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  1. 1. Sunday, December 13, 2015 MEMORIES OF A SOLDIER PAKISTAN MILITARY REVIEW VOLUME 18 INSIDE WAZIRISTAN MEMORIES OF A SOLDIER Humayun/dp/1516850238/ref=sr_1_22?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1505888494&sr=1- 22&keywords=pakistan+military+review Product Details Paperback: 34 pages Publisher: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform (August 12, 2015) Language: English ISBN-10: 1516850238 ISBN-13: 978-1516850235 Product Dimensions: 6 x 0.1 x 9 inches Shipping Weight: 3.5 ounces (View shipping rates and policies) HOW 11 CAVALRYS PURELY REGIMENTAL EVENT OF 1974 WAS HIJACKED BY CAREERISTS AND SYCOPHANTS Pakistan Military Review August 2015 Volume 19 Monthly Journal of Pakistani military matters and history. EDITOR Agha H Amin ISBN-13: 978-1516820078 ISBN-10: 151682007X E Mail- ABOUT THE AUTHOR Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps major who served in five tank regiments and commanded an independent tank squadron and served in various staff , instructional and research assignments. Presently heads think tank Centre for Study of Intelligence Operations. Editor in Chief of monthly Intelligence Review and monthly Military and Security Review. In his Pakistan Army tenure he wrote three original tactical papers on Reconnaissance Troops Tactical handling, Reconnaissance support
  2. 2. group , and RFS Concept. His writings were published in Pakistan Armys prime journals , Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta. His recommendations regarding bifurcation of officer corps into command and staff cadre advanced in 1998 were later accepted. In addition his recommendation of grouping various corps into army commands advanced in an article published in Citadel Journal in 1998 were accepted in 2005 or so. Wrote Pakistan Armys first tactical paper on Tactical handling of Reconnaissance Troop in 1986 which is now being incorporated in Pakistan Armys most important general staff publication " The Armored Regiment in Battle". Wrote The Essential Clausewitz in 1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in 1998 , Pakistan Army till 1965 in 1999 ,Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010) ,Taliban War in Afghanistan (2009). Served as Assistant Editor of Defence Journal ,Executive Editor of globe and Founder Editor of Journal of Afghanistan Studies . An associate of the think tanks ORBAT and Alexandrian Defense group. Expert in social impact and environmental assessment carried out various LARP surveys for Asian Bank and World Bank projects. He has lectured at various think tanks and organisations worldwide and shares his knowledge without any honorarium and at zero financial benefits. Carried out various oil and gas and power transmission line surveys in West Asia. One time Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Executive Editor Globe, Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies Feedback is MEMORIES OF A SOLDIER-1947-BEFORE DURING AND AFTER-MAJOR GENERAL SYED WAJAHAT HUSSAIN-FEROZSONS-RAWALPINDI-2010-ISBN 978 969 0 02253 0 BOOK REVIEW Major General Wajahats book is an interesting addition to Pakistani Military History. My father enjoyed a healthy relationship with Major General Wajahat and spoke well about him .This is 1975-77 when Wajahat was commandant of staff college and my father was commanding an engineer battalion in Quetta. When I landed in 11 Cavalry in March 1983 , the impression of Wajahat transformed into a snobbish general , who hounded 11 Cavalry in 1974 over a matter of petty protocol. I never met Wajahat but bought his book with keen interest in 2012. To be very polite Wajahats book was a deep disappointment. As a personal narrative of social events in Pakistan and Pakistan Army the book is very interesting but as a serious military work it lacks substance and meat. Wajahat makes claims that seem far fetched and fictitious ,like:-- 1. Mr Jinnah did not know about the plan to send tribal raiders into Kashmir . 2. That Pakistani Army and Pakistani General Headquarters of Pakistan Army (GHQ) had no knowledge about Kashmir War etc. After reading his book one can safely conclude that Wajahat did not do his homework properly. In his select bibliography primary reference of Kashmir War "Raiders in Kashmir" by Ex Major General Akbar Khan , DSO is missing .So is Pakistan Army official history Kashmir Campaign. The select bibliography lists Punjab Cavalry by Sardar Yahya Effendi but from what you read in Wajahats book it seems that Wajahat never read Effendis book ! For example Wajahat claims that Pakistani GHQ had no clue about the tribal attack.However Sardar Yahya Effendi clearly mentions on page-151 of his book precisely mentions that Commanding Officer of 11 Cavalry was called by Pakistani Director Military Intelligence Colonel Sher Khan , MC to the GHQ in last week of August 1947 and briefed about Pakistani invasion plan. On page 153 Effendi mentioned that the Pakistani DMI Brigadier Sher Khan instructions to
  3. 3. coordinate with tribals attacking Srinagar and these arrangements included sending a jeep fitted with long range communication sets. Wajahats observations about anti armour as well as anti talent bias of Pakistani self promoted Field Marshal Ayub are interesting.Thus on page 202 he states that Ayub and Musa preferred pliant loyalists and were anti armour.He quotes Brigadier Hissam Al Effendis example who was superseded despite outstanding performance as armour brigade commander in Exercise TEZGAM. On page 205 Wajahat alleges that Lieutenant Colonel Umar Khan , regarded as an iconic figure in 11 Cavalry was parochial and thought that only a Pathan officer should command Guides Cavalry.Wajahat included Major General Jahanzeb also in his list of biased and parochial Pathanofficers.How far he was right or wrong is difficult to judge. As a matter of fact everyone was biased in Pakistan of 1950s and 1960s.In my regiment 11 Cavalry for example Ranghars from East Punjab preferred Pathan officers who the Ranghars found less biased than Punjabi officers from Pindi , Jhelum and Sargodha. On page- 229 Wajahat absolves Major General Naseer regarded as principal reason for failure of First ArmouredDivision . How Wajahat could do this is a mystery ! On page 233 Wajahat notes that Major General Abrar was superseded despite good war performance and resigned in disgust. The right sentence should have been asked for retirement as Abrar never resigned. On page- 235 Wajahat confirms that then Brigadier Zia was breeding chickens to add to his income and developed a grudge against Wajahat for impeding using official transport for his chickens movement on posting ! Wajahat claims that Zia carried on this grudge against him but does not rationalize how he managed to stay under the usurper Zia as Pakistans ambassador for nine long years. Wajahat simply omits how he hounded 11 Cavalry when he developed a personality clash with Lieutenant Colonel Syed Sabir Ali Shah over a matter of petty protocol. Wajahats insights about 1965 war are centredaround projecting his personal role which Wajahat exaggerated considerably. Wajahat offers no insights about 1971 war except his CENTO mission to procure arms which was not much of an exercise. Wajahat makes snide personal remarks about General Zia and sums him up as a man of very low caliber.But explains nowhere how he managed to hold on to ambassadorship in plush assignments like Australia under Zias very personal rule.We can only conclude that Wajahat was a man of all seasons. Xxxxxxxxxxx