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Designing security into low
cost IoT systems
JimWallace
Linaro Connect, Bangkok 2016
Director, SSG Marketing
8th March 2016
© ARM 20152
Connectivity EfficiencyManagementProductivity Security
From Sensors to Servers
© ARM 20153
IoT is going everywhere
Weak crypto, protocols
Default Passwords
No Passwords
Hacked Devices
Weak crypto
Hacked device keys
Side-channel attacks
Memory bus probing
No device renewability
Software attacks
After hours cloning
Stolen keys
Weak Protocols
Base Stations
Weakness in protocol
No renewability
Smart Meter
Data ServersKeyServer
Silicon/OEM
Manufacturing
Sensors/Devices
Risks are hard to predict
© ARM 20154
Ultra-low cost Low cost
BBC micro:bit
BT Smart beacon
Rich BT Smart
Thread node
BT Smart
Device SW Capabilities
IP +TLS
mbed OS uVisor
Management Security
Firmware OTA
ARMv6-M
ARMv8-M Baseline
TRNG + Crypto
Device HW Resources
ARMv8-M Mainline
ARMv7-M with MPU
Generic
WiFi node
Gateway
Cortex-A Class
TRNG + Crypto +
GPU +VPU
IP +TLS
OP-TEE
Management Security
Firmware over-the-air
Rich UI/Multimedia
mbed OS / RTOS Linux / Rich OS
IoT - From Cortex-M to Cortex-A class devices
Intelligent
Connected
Secure
© ARM 20155
Evolution of IoT driving need for generic devices
 Local intelligence enables:
Camera/microphone/other
sensors
 Raw data does not need to be sent
to the cloud, only processed meta-
data is being sent
 Reduced data bandwidth, transfer
overhead and processing latency
to/from cloud
 Increased security
Face Detection
Arm/Disarm
Motion Sensor
Voice recognition
Breaking Glass
Communication
© ARM 20156
Security in IoT end points
 Device management
 Support for bootstrapping /
provisioning / Behaviour
monitoring…
 Keep firmware up-to-date
 Device integrity
 Protect from untrusted S/W
 Allow recovery from attack
 Asset protection
 Prevent access to certain
resources
 Data security
 Keep data confidential
 Prevent data alteration
 Physical Security
 Anti-tampering
Device security Communications security
Management security
 Link encryption
 Prevent eavesdroppers listening
 Authentication
 Identity of endpoint / server
©ARM 20157
Security must be built into all stages
of the system
© ARM 20158
 mbed Device Connector eases development, management and scaling of IoT
 Available at https://connector.mbed.com
 Management security implemented via standards such as OMA LWM2M
Management security: mbed Device Connector
Build IoT Device Connect your devices
Build application
with example code
Utilize cloud
solutions
© ARM 20159
Hardware Interfaces
mbed OS
uVisor
mbed OS
Core Schedulers
mbed OS API
Communication Management
Device Management mbed TLS
mbed Client
IP Stack
BLE APIEvent
TasksEnergy
Application Code Libraries
uVisor
Management SecuritySecure Drivers
ARM Cortex-M CPU Crypto SensorRadio
SW Crypto
Thread API
mbed OS 15.11
 mbed OS is a modular, secure, efficient, open source OS for IoT
 Connects to mbed Device Connector
mbed OS
Drivers Device DriversCMSIS-Core Debug Support
Thread BLE6LoWPAN
uVisor
secure
isolation
MPU
Communication
Security
Management
Security
Device
Security
© ARM 201510
Device Connector
Support
Protocol Implementations: LWM2M, CoAP, HTTP
Channel Security Implementations: TLS, DTLS
Client Library Port
mbed OS or RTOS / Linux + Networking
mbed Client C++ API
Application and Service Integration
mbed Client
 Connects to mbed Device Connector
 Included as part of mbed OS, also
portable to other platforms including
Linux and third party RTOS
 Implements protocols and support for
securely publishing resources (e.g.
sensor data), and managing the device
from the cloud
© ARM 201511
Communication security: mbedTLS
 Fully-fledged SSL /TLS / DTLS Library
 Developer friendly: Clean API and
documentation
 Open Source under Apache 2.0 license at
https://tls.mbed.org/
 Suitable for use on Cortex-M and Cortex-A
processors based targets
Transport
Security
Symmetric
Encryption
Public Key
Algorithms
Hash
Algorithms
Random
Number
Generation
X.509
Certificate
Handling
TLS/DTLS,
etc
AES, etc ECDHE,
ECDSA, etc
SHA, etc Entropy pool,
CTR_DEBUG,
etc ✔ https://tls.mbed.org/security
© ARM 201512
Device security services in low cost devices
 Existing IoT solutions use flat
address spaces with little
privilege separation
 Especially on microcontrollers
 Mitigating strategy to split
security domains into
 Exposed code
 Protected critical code
Security
Foundation
• Cryptography
• Key Management
• Secure Identity
• …
Critical (secure world)
Remainder of
mbed OS
• Scheduler
• HAL + Drivers
• Connectivity stack(s)
• …
Exposed (Normal world)
mbed OS uVisor
Hardware Interfaces
ARM Cortex-M CPU Crypto SensorRadio
MPU
© ARM 201513
TrustZone for low cost ARMv8-M IoT platforms
 The ARMv8-M architecture introduces
secure and non-secure code execution
 Code running in non-secure memory can only
access non-secure devices and memory
 Code running in secure memory can access whole
address space
 So low cost devices can
 Have trusted code & Apps in secure memory
 Can have non trusted applications installed in non
secure memory safe in the knowledge that they
cannot be used to attack the system
 CryptoCell augmentsTrustZone
 Providing a range of security subsystems for
acceleration and offloading
Non Secure
App
Secure
App/Libs
SECURE WORLDNORMAL WORLD
Non Secure
RTOS
Secure
RTOS
TrustZone
AMBA 5 AHB5
Microcontroller
-310
Asymmetric
Crypto
Symmetric
Crypto
Data
interface
Security
resources
Roots
oftrust
Always
On
Control interface
CryptoCell-310
© ARM 201514
TrustZone technology for every IoT platform
Non Secure
App
Secure
App
Secure Monitor
SECURE WORLDNORMAL WORLD
Rich OS. e.g.
Linux
Secure
OS
Asymmetric
Crypto
Symmetric
Crypto
Data
interface
Security
resources
Roots
oftrust
Always
On
Control interface
CryptoCell-710
AMBA AXI
Apps Processor
Non Secure
App
Secure
App/Libs
SECURE WORLDNORMAL WORLD
Non Secure
RTOS
Secure
RTOS
TrustZone
AMBA 5 AHB5
Microcontroller
-310
Asymmetric
Crypto
Symmetric
Crypto
Data
interface
Security
resources
Roots
oftrust
Always
On
Control interface
CryptoCell-310
© ARM 201515
Trusted Firmware, OP-TEE reduce fragmentation
 SecureWorld foundations for
ARMv8-A:
 Trusted Board Boot
 Secure World runtime – world switch,
interrupt routing, PSCI, SMC handling
 Open source projects on GitHub
https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-
trusted-firmware
https://github.com/OP-TEE
 v1.2 (December)
 + Trusted Boot baseline features
 + PSCI v1.0 key optional features
 + OS vendor alignment
 GICv3 drivers
ARM Trusted Firmware
EL3
SoC/platform port
Normal World OS
EL1/EL2
OP-TEE OS
Secure-EL1
OP-TEE Dispatcher
OP-TEEprotocol
andmechanism
Trusted App
Secure-EL0
App
EL0
OP-TEE Linux
driver
OP-TEE client
OP-TEEprotocolviaSM
C
viaioctl
Porting interface
between Trusted
Firmware and SoC/
platform
Interface between
Trusted Firmware and
Trusted OS Dispatcher
ARM Trusted Firmware
Trusted OS supplier
SoC supplier
OS/hypervisor supplier
Trusted App supplier
Internal TOS interface
© ARM 201516
ARM TrustZone CryptoCell
 TrustZone,TEE and CryptoCell provide platform level security
 with a hardware Root of Trust /Trust Anchor for the system
 Crypto acceleration
 TRNG
 Configurable to target application – right size
 Enhances usability e.g. time for DTLS handshake & door lock to open
 Simplifies security implementations
Asymmetric
Crypto
Symmetric
Crypto
Data
interface
Security
resources
Roots
oftrust
Always
On
Control interface
CryptoCell
© ARM 201517
LITE using this to enable a security foundation
Efficient Crypto
Robust Protocols
Device Health Checks
TLS
Secure Manufacturing Line
Strong Crypto
Secure Meter
Renewability
Key Rotation
Secure Key Provisioning
End-to-End
Security
Silicon/OEM
Manufacturing
Hardware Root of Trust
Secure Boot
Trusted Execution Environment
Trusted Firmware
Secure Clocks/Counters, Anti-Rollback
Secure Key Storage, Robust Crypto
Data
Servers
Secure
Key
Server
Secure Base
Stations
Strong ID/Trusted UI
Memory Isolation
FOTA
HW-RoT
TEE
© ARM 201518
Imagine a world where…
 From the wide choice of ARM-based devices, you chose the perfect one
for you
 Price, performance, power, form, security etc.
 And what software you ran on it was up to you…
 Android / Brillo, BSD, CentOS, ChromeOS, RHEL, SUSE, Tizen, Snappy Ubuntu,
Windows, Yocto/OE, etc …or something we haven’t even thought of yet
 But once you made that choice, it should all just work!
 ARM & Linaro are committed to making this happen
© ARM 201519
Linaro and ARM providing the foundation for IoT
 ARM working with Linaro to provide an end-to-end open source IoT
framework for specific IoT implementations
 ARM part of LITEWG
 “Place to collaborate on ARM architecture for IoT”, enabling
 Software solutions from Cortex-M to Cortex-A based platforms
The trademarks featured in this presentation are registered and/or unregistered trademarks of ARM Limited (or its
subsidiaries) in the EU and/or elsewhere. All rights reserved. All other marks featured may be trademarks of their
respective owners.
Copyright © 2016 ARM Limited

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BKK16-200 Designing Security into low cost IO T Systems

  • 1. Designing security into low cost IoT systems JimWallace Linaro Connect, Bangkok 2016 Director, SSG Marketing 8th March 2016
  • 2. © ARM 20152 Connectivity EfficiencyManagementProductivity Security From Sensors to Servers
  • 3. © ARM 20153 IoT is going everywhere Weak crypto, protocols Default Passwords No Passwords Hacked Devices Weak crypto Hacked device keys Side-channel attacks Memory bus probing No device renewability Software attacks After hours cloning Stolen keys Weak Protocols Base Stations Weakness in protocol No renewability Smart Meter Data ServersKeyServer Silicon/OEM Manufacturing Sensors/Devices Risks are hard to predict
  • 4. © ARM 20154 Ultra-low cost Low cost BBC micro:bit BT Smart beacon Rich BT Smart Thread node BT Smart Device SW Capabilities IP +TLS mbed OS uVisor Management Security Firmware OTA ARMv6-M ARMv8-M Baseline TRNG + Crypto Device HW Resources ARMv8-M Mainline ARMv7-M with MPU Generic WiFi node Gateway Cortex-A Class TRNG + Crypto + GPU +VPU IP +TLS OP-TEE Management Security Firmware over-the-air Rich UI/Multimedia mbed OS / RTOS Linux / Rich OS IoT - From Cortex-M to Cortex-A class devices Intelligent Connected Secure
  • 5. © ARM 20155 Evolution of IoT driving need for generic devices  Local intelligence enables: Camera/microphone/other sensors  Raw data does not need to be sent to the cloud, only processed meta- data is being sent  Reduced data bandwidth, transfer overhead and processing latency to/from cloud  Increased security Face Detection Arm/Disarm Motion Sensor Voice recognition Breaking Glass Communication
  • 6. © ARM 20156 Security in IoT end points  Device management  Support for bootstrapping / provisioning / Behaviour monitoring…  Keep firmware up-to-date  Device integrity  Protect from untrusted S/W  Allow recovery from attack  Asset protection  Prevent access to certain resources  Data security  Keep data confidential  Prevent data alteration  Physical Security  Anti-tampering Device security Communications security Management security  Link encryption  Prevent eavesdroppers listening  Authentication  Identity of endpoint / server
  • 7. ©ARM 20157 Security must be built into all stages of the system
  • 8. © ARM 20158  mbed Device Connector eases development, management and scaling of IoT  Available at https://connector.mbed.com  Management security implemented via standards such as OMA LWM2M Management security: mbed Device Connector Build IoT Device Connect your devices Build application with example code Utilize cloud solutions
  • 9. © ARM 20159 Hardware Interfaces mbed OS uVisor mbed OS Core Schedulers mbed OS API Communication Management Device Management mbed TLS mbed Client IP Stack BLE APIEvent TasksEnergy Application Code Libraries uVisor Management SecuritySecure Drivers ARM Cortex-M CPU Crypto SensorRadio SW Crypto Thread API mbed OS 15.11  mbed OS is a modular, secure, efficient, open source OS for IoT  Connects to mbed Device Connector mbed OS Drivers Device DriversCMSIS-Core Debug Support Thread BLE6LoWPAN uVisor secure isolation MPU Communication Security Management Security Device Security
  • 10. © ARM 201510 Device Connector Support Protocol Implementations: LWM2M, CoAP, HTTP Channel Security Implementations: TLS, DTLS Client Library Port mbed OS or RTOS / Linux + Networking mbed Client C++ API Application and Service Integration mbed Client  Connects to mbed Device Connector  Included as part of mbed OS, also portable to other platforms including Linux and third party RTOS  Implements protocols and support for securely publishing resources (e.g. sensor data), and managing the device from the cloud
  • 11. © ARM 201511 Communication security: mbedTLS  Fully-fledged SSL /TLS / DTLS Library  Developer friendly: Clean API and documentation  Open Source under Apache 2.0 license at https://tls.mbed.org/  Suitable for use on Cortex-M and Cortex-A processors based targets Transport Security Symmetric Encryption Public Key Algorithms Hash Algorithms Random Number Generation X.509 Certificate Handling TLS/DTLS, etc AES, etc ECDHE, ECDSA, etc SHA, etc Entropy pool, CTR_DEBUG, etc ✔ https://tls.mbed.org/security
  • 12. © ARM 201512 Device security services in low cost devices  Existing IoT solutions use flat address spaces with little privilege separation  Especially on microcontrollers  Mitigating strategy to split security domains into  Exposed code  Protected critical code Security Foundation • Cryptography • Key Management • Secure Identity • … Critical (secure world) Remainder of mbed OS • Scheduler • HAL + Drivers • Connectivity stack(s) • … Exposed (Normal world) mbed OS uVisor Hardware Interfaces ARM Cortex-M CPU Crypto SensorRadio MPU
  • 13. © ARM 201513 TrustZone for low cost ARMv8-M IoT platforms  The ARMv8-M architecture introduces secure and non-secure code execution  Code running in non-secure memory can only access non-secure devices and memory  Code running in secure memory can access whole address space  So low cost devices can  Have trusted code & Apps in secure memory  Can have non trusted applications installed in non secure memory safe in the knowledge that they cannot be used to attack the system  CryptoCell augmentsTrustZone  Providing a range of security subsystems for acceleration and offloading Non Secure App Secure App/Libs SECURE WORLDNORMAL WORLD Non Secure RTOS Secure RTOS TrustZone AMBA 5 AHB5 Microcontroller -310 Asymmetric Crypto Symmetric Crypto Data interface Security resources Roots oftrust Always On Control interface CryptoCell-310
  • 14. © ARM 201514 TrustZone technology for every IoT platform Non Secure App Secure App Secure Monitor SECURE WORLDNORMAL WORLD Rich OS. e.g. Linux Secure OS Asymmetric Crypto Symmetric Crypto Data interface Security resources Roots oftrust Always On Control interface CryptoCell-710 AMBA AXI Apps Processor Non Secure App Secure App/Libs SECURE WORLDNORMAL WORLD Non Secure RTOS Secure RTOS TrustZone AMBA 5 AHB5 Microcontroller -310 Asymmetric Crypto Symmetric Crypto Data interface Security resources Roots oftrust Always On Control interface CryptoCell-310
  • 15. © ARM 201515 Trusted Firmware, OP-TEE reduce fragmentation  SecureWorld foundations for ARMv8-A:  Trusted Board Boot  Secure World runtime – world switch, interrupt routing, PSCI, SMC handling  Open source projects on GitHub https://github.com/ARM-software/arm- trusted-firmware https://github.com/OP-TEE  v1.2 (December)  + Trusted Boot baseline features  + PSCI v1.0 key optional features  + OS vendor alignment  GICv3 drivers ARM Trusted Firmware EL3 SoC/platform port Normal World OS EL1/EL2 OP-TEE OS Secure-EL1 OP-TEE Dispatcher OP-TEEprotocol andmechanism Trusted App Secure-EL0 App EL0 OP-TEE Linux driver OP-TEE client OP-TEEprotocolviaSM C viaioctl Porting interface between Trusted Firmware and SoC/ platform Interface between Trusted Firmware and Trusted OS Dispatcher ARM Trusted Firmware Trusted OS supplier SoC supplier OS/hypervisor supplier Trusted App supplier Internal TOS interface
  • 16. © ARM 201516 ARM TrustZone CryptoCell  TrustZone,TEE and CryptoCell provide platform level security  with a hardware Root of Trust /Trust Anchor for the system  Crypto acceleration  TRNG  Configurable to target application – right size  Enhances usability e.g. time for DTLS handshake & door lock to open  Simplifies security implementations Asymmetric Crypto Symmetric Crypto Data interface Security resources Roots oftrust Always On Control interface CryptoCell
  • 17. © ARM 201517 LITE using this to enable a security foundation Efficient Crypto Robust Protocols Device Health Checks TLS Secure Manufacturing Line Strong Crypto Secure Meter Renewability Key Rotation Secure Key Provisioning End-to-End Security Silicon/OEM Manufacturing Hardware Root of Trust Secure Boot Trusted Execution Environment Trusted Firmware Secure Clocks/Counters, Anti-Rollback Secure Key Storage, Robust Crypto Data Servers Secure Key Server Secure Base Stations Strong ID/Trusted UI Memory Isolation FOTA HW-RoT TEE
  • 18. © ARM 201518 Imagine a world where…  From the wide choice of ARM-based devices, you chose the perfect one for you  Price, performance, power, form, security etc.  And what software you ran on it was up to you…  Android / Brillo, BSD, CentOS, ChromeOS, RHEL, SUSE, Tizen, Snappy Ubuntu, Windows, Yocto/OE, etc …or something we haven’t even thought of yet  But once you made that choice, it should all just work!  ARM & Linaro are committed to making this happen
  • 19. © ARM 201519 Linaro and ARM providing the foundation for IoT  ARM working with Linaro to provide an end-to-end open source IoT framework for specific IoT implementations  ARM part of LITEWG  “Place to collaborate on ARM architecture for IoT”, enabling  Software solutions from Cortex-M to Cortex-A based platforms
  • 20. The trademarks featured in this presentation are registered and/or unregistered trademarks of ARM Limited (or its subsidiaries) in the EU and/or elsewhere. All rights reserved. All other marks featured may be trademarks of their respective owners. Copyright © 2016 ARM Limited