Ioannis Lianos, Hellenic Competition Commission

1. Competition Law for the Digital
Era: A BRICS Perspective
Ioannis Lianos
President, Hellenic Competition Commission
Professor of Global Competition Law and Public Policy
UCL Faculty of Laws
Views are personal

2. State of play BRICS
Digital market penetration rate, BRICS countries
(percentage of population over 16)
Source: ITC (2017)

3. Focus: India
560 million internet users (increasing from 238.7 million in 2013)
 1.2 billion mobile users
294 million Indians engaged in social media with an average Indian
social media user spending as many as 17 hours a week on a social
media platform, thus surpassing the number in US and China
Number of people registered with Aadhaar (the unique biometric
digital identity system in India) stood at 1.22 billion in 2019 (increasing
from 510 million in 2013) with 870 million Aadhar linked bank accounts
and 26.7 billion Aadhaar authenticated transactions
Prominent India-based platforms
Hotstar (Video Streaming platform)
Ola (Taxi-aggregator platform)
Oyo Rooms (Hotel Booking platform)
Paytm (Payments wallet platform)
Big Basket (Online grocery platform)
Byju (Online learning platform): the world’s most valued education
technology firm.
Swiggy (Online Food Delivery platform)

4. Focus: China
 802 million internet users in 2018
(increasing from 731 million in 2016)
 1.6 billion mobile users (2019)
 The digital economy accounted for 32.9%
of GDP in 2017
 171 million people were working in the
digital economy of China, accounting for
22.1% of the total employment
 online advertising market in China reached
375.01 billion yuan in 2017 (53.3 billion $)
 Prominent China-based platforms
 Baidu, Sogou Inc., 360 Search (search
engines)
 WeChat moments, QQ (Qzone) and Weibo
(social networks)
 Alibaba (e-commerce platform and
diversified digital conglomerate)
 Tencent (ISP and diversified digital
conglomerate)
 Beijing Byte Dance (digital news)
12220 26161 48092
94896
161640
186301
225823
271737
10.30%
14.20%
15.20%
20.30%
26.10%
27.50%
30.30%
32.90%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: China Institute of Information and
Communications (CAICT)）
Total size of digital economy（hundred million yuan） ratio to GDP（%）
6.09
8.11
10.4
16.39
21.79
26.1
29.16
33.80% 33.20%
28.20%
57.60%
32.90%
19.80%
11.70%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: China E-Commerce Report,National Bureau of
Statistics, Ministry of Commerce
E-commerce volumes in China (trillion yuan)
year on year growth rate （%）

5. Competition enforcement BRICS
(2008-2019)
proceedings by infringement type - BRICS aggregate

6. App stores
Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-available-in-leading-app-stores/
Number of apps available in leading app stores (2019)

7. Limited effects of competition
law to promote inter-ecosystem
competition
• In markets with strong network and
learning effects, once few firms are in
operation, the addition of new
competitors, even under free entry,
does not change the market structure
in any significant way
• Although eliminating barriers to entry
can encourage competition, the
resulting competition may not
significantly affect market structure
• In markets with strong network and
learning effects, antitrust authorities
may not be able to significantly affect
market structure by eliminating
barriers to entry
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8. Multi-homing
(e.g. social media)
1 app
5.40%
2 apps
30.30%
3 apps
36.70%
4 apps
12.50%
5 apps
6.10% 5 and more
9.00%
Source: iResearch's 2017 China Mobile Social User Insight
Report
Number of Mobile Social Applications used by
Chinese Mobile Social Users (2017)
77.20%
6.60%
3.20%
13%
Source: China Internet Association China Internet
Development Report 2018
Baidu Sogou 360 others
Market Structure of Search Engines in
China

9. • Business Eco-systems: modular
architecture, non-generic super-
modular
complementarities/they replace
industries
• Market power in multiple
segments of the chain
• Allocation of the total surplus
value of the value chain: vertical
competition and distributive
justice considerations (fairness)
• Extraction of revenue and
capture of value: limiting the
market power of other
segments of the value chain to
increase your share
• Different ways of public action
(competition law, net neutrality,
compulsory licensing,
regulation)
• Financialisation
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Vertical Competition: Digital Value
Chains

10. Data
protection
Comparative Table: Data portability
in BRICS, EU and US
 Brazil: General Data
Protection Law (2018)
 Russia: Law on Personal
Data (2006)
 India: right to privacy
Justice KS Puttaswamy And
Another Vs. Union of India
and Ors (2017); Personal
Data Protection Bill (PDPB)
(2018) in consideration
 China: No regime of data
protection and a right to
privacy, legal practice tends
to apply The Law against
Unfair Competition to
provide ultimate protection
when no protection can be
sought elsewhere
 South Africa: right to
privacy (S. 14 of the
Constitution) & Protection
of Personal Information Act
(POPIA)[ not yet in effect]

11. A Legal institutionalist
perspective
• The institutional/legal foundations of value extraction in digital
capitalism
• A toolkit approach
 Pervasive utilities’ style regulation (but is it a natural monopoly?)
 Soft regulation via codes of conduct
 Creation of missing data markets and increasing commodification
(of attention)
 Establishing property rights for the new fictitious commodities (data, attention) or data
portability
 More than just property rights : Indian Draft National e-Commerce Policy (2019) pp.
14-15 ‘(t)he data of a country, therefore, is best thought of a collective resource, a
national asset, that the government holds in trust, but rights to which can be
permitted. The analogy of a mine of natural resource or spectrum works here’
 Countervailing powers – collective bargaining
 Collective bargaining from freelancers/users etc.
 Polycentric competition law
11