not needed in this case (automatic path optimization) • „soft“ hand-over, i.e. without packet loss, between two subnets is supported • MN sends the new COA to its old router • the old router encapsulates all incoming packets for the MN and forwards them to the new COA • authentication is always granted
  • 23. Problems with mobile IP • Security • authentication with FA problematic, for the FA typically belongs to another organization • no protocol for key management and key distribution has been standardized in the Internet • patent and export restrictions • Firewalls • typically mobile IP cannot be used together with firewalls, special set-ups are needed (such as reverse tunneling) • QoS • many new reservations in case of RSVP • tunneling makes it hard to give a flow of packets a special treatment needed for the QoS • Security, firewalls, QoS etc. are topics of research and discussions
  • 24. Security in Mobile IP • Security requirements (Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, RFC 4301, was: 1825, 2401) • Integrity any changes to data between sender and receiver can be detected by the receiver • Authentication sender address is really the address of the sender and all data received is really data sent by this sender • Confidentiality only sender and receiver can read the data • Non-Repudiation sender cannot deny sending of data • Traffic Analysis creation of traffic and user profiles should not be possible • Replay Protection receivers can detect replay of messages
  • 25. IP Micro-mobility support • Micro-mobility support: • Efficient local handover inside a foreign domain without involving a home agent • Reduces control traffic on backbone • Especially needed in case of route optimization • Example approaches (research, not products): • Cellular IP • HAWAII • Hierarchical Mobile IP (HMIP) • Important criteria: Security Efficiency, Scalability, Transparency, Manageability
  • 26. Cellular IP • Operation: • “CIP Nodes” maintain routing entries (soft state) for MNs • Multiple entries possible • Routing entries updated based on packets sent by MN • CIP Gateway: • Mobile IP tunnel endpoint • Initial registration processing • Security provisions: • all CIP Nodes share “network key” • MN key: MD5(net key, IP addr) • MN gets key upon registration CIP Gateway Internet BS MN1 data/control packets from MN 1 Mobile IP BS BS MN2 packets from MN2 to MN 1
  • 27. Cellular IP: Security • Advantages: • Initial registration involves authentication of MNs and is processed centrally by CIP Gateway • All control messages by MNs are authenticated • Replay-protection (using timestamps) • Potential problems: • MNs can directly influence routing entries • Network key known to many entities (increases risk of compromise) • No re-keying mechanisms for network key • No choice of algorithm (always MD5, prefix+suffix mode) • Proprietary mechanisms (not, e.g., IPSec AH)
  • 28. HAWAII • Operation: • MN obtains co-located COA and registers with HA • Handover: MN keeps COA, new BS answers Reg. Request and updates routers • MN views BS as foreign agent • Security provisions: • MN-FA authentication mandatory • Challenge/Response Extensions mandatory BS 1 2 3 Backbone Router Internet BS MN BS MN Crossover Router DHCP Server HA DHCP Mobile IP Mobile IP 1 2 4 3 4
  • 29. HAWAII: Security • Advantages: • Mutual authentication and C/R extensions mandatory • Only infrastructure components can influence routing entries • Potential problems: • Co-located COA raises DHCP security issues (DHCP has no strong authentication) • Decentralized security-critical functionality (Mobile IP registration processing during handover) in base stations • Authentication of HAWAII protocol messages unspecified (potential attackers: stationary nodes in foreign network) • MN authentication requires PKI or AAA infrastructure
  • 30. Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (RFC 4140) • Operation: • Network contains mobility anchor point (MAP) • mapping of regional COA (RCOA) to link COA (LCOA) • Upon handover, MN informs MAP only • gets new LCOA, keeps RCOA • HA is only contacted if MAP changes • Security provisions: • no HMIP-specific security provisions • binding updates should be authenticated MAP Internet AR MN AR MN HA binding update RCOA LCOAold LCOAnew
  • 31. Hierarchical Mobile IP: Security • Advantages: • Local COAs can be hidden, which provides at least some location privacy • Direct routing between CNs sharing the same link is possible (but might be dangerous) • Potential problems: • Decentralized security-critical functionality (handover processing) in mobility anchor points • MNs can (must!) directly influence routing entries via binding updates (authentication necessary)
  • 32. DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol • Application • simplification of installation and maintenance of networked computers • supplies systems with all necessary information, such as IP address, DNS server address, domain name, subnet mask, default router etc. • enables automatic integration of systems into an Intranet or the Internet, can be used to acquire a COA for Mobile IP • Client/Server-Model • the client sends via a MAC broadcast a request to the DHCP server (might be via a DHCP relay) client relay client server DHCPDISCOVER DHCPDISCOVER
  • 33. DHCP - protocol mechanisms server (not selected) client server (selected) initialization collection of replies selection of configuration initialization completed release confirmation of configuration delete context determine the configuration DHCPDISCOVER DHCPOFFER DHCPREQUEST (reject) DHCPACK DHCPRELEASE DHCPDISCOVER DHCPOFFER DHCPREQUEST (options) determine the configuration
  • 34. DHCP characteristics • Server • several servers can be configured for DHCP, coordination not yet standardized (i.e., manual configuration) • Renewal of configurations • IP addresses have to be requested periodically, simplified protocol • Options • available for routers, subnet mask, NTP (network time protocol) timeserver, SLP (service location protocol) directory, DNS (domain name system)
  • 35. Mobile ad hoc networks • Standard Mobile IP needs an infrastructure • Home Agent/Foreign Agent in the fixed network • DNS, routing etc. are not designed for mobility • Sometimes there is no infrastructure! • remote areas, ad-hoc meetings, disaster areas • cost can also be an argument against an infrastructure! • Main topic: routing • no default router available • every node should be able to forward A B C
  • 36. Solution: Wireless ad-hoc networks • Network without infrastructure • Use components of participants for networking • Examples • Single-hop: All partners max. one hop apart • Bluetooth piconet, PDAs in a room, gaming devices… • Multi-hop: Cover larger distances, circumvent obstacles • Bluetooth scatternet, TETRA police network, car-to-car networks… • Internet: MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Networking) group
  • 37. Manet: Mobile Ad-hoc Networking Fixed Network Mobile Devices Mobile Router Manet Mobile IP, DHCP Router End system
  • 38. Problem No. 1: Routing • Highly dynamic network topology • Device mobility plus varying channel quality • Separation and merging of networks possible • Asymmetric connections possible good link weak link time = t1 time = t2 N1 N4 N2 N5 N3 N1 N4 N2 N5 N3 N6 N7 N6 N7
  • 39. Traditional routing algorithms • Distance Vector • periodic exchange of messages with all physical neighbors that contain information about who can be reached at what distance • selection of the shortest path if several paths available • Link State • periodic notification of all routers about the current state of all physical links • router get a complete picture of the network • Example • ARPA packet radio network (1973), DV-Routing • every 7.5s exchange of routing tables including link quality • updating of tables also by reception of packets • routing problems solved with limited flooding
  • 40. Routing in ad-hoc networks • THE big topic in many research projects • Far more than 50 different proposals exist • The most simplest one: Flooding! • Reasons • Classical approaches from fixed networks fail • Very slow convergence, large overhead • High dynamicity, low bandwidth, low computing power • Metrics for routing • Minimal • Number of nodes, loss rate, delay, congestion, interference … • Maximal • Stability of the logical network, battery run-time, time of connectivity …
  • 41. Problems of traditional routing algorithms • Dynamic of the topology • frequent changes of connections, connection quality, participants • Limited performance of mobile systems • periodic updates of routing tables need energy without contributing to the transmission of user data, sleep modes difficult to realize • limited bandwidth of the system is reduced even more due to the exchange of routing information • links can be asymmetric, i.e., they can have a direction dependent transmission quality
  • 42. DSDV (Destination Sequenced Distance Vector, historical) • Early work • on demand version: AODV • Expansion of distance vector routing • Sequence numbers for all routing updates • assures in-order execution of all updates • avoids loops and inconsistencies • Decrease of update frequency • store time between first and best announcement of a path • inhibit update if it seems to be unstable (based on the stored time values)
  • 43. Dynamic source routing (DSR) • Reactive routing protocol • 2 phases, operating both on demand: • Route discovery • Used only when source S attempts to to send a packet to destination D • Based on flooding of Route Requests (RREQ) • Route maintenance • makes S able to detect, while using a source route to D, if it can no longer use its route (because a link along that route no longer works)
  • 44. DSR: Route discovery (1) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q
  • 45. DSR: Route discovery (2) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q (S)
  • 46. DSR: Route discovery (3) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q (S,A) (S,E)
  • 47. DSR: Route discovery (4) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q (S,E,G) (S,B,C)
  • 48. DSR: Route discovery (5) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q (S,E,G,J) (S,A,F,H)
  • 49. DSR: Route discovery (6) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q (S,A,F,H,K)
  • 50. DSR: Route discovery (7) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q (S,A,F,H,K,P)
  • 51. DSR: Route discovery (8) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q RREP(S,E,G,J,D)
  • 52. DSR: Route Discovery (9) • Route reply by reversing the route (as illustrated) works only if all the links along the route are bidirectional • If unidirectional links are allowed, then RREP may need a route discovery from D to S • Note: IEEE 802.11 assumes that links are bidirectional
  • 53. DSR: Data delivery E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q DATA(S,E,G,J,D)
  • 54. DSR: Route maintenance (1) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q DATA(S,E,G,J,D) X
  • 55. DSR: Route maintenance (2) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q X RERR(G-J) When receiving the Route Error message (RERR), S removes the broken link from its cache. It then tries another route stored in its cache; if none, it initializes a new route discovery
  • 56. DSR: Optimization of route discovery: route caching • Principle: each node caches a new route it learns by any means • Examples • When node S finds route (S, E, G, J, D) to D, it also learns route (S, E, G) to node G • In the same way, node E learns the route to D • Same phenomenon when transmitting route replies • Moreover, routes can be overheard by nodes in the neighbourhood • However, route caching has its downside: stale caches can severely hamper the performance of the network
  • 57. DSR: Strengths • Routes are set up and maintained only between nodes who need to communicate • Route caching can further reduce the effort of route discovery • A single route discovery may provide several routes to the destination
  • 58. DSR: Weaknesses • Route requests tend to flood the network and generally reach all the nodes of the network • Because of source routing, the packet header size grows with the route lengh • Risk of many collisions between route requests by neighboring nodes  need for random delays before forwarding RREQ • Similar problem for the RREP (Route Reply storm problem), in case links are not bidirectional Note: Location-aided routing may help reducing the number of useless control messages
  • 59. Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) • As it is based on source routing, DSR includes source routes in data packet headers • Large packet headers in DSR  risk of poor performance if the number of hops is high • AODV uses a route discovery mechanism similar to DSR, but it maintains routing tables at the nodes • AODV ages the routes and maintains a hop count • AODV assumes that all links are bi-directional
  • 60. AODV : Route discovery (1) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q
  • 61. AODV : Route discovery (2) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q Note: if one of the intermediate nodes (e.g., A) knows a route to D, it responds immediately to S : Route Request (RREQ)
  • 62. AODV : Route discovery (3) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q : represents a link on the reverse path
  • 63. AODV : Route discovery (4) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q
  • 64. AODV : Route discovery (5) E G M H R F A B C I D S K N L P J Q
  • 65. AODV : Route discovery (6) M D K L P J E G H R F A B C I S N Q
  • 66. AODV : Route discovery (7) M D K L P J E G H R F A B C I S N Q
  • 67. AODV : Route reply and setup of the forward path M D K L P J E G H R F A B C I S N Q : Link over which the RREP is transmitted : Forward path
  • 68. Route reply in AODV • In case it knows a path more recent than the one previously known to sender S, an intermediate node may also send a route reply (RREP) • The freshness of a path is assessed by means of destination sequence numbers • Both reverse and forward paths are purged at the expiration of appropriately chosen timeout intervals
  • 69. AODV : Data delivery M D K L P J E G H R F A B C I S N Q Data The route is not included in the packet header
  • 70. AODV : Route maintenance (1) M D K L P J E G H R F A B C I S N Q Data X
  • 71. AODV : Route maintenance (2) M D K L P J E G H R F A B C I S N Q X RERR(G-J) When receiving the Route Error message (RERR), S removes the broken link from its cache. It then initializes a new route discovery.
  • 72. AODV: Destination sequence numbers • If the destination responds to RREP, it places its current sequence number in the packet • If an intermediate node responds, it places its record of the destination’s sequence number in the packet • Purpose of sequence numbers: • Avoid using stale information about routes • Avoid loops (no source routing!)
  • 73. AODV : Avoiding the usage of stale routing tables S D A B DSN(D) = 5 : Forward path S D A B DSN(D) = 5 … … DSN(D) = 8 1. 2. S D A B DSN(D) = 5 … DSN(D) = 8 3. RREQ S D A B DSN(D) = 5 … DSN(D) = 8 RREP 4.
  • 74. AODV : Avoiding loops A B S D C : Forward path • Assume there is a route between A and D; link S-D breaks; assume A is not aware of this, e.g. because RERR sent by S is lost • Assume now S wants to send to D. It performs a RREQ, which can be received by A via path S-C-A • Node A will reply since it knows a route to D via node B • This would result in a loop (S-C-A-B-S) • The presence of sequence numbers will let S discover that the routing information from A is outdated • Principle: when S discovers that link S-D is broken, it increments its local value of DSN(D). In this way, the new local value will be greater than the one stored by A. X
  • 75. AODV (unicast) : Conclusion • Nodes maintain routing information only for routes that are in active use • Unused routes expire even when the topology does not change • Each node maintains at most one next-hop per destination • Many comparisons with DSR (via simulation) have been performed  no clear conclusion so far

Editor's Notes

  1. Mobilkommunikation SS 1998