Why Indian Army and Pakistan Army Failed in War

1. Why Indo-Pak Armies
Failed in War
The failures of the two armies in the various conflicts.
A H AMIN
First Published in Defence Journal , Karachi, May 2004 Issue

2. Around the time of partition there were great expectations from the successor armies of the old British
Indian Army i.e the Pakistan and the Indian Army!
Thus while discussing the boundaries of the to be partitioned province of Punjab an Indian giving
evidence before the Punjab Boundary Commission stated “If Pakistan manages in a counterattack to
make a 40 miles advance then the defence of India would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda
and Dhuri and Pakistan forces were within measurable distance of Ambala, but they (The future Indian
Army) do not lose all. Their communications are not upset; they lose so much of the railway line up to

3. the extent of 40 miles, but they still have the main line bringing their supplies at right angle to their
forces”.
The same person in this discussion gave the Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles inside Pakistan”!
Compare this remark with the later performance of both Indian and Pakistan Armies in actual war which
was pathetic in terms of speed of advance or area captured in all three Indo-Pak wars!
On a personal level I may add that this subject of phenomenal mediocrity at strategic as well as
operational level motivated me to write “The Pakistan Army till 1965”. The reasons for the dismal
performance of both the armies are to be seen in their historical background, the classes which were
inducted in both the armies and in the impact of British military as well as colonial legacy on both the
armies! The reader may note that since it was the failure of success of armour that decided the issue in
all Indo-Pak Wars at least as far as any decisive breakthrough was concerned the discussion centres
around employment of armour and leadership with special reference to armour. Before proceeding into
the analytical phase a glance at two comparative decisive battles is necessary so that necessary lessons
can be linked to the analysis.
The four test studies are Pakistani armours failure to achieve a breakthrough on the first day of
Operation Grand Slam in 1965, both Pakistani and Indian 1st Armoured Division's major offensives
opposite Khem Karan and Chawinda Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's failure opposite Bara Pind.
Following is a summary of the four battles.
Pakistani failure to achieve a decisive breakthrough on
first day of Grand Slam

5. The Chamb Sector in 1965 was a very weakly held sector held by three dispersed Indian infantry
battalions supported by a tank squadron of AMX-13 tanks which were like matchboxes as compared to
the Pattons held by the two opposing Pakistani tank regiments i.e a superiority of 6 to 1 in tanks. Further
Pakistan had immense artillery superiority both numerical and material of 6 to 1. Pakistani 8 Inch Guns
were phenomenally superior to anything that the Indians had. Unfortunately, the Pakistani armour was
distributed in penny packets to the two infantry brigades. Thus instead of using armour as a punch it
was employed as a thin net as a result of which its hitting power was vastly reduced. Thus many tanks
were lost on the first day and Indian brigade holding the sector withdrew during the night in an
organized manner. This initial setback on the first day reduced Pakistani chances of victory which was
later on compromised due to other political reasons.

7. Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure at Chawinda
The major Indian attack of 1965 War was launched by the Indian 1st Armoured Division opposite
Chawinda on 8th September 1965. The Indian formation had four tank regiments as opposed to 1 tank
regiment of Pakistan Army! There was no infantry on both flanks of the Pakistani unit and only one
battalion in its rear yet the Indians miserably failed to outflank this unit and reach Sialkot-Pasrur Road
opposite Badiana or to the South of Pasrur! While two Indian tank regiments advancing on a narrow
front unimaginatively battered frontally with a single Pakistani tank regiment, two Indian tank regiments
in the rear were not employed by an Indian GOC and his brigade commander paralysed by intertia
vacillation and procrastination !
This was not a case of a more martial morally superior Muslim soldier blunting a less martial Hindu
soldier at Panipat but a failure on part of two Indian commanders sitting many miles in the rear! Thus
the truth in Clausewitz's pronouncement on higher leadership “marches to turn a flank, right or left are
easily combined …but let a general try to do these things like Frederick the Great …it required the King's

8. boldness, determination and strength of will to see the things in this light and not to be led astray and
intimidated by the danger of which 30 years after people still wrote and spoke”.
GOC OF INDIAN FIRST ARMOURED DIVISION WHO FAILED MOST MISERABLY ON THE 8TH
SEPTEMBER
1965 DESPITE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY
The most interesting aspect of the first engagement opposite Gadgor being discussed is that Pakistan's
25 Cavalry which faced the Indian Armoured Division was not aware that it was facing an Indian
Armoured Division while the Indian Armoured Division commander was also not aware that there was
only one tank regiment opposing his tank division! If both knew what was the actual case then 25
Cavalry's commanding officer may have been paralysed by irresolution and inertia and history may have
been different and the Indian commander may have gathered greater resolution and bypassed the unit!
However, this is the realm of speculation! More important is what actually happened! The Indian
commander decided not to outflank the Pakistani's in front because of three reasons i.e (1) that his four
tank regiments were opposed by two tank regiments (2) no news of his left flank protection force (3)
that his rear was under attack. At the end of the day the Indian divisional commander withdrew his
division back and stayed inactive till 10th September 1965, during which Pakistan reinforced the area
with its 6th Armoured Division! The battles that followed from 11th September till ceasefire could not
be decisive since initial Indian superiority at the decisive point had been compromised!

9. The reason why the Indian commander thought that he was faced with two tank regiments was
Pakistan's 25 Cavalry's unusually extended line of defence, his flank protection force had lost his way
because of poor map reading and strayed out of wireless contact and the attack on his rear which
unnerved him was an exchange of fire between his left flank protection force and his own artillery guns!
These three reasons were considered enough by the Indian GOC to withdraw eight miles to the rear and
do nothing for the next two days! After 11th September when the Indians resumed advance the
Pakistanis had brought reinforcements and there was no room for a battle of manoeuvre!
Pakistani 1st Armoured Division's failure at Khem Karan
Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division with five tank regiments and additional two supporting tank regiments
on the flanks failed to breakthrough the Khem Karan area on 7th and 8th September at a time when
only one Indian tank regiment with ancient Sherman tanks was opposing the Pakistani five tank
regiments having most modern Patton Tanks. The reason of the dismal performance was not Indian
resistance but poor initial planning and staff work in not taking adequate measures to ensure crossing of

10. one water course and one canal both in Pakistani territory! This delayed the induction of the armoured
division in the battle area enabling the Indians to reinforce their lone Sherman tank regiment with two
more tank regiments! It is ironic to note that the Pakistani plan to attack in this sector was not new but
formulated many years before the war. Here was a case like Chawinda earlier discussed where there
was failure in achieving a breakthrough despite a five to one superiority simply because the superiority
could not be put into practice due to poor initial planning and staff work.

12. Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's Failure at Bara Pind
Pakistan's 8 Independent Armoured Brigade was launched at Bara Pind on 16th December 1971! The
situation here was ironically similar to Indian situation at Gadgor on 8th September 1965! Three
Pakistani Patton Regiments were available as against one Indian Centurion tank regiment holding a
bridgehead at Bara PindJarpal! Ironically as happened with the Indians at Gadgor here too the Pakistani
tank brigade commander failed to achieve a breakthrough despite a three to one superiority. The first
Pakistani tank regiment was initially launched with the initiative of the detailed planning of the attack,
decentralized to the tank regiment commander! This was a fatal decision!

14. The tank regiment commander known as Masood Chhakrra initially launched one tank squadron in
attack. Once this squadron was badly beaten being in a frontal role against Indian tanks in static
positions, he launched his remaining two squadrons a little to the north and again with disastrous
consequences! Once the first tank regiment had failed the Pakistani tank brigade commander launched
his second regiment again with disastrous results. In short three tank regiments failed to dislodge a
single Indian tank regiment in a counter attack which was a planned contingency before the war and
carried out in Pakistani territory. Prominent in this case was failure to coordinate artillery support which
was available in abundance but not utilized in the attack plan. The Indian armoured corps historian held
the view that the Pakistanis could have broken through even without artillery support if all three
squadrons of 13 Lancers had attacked the Indian position in concentration!3
Analysis
Failure occurred not because of material or numerical
but other reasons
It has been a common practice to cite insufficient numerical superiority at the decisive point as a reason
for failure. In all four cases, all decisive battles, this was not the case. The Pakistanis failed at Grand Slam
despite 6 to 1 superiority on the first day. This was a case of not concentrating tanks and using them as
infantry support vehicles. The Indian failed at Gadgor despite a 4 to 1 superiority. This was a case of the
Indian brigade commander losing his nerve because of timidity and irresolution and the Indian GOC not
spurring his brigade commander and instead withdrawing to the rear for the next two days while only
one tank regiment opposed his division. The Pakistanis failed at Khem Karan despite a five to one
superiority because of poor initial planning and incorrect armour tactics in withdrawing to the leaguer at
night. Again Bara Pind was a failure in not integrating artillery in attack and in not concentrating the
armoured brigade in attack.
British Colonial Legacy
Once the British initially came to India they allowed Indians entry in officer rank. The real danger in
history has always been posed not by weapons but by men of resolute description! Thus Mustafa Kemal
defied superpowers of his day not by any nuclear warhead but by generalship in the field! Once the
British came to India initially they were not aware of the dangers that Indians in higher rank could pose
to their rule!

15. Thus once a cavalry unit Moghal Horse was raised at Patna in July 1760 it was an All Muslim unit with
Sardars Mirza Shahbaz Khan and Mirza Tar Beg. More notable was the case of Yusuf Khan! Back in 1752
a Muslim of Pathan descent enlisted under Colonel Clive and distinguished himself in battle (not by
verbosity on courses or in model discussions) on many occasions. As a reward for excellence in battle
Yusuf Khan was made commandant of all Indian sepoys in the service of the English East India Company
in 1754, three years before Plassey, presented with a medal in 1755 and further rewarded by renting of
two districts in Carnatic for 20 Lakh Rupees in 1759 !

16. From 1760 onwards Yusuf Khan became more powerful and started defying the English East India
Company. The Englishman were forced to start a war against Yusuf Khan which lasted for more than an
year! All the British Troops of Madras Army were committed and peace only came after Madura Yusuf
Khan's stronghold was finally captured on 13th October 1764!4 No more Yusuf Khans! This was the
Englishmen's conclusion and this they enforced religiously right till 1947! Have no native leadership in
the Indian Army! This was ensured as a policy right till 1947 even though Indo-Pak natives were
admitted synthetically in the officer rank in 1919! While Indians were recruited as officers from 1919 it
was ensured that these must be the most slavish and meek ones! Outwardly smart and impressive in
bearing, but loyal to the core, lacking initiative in higher decision making and good till only company and
platoon level!

17. Thus the basic aim of Indian Military Academy Dera Dun was to produce Indian officers who at best
could be good company commanders and nothing more! This system was enforced as a Machiavellian
policy! Sir Sivaswamy Ayer in 1921 demanded in the Indian legislative assembly that all seats to
commissioned officer rank in Indian Army should be filled by open competitive exam held on all India
basis.The British sabotaged this scheme!
Thus when Indian Military Academy Dera Dun was established the Britisher ensured a slavish Indo-Pak
officer corps by insisting that 30 out of 60 officer vacancies be given to rankers from Indian Army who
had spent many years in ranks under British officers and considered more loyal than educated Indo-Pak
candidates selected on the open merit! As a result the Indian Army and its successors Indian and
Pakistan Army remained pro West and conservative in outlook!

18. In 1950s Ayub Khan was ready to defend Anglo Iranian Oil fields in Iran for US interests! A relationship
with USA was cemented with the rationale that it would enable Pakistan to regain Kashmir! Yet when
the time came in 1965 Pakistan's self-promoted field marshal had cold feet!
The military advantage over India in 1965 in terms of superior equipment was lost in Khem Karan not
because of material inferiority, where Pakistan had tank superiority of 6 to 1 on 7th and 8th September,
but qualitative inferiority on part of Pakistani higher military leadership! India's leading military thinker
Ravi Rikhye admitted in an article on www.orbat.com that Khem Karan had the potential to be India's
Fourth Battle of Panipat had the Pakistan Army broken through! Deliberate measures were taken to
instil an inferiority complex in the Indian officers!
Major General Jahanzeb who was commissioned in 1942 states “In their regiments they were treated
with undignified and unconcealed contempt. Once a British regiment invited the Indian C in C to dinner.
On enquiry about the segregated table he was told unabashedly that it was for the attached Indian
officers”. The general further stated that till mid-thirties Indians commissioned from Sandhurst were not
allowed to enter the precincts of the Peshawar Club and there were cases when an Indian officer asked
for a chair being told by the quartermaster that Indian officers were not authorized chairs.5
Indian Army experience in WW Two
The British Indian Army was basically an internal security army designed to ensure continuity of British
rule in India. It had no dynamic operational role. Tanks were inducted only in 1938 and Indians were
discriminated against in tank units. Major General Jahanzeb states “The Indian cavalry was the domain
of the British aristocracy. The odd Maharaja's sons were admitted on sufferance. In 1932 three cavalry
regiments were Indianised, the 3rd 7th and 16th.
They accepted rich and titled Indian officers. The other regiments admitted Indian officers almost two
years after declaration of World War Two, a fact which was to cost Pakistan dearly when it came into
being”.6 To compound the fact further, the British had a phenomenally incompetent record in handling
of armour and were beaten decisively by the Germans repeatedly from 1940 till 1942 when
overwhelming material superiority enabled them to turn the tide. In addition Indian war record was
nominal since most of the Indian units in North Africa comprised of armoured cars while in Burma where
the Indian tank regiments had Shermans there was no worthwhile enemy in front since the Japanese
had very inferior tanks.

19. The Indian experience in WW Two was also significant. In North Africa they encountered Rommel who
was a master of armoured warfare who could appear from any direction. Thus a strange fear of enemy
on the flanks or in the rear imported from North Africa. Similarly, the Japanese who confronted the
Indians in Burma were again masters of infiltration and the emphasis that the Indian officers saw was on
security and defence rather than any bold offensive tactics. The resultant failures in 1965 and 1971 had
deep historical reasons.

20. The Indian commanders who failed beyond unit level consisted of men who had operated in a tactical
and operational environment in WW Two where operations were infantry biased. Even at Al Alamein
the major tank attack was carried out by pure British army units while Indian units and formations were
in a static or holding role or assisting British units in the initial breakthrough as infantry units. Thus, the
post 1947 commanders of Indian and Pakistani army did not understand the real essence of armoured
warfare. It was this lack of understanding because of which both sides failed to achieve any decisive
breakthrough in all three wars. It was a failure of the command as well as the staff system where even
the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and thought in terms of yards and
furlongs rather than miles.Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and
their typical idea of a battlefield was a linear one rather than a multi-linear one.
Their Burma and North Africa experience where the Japanese or Germans frequently appeared in their
rear made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men who thought in terms of security
rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish
colonial “orders oriented” British Indian Army.
These men had joined the army for social and personal advancement reasons and warfare to them
was a job like WAPDA rather than a supreme test of nationalism or ideology.

21. Further, in the British way of war a higher commander was more interested in doing the job of those
one step junior to him that led to lack of initiative and dynamism.The same legacy was imported in the
post-1947 Pakistan and Indian Armies.
Conclusion
Today the serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army console themselves with the fact that today's
officer is far more educated than his predecessors. The matter is not as simple as it appears. Both the
armies have crossed the stage where a decisive defeat could be inflicted on each other. In the post-
Nuclear Age conventional superiority or conventional weapons are no longer decisive. Warfare has been
privatized with ideological organizations conducting a war that is spread all over the globe with multiple
cells in nominal communication with each other. Today when an army marches into operation in one
region its enemies react by bomb blasts in areas previously considered unassailable!
The mainland of USA once considered impregnable has been rendered vulnerable since 9/11. The other
country's army is no longer the decisive target to be eliminated as the Iraq war has proved.Iraqi
resistance continues despite the demise of Iraqi Army! Airpower alone cannot win wars as is proved in
Afghanistan and Iraq!
The Indian thrust is today no longer to defeat Pakistan in Siachen or Kargil! The thrust is on cultural
wars, psychologically disarming moves and on strengthening the economy. Seen in this context Pakistan
Army is still preparing for the previous war. No effort is being made to organize the populace for a
conflict which would continue even after the conventional army has collapsed.
The future wars will have no beginning and no end, fought with soft power and by modifying
educational syllabi and trade regulations! Conducted by proxy through minority ethnic groups and by
minority sects who are threatened by majority sects. Conversely, the Indian leadership has realized that
it would be cheaper to win the race by unconventional means and projecting India as a moderate state
with its western borders with a state full of fanatics and lunatics who deserve to be bombed without
remorse.
Whatever policies that President Musharraf is following are seen in the West as the efforts of one man,
while the Pakistani nation is being increasingly perceived as an unstable state which must not be trusted
with nuclear weapons. If the military regime fails to find a viable solution to the political problems of
Pakistan and design a suitable exit strategy Pakistan's future may not be brighter than Serbia or Somalia!
The fact that today's Pakistan is far more vulnerable than 1947 or 1965 or 1971's Pakistan is not being

22. understood. Nuclear weapons may not prove to be a guarantee of Pakistan's survival unless the political
and military forces decide in the best interest of the nation to respect each other! The important point
to be noted is that Pakistan was the result of a political process and the armed forces were meant to be
a subordinate organ of the political leadership! The next threat would not be the Indian 1st Armoured
Division with its many mechanically unfit tanks but combined forces of many hostile neighbours
attacking Pakistan's Nuclear facilities by stealth! The next conflict will be multi-national and very fast
moving! This time there would be no KK Singhs worrying about their flanks since Pakistan may be facing
not India alone but a combined Indian-Israeli-US onslaught!
The lesson of today's Pakistan remains that Pakistan is ill-equipped for the future challenges that it may
face! Rather Balkanisation at best and Somalisation at worst cannot be ruled out! With a crisis of
legitimacy paralyzing this country's natural growth since 1954 the future does not appear to be bright!
All depends on which country has a superior Grand Strategy and can handle its total national resources
in a better manner!
END NOTES
Page-318-Remarks of Sir Zafrullah Khan- “The Partition of the Punjab” - A compilation of official
documentsVolume Two-National Documentation Centre-Lahore-1983-Printed at Ferozsons.
Pages-244 & 245-On War- Carl Von Clausewitz-Penguin-1974.
Page-506-The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1947-71-Major General Gurcharan
Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi -1993
Page-28-The First Punjabis-Maj M.I Qureshi-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1953.
Pages-21 & 22-Role of Armed Forces in the Independence of the Subcontinent-Major General Jahanzeb
Khan Defence Journal-Vol X -No 9-1984.
Pages-52 & 53-From Bitter Lakes to Bitter Thoughts-Major General Jahanzeb Khan (Retired) -The Sabre
and Lance -1997-Golden Jubilee Issue-The School of Armour and Mechanised Warfare-Nowshera-
Pakistan. On a personal level I would like to add that this publication was a singlehanded Herculean feat
of Brigadier Munawar Rana the then commandant of that otherwise bulky and bureaucratic bastion of
pedantry.