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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Dave Shackleford
Building an Effective Supply
Chain Security Program
GRC-W02
Sr. Faculty and Analyst
SANS
@daveshackleford
#RSAC
Supply Chain Security: What It Means
Supply chain security is a program that focuses on the potential
risks associated with an organization’s suppliers of goods and
services
Attackers are focusing on this!
There are many ways that a supply chain breach could occur
Software compromise, credential theft, and more are becoming
common scenarios
#RSAC
Supply Chain Breach Example: Target
Target experienced a significant breach of roughly 110 million
customers’ data, with at least 40 million payment cards stolen.
During the course of the investigation, it was found that Target
was initially breached through a connection established by one
of their vendors, HVAC vendor Fazio Mechanical Services
#RSAC
Supply Chain Breach Example: Home Depot
Home Depot, another large retailer, also claims that its credit
card breach in 2014 was initially due to stolen credentials from a
third-party vendor.
In many of the most public cases we have seen, the attackers
have targeted personal data, health care information and
financial data, such as debit and credit card details.
#RSAC
Supply Chain Breach Example: OPM
In 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
revealed a significant breach of 22 million records including
sensitive data tied to numerous federal employees, contractors
and military personnel.
This breach, like many others, seems to have originated with
stolen credentials from a background check provider that
worked with OPM, KeyPoint Government Solutions
#RSAC
Getting a Handle on Vendor Management
#RSAC
Current State
Not Defined
• No Process Defined
• Ad Hoc and Inconsistent Approach
Defined &
Implemented
• Consistent but Unstructured Approach
• Documented and Detailed but not Measured or Enforced
Continuous
Improvement
• Monitoring, Measuring, and Process Improvements
• Best Practices for Risk Management and Automation
#RSAC
Vendor Management:
Define Important Vendors
• Define Important Vendors
• “Important” vendors can mean many things
• These are vendors that:
• Are critical to business operations
• Maintain unique or legacy components of importance
• Provide critical services
#RSAC
Vendor Management:
Specify Primary Contacts
• Specify primary contacts
• Coordinate due diligence on vendors and report to senior leadership
using a risk-based approach
• Maintain knowledge of, and compliance with, policies and reporting
requirements.
• File documentation and paperwork with the legal and contracting
teams to ensure there is a central repository and audit trail.
• Coordinate broad communication with those who can add value in
vendor oversight
#RSAC
Vendor Management:
Establish Guidelines and Controls
• Policies should include:
• Requiring the right to audit and test the security controls of vendors and
service providers annually, upon significant changes to the relationship
and in response to audit requests or events
• Requiring vendors to adhere to security monitoring requirements
• Requiring periodic reports from the vendors and service providers
demonstrating service level attainment and performance management
• Requiring vendors and service providers to provide timely notification
pursuant to any security breaches or incidents that may cause impact to
the organization
#RSAC
Vendor Management:
Integrate with Organization’s Practices
• With the pieces in place, a vendor management program
can now start to integrate with the organization’s
assessment and audit practices
• Depending on the industry, organization, and culture, these
practices will vary widely
#RSAC
Supply Chain Security Best Practices
#RSAC
People, Process and Technology
#RSAC
Best Practices: People
• These should be in place at supply chain companies
• HR Teams: Background checks should be performed on a
regular basis for both new and existing employees and
contractors
• Every 6-12 months is ideal
• Monitor all staff that work with your organization’s data
and systems for changes to job status and requirements
• Access to critical systems should be monitored, and all third-party
access should be revoked after a defined period of inactivity
#RSAC
Best Practices: Employment Agreements
• HR and security teams should verify that security
requirements are clearly spelled out in contracts for supply
chain personnel
• Acceptable use provisions should be in place for supply
chain organization employees through their employment
agreements
#RSAC
Best Practices: Process
• Create a supply chain assessment questionnaire and checklists:
• Application security
• Audit and compliance
• Business continuity and disaster recovery capabilities
• Change and configuration management
• Data security and data life cycle management
• Physical (data center) security
• Encryption and key management
• Governance and risk management
• Identity and access management (IAM)
• Infrastructure and IT operations security
• Threat and vulnerability management
#RSAC
Best Practices: Process
• Supply chain review should follow these guidelines:
• Decide on a list of controls with which supply chain organizations
need to demonstrate compliance
• Determine the frequency of security reviews for internal and
regulatory compliance needs
• Define a remediation and arbitration process for handling supply
chain organizations that are not currently meeting security
requirements
#RSAC
Process Best Practices: Code Review
• Code analysis of software should ideally be done for supply
chain partners
• Having the code reviewed should ideally be the
responsibility of the vendors, and they should attest to
software security via a report issued prior to installation or
updates
• Contracts should require this!
• Pen testing of software should also be allowed in contracts
#RSAC
Process Best Practices: Vulnerability Mgmt
• Supply chain vendors should have to provide patches to
their products in a timely fashion
• Heartbleed, Shellshock, and others have affected us significantly
• SLAs should be in place for patch creation
• Supply chain partners should be required to notify you of
data breaches that may materially impact you
• Incidents should be communicated, too…could you be the next
target?
#RSAC
Best Practices: Technology
• The first, and perhaps simplest, change is to begin using
technology services that offer supplier risk ratings or
rankings compared to other industry organizations.
• Monitoring the overall risk ratings of supply chain participants from
other organizations working with them provides information on
industry perceptions of security posture
#RSAC
Technology Best Practices: Privileges
• Vendors and partners with privileges should be controlled:
• Enforce separation of duties and least privilege for accounts
• Implement strict password and account-management policies and
practices
• Log, monitor, and audit all vendor/partner online actions
• Consider a “sandboxed” approach for remote access
• Most importantly, all organizations need a policy and
approach to managing and monitoring privileged users
#RSAC
Technology Best Practices: Network Isolation
• Network isolation and segmentation changes can help with
improving supply chain security
• Remote attacks through supply chain access should be limited
• Careful zoning and network isolation with strategic access controls can
help prevent this
• Multiple authentication points (while annoying) can be useful
• Logs and events from remote access systems (VPNs, etc.) should
be carefully monitored
• Jump boxes and “thin client” approaches are also valuable
#RSAC
Technology Best Practices: Analytics+Threat
Intelligence
• Many organizations use or plan to use security analytics tools
and threat intelligence to help identify and combat advanced
attacks
• Analytics platforms provide:
• Deep data sets
• Pattern recognition
• Machine learning
• Threat intelligence can help to correlate information gleaned
from internal sources with indicators of compromise spotted by
other organizations
#RSAC
Technology Best Practices: Exfiltration
Monitoring
• Monitoring egress points from the internal network is
another way to improve security within the supply chain
today
• Some of the most common protocols and standards used
for data exfiltration or command and control include
HTTP/HTTPS, FTP/FTPS/SFTP, SSH, IRC, Email, P2P, and DNS
or ICMP for covert channels
• Monitor at NGFW, IDS/IPS, Proxy, and in DNS
#RSAC
Wrapping Up
#RSAC
Applying What We’ve Discussed
Next week you should:
Review your existing vendor management/procurement capabilities
In the first three months following this presentation you should:
Update product and vendor inventories
Define appropriate controls for different vendor types (check best practices
discussed earlier)
Within six months you should:
Update risk assessment processes for vendor review
Ensure all critical vendors have complete reviews & documentation

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Building an Effective Supply Chain Security Program

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC Dave Shackleford Building an Effective Supply Chain Security Program GRC-W02 Sr. Faculty and Analyst SANS @daveshackleford
  • 2. #RSAC Supply Chain Security: What It Means Supply chain security is a program that focuses on the potential risks associated with an organization’s suppliers of goods and services Attackers are focusing on this! There are many ways that a supply chain breach could occur Software compromise, credential theft, and more are becoming common scenarios
  • 3. #RSAC Supply Chain Breach Example: Target Target experienced a significant breach of roughly 110 million customers’ data, with at least 40 million payment cards stolen. During the course of the investigation, it was found that Target was initially breached through a connection established by one of their vendors, HVAC vendor Fazio Mechanical Services
  • 4. #RSAC Supply Chain Breach Example: Home Depot Home Depot, another large retailer, also claims that its credit card breach in 2014 was initially due to stolen credentials from a third-party vendor. In many of the most public cases we have seen, the attackers have targeted personal data, health care information and financial data, such as debit and credit card details.
  • 5. #RSAC Supply Chain Breach Example: OPM In 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed a significant breach of 22 million records including sensitive data tied to numerous federal employees, contractors and military personnel. This breach, like many others, seems to have originated with stolen credentials from a background check provider that worked with OPM, KeyPoint Government Solutions
  • 6. #RSAC Getting a Handle on Vendor Management
  • 7. #RSAC Current State Not Defined • No Process Defined • Ad Hoc and Inconsistent Approach Defined & Implemented • Consistent but Unstructured Approach • Documented and Detailed but not Measured or Enforced Continuous Improvement • Monitoring, Measuring, and Process Improvements • Best Practices for Risk Management and Automation
  • 8. #RSAC Vendor Management: Define Important Vendors • Define Important Vendors • “Important” vendors can mean many things • These are vendors that: • Are critical to business operations • Maintain unique or legacy components of importance • Provide critical services
  • 9. #RSAC Vendor Management: Specify Primary Contacts • Specify primary contacts • Coordinate due diligence on vendors and report to senior leadership using a risk-based approach • Maintain knowledge of, and compliance with, policies and reporting requirements. • File documentation and paperwork with the legal and contracting teams to ensure there is a central repository and audit trail. • Coordinate broad communication with those who can add value in vendor oversight
  • 10. #RSAC Vendor Management: Establish Guidelines and Controls • Policies should include: • Requiring the right to audit and test the security controls of vendors and service providers annually, upon significant changes to the relationship and in response to audit requests or events • Requiring vendors to adhere to security monitoring requirements • Requiring periodic reports from the vendors and service providers demonstrating service level attainment and performance management • Requiring vendors and service providers to provide timely notification pursuant to any security breaches or incidents that may cause impact to the organization
  • 11. #RSAC Vendor Management: Integrate with Organization’s Practices • With the pieces in place, a vendor management program can now start to integrate with the organization’s assessment and audit practices • Depending on the industry, organization, and culture, these practices will vary widely
  • 12. #RSAC Supply Chain Security Best Practices
  • 14. #RSAC Best Practices: People • These should be in place at supply chain companies • HR Teams: Background checks should be performed on a regular basis for both new and existing employees and contractors • Every 6-12 months is ideal • Monitor all staff that work with your organization’s data and systems for changes to job status and requirements • Access to critical systems should be monitored, and all third-party access should be revoked after a defined period of inactivity
  • 15. #RSAC Best Practices: Employment Agreements • HR and security teams should verify that security requirements are clearly spelled out in contracts for supply chain personnel • Acceptable use provisions should be in place for supply chain organization employees through their employment agreements
  • 16. #RSAC Best Practices: Process • Create a supply chain assessment questionnaire and checklists: • Application security • Audit and compliance • Business continuity and disaster recovery capabilities • Change and configuration management • Data security and data life cycle management • Physical (data center) security • Encryption and key management • Governance and risk management • Identity and access management (IAM) • Infrastructure and IT operations security • Threat and vulnerability management
  • 17. #RSAC Best Practices: Process • Supply chain review should follow these guidelines: • Decide on a list of controls with which supply chain organizations need to demonstrate compliance • Determine the frequency of security reviews for internal and regulatory compliance needs • Define a remediation and arbitration process for handling supply chain organizations that are not currently meeting security requirements
  • 18. #RSAC Process Best Practices: Code Review • Code analysis of software should ideally be done for supply chain partners • Having the code reviewed should ideally be the responsibility of the vendors, and they should attest to software security via a report issued prior to installation or updates • Contracts should require this! • Pen testing of software should also be allowed in contracts
  • 19. #RSAC Process Best Practices: Vulnerability Mgmt • Supply chain vendors should have to provide patches to their products in a timely fashion • Heartbleed, Shellshock, and others have affected us significantly • SLAs should be in place for patch creation • Supply chain partners should be required to notify you of data breaches that may materially impact you • Incidents should be communicated, too…could you be the next target?
  • 20. #RSAC Best Practices: Technology • The first, and perhaps simplest, change is to begin using technology services that offer supplier risk ratings or rankings compared to other industry organizations. • Monitoring the overall risk ratings of supply chain participants from other organizations working with them provides information on industry perceptions of security posture
  • 21. #RSAC Technology Best Practices: Privileges • Vendors and partners with privileges should be controlled: • Enforce separation of duties and least privilege for accounts • Implement strict password and account-management policies and practices • Log, monitor, and audit all vendor/partner online actions • Consider a “sandboxed” approach for remote access • Most importantly, all organizations need a policy and approach to managing and monitoring privileged users
  • 22. #RSAC Technology Best Practices: Network Isolation • Network isolation and segmentation changes can help with improving supply chain security • Remote attacks through supply chain access should be limited • Careful zoning and network isolation with strategic access controls can help prevent this • Multiple authentication points (while annoying) can be useful • Logs and events from remote access systems (VPNs, etc.) should be carefully monitored • Jump boxes and “thin client” approaches are also valuable
  • 23. #RSAC Technology Best Practices: Analytics+Threat Intelligence • Many organizations use or plan to use security analytics tools and threat intelligence to help identify and combat advanced attacks • Analytics platforms provide: • Deep data sets • Pattern recognition • Machine learning • Threat intelligence can help to correlate information gleaned from internal sources with indicators of compromise spotted by other organizations
  • 24. #RSAC Technology Best Practices: Exfiltration Monitoring • Monitoring egress points from the internal network is another way to improve security within the supply chain today • Some of the most common protocols and standards used for data exfiltration or command and control include HTTP/HTTPS, FTP/FTPS/SFTP, SSH, IRC, Email, P2P, and DNS or ICMP for covert channels • Monitor at NGFW, IDS/IPS, Proxy, and in DNS
  • 26. #RSAC Applying What We’ve Discussed Next week you should: Review your existing vendor management/procurement capabilities In the first three months following this presentation you should: Update product and vendor inventories Define appropriate controls for different vendor types (check best practices discussed earlier) Within six months you should: Update risk assessment processes for vendor review Ensure all critical vendors have complete reviews & documentation