Giovanni Allegretti is an architect and senior researcher at the Centre for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra, Portugal. Presentation given on Thursday 22nd November 5.30 – 8pm Wellington Public Library – Mezzanine Floor Meeting Room – lift across from Clarks Cafe

1. 22nd November 2012
Wellington
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY VIA
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

2. Attempts of a
definition of PB

3. When we talk about PB, we are referring to an IDEOSCAPE,
i.e. a model travelling around the world, which becomes
real in the different places where it happens, and whose
name is note necessarily that representative…
participativo - Budżet Partycypacyjny - Bilancio Partecipativo - deltagend

4. Butdoes a “minimum common
denominator” exist? And does it need
continuity or discontinuity with the
pre-existing participatory practices?
Source: Learning from the South, 2010, GIZ- Bonn

5. What is this common “minimum denominator”:
• According to the PB-Unit (english
think thank on PB):
• Participatory budgeting is a democratic
process which ENTRUST CITIZENS (and no
formal citizens, too) to decide how to allocate
part of a municipal budget or another budget
that affects them…
So, is not just a “device” or a “technique”, but a series of
! principles that can use different methods and techniques to
be “translated” into concrete action, according to local
possibilities. 5

6. WHY PB? If we take one of the definitions given by the
PB Unit, PB is based on four hypothesis:
1) That opening decision on “money” is highly practical
and symbolic
2) That is possible to RIBUILD social trust
3) That both citizens and politician are better than in
the other’s perspective (social collective
intelligence)
4) the individuals andof today, is betterto meet and
That, in the world starting from
then invite them
listen to each other is more effective
PATIENCE is NEEDED for implementing a good
process and having strong results!

7. Source: Nelson
Dias, 2012
AN EXAMPLE:
PORTUGAL
EXPLOSION
by
CONTAGION

8. PB beyond parties? (Portugal, 2002 /2012)
42
Fonte: Nelson Dias | 2012
12
11
3 3
2
PS CDU PSD PSD+CDS-PP INDEP. PSD+CDS-PP+PPM+MPT

9. It’s main differences with other pre-existing tools of CONSULTATION
are that is not an INDIVIDUAL DIALOGUE between a single citizen or
a single group and one politician that is fostered :
but
… but a LEARNING BY DOING
ENVIRONMENT.
That’s why it helps to build “mutual trust”, helping to
deal with COMPLEXITY WHILE CO-DECIDING
9

10. ADOPTING PBs as
“a continuity” or a “discontinuity” in relation
to past experiences? Could it become na
“engine” coordinating other spin-offs?
City Master Plan P
Rogram of
and District Plans
priority roads
Social Guidelines
Municipal Programa
Plan of Sanitation BH - Cidadania
Participatory Social Inclusion
Budgeting
Master Plan Global Specific
of Urban Drainage Plans of Slums
Regionalised
Participatory
Planning (PPR)

11. PB’s MAIN FEATURES ARE:
1) explicitly discussing financial issues (resources
are not always guaranteed)
2) Having cycles (negotiating needs time)
3) Coinciding with an institutional responsibility (is
not a “devolved pot” as in the Community Driven
Development, but implies a relation with political
authorities)
4) Having some degree of co-decision
5) Giving feedbacks to citizens
(Source: Marc Bloch comparative research, 2005-
2009, Berlin) 11

12. Sometimes TRANSFERS and emulation
look strange and models are unaware of
their weight in innovation elsewhere…
• It is the case of Christchurch, which beacame
the inspirational source for many German PBs
(based on a “consultation on public finance”
procedure) after the Bertelsmann Award for
“Democracy and Efficacy of the Administration”
in 1993 (through the “Cities of Tomorrow
Network”) because of its system of community
boards and web-transparency (NPM approach).
• It is also the case of the Hungarian 1% Budget,
which is today the base of japanese PBs. 12

13. WHEN PB WAS BORN IN LATIN AMERICA it was mainly a
matter of “EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES”, if we
consider the African Models, today, is a PIVOTAL TOOL
to collect resources
PB essence moved from
EXPENSES to the CREATION
OF INCOME and LOCAL
FINANCIAL AUTHONOMY
(so DEVELOPEMENT). See
Rural Senegal or
Madagascar (extractive Porto Alegre: l’epicentro
industries)
13

14. Macromodels

15. The Empowerment Line
PB works in different ways, but should aim to be
meaningful and change how money is spent
Decision
Communicating Consulting Involving Partnership
making
Scope of PB activity
Passive engagement (not PB) Empowerment through PB
Progression

16. ONE PROCESS, TWO INTERLINKED CYCLES:
Ciclo de discussão
PROPOSING -> DECIDING ->execução
Ciclo de
IMPLEMENTING
PHASE 0:
Creation of
pre-conditions for PHASE 1:
Mobilization of citizens
implementing PB and employees
PHASE 2:
Structuring PHASE 3:
and Monitoring and
Implementation implementation of
of public dialogue Common decisions
16

17. THREE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF PBs
TEMATIC
FACE-TO-FACE APPROACH
VIRTUAL/DIGITAL APPROACH
MIXED APPROACH (variable geoetry)
THEY CAN OVERLAP Source: Nelson
Dias, 2012

18. LOGIPARC – Poitiers (France)

19. Young People and
“ENCOURAGING
Schools PBs in Europe
DESIGNs” need to be
imagined, especially
where concentration
of critical issues is
high (in Europe
immigrants without
voting capacity, poor
areas) in order to
guarantee PLURALITY
and DIVERSIFICATION
OF PARTICIPANTS
19

20. 20

21. TWO MAIN APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING
Source: Nelson
Dias, 2012

22. “Branding matters”? Analyses show that
“concretizing” decisions and mouth-to-mouth
works better...
22

23. It means that citizens have to be involved in both cycles
(either if they are overlapped or the process is biennial)
+ Virtual
23

25. HOW AN AVERAGE CYCLE LOOKS LIKE
THE CYCLE OF CO-DECISION
APPROVAL OF
PREVISIONAL BUDGET
Winter
CITIZENS’ VOTE MAKING NEEDS AND
PLAN OF FEED-BACKS PROPOSALS EMERGE
Feedback citizens’ Assemblies Neighbourhood Assemblies
Presentation of projects SPRING
and voting phase.
PARTICIPATORY
AUTUMN
PLANNING
Thematic Assemblies
Feasibility evaluation.
Transformation of proposals to
into projects
SUMMER-AUTUMN
…AND A CYCLE OF CO-IMPLEMENTATION…
25

26. THE PIVOTAL ROLE of the
“MANAGEMENT OF
EXPECTATIONS”
Virtual
S≥R-E
“SATISFACTION ≥ RESULTS – EXPECTATIONS”
26

27. THE CO-DECISIONAL PBs impliy “giving-up” a part of the decisional DISCRETIONALITY of
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, but they make EXPECTATIONS
MORE REALISTIC and
CO-RESPONSBILIZE PEOPLE , so produce higher results
And they
are usually more
SUSTAINABLE and 27
LONG-LASTING

28. PERCEPTIONS of CITIZENS ARE VERY
IMPORTANT and HAVE TO BE MONITORED
CONSTANTLY.
THE CASE
of
ZEGUO,
CHINA
‘If it feels like we have decided ---- it’s PB.
If it feels like someone else has decided, it isn’t.’
Brazilian resident involved in PB

29. INCREASING SATISFACTION: THE CASE OF OREBRO (SWEDEN)
29

30. The
importance of Celebrations and
Symbolic moments/places (marae?)
30

31. Which goals?

32. Which effects to evaluate, and for which process?
THE COEHERENCE BETWEEN MEANS AND GOALS
Cutting budget
Inverting prioritioes
Fighting corruption
Increasing financial authonomy
Social justice
Rebuilding mutual trust
Development
Community
Granting accountability
TRANSPARENCY
Social inclusion
Bettering the machine
Reducing the debt Reconstructing social links
Granting sustainability
Dynamizing social fabric
Territorial redistribution
Democratize Democracy 32

33. A NEW VISION OF ACCOUNTABILITY
(TRANSPARENCY +
RESPONSIVENESS)
A BETTER INFORMATION
CAPACITY
Arezzo: Focus Group to
test the efficacy of
informational documents 33

34. Adapted to the place...to allow
access to awareness and skills
34

35. TRACEABILITY IN EVERY
PHASE (Seville) and
control
committees
35

36. ALTRE INIZIATIVE
Vivibilità Centro Storico
Zanzara Tigre
Mobilità Sostenibile
Piccioni
Raccolta Differenziata
Iniziative in
Circoscrizione
Caro-affitti
Pulizia strade
>>Fine Presentazione 36

37. SOME EFFECTS CANNOT BE OBTAINED IF THEY ARE NOT
PURSUED…. (conclusions of INCLUIR project)
Examples
from
Senegal
and
Ecuador
For example, social inclusion
of minorities and vulnerable
groups need to challenge
structural inequalities with
specific tools.

38. The same happens with the goal of
redistributive justice
How to go Geographic Priority Need Population Total % of total Resource
Area total total total Score city score available
beyond the (£41,200)
“usual Area A
Area B
6
3
6
9
9
6
21
18
12. 9%
11%
£5,314
£4,544
suspects”, so Area C 12 12 6 30 18. 4% £7,581
Area D 3 2 2 7 4. 3% £1,772
the audience Area E 12 2 2 16 9. 8% £4,038
etc ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
which already Total for all areas of the city 163 100% £41,200
is prepared to
participate
(TRAINING)?
38

39. More simple ways exists for fostering solidarirty: i.e. CARAVANS seeks to create
solidarity, and take into account the needs of ABSENT people. INFORMALITY is
also very important
39

40. Evolving and
correcting mistakes
THE CASE OF
LISBON, Portugal 40

41. HOW TO CALCULATE
COSTS/BENEFITS? The number of
participants (in Portugal)
Source: Nelson
16.1 Dias, 2012
13.8
5.9
1.5
0.9
Odemira Cascais Lisboa Portimão Aveiro
3.469 23.198 29.911 694 616

42. % of PB on Municipal Investments
(Portugal) Source: Nelson
Dias, 2012
6.3
3.1
2.6 2.4 2.3
1.6
1 0.9
0.4
0.05

43. PB investments per capita (Euros)
in Portugal Source: Nelson
Dias, 2012
19.2
17.9
12.2
7.3
4.6
2.9 2.8
0.3
Odemira Portimão Cascais V.F. Xira Lisboa Caldas Amadora Aveiro
Rainha

44. SOME LONG-TERM
EFFECTS

45. Small interventions benefit PME local enterprises and
generate a new territorial redistribution of public
resources (1 billion R$ untill now)
EMPREENDIMENTOS APROVADOS POR TEMÁTICA
Urbanização de Vila 28,2
Social 3,1
Saúde 11,0
Meio Ambiente 1,9
Infraestrutura 40,0
Habitação 1,1
Esporte 3,7
Educação 9,7
Cultura 1,3
0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 30,0 35,0 40,0 45,0
Wealthy actors usually don’t appear…

46. BP better addresses the goals of
SUSTAINABILITY
Winner of the EU blue-flag (1999/2005)
Reproducing the Porto Alegre model, where (in 10
years) 9 shores in the polluted lake were made safe for
The Grottammare example: bathing
“Stop new beach-housing in a touristic
city; let’s improve the quality of water
and beach-facilities accordin to the
eco-system protection” (1994)

47. It requires detailed deliberation on
the centarl and
side.issues (through
SPIN-OGFFs)

48. The case of Borbona (Lazio): a strategy of sustainability
which enriched the resources of PB through savings

49. Fragilities

50. PB success depends on
how CENTRAL or
MARGINAL it is, within
the local political
strategy.
The case of Belo
Horizonte

51. What are PB’s main structural LIMITS, i.e. its
fragility/volatility? They are strictly linked to:
1) Minimal prerequisites to be implemented
(political will, a cohesion in the social fabric, a
minimal financial autonomy, a good subdivision of
the territory, an institutional structure which
works and could be bettered, a good PB
organizational ARCHITECTURE)
2) The difficulty of reaching “diversity” in
participants (let aside the “representativity”
issue…rich sectors and the most poor are absent)
3) The growing scarcity of local financial resources
within an incomplete decentralization framework

52. ARE PBs FRAGILE? Only when they create
unrealistic expectations, and are not “RESILIENT”
Analyzing fragilities to create “contention walls”
for the still ongoing processes…
Fonte: Alves/Allegretti (2012)
baseado em dados de Nelson Dias
52

53. Ongoing and interrupted (2002- 2012)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
31
28
25
23
18
14 13
6 6
3
1
-1
-3 -4
-8
Fonte: Nelson Dias | 2012 -13
-18
Ongoing PBs Interrupted PBs

54. Ruling party in Portuguese cities that have abandoned
PBs, until 2010. The majority have been interrupted by
the same government that created them… Why?

55. The cycle of life and death…
55

56. CASES OF IN PORTUGAL BY MODEL
Source: Nelson
Dias, 2012
DELIBERATION/
NEGOTIATION
27 3
CONSULTATIVE DECISIONAL
23 17
INDIVIDUALISM
Interrupted Ongoing
PBs PBs

57. HOW DOES A “RESILIENT PARTICIPATORY
BUDGETING*” LOOK LIKE?
(RESILIENCE IS THE CAPACXITY OF ADAPTATION TO SURVIVE TO THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EXTERNAL ENVIROINMENT AND
CONDITIONS…)
Fonte: Alves/Allegretti (2010)

58. Does a resilient capacity of
transformation relay on clear principles?
Yes, transformations along time could
be “oriented” by these ideas:
1) Maintaining people at the “centre” (for
example in filtering)
2) Respecting authonomy between
society and institution, being
complementary to representative
democracy
3) Being evolutionary (inctrementality –
not repetition of a “ritual”)

59. Models of PB dissemination in Portugal, which can contribute to that…
1ª
Fase Local design based on adaptation of International
Models
2ª
Fase
Desenho local do processo baseado na adaptação
de modelos nacionais e/ou internacionais
3ª
Fase Implementation based on copy-paste from Internet
Source: Nelson
Dias, 2012

60. A FAKE PROBLEM: the conflict with representative
Democracy, and electoral programs:
1) The PB is more realistic and concrete, acting as a “diacronic”
filter of what to do, in time…
2) Is representativeness so represenative? Could it catch
diversity?
3) Upkeeping is easier, when there is major “onwership” of
public works..
Che relazioni con il
“Programma” elettorale?

61. PB can compete com other process and must be
rrclearly definined…
Parce que sens perception de l’innovation, n’a pas d’innovations et d’enracinement/durabilitè…

62. It needs that what is promised
is done… (underlying its unicity)
Le BP est faite de deux cycles

63. From limits to
challenges

64. USE OF ICTs in an
RESETTING THE
adequate and coherent manner?
64

65. Evaluating is always fundamental for saving energies and
optimizing investments (which in PB are also emotional, and
not only material)…
BUT, OFTEN,
both POLITICIANS and
CITIZENS are scared of evaluation,
65
or they do not have RESOURCES

66. It helped to understand what are PB’s main
structural LIMITS, i.e. its fragility/volatility
strictly linked to:
1) Minimal prerequisites to be implemented
(political will, a cohesion in the social fabric, a
minimal financial autonomy, a good subdivision of
the territory, an institutional structure which
works and could be bettered, a good PB
organizational ARCHITECTURE)
2) The difficulty of reaching “diversity” in
participants (let aside the “representativity”
issue…)
3) The growing scarcity of local financial resources
66
within an incomplete decentralization framework

67. Thinking in terms of RAISING DIVERSITY

68. The Dilemma of participation by ADVOCACY.

69. Scaling-up helps dissemination
69

70. The case of Solecki Funds in
Poland (since 2009)
Fonte: SLLGO, 2012

71. A NEW OPPORTUNITY: the SCALING-UP
(South Kivu in RDC, the case of Tuscany and
Lazio I Italy, Malaga Province and Andalusia
Region in Spain) - HOW TO IMPROVE
QUALITY OF DELIBERATION?
Numeric
multiplication
Support for financial
weakness and
trembling coalitions
Fake examples?
Major procedural
quality
Introducing PB
principles in
other policies 71

72. KIA ORA (and thanks for your patience!)
Questions are
welcome!
giovanni.allegretti@ces.uc.pt
allegretto70@hotmail.com