The paper addresses managing the land transport effects of population growth and network congestion in Australia, this paper outlines the need by the mid-to-late 2020s for new major urban rail capacity projects to be completed such as Melbourne Metro and new rail crossings of Sydney Harbour and the Brisbane River. For freight, it makes the case for constructing an inland railway between Melbourne, Parkes and Brisbane and improving the East-West rail corridor to North American Class I railroad standards. Regional rail networks linking grain areas to ports will also need upgrading, and more gauge standardisation will be needed. The benefits of new and improved rail infrastructure will include less road congestion, improved safety, reduced dependence on imported oil and fewer greenhouse gas emissions. A paper I presented at the CORE 2016 Conference in Melbourne and co-authored with A/Prof Philip Laird.

1. MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGES
Scott Martin
1
, Philip Laird
2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
Corresponding Author: scott.martin@canberra.edu.au
SUMMARY
In May 2015, Infrastructure Australia released its draft National Infrastructure Audit that highlighted the need
for Australia to respond to future population growth and increasing demands for and congestion of land
transport and other infrastructure networks.
This paper proposes that in light of the Audit’s findings, policy makers must give more attention to both
improving rail infrastructure and new methods of transport pricing to effectively manage the effects of future
population growth and high costs of road congestion. Pricing methods include congestion pricing and mass-
distance-location pricing that were both raised in the 2004 AusLink White Paper.
In managing the land transport effects of population growth and network congestion, this paper outlines the
need by the mid-to-late 2020s for new major urban rail capacity projects to be completed such as Melbourne
Metro and new rail crossings of Sydney Harbour and the Brisbane River. For freight, it makes the case for
constructing an inland railway between Melbourne, Parkes and Brisbane and improving the East-West rail
corridor to North American Class I railroad standards. Regional rail networks linking grain areas to ports will
also need upgrading, and more gauge standardisation will be needed. The benefits of new and improved rail
infrastructure will include less road congestion, improved safety, reduced dependence on imported oil and
fewer greenhouse gas emissions.
1. INTRODUCTION
In May 2015, Infrastructure Australia (IA) released
its draft Australian Infrastructure Audit [1]. Like
previous IA audits, it addresses the nation’s
energy, water, telecommunications and transport
infrastructure needs across a 15-year time horizon.
The Audit’s findings highlight the need to increase
the capacity of the land transport network as a
response to population growth and congestion.
This paper suggests that Australia’s political
leaders and policy makers must give more
attention to both improving rail infrastructure and
establishing a new regime of land transport pricing
than in previous decades. Any new land transport
pricing regime must reduce dependence on ‘blunt’
instruments such as registration and fuel excise
and include congestion pricing on urban roads and
mass-distance-location pricing for articulated
trucks.
In providing the improved rail infrastructure to meet
Australia’s land transport challenges to 2025 and
beyond, this paper recommends:
• increasing passenger rail capacity on the
inner cores of urban rail networks in
Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney;
• upgrading the East-West mainline rail
corridor and construction of the
Melbourne-Brisbane Inland Railway to
North American Class I standards, and
• renewing regional rail lines that link
primary production areas to ports and
selective gauge standardisation for better
integration with the national rail network.
The long-term benefits to Australia’s economy,
society and environment from a fit-for-purpose
national rail network for both urban passengers
and freight are noted as including reduced road
congestion, improved safety, reduced dependence
on imported oil and reduced greenhouse gas
emissions.
2. NOTATION
Australasian Railway Association (ARA)
Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC)
Australian Transport Council (ATC)
Billion tonne kilometres (btkm)
Bureau of Infrastructure Transport & Regional
Economics (BITRE)
Engineers Australia (EA)
Infrastructure Australia (IA)
National Transport Planning Taskforce (NTPF)
Vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT)
3. BACKGROUND
Australia’s land transport strategy has been the
subject of numerous studies over the last three
decades. Such studies go back over at least 20
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2. years from the 1994 report of the National
Transport Planning Taskforce [2]. Its main report
had 16 recommendations to improve transparency
(including better data), regulation and investment
in land transport infrastructure.
Over 20 years later, most of these
recommendations remain valid. As noted by the
Taskforce there remains a need for: “… work to be
vigorously pursued to ensure the best transport
solutions for Australia into the twenty first
century...” and “...Perpetuation of existing
arrangements will condemn the nation to
ineffective results.”
Since the mid-1990s, Australian governments have
continued their path dependency in transport
infrastructure by investing heavily in road supply,
with little attention to managing demand through
road pricing or providing credible alternatives to
roads for passenger and freight movement. In
order to augment the supply of urban roads, some
financially-constrained state governments have
turned to toll roads, funded by PPPs (Public-
Private Partnerships), with arguably mixed results
including four ‘failed’ toll road projects.
Rail reform in the 1990s has also posted an
arguably mixed set of results, including the
formation of the Australian Rail Track Corporation
(ARTC) with some gains, above-rail privatisation
with very mixed results, greater investment in
urban rail and the completion of the Alice Springs
Darwin railway in 2004. Overall, there has been an
ongoing over-reliance on "existing arrangements"
in Australia’s rail sector.
There have been further warnings given since the
mid-1990s. By way of example, in 2002, the then
Secretary of the Australian Treasury, Dr Ken Henry
[3] noted the projected increases in urban traffic
and interstate road freight raised "important
issues"; also "Not dealing with these issues now
amounts to passing a very challenging set of
problems to future generations”.
The 2015 IA Audit [1] noted that on mid-range
projections, Australia’s population is projected to
grow by 38 per cent from 22.3 million in 2011 to
30.8m in 2031. Most of this growth is expected to
occur in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth.
IA’s audit highlights the need for Australia to
respond to population growth and increased land
transport network congestion. The Audit estimates
the cost of congestion on urban roads alone was
estimated to rise by 290 per cent over 20 years,
from $13.7b (2011) to $53.3b by 2031 without
remedial action.
From the Audit’s 81 findings, only five specifically
relate to rail, namely:
• long-term funding constraints will continue
to challenge the ability of governments to
provide fit-for-purpose freight rail
infrastructure, particularly landside access
to ports and regional branchlines
constrained by low-capacity track and
bridges (findings 46 & 57).
• traffic demand on many key urban rail (and
road) corridors will exceed capacity by
2031 (finding 49), and;
• traffic demand for freight rail infrastructure
will continue to grow, particularly for bulk
commodities, hauls between ports and
inland terminals and for longer-haul
intermodal and general freight (findings 53
& 54) [1].
4. THE NATIONAL ROAD NETWORK
In the past 20 years, the road freight task
performed by articulated trucks (including B-
Doubles and road trains), rigid trucks and light
commercial vehicles has increased from about 119
billion tonne kilometres (btkm) in 1994-95 to an
estimated 203 btkm in the 12 months ended 31
October 2014 (with the articulated truck freight task
increasing from 89 btkm to around 161 btkm).
Australia’s truck and light commercial fleet has
increased its vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT)
over this period by over 73 percent, from 38.4
billion VKT in 1994-95 to 66.54 billion VKT in 2014-
15 [4].
To accommodate this growth in road freight task
over the 20 years since 1994-95, road funding by
all three levels of Australian governments has
increased in relative terms from below one percent
of GDP to over one per cent of GDP. This funding
is for enhancing capacity on existing roads,
building new roads and the increasingly important
task of maintaining the mature network of existing
roads. In the early 1990s, the total cost of road
vehicle operations, including road construction,
and maintenance, congestion and road trauma
was around $80 billion a year or about 11 per cent
of GDP [5]. If these costs have remained a
constant proportion of GDP, the total cost of roads
and road use is now over $170 billion a year [6].
During this period, Australia’s road network has
reached maturity, particularly for freight haulage
with the extension of the National Highway system
into Australia’s capital cities and the connection of
airports, ports and major urban arterial road and
freeway links to the national network. This has
taken place alongside the continuous improvement
and upgrading of the National Highway system to
accommodate increasingly heavy articulated truck
traffic and the total reconstruction of the Hume
Highway between Sydney and Melbourne into a
modern, dual carriageway road.
MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGESScott Martin1
, Philip Laird2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
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3. This significant investment in the National Highway
network has meant a progressive increase of
heavy vehicle mass limits and axle loadings across
the network to provide publically-funded roads that
offer similar, if not better freight carrying capacity to
most of the publically-funded rail network. The
most common heavy articulated vehicle in
Australia is a 19 metre-long 6-axle semi-trailer,
with a general mass limit (GML) of 42.5 tonnes,
with axle group loadings of 16.5 tonnes (2-axle)
and 20 tonnes (3-axle). A 25-metre long 9-axle B-
Double has a GML of 62.5 tonnes with similar 2-
and 3-axle group loadings [7]. These are equal to
or better than the prevailing axle loadings on many
Australian branch line railways. On National
Highway routes where Higher Mass Limits (HML)
higher loadings apply, HML axle group loadings of
17 tonnes (2-axle) and 22.5 tonnes (3-axle) are as
good or better than some mainline railways,
particularly Queensland’s North Coast Line and
Victoria’s broad gauge network and close to the
maximum 23 tonne axle loading applying on most
of the Defined Interstate Rail Network.
Much of the expansion of Australia’s road network
has been directly or indirectly funded across all
three levels of government by the federal
government, whose ability to recover the costs of
road construction and maintenance has been
constrained by the removal of indexation on fuel
excise (between 2000/01 to 2014/15) and a
reduction in real terms of federal registration and
road user charges. A report prepared for
Infrastructure Australia noted that Australia's three
levels of government and the private sector are
now spending more than $20 billion a year on road
construction and maintenance and, “between
2008-09 and 2011-12, over $4.5 billion more was
spent on roads than was raised in almost all road
taxes and charges” [8].
There is a clear and pressing need to better
recover the costs of road construction and
maintenance from road user in Australia. The
situation is so broken that any change to the
existing system would be an improvement.
Australia’s current road pricing regime is based on
three revenue streams that are notional road user
charges:
• an excise on petrol and diesel fuel;
• vehicle registrations collected by state and
territory governments, and
• a road user charge (RUC) collected by the
federal government and distributed to
states and territories.
The current regime is viewed as unfair and
inequitable in three key areas:
• It recovers well below the true cost of road
use by heavy trucks hauling large
distances each year;
• User charges (registration and fuel excise)
from cars and light vehicles effectively
cross subsidise heavy vehicles;
• The heaviest trucks travelling the longest
distances on the national highway system
pay less than lighter vehicles travelling on
urban and regional roads
The current road pricing regime is also a significant
competitive disadvantage for rail freight, with
research showing that while heavy vehicle user
charges account for only 5 to 10 per cent of costs
of freight carried by road, compared to user
charges making up 30 per cent of the cost for
freight carried by rail [9].
Since the announcement of the COAG road reform
plan in 2007, progress has stalled on reform of
road user charges through the introduction of
mass-distance-location (MDL) charging. MDL
charging would provide a more equitable system
for road users, particularly in reducing cross-
subsidies between cars, light vehicles and heavy
vehicles. It would also provide an effective way to
manage demand for the busiest parts of the road
network through price signals. Introduction of MDL
charging would also place heavy vehicles on
similar regulatory and pricing frameworks to rail
freight and other infrastructure utilities (gas, water,
electricity), provide better cost recovery models for
road use and a more transparent road
infrastructure investment process.
In July 2015, South Australian Premier Jay
Wetherill proposed a trial of MDL charging for
heavy vehicles in that state as a precursor to a
national road user charging system [10]. He
believes this will better price the true costs of road
use, create a more level playing field between road
freight and rail freight and provide a more
transparent model for road funding. This need for
road pricing reform (including MDL charging for
heavier trucks) is backed by an Infrastructure
Australia report which also considers the current
outlay on roads, which is set to grow even larger at
the expense of federal funding of urban rail, is a
"road spend [that] can only be described as
hideously inefficient" [8].
Although many road projects, including the total
reconstruction by 2013 of the Hume Highway to
modern engineering standards have positive
benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) and make made solid
contributions to the national land transport network,
other publically-funded road projects have been
more questionable, with low BCRs and diminishing
returns on investment.
MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGESScott Martin1
, Philip Laird2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
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4. For example, the upgrading of the Pacific Highway
between Sydney and Brisbane to dual carriageway
standards shows that upgrading the heavily
trafficked sections of the Pacific Highway in NSW
have positive BCRs, however lightly trafficked
sections were assessed in 2011 as having a BCR
of just 0.8. This led Infrastructure NSW to state in
2012 that "Given competing priorities for NSW and
Commonwealth Government funds, the high cost
and relatively limited benefits of these remaining
sections raises questions"…as to whether the
ongoing allocation of funds to this highway would
be better directed to other roads" [11]. Or for that
matter, railways.
Similarly, privately funded urban road projects
have not always been the best way to allocate
investment in land transport. Between 2005 to
2012, there were no fewer than four failed tollway
projects (Sydney's Cross City Tunnel in 2005 and
Lane Cove Tunnel in 2007, then Brisbane's Clem 7
in 2010 and Airport Link in 2012) and one
(Melbourne’s EastLink) requiring refinancing. Court
cases were heard during 2014 and 2015 over
excessively high patronage projections by
consultants for the Lane Cove Tunnel and Clem 7
project, with extensive damages awarded.
It is considered in some quarters that Australia has
reached the end of the modernist era of road
construction based on traffic modelling predicting
expansionary trends of increased car use and road
congestion. Indeed, Professor Peter Newman from
Curtin University describes three major urban road
projects currently under consideration in Australia
as “...the last gasp of the old era... the East West
Link in Melbourne, the Connex West (sic) in
Sydney, the Perth freight link, these are billions
and billions of dollars being thrown at a problem
that is disappearing” [12].
At the same time as the road freight task has
continued to rise, private car use as measured by
vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT) has effectively
‘peaked’ over the last decade. In Australia,
average per capita car VKT had fallen back to
early 1990s levels by 2011. Despite the strong
growth in Australia’s road freight task, average per
capita VKT for all vehicle types in Australia had
peaked in 2004 and by 2015 had declined to levels
not seen since 1999 [13]. These trends are
consistent with the ‘Peak Car’ phenomenon
identified in Europe, North America, Japan and
New Zealand [14].
There are a range of potential reasons for the
stagnation in Australia’s average per capita VKT,
particularly a range of long-term ‘weak signal’
trends, including demographic change (Generation
Y’s opting out of driving at higher levels than earlier
generations, as Baby Boomers transition out of
driving) [15], petrol price fluctuations and continued
weak economic conditions are also viewed as
important factors affecting road use [16].
The gathering strength of these ‘weak signals’ on
vehicle use have clear implications for Australian
governments and policy makers, particularly in
jurisdictions where land transport strategies focus
on continued road-building and subsidies for car
use at the expense of passenger and freight rail
infrastructure and services. As a result, the
development and implementation of major new
road and rail projects by governments and
increasingly from the private sector require greater
critical examination and scrutiny, particularly for
road projects with marginal or even negative cost-
benefit ratios.
5. THE NATIONAL RAIL NETWORK
Unlike Australia’s road network, Australia’s rail
network has been fully exposed to microeconomic
reform and competition policy since the 1990s.
Illustrating the differences between the ‘reformed’
environment for rail freight compared to road, it is
instructive to recall that user charges account for
only 5 to 10 per cent of costs of freight carried by
road, compared to around 30 per cent of the costs
of the equivalent freight carried by rail [9].
A comprehensive audit of Australia's mainline rail
networks was given in commissioned work for the
1994 National Transport Planning Taskforce [2]
that included by two carefully formulated
competitive goals for rail freight. This was followed
by the Australian Parliament’s 1997 Tracking
Australia report which found, inter alia, that the
existing mainline interstate track is in urgent need
of upgrading, or that "rail will continue to
deteriorate” to the point that intercity rail will
become "irretrievable" [17].
At a historic 'Rail Summit' in September 1997, the
Australian Transport Council (ATC) of federal and
state ministers agreed to adopt certain measures
with a view to making "...dramatic improvements in
the performance of interstate rail" in order to
overcome the present situation where rail has
"...failed to compete effectively with road transport"
and rail "...has not realised its potential contribution
to the national economy". The measures included
average speeds for freight trains with 21 tonne axle
loads, of 80 km/h as a five year goal, and 100 km/h
as a 'longer term' goal [18].
Since then, a range of reports have recommended
that Australia’s state and federal governments
adopt measures to improve the productivity and
performance of interstate rail, most notably the
2001 ARTC Track Audit [19]. The ARTC Track
Audit is now mainly remembered now for making a
robust case for increased investment in mainline
rail tracks, including the South Sydney Freight Line
MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGESScott Martin1
, Philip Laird2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
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SUPPORTED BY

5. (completed in 2013), Melbourne-Brisbane deviation
and track straightening options and an early report
on the feasibility of the Inland Railway.
The need to upgrade not only existing interstate
rail track, but also regional rail, and rail
connections to ports, was addressed in some detail
in a 2007 Parliamentary Committee report [20].
A 2010 Engineers Australia Infrastructure Report
Card noted: "Rail has been given a D+ rating. …
The low rating has been given on the basis that
urban rail networks cannot cope with demand.
There is a need for a high speed rail network along
the eastern coast of Australia to ease airport
congestion and to reverse the trend of declining
regional rail utilisation, which is resulting in more
road traffic…" [21].
In addition "Improving the efficiency and
productivity of existing rail networks is a challenge
in many jurisdictions. For instance, increasing train
length, load capacity, operating speed and
turnaround time will require considerable
improvements in rolling stock, below-rail
infrastructure, and port-rail connections and
intermodal hubs. The investment to achieve
improvements will require substantial investment
over at least a decade."
The Infrastructure Report Card also considered
that it is "essential to increase rail freight to
accommodate the greater freight task…" and to
this end, it is necessary to improve the interstate
and regional freight lines, plus develop multi-use
intermodal terminals. Improved separation of
freight and passenger trains is "particularly needed
in Sydney and Brisbane" [21].
A CORE 2014 paper by Imrie outlined in some
detail the failure to achieve the 1997 ATC rail
targets despite the extensive federal government
investment through ARTC to upgrade the interstate
mainline rail network on existing (and often
substandard) alignments [22].
Another paper delivered at CORE 2014 by Laird
(prepared independently of Imrie’s), found that on
the North-South corridor linking Australia’s three
largest cities, rail’s share of land freight has gone
backwards since 1989, and that measured against
five criteria (axle loads, average speeds,
containers, longer crossing loops and a second
transcontinental route), the Class I mainline rail
network of Canada (both historical peer and global
economic competitor to Australia) is now superior
to Australia’s interstate mainline rail network [23].
In order to deal with the issues affecting the
interstate rail network and the unfavourable
comparisons to both the Australian road network
and overseas rail networks such as Canada and
the United States, the authors propose that action
be taken to address the biggest barriers to
improving Australia’s rail network:
5.1 Reduced Transit Times
Rail transit times have remained essentially static
for over 20 years, particularly on the north-south
(Melbourne-Sydney-Brisbane) corridor (but also on
the East-West) and still short of the initial ‘5-year’
ATC targets set in 1997. Imrie’s paper argues that
adopting the ATC’s longer-term average transit
time ‘stretch’ targets would make rail more
competitive with road and increase rail’s
contestability of medium haul freight, particularly
intermodal [22]. Laird makes the point that some
track straightening on mainline track is also
needed for appreciable faster transit times [23].
5.2 Higher Axle Loadings
The ability to increase axle loadings to maximise
the amounts of freight consigned by rail is a vital
competitive advantage over road transport and one
that providers shippers with an ability to fill high
capacity wagons and containers to maximum
levels, particularly for mineral and agricultural
products. Upgrading bridges, formations, ballast
and rails on the interstate network and key feeder
lines to provide a minimum 25-tonne axle load
(TAL) at average speeds of 100km/h, with a long-
term target of 30 or 32.5 TAL at an average speed
of 100km/h are critical. Ensuring rail upgrades like
Victoria’s Murray Basin Rail Project are built to
higher (25 TAL) standards than at present would
send an important signal to drive improvements on
other key corridors such as Maroona-Portland [24].
5.3 Improved Structure Clearances
Improving structure clearances to 7.1 metres
above rail height east of Adelaide (SA) and Parkes
(NSW) by 2030 would provide a medium-term
option for double stacking containers in well
wagons between Melbourne, Parkes and Brisbane
on the Inland Railway. While selected deviations
and/or daylighting of tunnels between Melbourne –
Adelaide and Sydney-Parkes would provide similar
capability on ‘legacy’ interstate routes. Improved
clearances on non-interstate network lines would,
at a minimum preserve future network options for
carrying maxi-cube (10’ 6” height) containers.
5.4 Increased Network ‘Reach’
Broadening the catchment of the national rail
network could help overcome the isolation of some
of Australia’s most productive agricultural and
mining regions to key local and export markets,
either through gauge standardisation, reinstating
closed lines or construction of new lines. Victoria’s
Murray Basin Rail Project is a good example of
achieving this goal. As a result of such works,
regional locations with rail access to multiple ports
MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGESScott Martin1
, Philip Laird2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
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SUPPORTED BY

6. could become increasingly attractive as bases for
industrial and agribusiness firms.
5.5 Network Redundancy
Construction of the Inland Railway between
Melbourne and Brisbane to modern standards
guaranteeing reduced transit times, higher axle
loadings, consistently high reliability and improved
structure clearances would be the most important
work undertaken here. Creating an alternative to
the legacy coastal route would go a long way to
improving rail’s competitiveness with road for
freight and provide increased reach for the national
rail network into regional Australia.
In addition to completion of an inland railway
between Melbourne, Parkes and Brisbane to
standards of performance better than those
prevailing on the national highway network, there is
much needed upgrading work to ensure that
interstate rail freight has an ongoing future in
Australia as opposed to putting ever more loads on
interstate highways. These are addressed below.
6. URBAN RAIL TRANSPORT
The increases in urban rail patronage since 2002
have been substantial. By way of example, in the
ten years from 2002-03 to 2012-13, heavy rail
patronage in the five mainland capital cities
increased by some 34 per cent to 659m trips ; then
to 672m trips in 2013-14) and light rail went up
over these ten years some 28 per cent (to 191m
trips) [25]. Rail patronage increases exceeded
population growth in the five cities’ of 17 per cent
over the same period and was exceeded growth of
vehicle kilometers travelled (about 16 per cent) in
Australia's capital cities over the same period.
Looking ahead over the next ten years, there are a
number of rail projects already under construction
or advanced planning. Apart from the Moreton Bay
Rail Link (due to open in 2016) these include:
Inner Urban Rail Capacity Projects
Sydney’s North West Metro. At 36 km in
length, it includes the existing Chatswood-
Epping line in tunnels followed by a further
15km of twin tunnels, a viaduct to Rouse Hill
and a stabling area. The new line will use
automated single-deck trains and is due to
open in 2019 at an estimated cost of $8.3
billion. Pending the long-term lease of the
NSW electricity distribution network, the state
government will then proceed with a 30km
‘City and South West Metro from Chatswood
to Bankstown, providing a new relief line on
the lower north shore, a second rail crossing
of Sydney Harbour (tunnelled), new CBD and
inner city stations and conversion of the
existing Sydenham – Bankstown line. This
project is due for completion by 2024.
Melbourne Metro, a nine-kilometre long
underground rail line that will increase
capacity on the inner core of Melbourne’s rail
network, connecting the north/west and
south/east rail lines with a new, high-capacity
link with five stations in the CBD and inner
suburbs. Construction is due to start in 2018
and is projected to cost up to $11 billion.
Since the 2015 change of Prime Minister,
there are still question marks over how much
federal funding the project may secure.
Cross River Rail, a second rail crossing of
the Brisbane River that will increase capacity
on the inner core of the city’s rail network and
provide additional capacity for Beenleigh and
Gold Coast line trains. After two changes of
government and changes in scope and route,
the current government has returned to the
pre-2011 concept design, but finalised plans
and costings have not yet been revealed.
Other important urban rail projects include:
The 12-km long Sydney and South-East
Light Rail to run from Circular Quay to
Kingsford and Randwick via the University of
NSW. At a cost of over $2 billion, it is due to
become operational by 2019. The gradual
rescoping of the project to accommodate
longer and larger light rail vehicles indicates
this project was underspecified and that a
future heavy rail option may be required on
this corridor by mid-century.
Perth's $2 billion Forrestfield-Airport Link
project will provide an important heavy rail link
to Perth’s airport and major commercial sites
around it. With construction due to start in
2016, the first trains are scheduled to run on
the line in 2020.
7. OTHER RAIL UPGRADES
Attention will also be required to other rail track.
Setting aside High Speed Rail proposals, the
subject of no fewer than four major studies [26] in
the past 20 years, other rail network upgrading
opportunities have been identified, including:
• Speeding up interurban passenger rail
in Greater Sydney, Greater Melbourne and
Southeast Queensland with improved track
and new rolling stock to increase average
speeds and reduce transit times between
major regional cities and Sydney,
Melbourne and Brisbane.
• Improvement of key regional passenger
rail corridors to medium speed (200km/h)
rail standards, particularly the Sydney –
MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGESScott Martin1
, Philip Laird2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
R
Broc
SUPPORTED BY

7. Canberra, Melbourne – Albury and Perth –
Bunbury corridors using a combination of
new and existing alignments and new
rolling stock.
• Urban rail capacity enhancement through
improved separation of freight and
passenger trains. In Sydney this would
be assisted by completion of the Maldon-
Dombarton rail link and the planning and
implementation of the Western Sydney
Freight Line.
• Further upgrading Queensland’s North
Coast Line to modern standards including
curve easing, realignments, bridge
replacement and deviations (with some
options identified in the 2015 Queensland
Draft Infrastructure Statement) to allow for
faster, longer trains at higher axle loads;
• The continuing rehabilitation of grain
lines to allow longer, higher-capacity
trains, preferably with co-investment from
grain handlers to lift grain supply chain
productivity through increased silo
capacity, rail loading speeds and silo-port
cycle times;
• Residual gauge standardisation in
Victoria and South Australia, particularly as
the Murray Basin Rail Project nears
completion and in Queensland to
maximise the reach of the Inland Railway.
8. A PIPELINE OF OPPORTUNITY
In late 2015, the Australasian Railway Association
(ARA) released its Pipeline of Opportunities
document that outlined the rail industry’s 20-year
infrastructure plan out to 2035 and sequenced over
60 rail projects in Australia and New Zealand in a
phased order of delivery [27]. The lead author of
this paper developed the Pipeline while working at
the ARA in conjunction with ARA’s passenger,
freight, contractor and constructor members and
other industry stakeholders.
Many projects discussed in this paper were
identified in the Pipeline as important to the
industry’s future, particularly key capacity
enhancement projects for freight and the new
urban heavy and light rail projects. The work done
on the ARA’s Pipeline of Opportunities was
provided as part of its submission to Infrastructure
Australia informing IA’s 15-year Infrastructure Plan
released in early 2016.
9. LEVELLING THE PLAYING FIELD
The longstanding lack of competitive neutrality
between road and rail for land freight does
adversely affect rail and its finances, along with
significant impacts on Australia’s economy, society
and environment. Competitive neutrality includes
both government provision of infrastructure and
access pricing, while the question of over-
regulation of rail freight and the under-regulation of
road freight remains.
The National (Road) Transport Commission which
since its formation in 1991 (as NRTC and then the
NTC from 2004) has favoured a methodology that
the Productivity Commission noted as being
“conservative” [28].
Indeed, little has changed since as observed by
the Industry Commission's Annual Report for 1991-
92 that due to the NRTC charges The result is that
some vehicles - the heaviest travelling long annual
distances - will meet less than 20 per cent of their
attributed costs. …The charges, as recommended,
will therefore potentially distort the long-haul freight
market as rail reforms take effect."
A further aspect of competitive neutrality is the
NTC and government active support for heavier
trucks, while the Australian Transport Council’s
1997 goals for faster and heavier freight trains
remain elusive. NTC support for even heavier
trucks prompted a November 2010 ARA press
release ‘NTC Lost on transport and sustainability’
that effectively called for the NTC to review its
approach and take another look at rail.
The 2010 EA Infrastructure Report considered that
the relative low pricing of road freight was noted
and ensuring 'user pays' is an issue "that will need
to be addressed sooner rather than later." [21]
Present road pricing within Australia results in a
disincentive to invest in new railway track, or to
upgrade substandard existing track. Three areas of
reform are suggested to moderate road vehicle
usage demand and generate more funds for
infrastructure include: a short-term increase in fuel
excise and in the medium-term, implementing
congestion charging in major cities (as noted in the
2004 AusLink White paper); and mass-distance-
location pricing for heavier articulated trucks.
A cautionary tale on further rail privatisation may
also be noted [29]. One of the poorer results to
date in Australia occurred in 1997 with the sale of
the Tasmanian Rail system. The track, and later
the trains, ended up back in the public sector at
great cost. The Victorian non-urban track lease
also returned to public hands at much cost, whilst
the management of the West Australian below rail
lease remains problematic.
Accordingly, any future rail privatisation proposals
in Australia should be subject to rigorous scrutiny.
In regards to the future of ARTC, while the long-
term lease of the Hunter Valley coal network may
be viable, the case for the interstate network in the
present road-rail environment is less viable.
MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGESScott Martin1
, Philip Laird2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
R
Broc
SUPPORTED BY

8. 10. SOME RECENT RAIL PROJECTS
Rail projects completed by 2012, and their costs,
were considered by the Productivity Commission
[30] and also by Martin [31] who looked at 28
passenger rail projects (22 heavy rail and 6 light
rail) constructed between the year 2000 and 2012.
Attention was also given to the significant
additional costs imposed by tunnelling, citing three
examples where costs exceeded $100 million per
kilometre (Sydney Airport, Epping Chatswood, and
the short tunneled approach to Perth Station for
the Perth-Mandurah Railway). In addition, rough
cost benchmarks were given for electrification,
amplification and extension of rail track.
During 2011-12, a NSW Parliamentary Inquiry was
held into "Rail Infrastructure Project Costing in
New South Wales". The main finding was that it
cost slightly more (as opposed to a strong
perception by some inquiry participants than it cost
much more) to build railway infrastructure in New
South Wales than other jurisdictions in Australia,
with nine recommendations given for Transport for
New South Wales to better control costs.
On a different basis, Laird examined four rail
projects since the early 1990s that have delivered
good outcomes in a timely manner [32]. These
were Queensland Rail’s Mainline Upgrade of the
1990s, the Alice Springs to Darwin railway
(completed 2004), Victoria's Regional Fast Rail
(2006) and the Perth to Mandurah Railway
(opened 2007). Three expensive major rail projects
were also outlined: Epping to Chatswood (2009),
Cronulla-Sutherland part duplication, (2010), and,
the Southern Sydney Freight Line (2013). Each of
the three projects in Sydney faced delays and
combined cost escalations in the order of $2 billion.
There is increasing evidence that transport
infrastructure projects with the best benefit/cost
ratios are those that seek to optimise and improve
existing networks. This knowledge is important in
debates on how to improve economic productivity
through investment in transport infrastructure [33].
Evidence from the UK demonstrates that lower-
cost/higher-benefit network improvements and
optimisation strategies can be implemented faster
at lower cost with higher economic benefits than
higher-cost/lower-benefit ‘mega projects’ [34].
In an environment with tightly constrained funding
sources (particularly through regional, state and
national budgets), network optimisation strategies
offer a viable strategy for maximising the capacity
of existing urban heavy and light rail systems at a
cost significantly lower than investment in major
new infrastructure. It is often difficult for rail
operators to advance network optimisation
proposals to bureaucratic and political levels of
government. This is particularly the case where
institutional preferences favour the building of new
infrastructure projects over improvements to
existing systems, or where confusion exists
between political and economic outcomes [33].
11. CONCLUSIONS
The costs imposed on Australia by an unbalanced
system of transport planning and the consequent
deficiency of the national rail network includes an
over-dependence on road transport to move
people and freight, with large hidden subsidies for
road use and unsustainable transport greenhouse
gas emissions and consumption of imported liquid
fuels. Despite evidence from a series of reports
going back at least two decades, from 1994’s
National Transport Planning Taskforce to 2015’s
Infrastructure Australia National Infrastructure
Audit, the belief still holds sway among Australia’s
political leaders and governmental decision makers
that path-dependent, ‘business as usual’ models of
road-based transport planning and financing will
suffice in meeting the nation’s transport needs.
This is despite rapidly increasing populations and
transport network congestion in major cities.
Over the last 20-years, a number of weak signals
have been building among the background noise
alerting perceptive listeners that the post-war
model of road-based transport planning and
financing no longer work. To change paths and
provide Australia with a transport network fit for
purpose and in a state of good repair that allows
the nation to face the challenges of the 21
st
Century, a range of reforms are needed.
Firstly, reform the funding mechanism for roads
away from taxes masquerading as user charges
toward a system that recovers close to the true
cost of road use.Secondly, reform the rail access
pricing model to provide incentives for above-rail
and below-rail operators to increase performance
and productivity and create positive cashflows to
help fund incremental upgrades to the rail network.
Finally, use the new land transport funding model
to better develop rail-based alternatives to urban
passenger transport and improve the national rail
freight network.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The first author acknowledges the assistance given
by the Australasian Railway Association and the
second author the University of Wollongong. Both
authors thank the Railway Technical Society of
Australasia and conference organisers for the
opportunity to present the paper along with their
respective organizations and the unknown referee
for their comments and suggestions. The views
expressed remain the authors’ and are not
necessarily shared by the above organisations.
MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGESScott Martin1
, Philip Laird2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
R
Broc
SUPPORTED BY

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MEETING AUSTRALIA’S 2025 LAND TRANSPORT CHALLENGESScott Martin1
, Philip Laird2
1
University of Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA
2
University of Wollongong, NSW, AUSTRALIA
R
Broc
SUPPORTED BY