302   Content Server Security   Challenges And Best Practices
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302 Content Server Security Challenges And Best Practices

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  • This talk is about how to ensure the integrity of your content, and secure access to it. For security experts: This talk will expose some of the risks specific to the Content Server, and ways to mitigate those risks. Including configuration and customization options. You might be more interested in s ession 1502 . For SCS experts: This will present lots of information about network security that will help you design a security plan for your organization. For folks familiar with both: don’t worry, this talk is technical but will not bog you down with details.
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  • The $105 billion is most likely hyper-inflated. As is the $50 billion number. The $1 billion estimate by Garner is the most believable, because they have the least to gain by inflating the numbers. Although it ‘feels’ low to me. Gartner called 2005 a ‘watershed year’ when it came to e-commerce. For the first time, security is major problem for the growth of the internet. 14% stopped paying bills online, 5% stopped e-commerce altogether. Big changes might be coming in 2006.
  • Mention lunchroom example here – would you secure your lunch in public fridge?
  • This methodology is care of Bruce Schneier. Risks: Who is trying to do what, and why. What are the odds of success. What are the repercussions? Policy: user/admin access depends on your organization. Hackers should be thwarted at every step, however. Countermeasures: Safe manufacturers rate their safes based on how many minutes (15, 30, 60) a professional takes to crack it. The safe is the PROTECTION. A guard checking on it every 5 minutes is DETECTION. The guard sounding an alarm for the police is the REACTION. In software its much harder, because you don’t know the vulnerabilities of the system.
  • Five kinds possible threats. Remember – a threat is a person. That 70% stat is probably meaningless, because there just isn’t enough hard evidence. Its true that 70% of identity thieves are insiders (Identity Theft Resource Center)... but only 30% of corporations have admitted firing somebody because of violating security practices (IDC's 2004 Security Survey ).
  • Five kinds possible threats. Remember – a threat is a person. That 70% stat is probably meaningless, because there just isn’t enough hard evidence. Its true that 70% of identity thieves are insiders (Identity Theft Resource Center)... but only 30% of corporations have admitted firing somebody because of violating security practices (IDC's 2004 Security Survey ).
  • Too many general network vulnerabilities to enumerate in detail. However, we will try to address all SCS vulnerabilities in detail. When selecting countermeasures, go for dual-purpose technology first. That is the best way to get security. If it improves the lives of administrators AND increases security, they are much more likely to buy it and learn it. Examples to follow. Will cover protection aspect first, then detection tools. Reactions
  • Single Sign On makes problem worse – you’re never prompted for a login.
  • Im not a huge fan of biometrics. You should have access keys first, add passwords to the keys for extra security, and add biometrics as a last resort. It helps, but only a little. And management is a pain. If somebody copies your password, you can make a new password. If somebody copies your thumbprint, you cant make a new thumb!

302   Content Server Security   Challenges And Best Practices 302 Content Server Security Challenges And Best Practices Presentation Transcript

  • Content Server Security – Challenges and Best Practices Brian “Bex” Huff, Software Developer Stellent, Inc. January 30, 2006
    • Outline what you need to protect your content
      • How Content Server fits into your security policy
      • Use risk-management to minimize cost
    • Discuss risks and known vulnerabilities
      • General network briefly, Stellent in detail
    • Present countermeasures to mitigate risks
      • General network briefly, Stellent in detail
    Purpose
    • Early days
      • Little security except governments, banks, and telcos
      • Most software was far too trusting
    • First virus (1983), worm (1988), and trojan (1200 BC)
      • Networks must defend against malware
      • Sparked battle between cryptographers and US government
    • Tech boom:
      • http://www.BURN-PILES-OF-MONEY.com
      • Spent on security, but didn’t understand it
    • Tech bust
      • All projects must justify expense, security was neglected
    Brief History of Internet Security
    • Today
      • Little security except governments, banks, and telcos
    • The Future
      • Annoying/disruptive malware is for amateurs
      • Intellectual property theft is the future
        • Cheap and effective industrial espionage
      • Database, file server, web-based CMS are next targets
      • Popularity of web services will lead to new attack forms
    Brief History of Internet Security, cont.
    • Affected 55 million Americans in 2005 (USA Today)
    • Yearly costs estimates vary wildly
      • $105 billion (2005, Treasury Department)
      • $1 billion (2003, Gartner)
    • 42% of Americans used internet LESS in 2005
      • Identity theft scares them away (Gartner)
    • Customers go elsewhere after security breaches (Ponemon)
      • 70% would leave after two thefts of customer data
      • Each customer record lost costs $75
    Cyber Crime Statistics
    • Don’t panic!
      • 100% security neither possible nor cost-effective
    • Ultimately, people make your assets secure
      • Security products (hardware, software) merely assist
      • Make your network defensible
    • Consider security like risk management
      • Security breaches always possible
      • Can lower the odds, for progressively more money
      • Minimize risk for the minimum price
    • “ Security is a process, not a product” – Bruce Schneier
    What Should We Do?
    • Determine risks and threats
      • Who is attacking you, and why?
    • Describe policy required to defend
      • Who should be allowed to do what?
      • Sarbanes Oxley compliance may also require this
    • Analyze vulnerabilities, design countermeasures
      • Cover all aspects: Protection , Detection , Reaction
    Making A Security Plan
    • Definition of Risk
      • Probability and effects of a harmful event
      • Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Impact
      • Threat: person with skills and motive to leverage vulnerability
    • Standard Consumers – LOW Risk
      • Customers, partners, site visitors, Google
      • Using leaked information against you
    • Contributors – MEDIUM Risk
      • Typical employees, Site Studio contributors
      • Information leakage, bad passwords, malicious content
    1) Determine Threats and Risks
    • Administrators – HIGH Risk
      • Site maintainer
      • Setting security improperly, stealing content
    • Developers – HIGH Risk
      • Component, fragment, or portal designers
      • Creating insecure code on your system
    • Unauthorized Users – HIGHEST Risk
      • Hackers, malware, ex-employees, differs based on organization
    • Oft cited stat: 70% of attacks are insiders
    1) Determine Threats and Risks, cont.
    • Specifics depend on organizational needs
    • Enterprise network policy
      • General process for users, administrators, applications
      • Most likely you have one already
    • Content Server specific policies
      • Who is allowed to view/change each type of content?
      • When is content fit for consumption?
      • Do contributors need access to scripting languages?
        • JSP, ASP, JavaScript
      • Which add-ons and components are secure?
    2) Determine Security Policy
  • 3) Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures
    • Protection, Detection, Reaction
    • Vulnerabilities common to all enterprise systems
      • Security holes in OS, web server, database
      • Bad passwords, eavesdropping, malware
      • Evil developers and administrators
      • Probably addressed in your current security policy
    • Vulnerabilities common to web apps
      • Cross Site Scripting ( XSS )
      • Information leakage
    • Java-based, immune to buffer overflows
    • Primary vulnerabilities in interfaces
      • Connection to authentication engine
        • Web server, portal server, LDAP
      • Database connections (SQL injection)
      • Administrative tools can impersonate users
    • Contributors uploading insecure content
      • Incorrect security group
      • Malicious ASP / JSP / JavaScript / HTML Forms
    • Insecure components
    Vulnerabilities in Stellent
    • Important regardless of your organization
    • General network security
    • Cross site scripting
    • Malicious content
    • Content server port access
    Protection - High Risk Vulnerabilities
    • Keep software/firmware patches up-to-date
      • 99% of attacks are known exploits (CERT)
    • Vulnerability analysis tools (Nessus, Metasploit)
      • Highly flawed, but catches known exploits
    • Secure network topology
      • Firewall both external and internal attacks (DMZ)
      • Minimize required trust and single points of failure
    • Restrict physical / shell access
    • Virus/Trojan scanners at internet gateway
      • Block malicious emails & web downloads
      • Cannot trust users to make secure decisions!
    General Network Security
    • HTML & HTTP flexibility very useful:
      • Form on my site to submit a Google search
      • Click submit, search results displayed in your browser
    • But could cause security problems:
      • Click submit, content deleted from your server invisible to you
    • Attacks can originate from ANYWHERE:
      • Form submission, URLs, or simple page loading
      • Attacks can be JavaScript, or pure HTML
    • Executed with your browser & security credentials
      • Hacker tricks you into attacking the server for him
      • Advanced attacks with AJAX can hijack your entire browser!
    Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
    • Block forms submitted from untrusted sites
      • Block insecure HTTP referrers ( HtmlPostAuthenticator )
        • Can be spoofed, in this case its usable
      • Block malicious URLs: EnableSecuredGets=true
    • Scrub XSS attacks from request data ( FilterDataInput )
      • Blocks JavaScript in metadata, content, URL parameters
      • Especially important for anonymous contributors
        • Comments forms, resume submissions
      • Significantly restricts your “power users”
    Cross-Site Scripting, cont.
    • Virus scanner on stellent/vault/~temp directory
      • Checks for malicious / careless contributors
    • Lock down JSP/ASP contribution to just developers
      • Lock down JSP with JspEnabledGroups
      • Enable ASP only for specific security groups
        • http://myhost/stellent/groups/scripts/
      • Remove secure data from JSPs/ASPs
        • Consumers with access to native file can view the source
    • Malicious HCSP same as malicious HTML
      • IdocScript limited to page display for security reasons
    Malicious Content
    • Authentication performed outside of SCS
      • Web server authenticates, passes username to port 4444
      • Out of the box, only localhost is trusted
      • With dedicated server & trusted admins, fairly safe
    • Rogue administrator can impersonate users
      • Content Integration Suite ( CIS ), IdcCommandUX
      • SOAP is safer – password authenticated by web server
    • First: block access with firewalls
      • Block all but web server and portal server
        • Restrict to specific users if possible
      • More safe than just SocketHostAddressSecurityFilter
    Direct SCS Port Access
    • Second: password secure access ( ProxyConnections )
      • Set ProxyPassword to a large random string
      • Web server sends secure authentication token:
        • User, hashed user password, IP, time, and ProxyPassword
      • Blocks connections without token
        • Some admin tools blocked
        • Manually create token for portal servers ( CIS , IdcCommandUX )
    • Or Third: encrypt access with SSL ( SecurityProviders )
      • CIS only, default web server not yet supported
      • Authenticate with SSL certificates
      • For systems with extraordinary needs
    Direct SCS Port Access, cont.
    • Less important, depending on organization and network
    • Data leakage
    • Eavesdropping
    • Passwords
    • Hacked database, file server, web server
    Protection - Lower Risk Vulnerabilities
    • How much does Google know about you?
    • Simplify the security model
      • Less accidental information leakage
      • Use security groups to secure , not to organize!
      • Use Profiles / WebDAV to simplify contribution
    • Workflows for public facing content
    • PDF Watermark, Dynamic Watermark
      • Embed the word CONFIDENTIAL in converted PDFs
      • Add date and viewer’s name with Dynamic Watermark
    • NeedToKnow component
      • User can view some metadata, but not content
    Data Leakage
  • Eavesdropping
    • Network vulnerable to packet sniffers
      • Spy on downloaded content or passwords
    • Use SSL (HTTPS)
      • Protects passwords and content
      • Important for Basic authentication and cookie login
        • NTLM authentication is already “encrypted”
      • Drawback: performance suffers
    • Customizations: use SSL only when needed
      • Login with cookies from HTTPS page
      • Set up both HTTP and HTTPS ( BrowserUrlPath )
        • Use SSL only for contributors / administrators
  • Password Hacking
    • Cannot trust users with their passwords
      • 70% give away passwords for chocolate (BBC)
      • Computers getting faster, passwords still 8 letters
      • Reused passwords, easily guessed passwords
    • Use Single Sign On (SSO)
      • NTLM, Active Directory, LDAP, Netegrity SiteMinder
      • Eases maintenance of passwords, users, new applications
      • Drawback: no login prompt can make XSS worse
    • Don’t allow users to know their access key!
      • USB / smart cards with SSL certificates for authentication
      • Protect certificate with password
        • Add biometrics for more security
      • In practice, managing such keys is very difficult
    • Web server primary target for unauthorized users
      • Typically exposed to outside world
      • Firewalls help, but don’t stop everything
    • Password secure SCS / web server connection
      • Require access tokens ( ProxyCredentials )
      • Hacker cannot impersonate users
    • Web proxy for extra security layer
      • Run web server on same machine as SCS
      • Connect to web server with proxy ( Squid ) outside firewall
      • If proxy is hacked, SCS is still safe (for now)
    Hacked Web Server
    • Compromise of SCS machine or file server
      • If user gains root access, anything is possible
    • Use NTLM/Kerberos authentication for Database
      • No need to store JdbcPassword
      • SQL Server: Use JTDS 1.2 driver, manual install
      • Oracle: Use version-specific thin driver
    • Encrypted file system
      • Secure the vault , weblayout , search , data directories
      • Performance loss, might not work with web server
      • Expanded support with FileStoreProviders (8.x)
    Hacked File System
    • SQL Injection attacks
      • Similar to XSS – malicious SQL through hacked web form
      • Can take over database through some web applications
    • SCS protected by abstraction layer
      • SQL in predefined queries, strongly typed parameters
    • SCS validates user-submitted data
      • Parses dates, numbers, escapes quotes in strings
      • Extra parenthesis added if found in query terms
    • Reduce table-modification rights of Stellent JDBC user
      • Adding metadata, schema, components requires DBA approval
      • User-level activity unaffected
    Database Connections
    • Difficult to measure
    • Untrusted developer making customizations
    • How to make secure components
    • Possible security customizations
    Protection - Risks in Customizations
    • Difficult to defend against
      • Requires complete auditing of code for back-doors
    • Install “development” servers
      • Protects content against rogue developers
      • Components audited and installed by trusted admin
    • Block Admin Server component installs
      • Restrict to Component Wizard from the console
      • AllowUpdateComponentConfig , AllowComponentUpload
    Malicious Components
    • Validate HTML form data in Java
      • JavaScript is handy, but not trustable
    • Encode IdocScript variables on pages
      • IdocScript functions: js(), xml(), url()
      • Prevents introduction of new XSS attacks
    • Use predefined SQL queries, avoid raw SQL
      • Predefined queries thwart SQL injection
    • Execute command-line applications with caution
      • Validate the command first
    Secure Component Tips
    • Use the checkSecurity action in custom services
      • Service security flags require dSecurityGroup to be present
      • Cannot trust values sent by the user
      • First determine dSecurityGroup with SQL query
      • Then call checkSecurity action in service
    • Expect people to call custom IdocScript maliciously
      • Restrict functionality to read-only actions
      • Workflow IdocScript allows write actions in special context
        • Condition variable allowWorkflowIdocScript
    Secure Component Tips, cont.
    • Modify security with Java components
      • Web security plugins require C++ code
    • Allow anonymous user to check in content
      • SecurityFilter component in 7.5 HowToComponents
      • Deny general access, allow it for specific requests
    • Establish download quotas
      • User can only download 50MB per day
    • Block certain service calls for consumption servers
      • Block SOAP or WebDAV explicitly
        • With firewall, or customization
      • Block all services except bare essentials ( SS_GET_PAGE )
    Security Customization Examples
    • Custom validation of metadata and content
      • Content Profile rules, or Java filters ( validateStandard )
    • Java User Providers for authentication
      • For legacy or atypical authentication protocols
    • Custom web authentication
      • Custom authentication filters ( SiteMinder , SSL Certificates )
      • Custom tokens for flexible SOAP security
      • Block login after 3 bad passwords
    • Custom cookie login
      • Existing sample version doesn’t have a timeout
      • Be sure to hash the username, a timestamp, and a secret
    Security Customization Examples, cont.
    • Check logs frequently
      • Firewall, intrusion detection, web server
      • Sometimes only human eyes catch ‘suspicious’ behavior
    • Syndicate access logs to remote servers
      • Must compromise several systems to “cover your tracks”
    • Intrusion detection systems (Snort, some firewalls)
      • Detects known attacks, generally suspicious packets
    Detection – Network Violations
    • Check SCS web logs
      • Access violation logged
      • Login failures not automatically logged
        • Use SSO or custom component
    • Content Tracker
      • Tracks popularity – who viewed what?
      • Check for allowed – but unusual – activity:
        • Downloading data before quitting
        • Downloading random highly secure data
      • Excellent dual-purpose technology
    Detection – SCS Specific
    • Someone someday will bypass all your security
      • Reaction depends on business needs
        • Block access with firewall? Unplug from network?
      • Minimize damage and disruption while you patch
    • Establish backup and recovery plans
      • Backup all applications and data
      • Most high-availability sites have sufficient plans
    • Redundancy is primary
      • System must survive a crash / compromise of one server
      • One compromise shouldn’t lead to several
    Reaction – Respond to Intrusion
    • Block hacked user accounts
      • Supported by some SSO vendors
      • Block the administrator ( SysadminBlocker )
    • Make database read-only
      • Block ‘commit’ rights to Stellent’s JDBC user at the database
        • Blocks ALL write activity, possible side effects
      • Make Counters table read-only
        • Blocks all transactions
    Reaction – SCS specific
    • Stellent less vulnerable than most systems
      • Smaller target than operating system, database
      • Recommendation: block XSS and direct port access
      • Others countermeasures as needed
    • Which countermeasures to use?
      • First, use dual-purpose technology
        • SSO, web proxies, Content Tracker
      • Second, select those with little cost/drawbacks
        • ProxyCredentials , SSL, simplified security model
      • Lastly, select those with significant cost/drawbacks
        • Scrub JavaScript content, SSL Providers, custom components
    Conclusions
    • Security Books:
      • Secrets & Lies: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0471453803
        • Source for some material presented here
      • Counter Hack: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0131481045
      • Hacking Exposed: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0072260815
      • Network Security: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0072226978
      • Tao of NSM: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0321246772
    • Open Source Tools:
      • Vulnerability Analysis: http:// www.nessus.org /
      • Intrusion Detection: http:// www.snort.org /
      • Packet Sniffer: http://www.ethereal.com/
    Useful Links
    • Contact Information:
      • Brian ‘Bex’ Huff <bex@stellent.com>
      • http:// www.stellent.com
      • http:// groups.yahoo.com/group/intradoc_users /
    • See Session 1502 on SSO Integrations
    • See Session 908 on Disaster Recovery
    • Please complete the session survey before you leave today
    • Access this presentation* and materials at:
    • http:// www.stellentcrescendo.com/Crescendo/Sessions/index.htm
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    Questions?