NETWORK SECURITY
TEKNIS PELATIHAN KEAMANAN INFORMASI




                             AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
AGENDA


NETWORK LAYER

INTERNET PROTOCOL

 IPV 4

 IPV 6

 IPSEC

NETWORK PACKET INSPECTION



                            AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
AGENDA


ATTACKING IP V4

  PASSIVE

  ACTIVE

COMMON TYPES OF ATTACK + HANDS ON

  EAVESDROPPING

    SNIFFER ATTACK



                                    AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
AGENDA


COMMON TYPES OF ATTACK

 SPOOFING

 TUNNELING

 MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM) ATTACK

 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK

DEFENCE



                                   AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
NETWORK LAYER

            NO. 3 FROM OSI MODEL

            PROVIDES THE FUNCTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL MEANS
            OF TRANSFERING VARIABLE LENGTH DATA SEQUENCES
            FROM SOURCE HOST TO A DESTINATION ON ONE
            NETWORK TO ANOTHER, WHILE MAINTAINING THE QOS
            REQUESTED BY TRANSPORT LAYER

            FUCTION: PATH DETERMINATION AND LOGICAL
            ADRESSING; DATA UNIT : PACKET/DATAGRAM

            IP (IPV4, IPV6), ICMP, IPSEC, IGMP, IPX, APPLE TALK


[1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

                                                       AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
OSI 7 LAYER




[1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

                                   AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
INTERNET PROTOCOL




            RESPONSIBLE FOR ADDRESSING HOSTS AND ROUTING
            DATAGRAM (PACKETS) FROM A SOURCE HOST TO
            DESTINATION HOST ACCROSS ONE OR MORE IP
            NETWORK.




[1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

                                             AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
IPV4


            FOURTH REVISION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IP AND THE
            FIRST VERSION OF THE PROTOCOL WIDELY DEPLOYED

            CONNECTIONLESS, NOT GUARANTEE DELIVERY, NOT
            ASSURING PROPER SEQUENCE OR AVOIDANCE OF
            DUPLICATE DELIVERY,

            32 BIT = 192.168.0.1

            IPSEC IS OPTIONAL



[1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

                                                AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
IPV 6

SUCCESSOR OF IPV4 WITH MORE “BETTER”
IMPROVEMENTS

  NEW PACKET HEADER

  MULTICAST (MULTIPLE DESTINATION IN SINGLE
  OPERATION)

  STATELESS ADDRESS AUTO CONFIGURATION

  LARGER ADDRESS SPACE 128 BIT = 2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334

  IPSEC SUPPORT IS MANDATORY


                                                    AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
IPSEC

PROTOCOL SUITE FOR SECURING INTERNET PROTOCOL
(IP) COMMUNICATIONS BY AUTHENTICATING AND
ENCRYPTINH EACH IP PACKET OF A COMMUNICATION
SESSION.

END-TO-END SECURITY SCHEME

PROTECT ANY APPLICATION TRAFFIC ACCROSS IP
NETWORK

AUTHENTICATION HEADER (AH), ENCAPSULATING
SECURITY PAYLOAD (ESP), SECURITY ASSOCIATIONS
(SA)


                                    AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
IPV4 V.S IPV6




                AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
NETWORK PACKET INSPECTION




                   AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
HANDS ON
WIRESHARK PACKET INSPECTION




                         AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
ATTACKING IPV4


SECURITY ISSUE LIES ON INTERNET PROTOCOL
(NETWORK LAYER), NO AUTH AND ENCRYPTION

IPSEC OPTIONAL

UPPER LAYER, CREATED WITHOUT SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS,

  TCP PROTOCOLS: FTP, TELNET, SMTP, POP3




                                     AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
ATTACKING IPV4



PASSIVE : NETWORK PACKET INFORMATION MIGHT BE
MONITORED;

ACTIVE: NETWORK PACKET INFORMATION IS ALTERED
IN INTENT TO MODIFY, CORRUPT, OR DESTROY TEH
DATA OR THE NETWORK.




                                 AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
EAVESDROPPING


THE MAJORITY OF NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS OCCUR
IN UNSECURED OR “CLEARTEXT” FORMAT

THE ABILITY TO MONITOR THE NETWORK
COMMUNICATION IS THE BIGGEST SECURITY PROBLEMS
THAT WE’VE FACED

HUB NETWORK DEVICE, ACCESS TO THE GATEWAY/
ROUTER DEVICE




                                  AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
SNIFFER ATTACK

SNIFFER IS AN APPLICATION OR DEVICE THAT CAN READ,
MONITOR, AND CAPTURE NETWORK PACKET.

  IF PACKET NOT ENCRYPTED THE ATTACKER CAN VIEW
  FULL DATA INSIDE THE PACKET

  IF PACKET ENCRYPTED THE ATTACKER NEED TO
  CREATE/USE/HAVE A VALID KEY

TUNNEL ONLY PACKET CAN ALSO BE BROKEN OPEN AND
READ



                                     AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
SNIFFER ATTACK


TCPDUMP

WIRESHARK (FORMERLY ETHEREAL)

ETTERCAP

CAIN AND ABEL

DSNIFF




                                AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
HANDS ON
WIRESHARK RECOVERY




                     AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
SPOOFING



            SPOOF = MASQUEARADE[1]

            IS A SITUATION IN WHICH A PROGRAM SUCCESSFULLY
            MASQUARADES AS ANOTHER BY FALSIFYING DATA AND
            THEREBY GAINING AN ILLEGITIMATE ADVANTAGE[2]




[1]: RFC4949
[2]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

                                              AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
SPOOFING


               IPSPOOFING, E.G: MODIFY SOURCE ADDRESS

               A COMMON MISCONCEPTION: IP SPOOFING CAN BE USED
               TO HIDE IP ADDRESS WHILE SURFING THE INTERNET,
               CHATTING, ON-LINE, AND SO FORTH. THIS IS GENERALLY
               NOT TRUE. FORGING THE SOURCES IP ADDRESS CAUSES
               THE RESPONSES TO BE MISDIRECTED, MEANING CANNOT
               CREATE NORMAL NETWORK CONNECTION.[1]

               USUALLY COMBINE WITH NETWORK DOS/DDOS ATTACK



[1]: ISS.NET

                                                   AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
HANDS ON
          MAC SPOOFING
IFCONFIG (IFACE) HW ETHER (NEW MAC)




                              AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
TUNNELING


               TUNNEL IS A COMMUNICATION CHANNEL CREATED IN A
               COMPUTER NETWORK BY ENCAPSULATING (I.E.,
               LAYERING) A COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL’S DATA
               PACKETS IN (I.E., ABOVE) A SECOND PROTOCOL THAT
               NORMALLY WOULD BE CARRIED ABOVE, OR AT THE SAME
               LAYER AS, THE FIRST ONE. [1]

               HTTP, SSH, DNS, ICMP

               SSH FOO@DOO -D PORT



[1]: RFC4949

                                                 AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
HANDS ON
HTTP OVER SSH (SSH TUNNELING)




                          AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE


A FORM OF ATTACK IN WHICH THE ATTACKER MAKES
INDEPENDENT CONNECTIONS WITH THE VICTIMS AND
RELAYS MESSAGES BETWEEN THEM, MAKING THEM
BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TALKING DIRECTLY TO EACH
OTHER , WHEN IN FACT THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION
CONTROLLED BY THE ATTACKER.

ATTACKER IMPERSONATE EACH ENDPOINT TO THE
SATISFACTION OF THE OTHER




                                    AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE




               AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
HANDS ON
MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM) USING CAIN ABEL




                                AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
DENIAL OF SERVICE



               THE PREVENTION OF AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO A SYSTEM
               RESOURCE OR THE DELAYING OF SYSTEM OPERATIONS
               AND FUNCTION. [1]

               PING OF DEATH (ICMP FLOODING), SYNFLOOD

               DISTRIBUTED DOS, BOT NET




[1]: RFC4949

                                                   AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
DENIAL OF SERVICE

DOS ATTACKER MAY:

  ATTEMPT TO FLOOD A NETWORK, THEREBY
  PREVENTING LEGITIMATE NETWORK TRAFFIC

  ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN TWO
  MACHINES, THEREBY PREVENTING ACCESS TO
  SERVICE

  ATTEMPT TO PREVENT PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL FROM
  ACCESING A SERVICE

  ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT SERVICE TO A SPECIFIC SYSTEM.


                                    AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
DENIAL OF SERVICE




               AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
HANDS ON
 EXAMPLE DOS




               AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
DEFENCE


EDUCATE USER

USING IPSEC (IPV6)

IMPLEMENT BEST POLICY

CONFIGURING FIREWALL, IDS, IPS

REGULARLY AUDITS




                                 AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
DISCUSSION




             AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
NETWORK SECURITY
TEKNIS PELATIHAN KEAMANAN INFORMASI




                             AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Network security

  • 1.
    NETWORK SECURITY TEKNIS PELATIHANKEAMANAN INFORMASI AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 2.
    AGENDA NETWORK LAYER INTERNET PROTOCOL IPV 4 IPV 6 IPSEC NETWORK PACKET INSPECTION AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 3.
    AGENDA ATTACKING IP V4 PASSIVE ACTIVE COMMON TYPES OF ATTACK + HANDS ON EAVESDROPPING SNIFFER ATTACK AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 4.
    AGENDA COMMON TYPES OFATTACK SPOOFING TUNNELING MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM) ATTACK DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK DEFENCE AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 5.
    NETWORK LAYER NO. 3 FROM OSI MODEL PROVIDES THE FUNCTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL MEANS OF TRANSFERING VARIABLE LENGTH DATA SEQUENCES FROM SOURCE HOST TO A DESTINATION ON ONE NETWORK TO ANOTHER, WHILE MAINTAINING THE QOS REQUESTED BY TRANSPORT LAYER FUCTION: PATH DETERMINATION AND LOGICAL ADRESSING; DATA UNIT : PACKET/DATAGRAM IP (IPV4, IPV6), ICMP, IPSEC, IGMP, IPX, APPLE TALK [1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 6.
    OSI 7 LAYER [1]:WIKIPEDIA.ORG AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 7.
    INTERNET PROTOCOL RESPONSIBLE FOR ADDRESSING HOSTS AND ROUTING DATAGRAM (PACKETS) FROM A SOURCE HOST TO DESTINATION HOST ACCROSS ONE OR MORE IP NETWORK. [1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 8.
    IPV4 FOURTH REVISION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IP AND THE FIRST VERSION OF THE PROTOCOL WIDELY DEPLOYED CONNECTIONLESS, NOT GUARANTEE DELIVERY, NOT ASSURING PROPER SEQUENCE OR AVOIDANCE OF DUPLICATE DELIVERY, 32 BIT = 192.168.0.1 IPSEC IS OPTIONAL [1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 9.
    IPV 6 SUCCESSOR OFIPV4 WITH MORE “BETTER” IMPROVEMENTS NEW PACKET HEADER MULTICAST (MULTIPLE DESTINATION IN SINGLE OPERATION) STATELESS ADDRESS AUTO CONFIGURATION LARGER ADDRESS SPACE 128 BIT = 2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334 IPSEC SUPPORT IS MANDATORY AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 10.
    IPSEC PROTOCOL SUITE FORSECURING INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) COMMUNICATIONS BY AUTHENTICATING AND ENCRYPTINH EACH IP PACKET OF A COMMUNICATION SESSION. END-TO-END SECURITY SCHEME PROTECT ANY APPLICATION TRAFFIC ACCROSS IP NETWORK AUTHENTICATION HEADER (AH), ENCAPSULATING SECURITY PAYLOAD (ESP), SECURITY ASSOCIATIONS (SA) AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 11.
    IPV4 V.S IPV6 AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 12.
    NETWORK PACKET INSPECTION AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 13.
    HANDS ON WIRESHARK PACKETINSPECTION AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 14.
    ATTACKING IPV4 SECURITY ISSUELIES ON INTERNET PROTOCOL (NETWORK LAYER), NO AUTH AND ENCRYPTION IPSEC OPTIONAL UPPER LAYER, CREATED WITHOUT SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, TCP PROTOCOLS: FTP, TELNET, SMTP, POP3 AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 15.
    ATTACKING IPV4 PASSIVE :NETWORK PACKET INFORMATION MIGHT BE MONITORED; ACTIVE: NETWORK PACKET INFORMATION IS ALTERED IN INTENT TO MODIFY, CORRUPT, OR DESTROY TEH DATA OR THE NETWORK. AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 16.
    EAVESDROPPING THE MAJORITY OFNETWORK COMMUNICATIONS OCCUR IN UNSECURED OR “CLEARTEXT” FORMAT THE ABILITY TO MONITOR THE NETWORK COMMUNICATION IS THE BIGGEST SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT WE’VE FACED HUB NETWORK DEVICE, ACCESS TO THE GATEWAY/ ROUTER DEVICE AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 17.
    SNIFFER ATTACK SNIFFER ISAN APPLICATION OR DEVICE THAT CAN READ, MONITOR, AND CAPTURE NETWORK PACKET. IF PACKET NOT ENCRYPTED THE ATTACKER CAN VIEW FULL DATA INSIDE THE PACKET IF PACKET ENCRYPTED THE ATTACKER NEED TO CREATE/USE/HAVE A VALID KEY TUNNEL ONLY PACKET CAN ALSO BE BROKEN OPEN AND READ AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 18.
    SNIFFER ATTACK TCPDUMP WIRESHARK (FORMERLYETHEREAL) ETTERCAP CAIN AND ABEL DSNIFF AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 19.
    HANDS ON WIRESHARK RECOVERY AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 20.
    SPOOFING SPOOF = MASQUEARADE[1] IS A SITUATION IN WHICH A PROGRAM SUCCESSFULLY MASQUARADES AS ANOTHER BY FALSIFYING DATA AND THEREBY GAINING AN ILLEGITIMATE ADVANTAGE[2] [1]: RFC4949 [2]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 21.
    SPOOFING IPSPOOFING, E.G: MODIFY SOURCE ADDRESS A COMMON MISCONCEPTION: IP SPOOFING CAN BE USED TO HIDE IP ADDRESS WHILE SURFING THE INTERNET, CHATTING, ON-LINE, AND SO FORTH. THIS IS GENERALLY NOT TRUE. FORGING THE SOURCES IP ADDRESS CAUSES THE RESPONSES TO BE MISDIRECTED, MEANING CANNOT CREATE NORMAL NETWORK CONNECTION.[1] USUALLY COMBINE WITH NETWORK DOS/DDOS ATTACK [1]: ISS.NET AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 22.
    HANDS ON MAC SPOOFING IFCONFIG (IFACE) HW ETHER (NEW MAC) AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 23.
    TUNNELING TUNNEL IS A COMMUNICATION CHANNEL CREATED IN A COMPUTER NETWORK BY ENCAPSULATING (I.E., LAYERING) A COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL’S DATA PACKETS IN (I.E., ABOVE) A SECOND PROTOCOL THAT NORMALLY WOULD BE CARRIED ABOVE, OR AT THE SAME LAYER AS, THE FIRST ONE. [1] HTTP, SSH, DNS, ICMP SSH FOO@DOO -D PORT [1]: RFC4949 AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 24.
    HANDS ON HTTP OVERSSH (SSH TUNNELING) AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 25.
    MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE A FORM OFATTACK IN WHICH THE ATTACKER MAKES INDEPENDENT CONNECTIONS WITH THE VICTIMS AND RELAYS MESSAGES BETWEEN THEM, MAKING THEM BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TALKING DIRECTLY TO EACH OTHER , WHEN IN FACT THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION CONTROLLED BY THE ATTACKER. ATTACKER IMPERSONATE EACH ENDPOINT TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE OTHER AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 26.
    MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 27.
    HANDS ON MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM)USING CAIN ABEL AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 28.
    DENIAL OF SERVICE THE PREVENTION OF AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO A SYSTEM RESOURCE OR THE DELAYING OF SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND FUNCTION. [1] PING OF DEATH (ICMP FLOODING), SYNFLOOD DISTRIBUTED DOS, BOT NET [1]: RFC4949 AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 29.
    DENIAL OF SERVICE DOSATTACKER MAY: ATTEMPT TO FLOOD A NETWORK, THEREBY PREVENTING LEGITIMATE NETWORK TRAFFIC ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN TWO MACHINES, THEREBY PREVENTING ACCESS TO SERVICE ATTEMPT TO PREVENT PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL FROM ACCESING A SERVICE ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT SERVICE TO A SPECIFIC SYSTEM. AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 30.
    DENIAL OF SERVICE AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 31.
    HANDS ON EXAMPLEDOS AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 32.
    DEFENCE EDUCATE USER USING IPSEC(IPV6) IMPLEMENT BEST POLICY CONFIGURING FIREWALL, IDS, IPS REGULARLY AUDITS AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 33.
    DISCUSSION AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
  • 34.
    NETWORK SECURITY TEKNIS PELATIHANKEAMANAN INFORMASI AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS