Revolutionary Terrorism and the Tupamaros

REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM AND COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY 1
Revolutionary Terrorism and Counterrevolutionary Terrorism
Michael Schuster
State University of New York College at Oswego
Terrorism and Homeland Security
Professor Brand
April 25, 2014

Abstract
This paper attempts to establish the environmental factors in which revolutions occur, utilizing
the history and actions of the Tupamaros. It further discusses how the Tupamaros created a
structural model for modern terrorist groups today. Although the group had once rivaled
governmental power, they alienated the people from their cause, which proved to be their
downfall. As the citizens strengthened the government’s power through their support,
vulnerabilities began to develop within the Tupamaro organization that proved to be their
downfall once the government began torturing prisoners. Through the use of more repressive
actions, governments can alienate the citizens from their cause. The determining factor for who
will win, the revolutionary terrorists or the counter revolutionary terrorists, lies with whom the
people are supporting.

Revolutionary Terrorism and Counterrevolutionary Terrorism
Originally defined by 18th century philosopher Edmund Burke during France’s Reign of
Terror (1794-1795) the notion of terrorism has changed over the past 220 years. His use of the
term referred to the repressive acts of the French government led by Napoleon Bonaparte as a
means to quell the French Revolution. In 1807 Napoleon invaded Spain, who could not fight
them conventionally. Instead they murdered off duty soldiers and utilized hit and run tactics
resulting in the French regarding them as terrorists. “Thus, the meaning of terrorism shifted away
from governmental repression to the resistance of some people to governments”. (White, 2014 p
9) During the 1800s Mikhail Bakunin called for the use of bombings and assassinations as a
means to bring about the changes anarchists like himself desired, claiming nonviolent anarchy
would not work. Radical German democrat Karl Heinzen took Bakunin’s belief one step further
by advocating violent action to be the best form of propaganda. Shortly following World War 1
(WW1) terrorism would be shaped towards what we know it as today. In Russia under Vladimir
Lenin and Leon Trotsky, as well as under Joseph Stalin, terrorism was used to control and scare
the people into not revolting. Brought about by the economic hardships faced in Uruguay, the
world witnessed the rise of the National Liberation Movement (MLN) later termed the
Tupamaros in 1963. The Tupamaros were the first to take guerilla warfare inside city walls and
are a model for many terrorist organizations out there today. (White, p 253) An analysis of their
history and ideology illustrates how revolutionary terrorist movements take root, grow and
wither or prosper against the governments they are revolting against.
Originally called the National Liberation Movement (MLN), the Tupamaros came to
power as a result of Uruguay’s economic collapse. As members of the middle class, primarily

sugar workers, took the brunt of the economic hardship, agitation amongst the workers festered,
the workers unionized and demanded for land expropriation and redistribution. In an effort to
gain acknowledgement and legitimization the organization moved to Uruguay’s capital,
Montevideo. The Uruguayan government considered the marchers to be revolutionaries, as
police clashed with sugar workers, resulting in the arrest of several union members. Of those
arrested was Tupamaro founder Raúl Sendic. Following his release a year later, Sendic
formulated a plot to bring about political and social change within the country. Sendic and his
followers believed Uruguay’s economic downfall was not due political or economic variables,
but to its capitalistic system. Despite being a model of Latin American government and one of
Latin America’s most promising developing countries, its capitalistic system was still in its
infancy. When subjected to unfavorable variables within the market, the system could not meet
the requirements to keep its people content, generating favorable sociological conditions for
revolution. In accordance with communistic beliefs “Not the industrially more efficient but the
industrially less efficient country is compelled to discard Capitalism, to undergo a social
revolution, and to adopt the superior system of Communism, or an approximation of it, because
the less efficient capitalist country fails first in world competition.” (Reiss, 1922). With the 180o
economic turn, Uruguayan workers rationalized the need for drastic reform as a means to soothe
the socioeconomic woes faced by the hard hit working class. Tupamaros rationalized that current
government institutions were inadequate and worsening the situation with time. Second,
capitalism resulted in an increasing earnings gap between the rich and the poor. Third, that
output stagnation and inflation had resulted in Uruguay becoming politically and economically
dependent on industrialized countries such as France and the United States. They believed that
little could be accomplished through minor administrative reforms. Rather, they proposed "deep

structural change" that would affect the production, exchange and distribution of the country's
output (Porzecanski, 1973). According to Sendic the “deep structural change” the Tupamaros
desired could only be achieved through the usage of violence. It was viewed necessary because it
would shift power from the wealthy elite via land and income redistribution, which the
Uruguayan government would not permit or be capable of achieving such drastic changes. In
accordance with Professor Byrnes of Florida State University advocated a Robin Hood concept
of taking from the haves and giving to the have-nots. (Slight variation should be noted as they
also aimed to go against foreign interests) (White, 2006) & (Brum, 2013).
In an effort to make them listen, the union workers and their supporters marched into the
capital Montevideo to make their voices heard. However, Uruguay’s legislative and executive
branches ignored the movement’s plea for land expropriation and met them with police clashes.
Sendic and several other union members were arrested during the movement’s occupation of the
capital. During his year of imprisonment, Sendic was subjected to various forms of police
mistreatment, including torture. Upon his release, he went into hiding and began acquiring
supplies for the revolution. As mentioned by Porzecanski and White, the first step towards
revolution by Sendic and the MLN was raiding the Swiss Hunting Club outside of Montevideo.
As Porzecanski further notes, the Tupamaros (MLN) obtained their supplies through robbing the
bourgeois regarding them as the “natural fountains of their own destruction”. Within the
organization these robberies were termed expropriations. Specific targets included private &
government run banks & casinos, wealthy individuals, gun shops, private weapon collectors,
chemical & pharmaceutical manufacturing plants, and construction & demolition companies.
(1973, p 41)

The Tupamaros believed that survival of the urban guerilla was based solely on his urban
counterpart. This was why most of the cells within the Tupamaros were directed towards
servicing the guerillas, rather than conducting acts of violence. For Sendic acquiring resources
was just as crucial as recruiting. In their analysis of terrorist organizations, James Fraser & Ian
Fulton noted “It takes many more people to support terrorist operations than to carry them out;
therefore, the majority of people who work within terrorist organizations serve to keep them in
the field” (White 2012, p62). As with any organization, terrorist or not, it is crucial that the
Hardcore
Leadership
Active Cadre
Passive Supporters
Active Supporters
Figure 1 - MAJ. Chappel’s structural analysis of terrorist
organizations (Naval War College 2002)
organization be well financed and
well-structured if it is to succeed
long enough to achieve its goals.
The structure of a terrorist
organization or its regime
adversary can be viewed like a
pyramid as shown in Figure 1. The
pyramid model as used by MAJ.
Chappel illustrates how a terrorist
organization is generally
structured. However, structure is
altered to suit the organization’s
needs as the leadership deems fit.
How various terrorist
organizations structured their
hierarchy will be discussed later

on. This model gives a basic idea of where individuals fall in line, as well as their importance to
the group. Being at the top, one would normally associate leadership with the greatest
significance, but it is the bottom that is most crucial. This is because without the support of the
people, the group is sure to fail because passive support is needed for it to flourish.With an
increase in passive support comes the expansion of higher tiers within the pyramid. What was
once passive support now becomes active, as citizens directly aid the group by satisfying the
logistical needs of the group, as well as giving false information to the group’s adversaries. As
the Tupamaros believed, this is the most important tier within the organizational structure as it
gives them the nourishment needed to sustain the fight for their cause. Next lies the active cadre
(guerillas/soldiers). This tier is often small in most terrorist organizations, but is the most
publicly portrayed by media. The active cadre are responsible for enacting the violent means
advocated by the leadership. Leaders included Raul Sendic (Tupamaros), Manuel Marulanda
Vélez & Jacobo Arenas (FARC), Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saied Mohsen and Ali-Asghar
Badizadegan (MeK) and Abimael Guzman (Shining Path) and more. This leadership guides the
movement through policy making, planning of attacks and the acquisition of resources.
However, given a terrorist organization’s necessity for secrecy, organization at the command
level is inadequate, resulting in a lack of communication. More legitimate organizations like the
United States military have clearer chains of command and better capabilities for selecting the
best suited personnel for the mission.
Regarding the Tupamaros, their structural organization consisted of an executive
committee which over saw both the operational and logistical columns. These columns consisted
of 4-6 member groups referred to as cells. Upon analysis, it has been concluded that these cells
were the strongest part of the Tupamaros. In connotation to Figure 1, terrorist cells fall within

active support or active cadre making the middle of their pyramid the sturdiest part. Although the
upper body stands out the lower body cannot be neglected, because it, like the human body
contains the strongest parts of the body. Take for example the war in Vietnam. During the
Vietnam War the United States had more & better resources, the more highly trained soldiers, as
well as more of them and a clear route for communication, something the Tupamaros lacked. Yet
in the end we lost the Vietnam War. Why? We lost because we did not have the support of the
people both in Vietnam and stateside. Like many other Marxist-Leninist (Revolutionary) groups,
their belief in Marighella’s concept of violence garnering support for the revolution proved to
work against them. Instead they alienated the support they once had from the working/middle
class. Their use of violence as a catalyst for revolution sickened the public, to the point where the
people favored the Uruguayan government. Even Tupamaro humanitarian gestures were viewed
with contempt because of the concurrent, violent terrorist campaign (White, 2012).
As the downfall of the Tupamaros proves, generating public disproval within the public
alienates potential supporters of the terrorist movement. Often these supporters will aid the
terrorist organization’s opposition, via cooperation with policies as well as more active roles. It
becomes the goal of the terrorist organization’s adversaries to target areas of vulnerability in an
effort to disrupt their operations. Each of the tiers in figure 1 can be targeted and be the downfall
of the group. “While analyzing a secretive terrorist organization is problematic, Colonel John
Warden has developed a simplified model for analyzing organizations by treating them as a
system” (Naval War College, 2002). Warden’s model is termed as the five ring model (see figure
2).

As Chappel mentions, Warden’s ring requires you to look at your enemy’s organization,
identify weakness/objectives and strike out against them, reducing their effectiveness and
ultimately forcing them to yield. In relation to the Uruguayan government, they decided to attack
the Tupamaro’s organic essentials. They recognized that the structure of the Tupamaro
organization was what was allowing them to stay in the field. One of the major components for
their success was the use of the terrorist cell. However, after their biggest prison break in which
some 180 Tupamaro prisoners were freed, vulnerabilities emerged within the cell. During their
time in prison many of the prisoners bonded with each other, breaking the chief rule of not
knowing each other’s names. Porzecanski further notes that some of the prisoners freed were
leaders and may have had animosity towards each other. Once recaptured, police and military
interrogators were more likely to gain information about other cell/column activities. (1973, p
70)
Every war against a terrorist revolution can be considered counterrevolutionary terrorism
because it is responding to violence with violence. More often than not it comes from the very
governments that are being revolted against. Counter revolutionary terrorism can be thought as
violent opposition towards those seeking change. When those in power cannot control the
Leadership
Organic Essentials
Infrastructure
Population
Fielded Military
Figure 2 – Warden’s
Five-Ring Model
(Naval War College,
2002)

revolution with police force they declare Martial law. Martial law places the citizens under strict
military rule and repression. This can at times become unfavorable with the people as they are
often subjected to being treated as if guilty, when in fact they may have been passive supporters
if that at the time. “In revolutionary situations it is difficult to establish facts; opinion is usually
so polarized- a condition which terrorism helps to create- that most people believe only the
arguments of the side with whom they are ideologically sympathetic.” (Crenshaw 1972)
Fortunately for Uruguay, the people viewed military rule and conduct as necessary to end the
atrocious murders committed by the Tupamaros. But, there are still occurrences where the
enacting of Martial law was not enough. During this time, many regimes turned to the use of
death squads as a last resort to remain in power. Death squads operate outside of the law,
conducting terrorist acts themselves against the revolutionaries. Those officials responsible for
using death squads believe that they are the only means to maintain order within the Country and
therefore justifiable. In some cases victims of death squads were arrested by members and taken
away without record, as conducted in Russia under Joseph Stalin. By forming illegal military
groups, death squads offer extra intimidation against revolutionaries and their supporters.
At times even the employment of death squads is not enough to stop revolutionary
terrorism from achieving its goals. In the cases of the Cuban Revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro
and the Sandistas of Nicaragua, both were able to achieve the support of the people. By
achieving the people’s support they were able to prosper and create a strong base for their
movement. Furthermore, they were able to destabilize their governmental opposition by
employing Warden’s model on the areas of vulnerability their wide acceptance created for them.
As stated by Crenshaw revolutionary terrorism is an insurgent strategy, in which violence
is used to catalyze the seizure of power, bringing about fundamental political and social changes.

In conclusion, the success of revolutionary and counter revolutionary terrorism is dependent on
five factors. The first is the strength of the leadership. Strong leadership offers confidence,
support inside and outside of the organization as well as oversight of all operations. The second
is the acquisition of materials. As tacticians of guerilla warfare agree the guerilla requires
logistical support to remain in the field. The third is the structural integrity of the organization.
As the Tupamaro organization demonstrated, the use of cells makes it difficult for the opposition
to hinder terrorist activities. Their use of the terrorist cell has made them a model for many
modern terrorist groups like 17 November and Al-Qaeda. The fourth is the military strength of
the cadre and how effective they are within the field. Lastly and most importantly is support
from the population. As the Tupamaro, Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions prove, the support of
the people is a necessity for a successful war. They are the base of a military group’s
effectiveness. As we have experienced in the Vietnam War, popular support is the key to
legitimizing your purpose for violent actions. The Tupamaros rallied support for their cause by
connecting with the working class and advocating expropriation. They had hoped that their
violence would act as a catalyst for revolution, but in the end proved to abhor the people into
favoring the government.

References
Brum, P. (September 16, 2013) José Mujica and Uruguay's “Robin Hood Guerillas”. The
National Interest, Retrieved from
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Byrnes, J. Changing Group Structures and the Metamorphosis of Terrorism [word document].
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http://chua2.fiu.edu/faculty/byrnesj/terrorweek3.htm
Crenshaw Hutchinson, M. (1972). The concept of revolutionary terrorism. The Journal of
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