a Pakistani general gives a history lesson

2. Essence of the Matter
A.H Amin
August 21 2002
Daily Nation , Lahore
www.nation.com.pk
While analysis of todays Pakistani politics is outwardly subtle and convincing
at the face value , serious historical analysis remains the weak point .What is
lacking is the long view , the inability to penetrate through appearances,the
motivation to write with an ulterior motivation to please to secure personal
business objectives and worse of all to criticise simply because a writer has
acquired the reputation of a cynic and his writings are read simply because his
cynicism provides a catharsis for many ! This does not mean that all is well or
all military or civil rulers are well meaning reluctant coup makers !
The Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A
Geographical Account, February 2010
This article is an attempt to capture crux of the whole issue in a few paragraphs
! An ambitious but certainly not impossible endeavour ! First of all the basis of
modern Indo Pak politics was initially a type of liberal set of beliefs based on
faith in British parliamentary system and liberalism mixed with the philosophy
of self rule ! The British introduced Western democracy in India with a view to
afford a vent to the Indians desire for participation and sense of involvement !
The urban professional classes picked it up as a means for self realisation or
self advancement ! The feudals picked it up as a means of continuing their
unfair advantage or position of influence in the Indian society. The middle
classes ran after government jobs as a means of self advancement and
economic benefit ! The Indian soldiers served in the army as mercenaries
motivated by economic benefits and part propelled by espirit de corps ! The
politicians came into conflict with the British not because all of them were
heroes or martyrs but because it was a struggle for power ! The civil servants
and mercenary pre 1947 Indo Pak soldiers collaborated with the British
because it improved their prospects of self advancement ! The pre 1947 Indian
Army , the father of the post 1947 Indian and Pakistan Army had nothing to do
with Indo Pak political struggle at least in what they voluntarily or deliberately
did less a platoon of Garhwal Rifles which refused to open fire on Muslims
demonstrating in Peshawar in 1930 ! After all who was shooting down Indo
Pak civilians like partridges in Wana , Razmak ,Sindh and Jallianwalla Bagh

3. other than the British Kings Indian Army ! Four brigades in tribal areas , two
brigades in Sindh in the Hur Rebellion ! The Indian or Muslim civil servant,
soldier and policeman till 14th August and some to date were collaborators of
the Western power which ruled India till the transfer of power !
The Hindus were better organised politically since the Indian National
Congress was dominated by a strong Hindu professional and business class
while the Muslims were condemned to be politically more backward since
because of peculiar historical reasons Mr Jinnah had no choice but to accept the
Muslim feudals who dominated Muslim politics ! Mr Jinnah was forced to ally
with the Unionists in Punjab and the Sindhi landlords in future against the
advice of Punjabi Muslim urban leaders like Dr Iqbal because it was a strategic
compulsion.Thus from August 1947 India inherited a strong political culture
while The Muslim League was destroyed by the feudals who had joined it out
of fear of land reforms and because of being in debt to Hindu money lenders
just a few years after Mr Jinnah's death ! Here again economics played a major
role ! It has been estimated that in pre 1947 Punjab and Sindh money lending
was the most important occupation after agriculture and that while the net
revenue of Irrigation Department of Punjab was 267 Lakh Rupees that of
money lenders was 500 Lakh Rupees ! In 1911 out of a total of 803,560 money
lenders in India some 25 % or 193,890 lived in Punjab alone ! Thus while the
total population of pre 1947 Punjab was one eleventh of India ,it had some one
fourth of India's money lenders ! All this ensured that the feudal elements
jumped in the Muslim League band wagon not out of genuine motivation but
because of economic compulsion !
Now the post 1947 era ! While post 1947 Indian Congress leaders like Nehru
and Patel chided the Indian Army for their un nationalistic role in British rule
and reduced their basic salary Pakistan was condemned to be ruled by a civil
military clique within eleven years of independence ! Men who had
collaborated with the British before 1947 became Pakistan's rulers within seven
years of Independence ! Officials of Indian Audit and Accounts Service like
Ghulam Mohammad and Mohammad Ali ! Feudals like Kalabagh who before
1947 were faithfuls of a man no higher than the British Deputy Commissioner
of Mianwali ! Compare the fact that while Nehru abolished Cantonment Boards
within no time after independence even today a Pakistani civilian living in a
plot of land bought by paying through his nose in a cantonment area lives
within perpetual awe of the cantonment boards simply because no Pakistani
statesman had the courage or the vision to reduce the military or civil
bureucrats to size !
A man who spent his life in sycophancy of the British was this country's
governor general within four years of independence while genuine freedom
fighters like Raja Ghazanfar Ali were outcasts within four years of
independence ! A political agent whose pre partition training was to intrigue
and lie and make the frontier tribes fight so that British rule was prolonged was
this country's president within eight years of independence ! A soldier who was
guilty of tactical timidity in Burma was this country's first Muslim Army chief

4. within four years of independence ! While this country's first military ruler
came with a pledge to modernise this country the culture of police gang rape
was a direct result of the Ayub-Kalabagh style of governance ! Who can forget
the Miss Akhtar Case of Lyallpur or the Kharian Police Gang Rape case of
1968.
Since the Pakistani military has had the best of all in most of Pakistan's history
we will confine this discussion to the military's role ! A study of history proves
that while the Roman Republic was great the citizens were poor or lived a
Spartan living ! While the first four Muslim caliphs practised austerity the
Muslim Kingdom touched Central Asia at one extreme and Egypt at the other !
Now compare Pakistan ! Three of the four of Pakistan's military rulers till to
date were from humble background less Yahya Khan whose father was from
the Indian Police Service ! All three less Yahya Khan departed richer than they
were when they took over while the Pakistani state successively became poorer
with their departure ! Compare Ayub Zia's or any of todays three or four star
generals assets with what they had at the time of passing out from the miltary
academy whether it was the Sandhurst or OTS Dera Dun or Kakul ! As per
Feldman a reliable authority Ayubs studies in college were financed by Nawab
Kalabagh ! Major General Tajammul states that in 1950 the then major general
Ayub had just one green suit ! Zia of 1960s is remembered by Gul Hassan as a
meek obsequeous soldier , a man unfit to be an officer of the Pakistan Army in
words of his immediate senior Major General Nawazish !
Why these man acted the way they did ! Was it because of ideology or self
interest ? From necessity or from choice ? Mustafa Kemal had saved Turkey
from disintegration , a direct consequence of the Treaty of Sevres ! Degaulle
was a military hero of France ! What were our military rulers ! Ayub destroyed
the Constitution of 1956 , a direct consequence of which was the separation of
East Pakistan within fifteen years ! General Zia destroyed the Second
Constitution of Pakistan simply because he feared a prime minister who could
threaten his personal authority !
We had one who came to wipe out corruption and institutionalised corruption
in the Pakistani society through route permits and industrial permits ! We had
one who attempted to undo what his soldier predecessor had been doing for
eleven years in order to perpetuate his rule and presided over this country's
partition in 1971 ! We had one who wanted to hold hands with God Almighty
in his dishonesties and in the process introduced extremism in this country's
politics ! He came with a Morris Minor and today his sons are in Land Cruisers
! We have one who professes to be a liberal and is strengthening the police and
faces the most serious religious threat in Pakistan's history ! All were motivated
by self interest ! All three came poorer and left the country poorer if not
economically then politically !
What is the conclusion ! All military rulers acted out of self preservation !
They had no ideology ! Less Yahya all started from the lower middle class or
middle class and ended as business tycoons ! They destroyed constitutions ,

5. promiscuously destroyed the political system by introducing test tube babies in
politics who they later condemned as corrupt and defective ! They destroyed
Pakistan's constitution transforming the office of prime minister from that of a
potent statesman and respectable political chief executive to that of a glorified
eunuch ! All to preserve one man's head ! All to ensure personal power !When
they acted out of choice it was for self preservation , when they acted out of
choice it was for self advancement ! In a nutshell Pakistan's political history is
a story of soldiers of humble origins motivated by intense ambition and rising
to the highest political office ! Entering the stage with one green suit and
departing the stage leaving a dynasty with phenomenal riches whether it was
Zia or Ayub or todays Crore Commanders ! While admirals guilty of worst sort
of bribery are allowed to go scot free politicians against whom one single
charge even one tenth of Mansoorul Haq is not proved are rotting in Jails since
last five years !
Our memories are short , we have been brought up doctored through
propaganda,through censured press and are made to believe that our present
rulers are honest while their predessors were dishonest ! Alas we have reached
a stage when no one seriously reads the newspapers any more ! The self
proclaimed Messiahs of this nation administered so many injections of
falsehood and distortion to it that today that the average man has lost all
political awareness ! He is well meaning and motivated but no longer has faith
in the state or in those who lead him ! Inflation and depression has reduced him
to a robot !
From those who day and night praise this regime motivated by a large number
of reasons of self interest one may ask this question ! Has human nature
changed ! Is personal interest not the ideology of todays military government !
If submarines were bought in the past are not Boeing 777 being purchased
today ! If there was a polo ground constructed in the past what about many
hundred acres leased to a foreign company for a commercial golf course today
! Defaulters who cannot enter Dubai are heading banks in Pakistan ! If all was
divided in between cousins and inlaws yesterday , is not the same happening
today !
In the worst Machiavellian phrase in todays Pakistan dominated by the soldiers
self propagated image as one who NABs the corrupt what is it all other than a
simple proof of Machiavellis dictum " Assume a virtue,Prince,if you have it not
! Honesty and Spartan living are not virtues in todays Pakistan ! Machiavelli
was not wrong when he said " men are easily corrupted and let themselves
become of the opposite nature,no matter how good they are and well taught".
We are condemned to rigged elections,manipulation of like minded lotahs and
palace intrigues ! We are condemned to long term insecurity simply because
some individuals are not secure with a strong and stable political system for
this country ! This is our tragedy from which we can only be rescued albeit
ironically by unforeseen air crashes or war !

6. FOR A MORE DETAILED HISTORY OF HOW ELECTIONS WERE
RIGGED AND THE PAKISTANI MILITARY UNDER ILLEGITIMATE
USURPERS DESTROYED PAKISTANS POLITICAL SYSTEM READ THE
INTERVIEW BELOW WHICH THIS SCRIBE CONDUCTED IN MARCH
2001
Amin Globe Journal May 2001 The Political Life of Gen Babar
End Notes by Dr Andre
-
The Political Life of Gen Babar[1]
Conducted by A.H Amin

7. Agha.H.Amin
Published in Globe Journal May 2001

8. April 2001
Personal Life
1. Please tell us something about your early life before you joined the Army?
I was born in Peshawar in 1928. Our ancestors originated from Kandahar and
had settled in the Peshawar Valley, particularly at Pirpai (my ancestral village)
near Nowshera. There is a Babar Settlement at Zhob and there are small
communities of Babar, at Quetta, Multan and D I Khan (Chaudwan).
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan also hails from the same tribe (Muzaffargarh). In
the First World War 78 people went to the war as Indian Army men and four
laid down their life. Pirpai is one of the very few villages which has an official
plaque commemorating its First World War contribution. My father was
basically a Recruiting Officer of the Indian Army but had been attached for

9. sometime to the 6 Rajputana Rifles.
After initial study of two years at a Private Public School (Miss Birch), I joined
the Presentation Convent School Peshawar from 1935 to 1939. From 1939 to
1941 I attended the Burn Hall School, then located at Baramula and Srinagar.
(Please note that they shifted from Baramula to Abbottabad in 1947 since they
did not desire to continue in India). From 1941 to 1946 I studied at the Prince
of Wales' Royal Indian Military College Dehra Dun from where I did my
Senior Cambridge and also received one year's pure Military Training. It was
here in Dehra Dun that I was lucky to be the student of the well-known Mr
Catchpole. Catchpole was a man of great devotion, conviction and dedication.
He played a very formative role in our education at Dehra Dun. After Senior
Cambridge from the RIMC Dehra Dun I appeared before the Services Selection
Board at Meerut and was selected for the Indian Army in November 1947. We
were airlifted to Lahore along with Muslim GCs (Gentleman Cadets) from the
IMA as the First PMA and were privileged to be received by Mr Liaquat Ali
Khan. I joined the PMA in January 1948.
2. Please describe your parents and their influence on your
perception/personality?
My father and grandfather were the two most honest and upright people that I
saw in life. I was greatly inspired by both of these individuals and inherited
their basic traits. In character building the role of mother was more significant.
3. Please tell us about any incident in your early years that left a lasting
impression on your personality ?
Two events left a particularly strong impression. One was the abject poverty
and submissiveness of the Kashmiri Muslims, particularly the males owing to
severe oppression by the Dogra rulers. However, the females were fairly
aggressive in protecting their rights. The second significant incident was while
proceeding to Meerut I saw a Muslim refugee train which had been attacked
near Jagadhri in 1947. All my life thence I have not been able to reconcile with
the feigned Indian democracy and been involved in four wars against India,
viz; 1948 (Kashmir); 1965 Rann of Kutch, 1965 (Indo-Pak War), 1971 (Indo-
Pak War). In three of these I found myself in Kashmir!
4. How was your student life?
It was memorable. The missionaries at the convent in Peshawar and at Burn
Hall Baramula/Srinagar were a dedicated lot. Education in those days was a
very healthy combination of intellectual and physical activity. I got an early
exposure to military training at RIMC where one year was completely
dedicated to military training.
5. Any teacher who played a decisive role in formation of your
perceptions/convictions?

10. There were many teachers who I can mention. There was Father Shanks, Father
Moran, Father Louis a Dutchman who later died at Malakwal, Father Mallet, at
Burns Haiz, Mr Catchpole and Mr E I Connolly, a Battle of Britain fighter
pilot, who had already received a DSO and DFC (Bar) at the RIMC.
6. What was your opinion about Mr Bhutto[2] as you saw him as a Minister the
period 1958-66?
I had seen Mr Bhutto as a Minister in 1958-66 as an Army Major and felt that
he had great talents. From 1972 onwards I saw him far more closely as IG FC.
7. What do you have to say about the Balochistan problem of 1974-76?
This problem was created through the intrigues of Khan Abdul Qayyum
Khan[3], the then Interior Minister. Qayyum was an arch intriguer and wanted
to strengthen his party in Balochistan. Thus the problem in Lasbela was started
due to his machinations. Mengal[4] was a patriot who was manoeuvred into a
controversial role through Qayyum's intrigues. I may add that the motivation of
taking the army to Balochistan was positive. Given the task even the FC could
have done the job as we earlier did in Kakar Khurasan. Mr Bhutto was a bit
impatient since all members of his family had not crossed the 50 year age
mark. He wanted to do away with the Sardari System[5] and bring
development in Balochistan. Regrettably, the Chief Secretary and the Corps
Commander were brothers and this led to a much quicker employment of the
Army.
8. What about the Hyderabad tribunal[6] and disengagement of the army
from Balochistan?
It is on record that Mr Bhutto wanted to withdraw the Army from Balochistan
in 1976. The then Army Chief Zia[7] opposed this idea. In addition around the
same time Mr Bhutto wanted to wind up the Hyderabad Tribunal. This was
again opposed by Zia as Army Chief. Ironically Zia did exactly what Mr
Bhutto wanted in 1977 rather than 1976. The two subjects were discussed in
my presence in November 1976 at Dir. Zia had wanted to use these as
excuses/pretexts for military take over. He was already in collusion with the
opposition.

11. 9. You were selected as Governor NWFP in 1974-75. How did this occur ?
Mr Bhutto had already seen me as IG FC (Inspector General Frontier Corps)
and was keen to have me in the province as a Governor since the province was
a political trouble spot and he wanted to integrate the tribal areas and organise
the nascent Afghan resistance, a task, commenced by me in October '73 as IG
FC.
10. So how was this stint?
We did well. During this period there were a large number of bomb blasts in
the NWFP with Ajmal Khattak[8] and Azam Hoti[9] sitting
in Kabul indulging in anti-Pakistan speeches and activity. In order to convey a
message to Sardar Daud[10] that we could play the same game and to assess
the training level of the resistance an operation was initiated
in Panjsher Valley in August 1975. The operation was a total success. The
Afghans suffered heavily in men and equipment and Daud sought peace and
accepted the Durand Line. He initiated an agreement in mid-1976. However,
the formal agreement was not signed in view of Zia's take over.
11. When did Pakistan enter the Afghan scenario as a party, which was
assisting the anti-Daud insurgents in Afghanistan?

12. In October 1973 while I was serving as IG FC an Afghan named Habibur
Rahman (Shaheed) came and contacted me about setting up a resistance
movement in Afghanistan with active military assistance of Pakistan. I
conveyed the same to Mr Bhutto, who accepted my proposal in view of the
changed situation in Afghanistan and asked me to organise training of Afghans.
12. What was the political and military aim of the Pakistani government of that
time?
From 1947 till that date all Afghan governments had generally not been
friendly towards Pakistan. They raised the bogey of Pakhtunistan but refrained
from acting against us in 1965 and 1971 when at war with India because of the
political environment after the Liaquat Bagh meeting. There were a large
number of bomb blasts. Mr Z.A Bhutto was very clear even in 1973 after
Daud's coup. An analysis of the regional environment was undertaken,
highlighting the break in the Afghan system of continuity; the impending
generational change in the leadership in the USSR and China (Chou had died).
The inability of continuity/stability in Iran with removal of Shah of Iran from
the scene. Being the last of the party ideologues it looked likely that
the USSR leadership may take the opportunity to move once more and
invade Afghanistan, a step towards the fulfilment of Peter the Great's will
(1777). Thus we established the base of Afghan Mujahideen resistance in 1973.
13. What type of assistance was provided to the Afghan resistance and which
Pakistani agencies were involved?
We gave them basic infantry weapons, some specialised training in how to
conduct guerrilla warfare under an SSG team[11] until it was discontinued on
05 July 1977 by Gen Zia, who lacked the strategic vision.
14. At what stage did the SSG enter the scene as the principal agency that
trained the Afghan resistance?
They (a team) imparted training in the belief that they were training Frontier
Corps personnel (all trainees were enlisted in the Frontier Corps before
training)
15. What was the ISI[12] role in Afghanistan in the period 1974-77?
It was a top secret affair and the ISI had no role. The secret was shared between
Mr Bhutto, myself, Aziz Ahmad[13] and the then Army Chief Tikka
Khan[14]. This was for obvious reasons. The Foreign Office could with,
nonchalance deny if the issue was raised at UN or any other forum.

13. 16. Who were the pioneers of the anti-Daud Afghan resistance?
These were Ustad Rabbani[15], Hikmatyar[16], Ahmad Shah
Masood[17] and a host of others who came to Pakistan after October 1973.
17. You have been a committed member of the PPP? At what stage did you
decide that you must join Mr Bhutto's party?
I was impressed by Mr Bhutto's progressive policies since 1972. On 27 July
1977 after Martial Law Mr Bhutto personally requested me to join the PPP. I
did so out of conviction once Mr Bhutto was out of power.
18. Why did Mr Bhutto select Zia as a COAS (Chief of Army Staff)?
There were a number of reasons and these were discussed with me personally

14. by Mr Bhutto, while in detention at Murree. One was the pretended humility of
Zia, and this disarmed Mr Bhutto into the belief that he would pose no threat to
the nascent democracy. Secondly, his performance when he invited Mr Bhutto
to the centenary celebrations of 11 Cavalry at Kharian. He took pains to
ascertain Mr Bhutto's tailor in Karachi (Hamid Khan) and had a Blue Patrols as
Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps stitched. On entering the room, Mr
Bhutto found a suitcase on his bed and on inquiry was told that it contained the
Blue Patrol. The next day, Mr Bhutto was requested to climb a tank and engage
a target. Quite obviously the target was hit. Then was his performance while on
deputation in Jordan, where he killed a large number of Palestinians (Black
September), Mr Bhutto was led to the belief that if he was so loyal to Jordan,
he would be even more loyal to Pakistan. His prime performance came
at Multan, where he invited Mr Bhutto as Colonel-in-Chief. After the function,
when Mr Bhutto had barely returned to Mr Sadiq Qureshi's house, when he
was informed that General Zia requested to meet him. Mr Bhutto was
surprised, having met him in the mess a little earlier. However, he called him
into Mr Sadiq Qureshi's study/library. Gen Zia on entrance went round the
Almirah, looking for something and on inquiry he revealed that he was looking
for a copy of the Holy Quran. On finding a copy he placed his hand on and
addressing Mr Bhutto he said, "You are the saviour of Pakistan and we owe it
to you to be totally loyal to you". Then was the fact that there was little to pick
and choose amongst the other aspirants. The only other suitable candidate
was General Majeed Malik who was Mr Bhutto's favourite as a sound
professional. Unfortunately was involved in the International Hotel
Scandal where he was caught with Mustafa Khar. He was sent as
Ambassador to Libya. Finally, of course was the American angle. Zia's
obsequeous behaviour made Mr Bhutto think that he was a non-political man.
Pakistani democracy was at an infant stage and could not afford an Army Chief
with political ambitions. Then there was not much choice. Gen Sharif was
considered politically unreliable since he had been very close to Ayub
Khan[18]. Jillani had no command experience and was the head of ISI. Akbar
Khan had not performed well as a GOC 12 Division in Kashmir in 1971 war.
Gen Aftab and AB Awan had no command potential and were not suitable.

16. 19. It has been said that a large number of PPP[19] tickets for 1977 elections
were awarded to opportunists who were not sincere workers of PPP. Why did
this happen?
It is good to be idealistic! However, in politics as in other fields of endeavour,
the ground realities cannot be ignored. It is typical of us to select one aspect of
an event and pass judgements rather than rationally analyse the problem in its
entirety. Firstly, political parties, unlike dictatorship, perform under a
manifesto or a programme rather than on whims as dictators generally do.
Individuals, in consequence, are not of prime import as long as they subscribe
to the basics/underlying philosophy of the manifesto. Judgement should only
have been passed if the individuals had performed for a reasonable period and
not abided by the party's basic philosophy/manifesto.
20. It has been asserted that Mr Bhutto was punished by some foreign
powers/power for initiating Pakistan's nuclear programme. Is this correct?
Within hours of the declaration of an election programme/date
the PNA[20] came into being and thus, through all means fair or foul thwarted
the political process. As, in the ultimate, they were working at someone else's
behest and according to someone else's agenda. It would be pertinent to recall
Kissinger's remarks at Lahore and the letters written to army officers by a
senior leader of the PNA (who even today masquerades as a democrat). The
entire movement was in keeping with a programme and, in consequence, a
large amount of dollars changed hands at Jan's, Peshawar Cantonment between
a foreign representative and a senior leader of the PNA.

17. ZA Bhutto meets Intellgence Boss Rao Rasheed .To the left another illustrious IG Police Fazl e Haq.I met Mr Fazl e Haq the first time
in 1971 when he was serving as IG Balochistan.He was good friend of my father.I remember meeting his son Faizi in Quetta in
1971.He later served as IG in Sindh and Punjab too and also later wrote columns in newspapers.
Further more, in keeping with this/their programme some key leaders, of the
PNA (detained at Sihala) thwarted efforts of reaching an agreement between
the government and the PNA despite the fact that initial agreement to hold
elections afresh was taken on May 12 1977 between the late Mufti
Mahmood[21] and Mr. Z.A Bhutto in a meeting at the PM's house. Today,
even Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, owing to belated pangs of conscience admits
that the army moved in, despite an agreement having been clinched.
The bane of this country has been the repeated intervention of the army and
thus frustrating political maturity and strengthening of political institutions.
The four post-1988 interventions amply confirm this attitude/malaise of the
Armed Forces.
It cannot be gainsaid that the military junta has failed in entirety in all
interventions, and departed ignominously. The fate of the present element is yet
to be seen but could be no different.
21. It has been said that Zia coup (he overthrew ruling Prime Minister Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto in a bloodless coup d'état on 5. July 1977 and became the state's
third ruler to impose martial law. He initially ruled as Chief Martial Law
Administrator, but later installed himself as the President of Pakistan in
September 1978.) was foreign inspired.

18. Yes, undoubtedly, the factors cited contributed to his selection as COAS. There
was off course the American angle. They had picked Zia as suitable
material at Fort Leavenworth, followed his career progress and possibly
lobbied in his favour. They made it known to friends months in advance that he
would be appointed COAS.
22. How would Mr ZA Bhutto have behaved had he been in power when the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan?
Mr Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan resistance in 1973. He had the
foresight and vision to do it. As a matter of fact we created the organisational
network which was used by Zia and the USA to oppose the Soviets. Zia had a
short term vision and ignored the political angle of organising an Afghan
government in exile with ulterior aims of gobbling US aid. Had Mr Bhutto
been in chair he would not have deliberately neglected the political angle like
Zia. Even Daud was convinced by Mr Bhutto in 1976 and said
"Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the same boat. If it is the threat from the
North (USSR) it is Afghanistan today and Pakistan tomorrow.
If it is the threat from the South (India) it is Pakistan today
and Afghanistan tomorrow". You see after 1971 Indian strategists had
placed Pakistan and Afghanistan in the same category as the next target. Mr
Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan resistance for reasons discussed

19. earlier. However, being a political animal, he also continued with a political
alternative/solution. In November 1976, in consultation with the resistance
leadership, two individuals, namely Wakil Azam Shinwari and Yunus
Khugiani were selected to proceed to Rome and request King Zahir
Shah[22] to return as his father had done earlier, to lead a movement
into Afghanistan.
The caveat was that Zahir Shah could return as a constitutional monarch under
the Constitution drafted by Mr Musa Shafiq, a former Prime Minister and the
mentor/founder of the Hizb in Afghanistan. However, Zahir Shah indicated that
he was willing to play his role but he would first visit Saadat (Egypt), then visit
the Shah of Iran and finally arrive in Pakistan. Mr Bhutto was confident that
King Zahir Shah could act as a rallying point and play his historical role.
Events, however, took a different turn and martial law was imposed
in Pakistan. The other aspect was the negotiations with Sardar Daud. Even
Daud as earlier discussed had accepted the Durand Line in 1976 and wanted
peace with Pakistan. Also the successful negotiations with Sardar Daud, to
safeguard Pakistan's, rightful interests are cases in point.
23. Why was the PPP unable to mobilise the masses around the time Mr.
Bhutto was sentenced to death till his execution?
It would be recalled that the PPP workers made great sacrifices and the

20. resistance put up by Mr. Bhutto himself during his incarceration proved a
beacon light. He endured all the excesses with great courage and dignity. The
workers on their part went to jail in the thousands! Every element of society
(pressmen, lawyers) were brutalised and lashed. A large number of workers
resorted to self-immolation. However, it was the leadership that eventually
deserted them. Jatoi and Khar colluded with the army, proceeded abroad and
despite being mixed up with the Indian intelligence agency RAW[23], later
Mr Khar was never tried by the military! Hafeez Pirzada also married afresh
and abandoned his leader! The worst instance was of the talented cousin
Mr Mumtaz Bhutto[24], who not only abandoned Mr. Bhutto but also
colluded with Zia. Maulana Niazi[25], Mir Afzal Khan[26] and a host of
others initially endeavoured to take over the party. In February 1978, when the
endeavour failed or was foiled and Begum Bhutto[27] was designated co-
chairperson, they disappeared from the scene. Their political nemesis is
abundant proof of their disloyalty and the party (workers) never accepted them
in their fold. The most poignant scene was at Garhi Khuda Bux, when on one
of the anniversaries, they were beaten up by the workers and had to flee
barefooted in the scorching heat! It is to the credit of the workers, that, despite
11 years of repression and intrigue (formation of IJI by the ISI), they yet
succeeded in bringing the party into government in 1988. Contrast this with the
events of October 1999 and subsequently, when the main leadership (Nawaz
Sharif[28] and family) of the so-called PML[29] (Nawaz) absconded to Saudi
Arabia and the workers left in the lurch.

21. The biased trial of ZA Bhutto manipulated by zia and the sold characterless judges
24. It is being said in Sindh and Balochistan that had Mr. Bhutto not been
from Sindh he would not have been executed but exiled like Mr. Nawaz
Sharif. What is your opinion?
There is no doubt in this assertion. Initially the attitude of the Lahore High
Court and its Chief Justice (Maulvi Mushtaq) is no secret. Even at the
Supreme Court, it was a divided verdict and the judges hailing
from Punjab on the one side and those hailing from the smaller provinces (all
dissenting) on the other.

22. It was a replay of the Lahore High Court scenario. Moreover, no divided
judgement has ever been affected but in this case Mr. Bhutto, hailing from a
smaller province, was executed. The merit of the judgement is evident from
the fact that it cannot be cited as a legal precedent. Foreign judicial/legal
experts have termed it as judicial murder.

23. Forced funeral of ZA Bhutto under military intelligence supervision of the usurper zia
25. How would you assess Zia's Afghan policy?
It was based on sheer opportunism and personal interest. Initially, he lacked
the vision and, therefore, suspended financing the movement. This resulted in
break-up of movement from one to seven groups, each leader fending for
himself. Secondly, when the Soviet invasion took place he did not form a
government in exile, which could gain experience during the Jehad and be
available when the Geneva talks took place. Also all the US/Saudi and other
assistance would have been routed through institutional organisations
(Ministries) rather than individuals and would have prevented heart burning
and divisive tendencies. Finally, he opposed the Geneva talks and
visualised only a military solution — the bane(curse) of all our subsequent
military leadership — Hamid Gul[30], Beg[31] etc. We were very deliberate.
Every resistance is based on a political centre, a hierarchy, like the DeGaulle
government in exile, the Algerian and Yugoslav Government in exile
etc. Zia deliberately kept the Afghan Mujahideen divided into various
groups in order to ensure that the bulk of the US aid could
be embezzled. The future events thus led to the post-1988 civil war
in Afghanistan.

24. 26. When Ms Bhutto[32] came to power after winning the 1988 elections the
Pakistani nation had very high expectations from her. However, she was unable
to bring any revolutionary changes and remained a prisoner of circumtances.
Why did this happen?
and
27. What was the role of COAS and the President in the period 1988-90 in
destabilising the PPP government?
(We have combined the two questions since Gen. Babar decided to answer both
the questions in a combined manner).
A programme/manifesto, however revolutionary requires time and freedom of
action, more so, when it comes in the wake of 11 years of Martial Law with all
its incumbent distortions. In democratic norms/practice, it also requires a
comfortable majority in the parliament as each measure has to receive the
assent of the Parliament, i.e, the Assembly and the Senate. This was
appropriately denied through formation of IJI[33]. Simultaneously, the
government has to operate in a free environment rather than limited by the
President (who had assumed abnormal powers in 1985) and, in consequence,
interpreted the constitution and rules of business according to his whims. This
was true in the case of Judges appointment and in Admiral Sirohey's[34],
retirement. The then Army Chief General Aslam Beg had the ambition to usurp
power during the period 1988-90 but lacked the courage! Initially, the IJI was
formed, then it was ensured that Punjab not only went to the opposition
(Nawaz Sharif) but remained in perpetual confrontation with the Centre. When
they felt endangered by the stability of the government, an effort was then
made to remove her through a vote of no confidence, engineered by Mr. Nawaz
Sharif, General Aslam Beg and, undoubtedly, with the blessings of
the President GIK[35]! Mr. Nawaz Sharif took the parliamentarians to Changa
Manga and later Murree (beginning the biggest bane of Pakistan politics........
"Horse Trading") and, of course dished out considerable financial (plots in
Lahore etc) and other benefits. Yet, it did not succeed. Gen Aslam Beg weaned
away the MQM[36] members from the coalition. A meeting having been held
at Yunus Habib's (Mehran Bank fame)[37] residence at Karachi. The
agencies also felt endangered with the removal of General Hamid Gul (more
famous for the fiasco at Jalabad — despite advice to the contrary) and the
establishment of Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Committee, tasked to bring the
intelligence agencies under a constitutional umbrella. The President had his
own distorted interpretation of law with regards to the retirement of Admiral
Sirohey (it would be recalled that the case was initiated by the Ministry of
Defence, after due scrutiny of rules and precedent) and duly processed by Law
Ministry). Next, the immaturish attempt of the Law Minister/Advisor to do
down the senior, experienced and competent Attorney General. The episode of
"Midnight Jackals"[38] to wean away PPP's MNAs (members of the National
Assembly). Two of the principal characters are today behind bars for corruption!
Finally of course, Gen Beg felt threatened (after removal of Hamid Gul and

25. the possible ouster of Admiral Sirohey). Need for brevity precludes fuller
details, for these petty intrigues can only be covered in many volumes! As
further proof of Beg's ambitions (fortunately curtailed by lack of courage)
which stand thwarted (his directing Mr. Yunas Habib at COAS house) to pay
Rs. 50 million to Mr. Javed Hashmi[39] at the peak of "Operation Desert
Storm" (Nawaz Sharif government) lends further credence to his ambitions.
However, when all these measures failed the President, in total collusion with
the COAS and the opposition, used 58(2) (b)[40] and removed the government.
The supine superior judiciary placed the seal of confirmation, on an act,
blatantly, unlawful.
It is to the credit of Ms Bhutto that despite all these intrigues/endeavours she
succeeded in enforcing her programme: rationalising the sugar industry,
spelling out sugar cane areas, benchmark for credit based on crushing capacity,
the establishment of Board of Investment; providing job opportunity to the
youth and overall improvement in the national economy, both, industrial and

26. agricultural. The growth rate GDP and the stability of the Dollar are evident
proof of her success. Her achievements must also be viewed in the context of
the time frame, barely 2 years as against 5 years as ruled in the constitution,
more so, when the first intrigue at destabilisation took place within 30 minutes
of her oath-taking (i.e a Russian aircraft hijacked and heading towards
Pakistan, her cool and composed response thwarted the attempt —details some
other time)
28. What is your opinion about limiting or totally finishing the ISI's political
role?
In its classic role i.e. Intelligence, it has rendered yeoman service. However, it
should neither have a political role nor dabble in politics. The bane in Pakistani
politics since 1977, has been the active dabbling of the ISI in politics. Zia
initiated this role for personal reasons and, since he was wearing many a hat
simultaneously, institutions became intermixed. An additional factor was the
Afghan Jehad, when at times, their assessment/action was at total variance with
that of the government in office. An endeavour like the one reflected in
the ACM Zulfiqar Committee Report and the proceedings pending in the
Supreme Court should be the vehicle to bring about this change. It is claimed
with great naivette that the ISI is under the direct control of the Chief
Executive! If this was so, then how did the ISI pick up Asif Zardari[41], the
Chief Executive's spouse, from the Governor House Lahore in 1996? These are
merely fictions and the reality is that it clobbered together the IJI in 1988, a
claim personally made by the then DG ISI (Gen Hamid Gul); in 1990 the ISI
distributed funds amongst politicans of their choice (Gen Asad Durrani;
Affidavit in the Supreme Court). Initially, they brought together the MQM in
1985-86 and when it became a threat, Gen Javed Nasser raised the Haqiqi.
All their measures have militated against the continuance/maturity of
political institutions/governments. The take over in 1996 (Dismissal of PPP
Government), was engineered by the ISI and not the 111 brigade as, is, the
general practice. The confession on organizing the IJI in 1988; the distribution
of funds by the ISI in 1990; the rigging of the 1997 elections are apt proof of
their continued dabbling in politics.

27. It is hoped that the Supreme Court, when it finds the courage/moral fibre to
proceed with the ISI Fund & Mehran Bank case may bring sanity to the
entire system and apportion rightful responsibility to each institution. It is
strange that the logic used in 1993 and 1996 was that they had responded to the
president/supreme commander (National) rather than the Chief Executive and
in 1998 they abandoned the Supreme Commander Sardar Farooq
Leghari[42] and supported Nawaz Sharif, the Chief Executive.
In brief/short, martial laws have been more in the nature of "economic
necessity" rather than any national commitment, the Armed Forces feeling left
out of the rat race for financial benefits!
29. It has been said that the 1988, 1990, 1997 Elections were rigged. In 1988
the system was relatively imperfect. However, it was made more perfect in
1990 and perfected totally in 1997. What is your opinion?
Undoubtedly, all elections since 1988 have been rigged to enable certain
desired results. In 1988, the IJI was placed in opposition so as to limit the
majority of the PPP. In 1990 the ISI not only disbursed funds to their favoured
candidates but made analysis of the electoral rolls so as to ascertain those
voters who generally did not cast their vote. These votes were then cast in
favour of their favourite candidates. In 1993 there was a little respite as both
the President and the PM were simultaneously given the marching orders. In
1997, the modus ope***** was further streamlined and made effective. The
candidates were issued different electoral rolls, one set to the favoured

28. candidates with two to three additional pages. These pages contained the newly
enrolled voters, this implied an additional 20-25 thousand votes (around 200
voters and with around 140 polling stations).
These additional pages were not available to the opposing candidate. These
additional votes, since they could not be challenged, were cast between Iftari
and Tarawih. Thus emerged the heavy mandate and the desired results! These
additional pages were detected at a few stations, but went overlooked, as being
an error on the part of the Election Commission/staff. It would be of interest to
note that in each of these elections the first results were from remote areas like
Maiwand (Dera Bugti) etc where no communications existed. Manipulation
was also carried out at the Aiwan-e-Sadar where a "Control Centre" was
established each time and the service of Justice S.A Nusrat and/or Gen
Mujeeb and Rafaqat were utilised.
30. The PPP was a progressive party. How did its leaders allegedly get
involved in capitalist activities? Further why did the PPP abandon its
progressive outlook after 1988?
Every government and political party works within an environment. The
political philosopy is designed/cut according to the obtainings/public desires.

29. When Mr. Bhutto assumed office there was despondency (aftermath
of surrender at Dacca and failure of the Armed Forces in West Pakistan)
and exploitation of the common man. Also, the threat from India persisted.
He took necessary measures to overcome these: introduced populist politics,
gave the right of Trade Unionism; nationalised industry, to break the steel
grip of the industrialists over the labour; gave the right of obtaining passports
and after opening avenues of job opportunity, oil as a weapon, ensured that
large number of individuals went abroad to seek employment and benefit.
Organised the Islamic Summit at Lahore. By giving observer status to PLO,
enabled its entrance into the portals of UN; opted out of South Asian Sub-
Continent and went back to the State's Islamic roots. At home he succeeded
in obtaining consensus on the 1973 Constitution, a document that still remains
sacrosanct and inviolable, despite efforts by Dictators/ML authorities,
including the present Junta. His high water mark, of course, was the launching
of the nuclear programme, in response to the Indian blast at Pokhran.
A singular measure (Balance of Terror) that has kept the Indians at
bay. When Ms. Bhutto came into government, it was in the wake of the 1985
party less elections, which were designed to and did destroy the political party
fabric. The issuance of Rs. 5 million as development fund by late Mr Mahbub-
ul-Haq[43] (in fact a political bribe) not only formalised corruption in the
body politics, but also reduced the MNA (members of the National Assembly)to the
position of local councillor (drains, street paving etc came within the ambit of
the MNA and legislation became secondary). Also, this introduced
malpractices within the election system and, in consequence, implied heavy
expenditure — i.e, 3 million to Rs. 5 million. These measures as all other
measures undermined party conformity and the parliamentarians, on the pretext
of covering the heavy election expenditures, began to seek undue favours.
Loyalty was at a price!
Despite these handicaps, the government continued to work unabatedly on a
egalitarian programme. There are four major factors that confront society;
One:- "Unemployment", Two: "Inflation", Three:- "The Security of Person
and Property", Fourth:- "Women Empowerment". It can be said with due
pride, that the government, based on merit and within the parameters of
provincial quota, provided around 40,000 jobs, particularly to the educated
youth. Secondly, it contained inflation within reasonable limits and there was
no widespread dissatisfaction. Thirdly, the law and order and, in consequence,
the security of person and property ensured. Fourthly, women empowerment.
Women constitute 52% of our population — yet, they are not only debarred
from the mainstream national endeavour, but also in most cases present a
picture of abject exploitation. They are used for labour (a manual task) and at
the receiving end of severe abuse. Resultantly; a "Women Development
Division" was created; the First Women Bank, to provide job opportunity was
established. Women Police Stations were opened; a lady was admitted into the
PSP in officer rank and permitted to undergo training at the Police Academy,
alongside with the male selectees. For the first time a lady was inducted into
the PIA (Pakistan International Airlines) as a pilot — today, she is operating
as captain of a Boeing aircraft. It was endeavoured to appoint a lady (Ms

30. Shireen Mazari) as Vice Chancellor of the Quaid-e-Azam University — to
be stopped only by the obduracy of Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Chancellor.
A massive socio-economic development programme was launched to provide
electricity, gas, potable water, schools and colleges and other facilities to the
neglected element of society. The ANF (Anti-Narcotics Force) was created so
as to eliminate the menace of Narcotics.
31. How would you define your Taliban policy?
The Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A
Geographical Account, February 2010
The Taliban movement was purely indigenous and a direct reaction to
the intra group fighting of the erstwhile Jehadi Groups i.e.
between Hikmatyar and Rabbani; Ahmed Shah Masoud, Dostam[44],
Sayyaf[45] and others. The Afghan people had had enough of the infighting
and desired peace so as to launch/undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction
of Afghanistan. It also stemmed from a failure on the part of the Western
Nations — after having achieved their objective (the destruction of Soviet
Union) they abandoned the Afghans to their own devices. It would have been
fair to launch a Marshall Plan or some such developmental activity.
Regrettably, they failed to so so. The Pakistan Government (PPP) had no
favourites and the only desire that motivated all activity was the unity, and
integrity of Afghanistan and the well being of the Afghan people. In
furtherance of this policy a tour (with permission from the Central Afghan
Government — Rabbani) of S.W Afghanistan was undertaken. The purpose:
Firstly, to prove to the world that peaceful conditions existed in the region;
Secondly, the Central Asian Republics had attained political independence but
not economic independence (integrated economy for 70 years); Thirdly, to
utilise the energy sources available in the Central Asian republics by the entire
region, including S.E Asia; Fourthly, to develop communication, and
resultantly, trade between Central Asian Republics (markets) and India
(industry) — Pakistan would act as a conduit and a single train/truck could take
anyone/anything from Ukraine to Singapore uninterruptedly. Fifthly, and most
importantly, enable the development of Gwadar port and thus reducing
pressure on Karachi port (eliminating the persistent law and order problem).
During the tour these issues were raised with the leaders, and possibly, fell on
good ears. Subsequently, within the space of a week a large number of
Diplomats (mostly Western) were taken to Herat and Kandahar so as to
familiarise them with the situation, and the need to assist in the reconstruction
and rehabilitation of Afghanistan and ameliorate the economic difficulties of
the Afghan people.
In view of the total absence of medicines and other essential goods a convoy
with relief goods for Kandahar, Lashkargah, Shindand and Herat (organised
through contribution from philanthrophists) arranged and despatched. The
convoy was, regrettably, stopped at Kandahar by the Indo-Iranian Lobby.

31. Then Iranians were justified as the opening of this route would have spelt the
death-knell to their own ambitions considering
the Central Asian Republics as their backyard. Moreover, the Iranian
route linking Ashkabad, Mashad, Tehran, Bunder Abbas was 3200 KMs,
whereas the contemplated route was 1600 KM, with 800 KM, from Karachi to
Chaman already developed. The Indians, however, were atypically foolish and
could not see/identify their strategic economic interests! The Taliban (former
Jehadis) sensing their economic interests being endangered, came to the rescue
and released the convoy. The convoy then proceeded to its destination.
However, the Taliban phenomena had commenced and then there was no
stopping until they finally entered Kabul in September 1996.
Consequent upon their entrance into Kabul in September 1996, negotiations
were commenced/set apace between the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance in October 1996. The negotiations, after a few shuttles, were
successful and a draft agreement compiled — reflecting a numbers of
issues. Article 5 stipulated the future political system — the establishment of
a commission: composed of representative from all the provinces
of Afghanistan, based on the population of each province; the representatives,
provided/nominated by the respective province could be local or from amongst
those settled abroad. The meetings (on Dostam's request and agreed to by
Taliban) would be in Kabul. The plan quite obviously was federal and one
that would enable suitable representation to all ethnic, cultural and
religious groups. Regrettably, Para 5 (at the time of the signing)
was erased by Dr. Holls, the then UN representative on Afghanistan, and
this caused a furore by the Northern Alliance and the agreement was
stalled. Subsequently, Dostam made a number of requests seeking finalisation
of the accord — the final one being on 3 November 1996. The same evening
i.e. 3 November 1996, a meeting was summoned at the Aiwan-e-Saddar with
the President, PM, the COAS, the DGISI and the Foreign Secretary in
attendance. It was decided/ruled that I should proceed to Mazar-e-Sharif and
have the agreement finalised on 5 November 1996. On the night 4/5
November, for reasons known to him, the President, acting under article 58 (2)
(b), dismissed our government. The Afghans were, regrettably, once
again left to their own devices and the power struggle continues unabated.
A similar trade agreement/protocol was drawn up and signed
between Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, China and Pakistan so as to enable
movement of goods in the region via the Khunjrab Pass.
The Indians on their part have, regrettably, been not only short sighted but
foolish and by siding with Iran (a natural antagonist — conflict of interest in
Gulf and Indian Ocean) have lost the opportunity of a millennium to benefit
from cheap/economic supply of power on the one hand and export of goods
to Central Asia on the other. Nations, like individuals, at times act most
foolishly and against their long term interests
32. What is your opinion about the Taliban Government and their

32. future relations with Pakistan?
The Taliban movement was purely an indigenous movement in response to
the local environment / conditions. It must be added with all emphasis that in
view of the cornerstone of our Afghan policy, unity and integrity
of Afghanistan and the well-being of the Afghan people, this was not the
ultimate. This is amply borne out by setting a pace negotiations between the
Taliban and northern alliance in October 1996, after the Taliban's entry
into Kabul in September 1996. The negotiations were aimed at establishment
of a broad based government and a possible federal structure so as
to apportion due rights to all ethnic and religious groups. These measures
would lead to peace and stability in Afghanistan and enable its reconstruction
and rehabilitation. The Afghans (all groups) are not only friendly
to Pakistan but consider it their second home —- which, in turn
has demolished the Pakhtunistan bogey. It is my firm belief / faith that in the
event of a future misadventure by India, it would find not only Afghan people,
but also at least 100,000 fully trained and armed Afghans on our side. The sub
continental balance of power has imperceptibly but effectively changed.
33. It has been said that the Zia regime acted as a mid-wife to
the MQM and Sipah-i-Sahaba[46] in order to reduce the PPP influence in
Sindh and Punjab and the ISI master minded the creation of MQM. How far
is this correct? Further what was the degree of Indian involvement with MQM
in Sindh?
One (MQM) was deliberate, while the Second (Sipah-e-Sahaba) was the
outcome of flawed government policies. The MQM was indeed, not only
organised by the Zia Regime (Intelligence Agencies) but also nurtured so as to
weaken the hold of political parties like PPP and Jamaat-e-Islami[47]. The
partyless elections helped the MQM in this agenda.
Progressively, they not only fell into inimical hands (India) but also became a
problem for the domestic government and in consequence, Javed
Nasir[48] proudly proclaims that he (ISI) nurtured the Haqiqi[49]. But a genie
once released from the bottle is uncontrollable and the Army (Intelligence
Agencies) in their naivette failed to realise/understand these subtleties/niceties.
The Sipah-e-Sahaba was the result of undue emphasis on religion. All
dictators, lacking a manifesto/programme fall back on religion. This
increases the tempo of the struggle between modernists (political
forces) and fanatics (religious groups) and imperceptibly undermine the
body fabric of national polity/direction. Simultaneously, these groups to
further their programme, wittingly or unwittingly, become proxies of other
fissiparous forces. The MQM, progressively fell into the hands of
the Indians and Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Arabs. The TNFJ[50] and other linked
groups covered Iranian interests.
The MQM was undoubtedly, a boom for the Indians as at a very
minimal/negligible expense (finance) brought the country's economic and

33. industrial hub (Karachi-Hyderabad) to a grinding halt. With a handful of
militants, they could hold the entire city (120 million) hostage. After the
demise of Zia-ul-Haq, they found a new mentor in General Aslam Beg. There
was no doubt that the MQM became Indian sponsored, recruitment being
done by Javed Langra[51] from the Bihari Camps at Tongi (Bangladesh)!
Being unscrupulous, they also took advantage of divided nature of families.
They had established a number of training camps (Lucknow, Rajasthan and
others) where they trained these elements and infiltrated them into Pakistan.
The Indians not only financed the operations (weapons/livelihood)
in Pakistan but also financed the grandoise life style of Altaf Hussain in
the UK — such life style not being possible through charitable donations (skins
on Eid)! The individuals to ensure an appropriate life style collected "Bhattas"
from Industrialists and the rich — apart of course, from donations in kind
(pulao etc) from marriage halls!
Additionally, some religious groups in their zeal to recruit individuals for the
Jehad in Kashmir, unwittingly, recruited individuals (Fahim Commando -
MQM leader) from amongst the rank and file of MQM, and sent them for
training to Afghanistan. No record being maintained these individuals joined
the militancy in Karachi. The most damaging aspect was the rule/misrule of the
late Jam Sadiq[52]. He provided employment to these individuals in the
thousands in the Police, the KMC, the KWSB, the Steel Mills etc. Thus
ensuring their economic well being. Similarly, he issued thousands of Arms
Licences to these individuals. At one point the US was also enamoured
(considering them oppressed) of them and were liberal in the issuance of
visas etc. However, after "Khaji Ground" operation in 1995, they not only
limited the visas but shifted the visa section to Islamabad, realising that
a terrorist in Pakistan was a "would be" terrorist in US.
I must in all honesty, reiterate that 99.9% of the Urdu speaking
element (Mohajir being a misnomer after 50 years) did not support them and
were, themselves hostage to militancy. After all the creation of Pakistan had
been their need and their forefathers had rendered yeoman secrifices in its
attainment. Further more, it was their fore-fathers who with sweat and blood
converted an unknown locality (Mai Kulachee) into the great metropolis that it
is today.
34. How did the MQM part ways with PPP in 1989. Was it due to the pressure
of the then COAS and the ISI?
Initially, there were difficulties (of principle) in their joining the coalition.
The MQM desired that all their terrorists be granted amnesty and cases
against them be dropped. The Federal Government could not, for obvious
reasons, accept these demands. However, the MQM realising the prinicipled
stand of the government, withdrew their demand and joined the Coalition.
However, in 1989 when the "No Confidence" move came up, General Aslam
Beg, prevailed upon the MQM to withdraw their support. A meeting was held

34. at the house of Mr. Yunus Habib (Mehran Bank fame) and
the MQM withdrew. Simultaneously, an effort was made by the Army and Mr.
Mustafa Jatoi[53] to wean away the Sindhi members of the N.A.(National
Assembly) At the time of their arrival at Islamabad Mr. Jatoi and late General
Asif Nawaz (in uniform) were present to whisk them away. The plan, however,
was largely foiled by my picking up the individuals from the aircraft at the
tarmac. Rana Chander Singh[54] and a couple of others fell prey and were
taken to Punjab House in Rawalpindi. The Pir of Ranipur[55] was evacuated
from Rawalpindi and moved to an annexe of the PM House so as to thwart his
kidnapping by the Punjab Police. The story of Cheema running across the aisle
in the national assembly shouting "save me, save me" seeking the speakers
protection is well known to warrant repetition! There are numerous other tales,
the classic being the movement of parliamentarians to Changa Manga and later
Murree. General Aslam Beg and the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan were
totally hand in glove as they did not take notice or react to these non-
constitutional endeavours.
35. What about human rights violations on part
of Police/Rangers and extrajudicial killings in the 1995 disturbances
in Karachi?
It was purely a slander campaign against the People's Government, designed
to influence the public and the superior judiciary when the case came up in the
form of a writ petition.
The Supreme Court, too, contrary to all recognised practices, accepted
newspaper cutting as evidence — the same court, however, declined to accept
similar proof when M. Rafiq Tarar[56], the sitting President, carried brief
cases stashed with money to Quetta and Peshawar so as to influence the judges
against their own Chief Justice! Nature has its own method of retribution! The
public responded positively and ignoring the slander cast 35,000 votes in my
favour in the 97 elections. The constituency, too, was the heart land of the
MQM and it was largely the MQM vote. Additionally, it is standard practice
that a judicial inquiry is conducted in each case where suspicions as to foul
play appears and, in consequence, in Karachi, too, this practice was duly
followed. The greatest of all proofs is the fact that no complaint as to excesses
was lodged in the years following 1995, more so, when an Opposition
Government was in office and the MQM was, atypically, part of the coalition.
However, in 1992 the Nawaz Government had to induct the Army to suppress
terrorism.
36. What are your impressions about the 1995 disturbances in Karachi?
In 1992, the Nawaz Government inducted the Army into IS Duties, though
the Army is not designed to handle terrorism. In November 1994,
responding to a major demand of the MQM leadership, the people's
government withdrew the Army, in the hope that this measure would bring
normalcy. However, not only did peace not return but in fact terrorist activity

35. increased.
The problem, being essentially a political/socio-economic one, and
the militancy only a manifestation rather than the malaise, the People's
Government decided on a three pronged policy. Firstly, restore peace, the
essential/precursor of any other activity; Secondly, conduct negotiations with
the MQM, an endeavour designed to bring MQM into the political
mainstream; Finally, the launching of a massive socio-economic
development programme to remove the economic/social anomalies. I was
assigned the Law and Order aspect and to co-ordinate the effort of all the
elements. At the outset, I would like to pay a tribute to the Intelligence Bureau
(IB)[57], who rendered yeoman service and enabled targeted action. They
succeeded where the ISI and MI (Military Intel) had totally failed. Tribute
must also be paid to the Police, who despite heavy casualties (109 martyrs in
period Jan-Jun 1995), responded with great courage and fortitude.
The Rangers[58], too played a classic role and responded to all calls of
assistance with great alacrity and there was total co-operation between the
elements on the ground. It would be appropriate to single out the
leadership, Mr. Masood Sharif[59] for his vision and organization of
intelligence efforts; Mr. Shoaib Suddle[60] for his sedate temperament and
outstanding integrity, thus acting as a beacon light to his subordinates. A
mention of Mr. Saeed Khan the IG Police would also be appropriate as he not
only co-ordinated all the police effort, but also ensured availability of strength
from the moffusil. Finally, the unflapable Gen Akram, who responded in a
cool and collected manner to all demands placed on his force, the Rangers. It is
a tribute to the impartiality and even-handedness of all ranks that not a single
case alleging excesses has been filed over the years, infact there has not even
been a muted complaint. The MQM parliamentarians Mr. Aftab
Sheikh and Mrs Nasreen Jalil, in particular and the others in general that they
did not create problems in the senate.
On arrival at Karachi on 1 July 1995, the press made inquiries as to the period
it would take to quell the terrorism? My answer was Dec 95. However, thanks
to the outstanding performance of the IB, the Police and the Rangers, the
problem was, to all intent and purpose, over by Sept '95. The remainder was
merely mopping up and consolidation. Regrettably, the political aspect did not
proceed apace and achieved very little. The socio-economic aspect was a great
success and the massive funds earmarked and projects undertaken have found
fruition in the succeeding years, viz the Liaquat Fly-Over being completed in
April 2001. It is a compliment to the wisdom and sagacity of the then PM, Ms.
Benazir Bhutto.
The story must, however, end on a sad note! Gen. Akram, Masood Sharif and
Mr. Shoaib Suddle and Mr. Saeed Khan were, in recognition of their singular
service awarded the Hilal-e-Shujaat (Civilian award for bravery). Gen
Akram being from the army, has been able to retain his award. The notification
with regards to the others was, contrary to all rules, cancelled by the
unscrupulous President....... Sardar Farooq Leghari. However, since these

36. awards are in the nature of gallantry awards, they are not subject to
cancellation and cudgels will have to be taken up in this behalf at an
appropriate time! The whole espisode savours of rank ingratitude.
37. How would you compare the Rangers in IS Duties with FSF (Federal
Security Force)[61]?
Events have come a full circle! What Mr. Bhutto could, with his vision,
conceive in the 70s came about in the 90s
(two decades later)!!!! It would be recalled that in 1972/73 there was a Police
strike in the Punjab and the NWFP. In the NWFP and Balochistan with the
availability of two federal forces, the Frontier Constabulary[62] and
the Frontier Corps[63], it did not pose a problem. However, in the Punjab it
did pose a problem, more so when the Army refused to come to the assistance
of the provincial government, although legally, even a district officer (DC) can
summon the Army. This led to the raising of the FSF. No FSF
unit was assigned to the NWFP as the FC and Frontier Corps already
existed. Furthermore, when during the PNA agitation, the Police requested for
Ranger support (Army being the last resort), they were informed that they
could provide only 20 men, Mr. Fazal-e-Haq, the then IG, was totally amazed
and commented that he could raise, a larger force from his village! The FSF,
because of the disrepute of its commander, Masud
Mahmood was disbanded immediately after imposition of Martial Law in
July '77. It may be of interest to add that the ammunition with which Mr.
Ahmed Raza Kasuri's, father was allegedly killed by the FSF, was never
issued to FSF, the Supreme Court was dishonest enough not to
summon Colonel Wazir, the then Commandant Ammunition Depot Havelian
to testify and thus belie the prosecution case.
Since the 1980, Punjab Constabulary and Rangers have been raised in
the Punjab and Sindh, apart, of course, from a horde of Frontier Constabulary
and Frontier Corps, personnel. The Rangers, in Sindh, in view of this
contingency, been divided into two elements: one, the operational element on
the border (with HQ's at Hyderabad); and the second dedicated purely for IS
Duties at Karachi. History has more than vindicated Mr. Bhutto's vision and
measure.
38. What is your opinion about Murtaza Bhutto's[64] gunning down in a
police encounter. Was it a conspiracy to destabilise the PPP Government or
was it an impromptu incident?
The case is subjudice and cannot be commented upon with honesty. Some day
the true facts will emerge, linked with the fact as to who, despite his
resistance/reservation, encouraged him to return to Pakistan so as to create
problems for Ms. Bhutto, the then PM. However, it can be said with confidence
that his life could have been saved if he had been moved to Jinnah
Postgraduate or the Aga Khan Hospital which were designed to meet such
emergencies. He was rushed to the Mideast Hospital (proximity), where neither

37. staff (being a holiday) nor appropriate equipment were available — so much so
that even the telephone key was not available.
He stated off the record that this was a job done by the Pakistani military
intelligence but did not wish this to be published.He later reconfirmed this in
a television interview later in which he stated that the ISI had a link with
Murtaza assasination
39. Why did Ms Bhutto get into confrontation with the Judiciary in her second
tenure?
To enable a full perspective, it would be appropriate to comment on his
(Sajjad Shah)[65] appointment. An appointment that was out of turn as he was
not the senior most sitting judge. Ms. Bhutto, the then PM, normally consulted
her cabinet colleagues when making such sensitive appointments. When she
consulted Iqbal Haider[66] and myself, we advised that she should strictly
abide by the seniority and thus each individual would remain for a year or so
and retire. No individual would be able to entrench himself. However,
the Shahs (Syeds) of Sindh, a formidable group, prevailed upon her to appoint
Mr. Sajjad Ali Shah. Thus the die was cast, and once safely placed in his saddle
he launched on a venture of "Judicial Activism". The CJ (Chief
Justice) began to conjure visions of glory and political ambition! The role of
the Judiciary, as listed in the constitution, is the 'interpretation' of law and
dispensing justice. They have no business to indulge in politics. Sajjad Ali
Shah's, indulgence in "Judicial Activism" is proven by the fact that he was
involved in a similar confrontation with the PML (Pakistan Muslim
League) government of Nawaz Sharif. Judicial activism and the tacit
collusion/support of Sardar Farooq Leghari, the then President, was the
common factor in both cases. It is inconceivable that the same CJ gets involved
in confrontation with two successive elected Prime Ministers (the prime source
of constitutional authority).
However, he met his Waterloo when the supine President, lacking in moral
fibre, abandoned him at the critical moment.
40. Some critics assert that since her marriage the major political
decisions have been made by Mr. Asif Zardari. How far is this allegation
correct?
This is a baseless allegation. Ms. Bhutto possessed not only a brilliant intellect
but was also deeply steeped in political acumen. All decisions (specially
important ones) were either discussed at the Cabinet/ECC or in private with
Ministers like the case cited above or the appointment of COAS/promotion of
officers to Lieutenant General rank and Zardari figured in none of these
discussions/decisions. Since they could not attack her directly so they
used Zardari as a stick to beat her with. Undoubtedly, there must have been
instances but these generally related to bad choice of friends or unscrupulous
MNAs. I may also add that if the army builds a 'Polo Ground' at Kharian at

38. state expense (although one already exists) no questions are asked but if a piece
of land of the PM's house is used for similar purpose it becomes scandalous.
Also, no questions are asked when the succeeding PM converts/uses the same
ground for cricket! People then rightfully/legitimately ask as to the difference
in similar cases by a Sindhi and a Punjabi.
41. Why did Farooq Leghari partways with the PPP? Was it due to
ideological reasons or because of personal reasons i.e. was it a matter of
principle or a case of clash of egos?
Sardar Farooq Leghari had become over ambitious and corrupt. In his stint
as Finance Minister with the caretaker government he had obtained 30
million from Yunus Habib (Mehran Gate fame) although only 15 million
were indicated in his bank account against a supposed sale of land to the
frontmen (servants) of Mr. Yunus Habib. The deal was shady because the
physical possession of the land was never taken. Resultantly, when the cabinet
was being formed he was involved with Ms. Bhutto in a prolonged
discussion/confrontation as he desired (having tasted blood) to become the
Finance Minister rather than accept the Foreign Minister's slot that was being
offered to him. After a long discussion in which I was also a participant he was
made to accept the job of Foreign Minister.
Ms. Bhutto like her father, has been trusting of their colleagues and suffered
in consequence. Despite the discussion above, she was magnanimous enough
to nominate and have him elected as President. As President too, she not only
accorded him due respect, consulted him on all major issues but also
encouraged him to preside over/address all functions that she was unable to
attend. These assignments went to his head and he began to conjure visions of
personal grandeur. He then insisted on and had General Jehangir
Karamat[67] appointed as COAS. The two then began to collude, the
common ground being the ISI case in the Supreme Court (against funding of
select individuals in the 1990 elections). He feared that he would also be
exposed (30 million from Yunus Habib). Furthermore, because of his earlier
political association he also began colluding with the Jamaat-e-Islami, a
party that only opposes and launches movements against elected political
governments.
He was fully a party to the Jamaat march on Islamabad. Regrettably, this also
failed as they did not expect the army to respond to the call of the PPP
government and against the Jamaat-e-Islami. Thus, he resorted to article
58(2) (b) and dismissed the elected government and that too of the party that
had brought him to the pinnacle of power. The Supreme Court (where he
already had a ready partner in the CJ) atypically supported the removal of
government and dismissal of the assemblies. However, the NWFP Government
under Aftab Khan Sherpao[68] was initially left intact. A Caretaker
Government was formed under another "turncoat" (Mr. Meraj Khalid[69],
incidentally, who had also received Two Lakhs from the ISI in 1990). The long
term plan was to remove the Caretaker Government and form a fresh Interim

39. Government for two to three years under himself and with Aftab Sherpao[70],
a collaborator, as Prime Minister Gen Jehangir Karamat, lacking the moral
fibre, got cold feet and declined to support any further ventures and, in
consequence, fresh elections were held. Elections that were once again
massively and scientifically rigged, and led to the 'heavy mandate' of Nawaz
Sharif. Nature's retribution was swift in coming, and Nawaz Sharif, borrowing
a leaf from Machiavelli successively removed the CJ, Farooq Leghari, and
finally, Gen Jehangir Karamat, the COAS. Bearing a guilty conscience all
went like docile lambs.
42. Why did you contest the 1997 elections from Karachi?
My natural constituency was NA IV, my home district and from where I had
been returned in 1993. I filed my papers for NA IV. However, in view of the
adverse propaganda that excesses had been perpetrated during 1995, restoration
of law and order and that this fact had also been cited as one of the reasons for
removal of the government under 58(2) (b), it was encumbent that I should
contest elections from Karachi. I was so ordered by Ms. Bhutto, whose cabinet
member I had been and I unhesitatingly complied——- though well aware that
it would be an exercise in futility as Farooq Leghari would ensure that I lost.
This was even more essential as, in its atypical manner, the Supreme Court had
authenticated the measure of dismissal—based on newspaper cuttings as the
only evidence placed on record. The constituency that I contested from was the
heartland of Urdu speaking community and it is to their credit that, despite
numerous interferences
(including the additional pages) by the agencies they cast 35,000 votes in my
favour. Whereas, I took out numerous rallies as it was an elongated
constituency and addressed numerous public meetings. The eventual winner
Ejaz Shafi could not even appear in the area——- though, because of the
massive availability of funds, he had opened numerous offices providing high
cost facilities. It would also be appropriate that Mr Imran Khan, masquerading
as a national leader could not visit the area and his publicity limited to
screening of "World Cup" matches. Needless to state he forfeited his security.
It would be proved if proof was needed of our impartiality in the restoring of
law and order. And, in a manner, was a slap in the face of Sardar Farooq
Leghari, his coterie and the members of the bench, who had, without
appropriate evidence applied the seal of authentication/validity on the
proceedings.
43. How do you compare the Pakistan Army of 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 2001
with each other in terms of military spirit/virtue, quality of leadership at higher
and lower level?
A rather sicklist question! The Army of 1947, was nascent and ill- equipped.
The bulk of the army being of mixed class groups, the units had to be re-
organised on arrival in Pakistan. India, playing its atypical Chanakian role, did
not release the entire share of equipment and, where it did, it was of little use:

40. all boots of size 8; disparate weapons and ammunition etc. The major failing
being that all the Ordnance factories were located in India. Therefore, it had to
start virtually at scratch. While these Herculean problems were not enough, the
problem of Kashmir was thrust on us. In addition of course was the security to
be provided to convoys of refugees after the engineered Radcliffe and Badge
Awards. Despite all these handicaps, the Army was highly motivated and
displayed no inferiority. It is to the credit of the political and the military
leadership that it not only met but overcame all these challenges. The officers
had served in Burma, Middle East and other areas as part of the Indian Army
and had some experience. The public too was highly motivated and it was,
thanks to the Lashkars, that we did manage to retain the area of Azad Kashmir.
Being short of officers the former INA officer/JCOs, etc. were inducted and
they played havoc with Indian regulars. Brigadier Sadiq Satti laid the
foundation of AK Army and being short of officers — quite naturally Subedars
etc commanded battalions, SMs, (Hony Captains) commanded Brigades. The
senior officers, but for rare instances, like Gen Akbar Khan and Sher Khan,
displayed lack of courage/military sense. The political leadership also erred
(after the sad demise of Quaid-e- Azam) and agreed to a ceasefire (Jan 49)
when the army was poised to attack Beri Pattan (area of Akhnoor) and with
Banihall Pass (route) not available due to snow, the Indian Army deployed in
the valley would have been cut off. This led to a natural reaction, the
Rawalpindi Conspiracy. In the interim Gen Sher Khan and Gen Iftikhar died in
an air crash on their way to the UN. It led to the appointment of Gen Ayub
Khan as C-in-C. The nation and Army remained spirited and motivated. This
was reflected in the historic "Liaquat fist" which aptly symbolised the national
will.
The next water shed came in 1954, when we joined the CENTO and SEATO
and, in consequence, received military equipment from the US as well as
training facilities at their military schools. Though we lost neighbours
like USSR (Russia) and China (went into NAM) against whom the pacts were
to act as bulwark, the army's quality of training and standard of equipment
improved drastically. However, in 1958 came the Martial Law and brought in
its wake, corruption and desire for properties etc. — the allotment of urban
properties and agricultural lands — the army was never to come out of this
quagmire.
In 1962, came the Sino-Indian war and the army, by and large, felt that taking
advantage of India's abject straits (roundly beaten by the Chinese) and the
improved equipment's availability, we should have taken advantage and
occupied/recovered the remaining areas of J & K (Occupied Kashmir). To the
contrary, Gen Ayub, by then President, offered a "No War Pact". His support
within the army began to wane. By 1965, the opinion in the army at all levels
was that a time of "do or die" has arrived vis-a-vis India. The Indians having
taken the debacle of 1962, to heart had begun a massive equipping and re-
organization of the army. The first opportunity to come in the marshes of the
Rann of Kutch Operation in early 1965. The Indians in keeping with their
tradition, decided to occupy the Rann — believing that it contained large oil

41. reserves. The operations of 51 Brigade were about even. However, 6 Brigade
under the dynamic command of Brigadier (later Maj Gen) Eftikhar not only
decimated them but also put them to total rout. The threat of F- 104's overhead,
kept the IAF at bay.
This operation was followed by "Operation Gibraltar" and "Grand Slam".
While "Operation Gibraltar" failing to take ground realities into account failed,
"Grand Slam" having been brilliantly planned strategically failed because of
the army high command's indecision procrastination vacillation and
irresolution! Similarly, the operation in the south (Khem Karan) area was
brilliant in conception but failed due to faulty timings and lack of co-
ordination. The army then merely responded to situations rather than abiding
with the original plan. The PAF executed their plans brilliantly and destroyed a
large component either on the ground or in air battles.
In the army the young officers fought with courage and dedication and
established a world record at the OR/officer ratio of martyrdom — they had
surpassed even the Israelis. However, the political (President Ayub) and the
army high command (Gen Musa) etc. cost us the war and it ended in stalemate
(though keeping the disparities in mind, we had achieved a marginal
advantage). The 1966 Tashkent Agreement took a heavy toll of the political
leadership and FM Ayub was ousted by a new adventurer/usurper Gen Yahya
in 1969. In 1969, the Agartala Conspiracy took place and Mujeeb, who, by
now, was totally in the Indian camp, was arrested to be tried. The trial could
not take place because of the misplaced obduracy (thanks to inadequacy of
information) of politicians who were to participate in the round table
conference summoned by President. The chicken hearted President gave in and
Mujeeb was released — despite advise by the Law Minister (Manzoor Qadir)
that he (Mujib) should be tried, guilt established and then granted clemency
(remission of punishment). The die was now cast.
In 1970, using his "Six Points" as his manifesto he launched on the secessionist
plan. The Cyclone in Dec 70 and the cool response to it in the sense that Yahya
visited only once and that, too, while returning from China and the fact that
relief/aid was received from all over the world, less West Pakistan. The Press
(local Bengalis) and international played havoc by spewing poison. The
election (which normally should have been postponed) that followed cast the
ultimate dagger in breast of nationalism.
The Bengali psyche, influenced for years, now totally changed and resulted in
the most unfair elections. No opposition party could hold a party meeting/rally,
nor could they establish polling stations etc. Resultantly, only two indiviuals
(Non-Awami League) were elected. India, too, sensing an opportunity of a
millennium added fuel to the fire — not only through the media but also by the
way of training the Mukti Bahini. The higher rank of officers (Maj Gen Farman
etc.) had sensed that E Pakistan had become a millstone and to be got rid of
through an honourable method. The final nail in the coffin was the intemperate
behaviour of Yahya Khan, in a bout of drunkenness, with the Russian President

42. at Tehran, during the Pahlavi celebrations. If 1965, was the Zenith, then 1971,
was the Nadir. The Army was effectively in control of both, civil and military
and, in consequence, must accept full blame for the fiasco and ignominy. The
first mistake was the withdrawal of Gen Tikka, who had restored normalcy and
afforded an opportunity for negotiations. The military junta, however, was in
no mood for a political solution to a manifest political issue. Next, was the
despatch of Gen AAK Niazi as commander, Eastern Command. The general
officer lacked moral, mental and physical capacity for the task. He changed the
eloborate plan made in 1968 and resorted to his pet "strong point" defence, in a
totally hostile environment. This was to progressively spell disaster. In West
Pakistan, too, the top leadership continued their unabashedly colourful life,
made no plans for the impending conflict and went to the extent of not even
informing the senior commanders with regards to the fast approaching
calamity. The formations, the vast bulk of them, were informed only 24 hours
in advance and thus belied the strategic concept of "the defence of E Pakistan
lies in West Pakistan". The strike force north and south remained uncommitted
—- one spent the war in entraining and detraining. The effort in the South -
Rahimyar Khan, proved a disaster, without air cover. Although, it was largely
due to PAF insistence that the "D Day" was fixed, yet, it was the PAF that did
not/could not respond. In the South, Jacobabad had not been activated and, in
consequence, air support impossible. The only credible operation took place in
Chamb, where considerable area was captured. However, here too, a major
thrust was made impossible by the non-availability of 17 Division, because of
the dilemma raised by the Commander 1 Corps, Gen Irshad. It was due to the
courage, leadership and leading from the front effort of late General Eftikhar
Khan that made possible the success. Air Commodore Saeed Ullah, visited the
HQs on D-Day and, on behalf of the PAF, made tall promises none of which
were to materialise when battle was joined. In view of the "masterly inactivity"
in Strike Force North, the middle rank Brigadier and the Junior Officers
mutinied and took over the command.
In E Pakistan, because of imcompetent leadership, except at Company and
Platoon level the war ended in ignominy, defeat and surrender. If the defeat
was not enough, the surrender was even more ignominious - putting to shame
the entire course of history of the Muslims in India. The main cause was the
pathetic leadership — who once, operations started not only lost their nerve but
also abandoned their command.
In 1972, they found a Chief Executive (President later PM) who rendered
yeoman service: the release of 90,000 PWs (out of which 34,000 were
civilians/non combatants) and return of considerable territory in Indian hands.
He re-created (re-raised) the formations that had dissolved in
E Pakistan. He directed a commission of inquiry — the Hamood-ur-Rehman
commission. The Commission, included General Altaf Qadir, a brilliant
intellect and an officer who had a bent for detail. The commission not only
identified the failures in command but also the shortcomings — structural,
organisational and training. In consequence, the National Defence College the

43. Joint Staff Committee were established etc. Mr. Bhutto, made an effort to make
the local industry cater for the service requirement, as in all conflicts — 65 &
71, restrictions were imposed by the US and West to the resupply of weapons
and spares. Thus he established: the Kamra Aeronautical Complex; the Heavy
Mechanical Complex. The Tank Rebuild Factory and, above all, launched the
nuclear programme. It is this "balance of terror" that has enabled 30 years of
respite.
The publication of the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission was not taken in hand
because of the implicit pleadings of the army. The COAS felt that the army had
already fallen into disrepute because of the abject surrender in 1971 and, if the
report was published, the public would lynch the army personnel. Being a
nationalist he acquiesced and the endorsement remains on the file. In gratitude,
the army sent him to the gallows.
In 2001, it can be said that while the Junior Officer remains as motivated as
ever and prepared for the supreme sacrifice —- Siachen and, particularly,
Kargil are classic cases. A glance at the roll of honour clearly reveals that their
sacrifices are at the same level as 65, if not higher. The same cannot, however,
be said for the senior ranks. It is the senior ranks, though better trained than
ever lack the mental stability — the withdrawal at Kargil. Undoubtedly, they
found a convenient peg at placing the blame on the political government — but
then, the withdrawal must have been with their connivance. Thus another
historical opportunity had been frittered away! It recalls to mind, my
opposition, when consulted to the appointment of Gen Jehangir Karamat as
COAS. In 1989/90 an incident (depicted in Alpha, Bravo, Charlie) took place
in Siachen, when to meet a possible threat of Indian occupation of a
strategic height, personnel of 45 AK were cargo slung lifted with helicopters
and landed on a strategic height. Within 24 hrs, at a request of the then
COAS, Gen Beg, a meeting was summoned at the Aiwan-e-Sadr. As the Army
High Command had begun to get cold feet. Being Security Advisor to the PM,
I attended the meeting. The meeting began with: a briefing by the
then DGISI (Gen Hamid Gul — Jalalabad fame) a story of counsels of fear;
then a briefing by Gen Jehangir Karamat, the then DGMO (Director
General Military Operations Pakistan Army), spelling a picture of doom and
recommending withdrawal. Gen Beg, of course, concurred with the renditions.
The reasons — artillery fire and lack of logistic support. Being a gunner and
aviator I spelt out the situation (space precludes detail) and the PM directed
holding on for another 24/48 hours. The Indians withdrew.
Another major reason for the failure in command is the fact that most of the
senior officers have either not seen war or either had barely joined the
army in 1965. The promotions today, as against the past, are largely based
as performance at the war course, NDC etc, rather
than war experience and this has even led, to the fudging of course
reports at the MS branch.

44. Finally, the single largest factor that has militated against high quality of
performance has been: First, secondment of good officers to the civil
services — largely, again on political contacts, Secondly, the continual
interventions —- imposition of Martial Law, and, in consequence,
employment on ML duties. In the 70's misuse of staff car was considered an
offence — today, they are used at will — apart, of course, from the fact that
most General Officers retain 7-8 cars. The allotment of plots and agricultural
land has been another bane, resulting in fudging of qualification points in
the W & R Directorate (Welfare and Rehabilitaion Directorate, Adjutant
General's Branch, Army). Corruption continues unabated. Recent purchase of
defective meters by WAPDA (Pakistan Water and Power Development
Authority) from Lithuania is a classic case.
It will take a Herculean effort to rectify the situation — although the Junior
Officer and the rank and file retain their erstwhile quality. The senior officer
will have to learn that "death comes but once", at the destined time and even
the Pharoahs could not take their worldly wealth with them. The ultimate is six
yards of coffin cloth, space for the grave and a heap of earth for the mound.
44. What do you have to say about the so-called accountability drive launched
by the present military regime?
Accountability is a farce. This was well proved once Nawaz Sharif was
pardoned. Another test case is that of Qidwai a highly corrupt man who
is Pakistan's Ambassador in Kenya and goes around bragging everywhere
that it was he who persuaded Mr Nawaz Sharif into appointing Musharraf the
Army Chief! Furthermore, important segments like Armed Forces officers,
judges and ulema[71] have been excluded, They are no angels!
After the release and exile of Nawaz Sharif and family, it has lost the moral
angle — the most important aspect of any accountability. It sounded romantic
and sublime when announced on 12 Oct 99 but has been progressively reduced
to the ridiculous. Today, it is too selective to warrant any approbation, as
important element of society have been excluded to wit; the Armed Forces
(particularly the generals and their progeny); the religious leaders-the JI has
still to respond and clear its position vis-a-vis the 5 million received from ISI in
1990; finally, and most importantly, the superior judiciary. The continued
sitting on the bench by Malik Qayum[72] and Rashid Aziz[73] have brought
the entire judiciary into disrepute. Add to it the beneficiaries of the alleged
brief cases carried by the Hon'ble President. Apparently the system has lost
total sense of direction. In an atypical manner it has come down to
the traditional level of "patwaris"[74], tehsildars[75] etc. Rather than the
Chairman Pakistan Steel Mill, who from the position of security officer and
despite an FIR-1/97, has moved upwards the reason, being a course mate of the
Chief Executive, it makes a sad reading when one sees people, who contracted
the floating coffins (Frigates type 21); the mine sweepers; the alleged tank deal
and—. The tales of numerous plots and agricultural holdings do not require
repetition. If the Service Chiefs receive a plot and dispose of for Rs. 20 million,

45. it is honourable, as also, if a DGISI, obtains a Bengali plot (allotment banned
by the Mohtasib — through an application filed by me in 1990, so that
residential accommodation can be built for government servants) it is justified
and honourable. However, if a similar allocation is made to a politician, it
constitutes a crime.
The Armed Forces (Senior Officers) have formalised their corruption by taking
over and alloting prized land in the cantonments (despite the fact that all land
is, basically, provincial and given to the army for specific purposes and
legitimately where the specific purpose is over, it should lapse to the respective
province) which is a sacred trust. Similarly, prized governmental agricultural
land is similarly allotted without any qualms of conscience. The Armed Forces,
as a preliminary, need to do some keen soul searching and dispense with the
differing standards —(what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander."!)
45. What is your advice to the present military regime?
The Armed Forces, should abandon their political ambitions and at the first
opportunity hold free, fair and impartial elections (unlike the rigged
elections — by their own confession of "88, 90 and 97") and get out. This
would bring them respect and sobriety to the society.
46. What political and economic solution do you propose in the present
conditions?
A return to democracy. The junta has totally failed in achieving any of its
agenda points. They were sweet music on 12th October 1999 but are a
nightmare today. They should, without delay, hold fair and transparent
elections (unlike the rigged election of 88, 90 and 97) and hand over
governance to the political elements. It is only political governments, supported
by the will of the people that can take correct and appropriate political and
economic decisions. Since political parties work under the umbrella of
manifesto/programme their measures are in keeping with the aspirations of the
people.
47. What is the future of politics in Pakistan?
The future of politics in Pakistan is bright, provided the army refrains from
continual interventions. The interventions have, generally, created more
problems than resolved them. The limited Martial Law of 1954, based on
the anti-Qadiani Movement[76] set the pace. The 1958 Martial Law, because
of the One Unit[77], a brainchild of the Field Marshal, set in motion the
ultimate secession of E Pakistan. It gave rise to the economic disparities in
society (22 families[78]) and the two wings of the country — leading to
the Six Points[79] and, ultimately, secession. By curtailing political activity,
they deny communication with the people and thus set in motion patterns
that are in conflict with the aspirations of the people.
The Yahya[80] intervention needs no comment. The Zia decade, in

46. the absence of manifesto/programme led to undue emphasis on religion
and fanaticism. It ended up with leaving a heroin and Klashinkov culture —
the nightmare of the nation since. Although two wrongs do not make a right
— however, it will be seen that there have been worst instances of
corruption — Estrada in Phillipines; Bill Clinton's immorality (Monica
Lewinsky) and reprieves — on final day of office); the German Chancellor
Helmit Kohl; a host of Japanese PMs and ministers — who merely resign;
the most glaring being "Bofors[81]" and "Tehelka[82]" are clear instances
where the incidents — however, grave, have not led to military intervention but
political activity/governance permitted to proceed __ as, in the ultimate, it is
the people who are the best arbiter and decide the issue at elections.
Although no angels themselves, the Armed Forces intervene with alacrity and
political maturity is delayed by another decade or so.
The Indians have attained maturity and, in consequence, world recognition
because of the emphasis on more and more politics and continual election
process. We are the Pariah and they are the darlings of the West. Pakistan was
created through a political process — based on the political vision of
Iqbal[83] and the political will of the Quaid-e-Azam[84]. It received stability
through a political process and vision of the Quaid-e-Awam[85], the 1973
Constitution and changing the pattern of politics to populism. Distortions, if
any have come during periods of military interventions — including the
debacle and ignominous surrender of 1971.
Therfore, if Pakistan has to survive, which, Inshallah, it will, there is no doubt
that politics has to be permitted to mature and result in good governance as,
political parties, have the will and strength of public opinion with them.
48. Do you plan to write your memoirs or some book on Pakistan?
No. No one likes the truth and, if written with a conscience it would
raise considerable controversy. The present article, too, has been written with
a clear conscience and am prepared, if questioned, to substantiate the issues
raised. Moreover, there has been a spate of writing in the recent past and do not
feel that people would welcome any more scribbling.
49. How serious is the supposed religious militant threat in Pakistan?
The religious parties have not ever had a constructive role in the politics
of Pakistan. The bulk of them (JUI[86] and JI[87]) were not only opposed to
the creation of Pakistan but did not hesitate to call it Kafiristan[88].
Similarly, they called the Quaid-e-Azam as Kafir-e-Azam. It was these
parties that brought about the first Martial Law in 1954 (anti-Qadiani
riots). However, when their key leadership summoned before the Munir
Commission[89], they could not render a unanimous definition of Islam or
Muslim.