The document critiques the publication of a book on the 1965 Indo-Pak war by Lieutenant General Mahmud, arguing that it misrepresents military history and is inappropriately credited to him alone. It highlights concerns over intellectual dishonesty within the military establishment and the suppression of truths regarding the war's conduct. The author, Agha H. Amin, provides a detailed analysis of the military strategies discussed in the book and expresses frustration with the reluctance to confront historical failures in Pakistan's military narrative.

1. The author Major A. H Amin (Retired) with LTG
Tariq Khan in 2011 November

2. Wednesday, January 22, 2014 General Mahmud had no
business of getting this group effort published with his
name -HISTORY OF 1965 WAR-LIEUTENANT GENERAL
MAHMUD -2006

3. 1965 war -Staff College Quettas Teaching Handbook published with a single authors
name
 July 2020
 DOI:
 10.13140/RG.2.2.24922.98244
 Project:
 Military History
 Agha H Amin

4. E MAIL FROM A SERVING 3 STAR GENERAL AND A SENIOR
CORPS COMMANDER:---
THEN COMMANDER 1 CORPS MANGLA
Agha , This book was a Staff College Handbook used by
Staff College to teach students .General Mahmud had no
business of getting this group effort published with his
name . Please note that this book was distributed by
Army Book Club and I did get my copy "

5. HISTORY OF 1965 WAR-LIEUTENANT GENERAL MAHMUD
-2006-
BOOK REVIEW BY
AGHA H AMIN
Note-I was based in Kabul permanently when I wrote
this review so my facts were not up to date about this
book.

6. The Army has bought all copies of a book written by a
former intelligence chief fearing it may explode the myth

7. victory in the 1965 war with India, a source has said” ,
thus reported Amir Mir for Gulf News on 01 October
2006.
Although not wholly correct this was a brave job of
reporting the prevalent intellectual dishonesty par
excellence in Pakistan.
22,000 copies of a book earlier cleared for publication
and distribution by the Army Book Club were thus wasted
and assigned to dusty store rooms.All so that the truth
remains enchained and suppressed , even when written
by a three star general without whom Musharraf would
have been behind the bars on 12 October 1999.
The book was however not titled The Myth of 1965
Victory, as claimed by Amir Mir but History of Indo Pak

8. War 1965. Another Pakistani analyst Hassan Abbas
claimed that Mahmud had requested Musharraf for a job
and this may have forced him to drop the title Myth of
1965 Victory.Military history being distorted here to get a
job in a fertiliser corporation called FFC.Mahmud must
have relented but even then his half truth was not seen
as fit for publication by Musharraf after earlier agreeing
to have it published ! Indecisive we are at the cost of
Pakistani taxpayer.
The book was not published by Oxford University press as
Amir Mir claims but published by Services Book Club of
Pakistan Army and only produced by Oxford University
Press.

9. Amir Mir states that the manuscript was submitted by
General Mahmud as per the rules in vogue . Are there any
? This is news ? Mahmud submitted the script to the GHQ
because the book was sponsored by GHQ as the fact that
it was published by Services Book Club !
The sources said that General Mahmood Ahmed had
submitted the manuscript of his book to the GHQ as per
the rules in vogue.
THIS PROVED TO BE A BOGUS CLAIM OF
REVIEWERS AS THE BOOK WAS DISTRIBUTED
IN ALL PAKISTAN ARMY OFFICERS

10. Criticising Pakistans most infallible organisation
and Mahmuds criticism however correct needed to be
buried in the best Pakistani tradition of burying the truth
!
Amir Mir claims in his 2006 article that General Mahmud
tried to get a few hundred copies for his own library but
could not get permission from the GHQ.THIS IS ALSO A
BOGUS CLAIM OF AMIR MIR.Mahmud did manage to get
at least a 100 copies .
Mahmuds book heavily supported by the army in terms of
cartographic efforts all maps made by the 477 Army

11. Survey Group may in brief be described as heavy in
tactical detail,sparse in operational analyis and barren in
strategic analysis.
Mahmuds book is not a solo effort .He thus states that it
all started when the Pakistan Army decided to analyse
1965 war in 1976 (preface).HOWEVER LATER LTG
TARIQ KHAN DISMISSED MAHMUDS PUBLISHING THE
BOOK IN HIS NAME AS AN IMPROPER ACT.
Its major plus point is that it debunks many myths about
1965 war.
Mahmud assesses Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik as
an exceptional commander of his times (p.69).
He assesses the Operation Gibraltar , infiltration in
Kashmir a success in the sense that it successfully

12. created a strategic opportunity for success of
Operational Grand Slam the Pakistani attack against
Akhnur.
He faults Pakistani high command with not launching a
concentrated attack in Khem Karan and instead dividing
its strength by dual attacks like Grand Slam and Khem
Karan.
Mahmud thinks that change of command in Grand Slam
was a major faux pas and finds faults with Major General
Yahya Khans conduct as a divisional commander (p.98).
Whereas he ignores the fact that major failure of Grand
Slam lay in the first two days when armour was divided
into penny packets and artillery divided overextended as

13. confessed by Pakistan Armys official military historian
Major General Shaukat Riza in his book 1965 War.
MAHMUDS ACCOUNT OF BATTLE OF GADGOR IS A BUNCH
OF LIES AND A FAIRY TALE AND ABSOLUTELY NON
FACTUAL.
HIS MAPS OF 25 CAVALRY ACTION OF 8TH SEPTEMBER ARE
MAPS DRAWN BY A SPINSTER BARREN OLD LADY WHO
NEVER WENT A MILE NEAR A TANK.
THAT MAHMUD IGNORES AND DISTORTS REAL FACTS OF

14. 8TH SEPTEMBER SHOW WHAT NONSENSE MUST BE
TAUGHT TO STAFF COLLEGE STUDENTS USING THIS TEXT
BOOK.
MY SQUADRON OFFICER COLONEL MOIN VIRK NARRATED
HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH STAFF COLLEGE WHEN HE
STATED THAT ON FIRST DAY SYNICATE DS COLONEL
FAYYAZ TOLD THE SYNDICATE THAT HE WAS IN STAFF
COLLEGE BECAUSE HE WAS FROM PUNJAB REGIMENT AND
WOULD FAVOUR PUNJAB REGIMENT OFFICERS.

15. WITH THEN CAPTAIN MOIN VIRK WHILE I WAS
COMMANDING 5 IAS

16. One reason why Mahmuds book may not have been
distributed after being printed a typical Musharraf style
change of decisions when high or not high may have been
his daming verdict on Pakistan Armys main attack in
Khem Karan.Mahmud thus summed up Pakistan Armys
main attack in Khem Karan as “ In 1965 the situation in
the Ravi Beas Corridor presented an opportunity of
classic envelopment which would have been realised by
any great captain of war .The Pakistan Army ,alas,had
none in authority” (Page 303).
On page 139 he states that Pakistani High Command
regarded the international border with India as
“inviolable”.This clears the myth that that it was ZAB

17. alone who duped the naieve Pakistani generals into
launching an offensive in Kashmir.
On page 530 Mahmud debunks the much circulated
theory of Pakistan being at a disdvantage in 1965 , thus
he states “ The critical question is whether the Pakistan
Army had the resources in 1965 to undertake the gigantic
double envelopment pre-emptive offensive ? The answer
is yes” ........but then Mahmuds goes on to elaborate
Pakistans military strategic failure at the highest level
when he states “ Had the military objective been
perceived correctly and had the necessary planning been
done thoroughly for such an offensive operation”.

18. On page 532 he places the blame squarely on the higher
level commanders when he states “ Pakistan Army’s
conduct of operations in 1965 war was gravely marred by
incorrect assessment of Indian strength,intentions and
capabilities”.
He credits the ISI with more clearly assessing Indian
intentions but states that ISI’s assessment was not
considered credible by the military higher command.

21. On page 532 again he analyses this being the gist of his
book titled “Epilogue” The price of our army’s ignorance
of the operational art was exacted by the stalemate of
1965 and the ignonimous defeat in 1971”.This Mahmud
ascribed to the fact that the Command and Staff College
did not prepare commanders for command beyond
brigade and divsional level.
On page 363 and 364 Mahmud confirms the greatest
intelligence failure of the war when the capture of Indian
despatch riders mail confirming presence of Indian 1st
Armoured Division was not taken seriously by both 15
Division Headquarters and GHQ.

23. Major General Naseerullah Babar who I had interviewed
in March 2001 had stated in the interview that the then
DG Military Intelligence Brigadier Irshad had dismissed
this as an Indian deception plan.
It appears that Mahmud did not bother to interview
Major General NUK Babar while he interviewed many
officers who were of same seniority as NUK Babar !
Mahmuds book is an expanded version of Shaukat Rizas
book 1965.Both are heavy on facts and poor in analysis
although Mahmud tried to be more blunt , although if we
believe Hassan Abbas his yearning for a post retirement
job in Fauji Fertiliser Corporation may have heavily
compromised the cause of military history in Pakistan.

24. Many of the maps are not wholly accurate although
prepared by a heavy brigade of serving officers from
corps of engineers.
Most important however is the treatment meted out to
Mahmuds book despite his mild criticism wrapped in
harmless sentences ! We are not prepared to accept
criticism even when done in a book supported and
sponsored by the military.
How thin skinned we are to criticism even when based on
facts made available to an insider ! If we in 2006 are not
ready to analyse what happened in 1965 then God Help
us in analysing more serious blunders committed after
1965 !
E MAIL FROM A SERVING GENERAL:---LTG Tariq Khan-2014

25. Agha , This book was a Staff College Handbook used by
Staff College to teach students .General Mahmud had no
business of getting this group effort published with his
name . Please note that this book was distributed by
Army Book Club and I did get my copy "
Agha H Amin
About the Author
Agha Humayun Amin studied at Saint
Marys Academy Lalazar and Forman Christian
College Lahore and at Pakistan Military Academy
Kakul. He was commissioned in 11 Cavalry (FF)
earlier known as PAVO Cavalry on 17 March 1983.
Served in various command , staff and

26. instructional appointments in the army , finally
commanding an independent tank squadron and
retiring from the army on 05 March 1994. His
writings were published in Pakistan Armys leading
institutional journals , notably Pakistan Army
Journal and Command and Staff College Quettas
Citadel Journal. He also authored three major
tactical publications “ Tactical Handling of Recce
Troop “ (1986) , “ Tactical Handling of Recce
Support Group” *(1989 and the “ The RFS Concept
“ (1990). His recommendations regarding creation
of army command groups as published as an
article in 1998 were accepted by the Pakistan Army
in 2007 when army commands were created. His
books are essential reading in more than 200

27. leading libraries of the world including Library of
Congress USA , Combined Arms Research Library
of US Army Command and General Staff College
,Fort Leavenworth which is worlds largest military
library ,US Army War College Carlisle
Library,Defence Intelligence Agency Library of USA
, Columbi University Library , US Armor School
Fort Knox Library,LUMS Library etc.He wrote
extensively for various journals and newspapers
and also served as Assistant Editor Defence Journal
, Executive Editor Globe, Founding Editor Journal of
Afghanistan Studies and presently as Editor in
Chief for “Intelligence Review”. He also actively
worked as an associate of two leading think tanks
www.orbat.com of Ravi Rikhye and as Fellow of

28. Alexandrian Defense Group ,USA. Major Agha H
Amin has been invited to lecture and present
papers at various institutions including US Army
Centre of Military History etc . He headed Afghan
Toll and Transoxiana two consulting firms which
played keyrole in various Asian Bank and World
Bank electric transmission line studies, notably
CASA 1000,Uzbekistan Afghanistan Pakistan line
and Turkmenistan-Shibirgan –Mazar Sharif line.