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MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
April 24, 2017
MUM Phnom Penh, Cambodia
By Sarpich RATH (Peter)
Hardening MikroTik
RouterOS
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
About PPIC
● Qualified and Vocational IT Training Center
● Found in late 2013. Offer service in June 2014
● Partners
β—‹ MikroTik Academy
β—‹ Cisco Networking Academy
β—‹ Pearson VUE
β—‹ Prometric
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
About Me
● Sarpich RATH (Peter)
● First used RouterOS since 2008
● MTCNA, MTCRE, Academy Trainer
● CCNA, CCNA Security, CCNP, Cisco Instructor
● Trainer @PPIC and AEU
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Topic: Hardening MikroTik RouterOS
● Customized RouterOS setting
● RouterOS Firewall
● Recommendation
Customized RouterOS setting
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Login Services: IP->Services
● Disable unused services
● Or modify default port
● Limit access from specific network
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
MAC WinBox: Tools->MAC Server
● Disable Allow to login from all interfaces
● Allow from specific interface only
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
RoMON: Tools->RoMON
● Disable by default
● /tool romon set enabled=no
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Login Credentials: System->Users
● Rename default admin account
● Strong password policy
● Set the right permission (group) to router users
● Backup login account
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Router Interface
● Disable all unused interfaces on your router, in order
to decrease unauthorized access to your router.
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
LCD touch screen
● Some RouterBOARDs have LCD module for
informational purpose, set pin or disable it.
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Neighbor Discovery: IP->Neighbors
● Disable Discovery on Interface that connect to
Internet
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Neighbor Discovery: IP->Neighbors
WAN Interface
are Disable for
Neighbors
Discovery
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
BTest Server: Tools-> Btest Server
● Bandwidth Test
● Disable when not used it
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
NTP Clock Synchronization
● Keep the router sync with accurate clock
● Server: kh.pool.ntp.org
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Logging: System->Logging
● Send log message to SysLog Server
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
SNMP: IP->SNMP
● Simple Network Management Protocol
● Used to Monitor Bandwidth and resource usages.
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Wireless Client Isolation
● Allows multiple clients to be on the same network,
but not send traffic to each other.
● Attention!!! streaming content to/from other devices
such as Chromecast, AppleTV, Ruku, etc… will not
work on the same AP.
MUM Phnom Penh, Cambodia 2017.
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Configuration Backup
RouterOS Firewall
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
What is FW used for?
● Preventing unauthorized access to networks
● Protect itself
● Filter for incoming and outgoing traffic.
● Protect and hide the server inside
● etc.
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
What can RouterOS FW do?
● stateful packet inspection
● Layer-7 protocol detection
● peer-to-peer protocols filtering
● traffic classification by:
β—‹ source MAC address
β—‹ IP addresses (network or list) and address types (broadcast, local, multicast, unicast)
β—‹ port or port range
β—‹ IP protocols
β—‹ interface the packet arrived from or left through
β—‹ internal flow and connection marks
β—‹ packet size
β—‹ packet arrival time
● and much more!
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Sample Network design
Outside Inside
ether1 ether2 ether3 ether4
Connect to Internet DMZ, Server LAN Management
Network 100.1.1.0/30 192.168.10.0/24 192.168.20.0/24 192.168.30.0/24
*** If we don’t have enough ports, then can used VLAN for DMZ, LAN and
Management network.
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Sample Network design
Internet
DMZ
Management
LAN
Mikrotik
RouterOS
192.168.10.0/24
192.168.20.0/24
192.168.30.0/24
ISP
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Internet to DMZ
Internet
DMZ
Management
LAN
Mikrotik
RouterOS
βœ“
ISP
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Internet to LAN/Management
Internet
DMZ
Management
LAN
Mikrotik
RouterOS
βœ—
βœ“
ISP
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Management to Router
Internet
DMZ
Management
LAN
Mikrotik
RouterOS
βœ—
βœ“
ISP
βœ—
βœ—
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
IPv4 firewall: Protect the router
● filter with new connections to decrease load on a
router;
● create address-list for IP addresses, that are allowed
to access your router; example Management
● enable ICMP access (optionally);
● drop everything else, log=yes might be added to log
packets that hit the specific rule;
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
IPv4 firewall: Protect the router
/ip firewall filter
add action=accept chain=input comment="default configuration"
connection-state=established,related
add action=accept chain=input src-address-list=Management
add action=accept chain=input protocol=icmp
......
add action=drop chain=input
/ip firewall address-list add address=192.168.30.0/24 list=Management
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
IPv4 firewall: Protect the Inside network
● Established/related packets are added to fasttrack for faster data throughput,
firewall will work with new connections only;
● drop incoming packets that are not NATed, ether1 is public interface
● drop incoming packets from Internet, which are not public IP addresses, ether1
is public interface
● drop packets from Inside that does not have address from inside address.
● create address-list=Inside to group all inside address
β—‹ 192.168.10.0/24 = DMZ
β—‹ 192.168.20.0/24 = LAN
β—‹ 192.168.30.0/24 = Management
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
IPv4 firewall: Protect the Inside network
/ip firewall filter add action=fasttrack-connection chain=forward comment=FastTrack
connection-state=established,related
add action=accept chain=forward comment="Established, Related" connection-
state=established,related
add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop invalid" connection-state=invalid
add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop incoming packets that are not NATted"
connection-nat-state=!dstnat connection-state=new in-interface=ether1
add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop incoming from internet which is not public
IP" in-interface=ether1 src-address-list=not_in_internet
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
IPv4 firewall: Protect the Inside network
add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop packets from Inside that do not have Inside
IP" in-interface=ether2 src-address-list=!Inside
add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop packets from Inside that do not have Inside
IP" in-interface=ether3 src-address-list=!Inside
add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop packets from Inside that do not have Inside
IP" in-interface=ether4 src-address-list=!Inside
/ip firewall address-list
add address=192.168.10.0/24 list=Inside
add address=192.168.20.0/24 list=Inside
add address=192.168.30.0/24 list=Inside
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
IPv4 firewall: Protect the Inside network
/ip firewall address-list
add address=0.0.0.0/8 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=172.16.0.0/12 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=192.168.0.0/16 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=10.0.0.0/8 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=169.254.0.0/16 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=127.0.0.0/8 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=224.0.0.0/4 comment=Multicast list=not_in_internet
add address=198.18.0.0/15 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=192.0.0.0/24 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=192.0.2.0/24 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=198.51.100.0/24 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=203.0.113.0/24 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=100.64.0.0/10 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=240.0.0.0/4 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet
add address=192.88.99.0/24 comment="6to4 relay Anycast [RFC 3068]" list=not_in_internet
*** Modify to meet the requirement
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
IPv4 firewall: Protect the Server/DMZ
WEB-SERVER IP =192.168.10.10
/ip firewall nat
add action=dst-nat chain=dstnat comment=WEB-SERVER dst
address=100.1.11.2 dst-port=80 in-interface=ether1
protocol=tcp to-addresses=192.168.10.10 to-ports=80
/ip firewall filter
add action=jump chain=forward comment=WEB-SERVER dst-
address=192.168.10.10 jump-target=WEB-SERVER
……
add action=accept chain=WEB-SERVER comment=WEB dst-port=80
protocol=tcp
add action=accept chain=WEB-SERVER comment="accept ssh from NOC" dst-
port=22 protocol=tcp src-address-list=Management
add action=drop chain=WEB-SERVER comment=DROP
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
More Firewall rules
● https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Firewall
● SynFlood
● ICMP Flood
● Port Scanner
● Email Spam
● L7 Filter
● DoS attack protection
● Etc.
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Recommendation
● Disable unused ports and services on router
● Strong password policy for router users and allow to
remote from specific network
● Disable discovery interfaces on outside/WAN ports
● Clock should be accurate synchronize
● Enable SysLog and SNMP for monitoring the router
● Separate network for each LAN and Server
● Used Address list to group all address for used in FW
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Recommendation
● Used Action=Jump to organized the FW rules and
better performance
● Used FW to protect router itself, inside network and
the Servers
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Reference
● wiki.mikrotik.com
MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Question?
Thanks for your Attention ☺
β€’ Upcoming Training: http://ppic-training.com/upcoming-courses/
β€’ Email: info@ppic-training.com
β€’ Facebook: www.facebook.com/PhnomPenhInformaticsCenter
β€’ Mobiel: 077/087 616102
β€’ Please subscribe to our mailing list to receive all update information such as
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Mikrotik Hardening

  • 1. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. April 24, 2017 MUM Phnom Penh, Cambodia By Sarpich RATH (Peter) Hardening MikroTik RouterOS
  • 2. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. About PPIC ● Qualified and Vocational IT Training Center ● Found in late 2013. Offer service in June 2014 ● Partners β—‹ MikroTik Academy β—‹ Cisco Networking Academy β—‹ Pearson VUE β—‹ Prometric
  • 3. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. About Me ● Sarpich RATH (Peter) ● First used RouterOS since 2008 ● MTCNA, MTCRE, Academy Trainer ● CCNA, CCNA Security, CCNP, Cisco Instructor ● Trainer @PPIC and AEU
  • 4. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Topic: Hardening MikroTik RouterOS ● Customized RouterOS setting ● RouterOS Firewall ● Recommendation
  • 6. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Login Services: IP->Services ● Disable unused services ● Or modify default port ● Limit access from specific network
  • 7. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. MAC WinBox: Tools->MAC Server ● Disable Allow to login from all interfaces ● Allow from specific interface only
  • 8. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. RoMON: Tools->RoMON ● Disable by default ● /tool romon set enabled=no
  • 9. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Login Credentials: System->Users ● Rename default admin account ● Strong password policy ● Set the right permission (group) to router users ● Backup login account
  • 10. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Router Interface ● Disable all unused interfaces on your router, in order to decrease unauthorized access to your router.
  • 11. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. LCD touch screen ● Some RouterBOARDs have LCD module for informational purpose, set pin or disable it.
  • 12. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Neighbor Discovery: IP->Neighbors ● Disable Discovery on Interface that connect to Internet
  • 13. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Neighbor Discovery: IP->Neighbors WAN Interface are Disable for Neighbors Discovery
  • 14. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. BTest Server: Tools-> Btest Server ● Bandwidth Test ● Disable when not used it
  • 15. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. NTP Clock Synchronization ● Keep the router sync with accurate clock ● Server: kh.pool.ntp.org
  • 16. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Logging: System->Logging ● Send log message to SysLog Server
  • 17. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. SNMP: IP->SNMP ● Simple Network Management Protocol ● Used to Monitor Bandwidth and resource usages.
  • 18. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Wireless Client Isolation ● Allows multiple clients to be on the same network, but not send traffic to each other. ● Attention!!! streaming content to/from other devices such as Chromecast, AppleTV, Ruku, etc… will not work on the same AP.
  • 19. MUM Phnom Penh, Cambodia 2017.
  • 20. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Configuration Backup
  • 22. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. What is FW used for? ● Preventing unauthorized access to networks ● Protect itself ● Filter for incoming and outgoing traffic. ● Protect and hide the server inside ● etc.
  • 23. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. What can RouterOS FW do? ● stateful packet inspection ● Layer-7 protocol detection ● peer-to-peer protocols filtering ● traffic classification by: β—‹ source MAC address β—‹ IP addresses (network or list) and address types (broadcast, local, multicast, unicast) β—‹ port or port range β—‹ IP protocols β—‹ interface the packet arrived from or left through β—‹ internal flow and connection marks β—‹ packet size β—‹ packet arrival time ● and much more!
  • 24. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Sample Network design Outside Inside ether1 ether2 ether3 ether4 Connect to Internet DMZ, Server LAN Management Network 100.1.1.0/30 192.168.10.0/24 192.168.20.0/24 192.168.30.0/24 *** If we don’t have enough ports, then can used VLAN for DMZ, LAN and Management network.
  • 25. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Sample Network design Internet DMZ Management LAN Mikrotik RouterOS 192.168.10.0/24 192.168.20.0/24 192.168.30.0/24 ISP
  • 26. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Internet to DMZ Internet DMZ Management LAN Mikrotik RouterOS βœ“ ISP
  • 27. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Internet to LAN/Management Internet DMZ Management LAN Mikrotik RouterOS βœ— βœ“ ISP
  • 28. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Management to Router Internet DMZ Management LAN Mikrotik RouterOS βœ— βœ“ ISP βœ— βœ—
  • 29. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. IPv4 firewall: Protect the router ● filter with new connections to decrease load on a router; ● create address-list for IP addresses, that are allowed to access your router; example Management ● enable ICMP access (optionally); ● drop everything else, log=yes might be added to log packets that hit the specific rule;
  • 30. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. IPv4 firewall: Protect the router /ip firewall filter add action=accept chain=input comment="default configuration" connection-state=established,related add action=accept chain=input src-address-list=Management add action=accept chain=input protocol=icmp ...... add action=drop chain=input /ip firewall address-list add address=192.168.30.0/24 list=Management
  • 31. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. IPv4 firewall: Protect the Inside network ● Established/related packets are added to fasttrack for faster data throughput, firewall will work with new connections only; ● drop incoming packets that are not NATed, ether1 is public interface ● drop incoming packets from Internet, which are not public IP addresses, ether1 is public interface ● drop packets from Inside that does not have address from inside address. ● create address-list=Inside to group all inside address β—‹ 192.168.10.0/24 = DMZ β—‹ 192.168.20.0/24 = LAN β—‹ 192.168.30.0/24 = Management
  • 32. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. IPv4 firewall: Protect the Inside network /ip firewall filter add action=fasttrack-connection chain=forward comment=FastTrack connection-state=established,related add action=accept chain=forward comment="Established, Related" connection- state=established,related add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop invalid" connection-state=invalid add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop incoming packets that are not NATted" connection-nat-state=!dstnat connection-state=new in-interface=ether1 add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop incoming from internet which is not public IP" in-interface=ether1 src-address-list=not_in_internet
  • 33. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. IPv4 firewall: Protect the Inside network add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop packets from Inside that do not have Inside IP" in-interface=ether2 src-address-list=!Inside add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop packets from Inside that do not have Inside IP" in-interface=ether3 src-address-list=!Inside add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop packets from Inside that do not have Inside IP" in-interface=ether4 src-address-list=!Inside /ip firewall address-list add address=192.168.10.0/24 list=Inside add address=192.168.20.0/24 list=Inside add address=192.168.30.0/24 list=Inside
  • 34. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. IPv4 firewall: Protect the Inside network /ip firewall address-list add address=0.0.0.0/8 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=172.16.0.0/12 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=192.168.0.0/16 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=10.0.0.0/8 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=169.254.0.0/16 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=127.0.0.0/8 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=224.0.0.0/4 comment=Multicast list=not_in_internet add address=198.18.0.0/15 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=192.0.0.0/24 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=192.0.2.0/24 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=198.51.100.0/24 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=203.0.113.0/24 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=100.64.0.0/10 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=240.0.0.0/4 comment=RFC6890 list=not_in_internet add address=192.88.99.0/24 comment="6to4 relay Anycast [RFC 3068]" list=not_in_internet *** Modify to meet the requirement
  • 35. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. IPv4 firewall: Protect the Server/DMZ WEB-SERVER IP =192.168.10.10 /ip firewall nat add action=dst-nat chain=dstnat comment=WEB-SERVER dst address=100.1.11.2 dst-port=80 in-interface=ether1 protocol=tcp to-addresses=192.168.10.10 to-ports=80 /ip firewall filter add action=jump chain=forward comment=WEB-SERVER dst- address=192.168.10.10 jump-target=WEB-SERVER …… add action=accept chain=WEB-SERVER comment=WEB dst-port=80 protocol=tcp add action=accept chain=WEB-SERVER comment="accept ssh from NOC" dst- port=22 protocol=tcp src-address-list=Management add action=drop chain=WEB-SERVER comment=DROP
  • 36. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. More Firewall rules ● https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Firewall ● SynFlood ● ICMP Flood ● Port Scanner ● Email Spam ● L7 Filter ● DoS attack protection ● Etc.
  • 37. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Recommendation ● Disable unused ports and services on router ● Strong password policy for router users and allow to remote from specific network ● Disable discovery interfaces on outside/WAN ports ● Clock should be accurate synchronize ● Enable SysLog and SNMP for monitoring the router ● Separate network for each LAN and Server ● Used Address list to group all address for used in FW
  • 38. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Recommendation ● Used Action=Jump to organized the FW rules and better performance ● Used FW to protect router itself, inside network and the Servers
  • 39. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Reference ● wiki.mikrotik.com
  • 40. MUM 2017, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Question?
  • 41. Thanks for your Attention ☺ β€’ Upcoming Training: http://ppic-training.com/upcoming-courses/ β€’ Email: info@ppic-training.com β€’ Facebook: www.facebook.com/PhnomPenhInformaticsCenter β€’ Mobiel: 077/087 616102 β€’ Please subscribe to our mailing list to receive all update information such as discount and promotion price