Short and glorious history of Organizational theory

1. Skorl ana LjLori
onous
UrcjaYLLzailonal

2. Cbarles Perrow
rom the beginning, the forces of light and the
forces of darkness have polarized the field of
organizational analysis, and the struggle has
been protracted and inconclusive. The forces
of darkness have been represented by the me-
chanical school of organizational theory—
those who treat the organization as a machine.
This school characterizes organizations in
terms o£ such things as:
• centralized authority
• clear lines of authority
• specialization and expertise
• marked division of labor
• rules and regulations
• clear separation of staff and Une
The forces of light, which by mid-
twentieth century came to be characterized as
the human relations school, emphasizes people
rather than machines, accommodations rather
than machine-like precision, and draws its in-
spiration from biological systems rather than
engineering systems. It has emphasized such
things as:
• delegation of authority keep records, write down policies, specialize,
• employee autonomy be decisive, and keep your span of control to
• trust and openness about six people. These injunctions were
• concerns with the "whole person" needed as firms grew in size and complexity,
• interpersonal dynamics since there were few models around beyond
the railroads, the military, and the Catholic
Church to guide organizations. And their in-
T H E R I S E AI-O) FALL OF junctions worked. Executives began to dele-
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT gate, reduce their span of control, keep records,
and specialize. Planning ahead still is difficult,
The forces of darkness formulated their posi- it seems, and the modern equivalent is Man-
tion first, starting in the early part of this agement by Objectives.
century. They have been characterized as the But many things intruded to make
scientific management or classical manage- these simple-minded injunctions less relevant:
ment school. This school started by parading 1. Labor became a more critical factor
simple-minded injunctions to plan ahead, in the firm. As the technology increased in

3. sophistication it took longer to train people, traits implied that leaders were made, not just
and more varied and specialized skills were born, that the matter was complex, and that
needed. Thus, labor turnover cost more and several skills were involved.
recruitment became more selective. As a con-
sequence, labor's power increased. Unions and
strikes appeared. Management adjusted by
beginning to speak of a cooperative system of ENTER HUMAN RELATIONS
capital, management, and labor. The machine
model began to lose its relevancy. From the beginning, individual voices were
raised against the implications of the scientific
2. The increasing complexity of mar-
management school. "Bureaucracy" had al-
kets, variability of products, increasing num-
ways been a dirty word, and the job design
ber of branch plants, and changes in technol-
efforts of Frederick Taylor were even the sub-
ogy all required more adaptive organization.
ject of a congressional investigation. But no
The scientific management school was ill-
effective counterforce developed until 1938,
equipped to deal with rapid change. It had
when a business executive with academic tal-
presumed that once the proper structure was
ents named Chester Barnard proposed the first
achieved the firm could run forever without
new theory of organizations: Organizations
much tampering. By the late 1930s, people be-
are cooperative systems, not the products of
gan writing about adaptation and change in
mechanical engineering. He stressed natural
industry from an organizational point of view
groups within the organization, upward com-
and had to abandon some of the principles of
munication, authority from below rather than
scientific management.
from above, and leaders who functioned as a
3. Political, social, and cultural cohesive force. With the spectre of labor un-
changes meant new expectations regarding rest and the Great Depression upon him,
the proper way to treat people. The dark, Barnard's emphasis on the cooperative nature
Satanic mills needed at the least a white-wash- of organizations was well-timed. The year
ing. Child labor and the brutality of supervi- following the publication of his Functions of
sion in many enterprises became no longer the Executive (1938) saw the publication of
permissible. Even managers could not be ex- F. J. Roethlisberger and William Dickson's
pected to accept the authoritarian patterns of Management and the Worf^er, reporting on
leadership that prevailed in the small firm run the first large-scale empirical investigation of
by the founding father. productivity and social relations. The re-
4. As mergers and growth proceeded search, most of it conducted in the Hawthorne
apace and the firm could no longer be viewed plant of the Western Electric Company dur-
as the shadow of one man (the founding en- ing a period in which the workforce was re-
trepreneur), a search for methods o£ selecting duced, highlighted the role of informal
good leadership became a preoccupation. A groups, work restriction norms, the value of
good, clear, mechanical structure would no decent, humane leadership, and the role of
longer suffice. Instead, firms had to search for psychological manipulation of employees
the qualities of leadership that could fill the through the counseling system. World War 11
large footsteps of the entrepreneur. They tac- intervened, but after the war the human re-
itly had to admit that something other than lations movement, building on the insights
either "sound principles" or "dynamic leader- of Barnard and the Hawthorne studies, came
into its own.
4 ship" was needed. The search for leadership

4. The first step was a search for the
traits of good leadership. It went on furiously
at university centers but at first failed to pro-
duce more than a list of Boy Scout maxims: A
good leader was kind, courteous, loyal, coura-
geous, etc. We suspected as much. However,
the studies did turn up a distinction between
"consideration," or employee-centered aspects
of leadership, and job-centered, technical as-
pects labled "initiating structure." Both were
important, but the former received most of
the attention and the latter went undeveloped.
The former led directly to an examination of
group processes, an investigation that has
culminated in T-group programs and is
Whde Charles Perrow's primary affiliation has moving forward still with encounter groups.
been with sociology departments in a variety
Meanwhile, in England, the Tavistock Insti-
of Universities {Michigan. Pittsburgh, Wis-
consin, and now, the State University o/ New tute sensed the importance of the influence of
Yor){^ at Stony Broo), he has tempered his the kind of task a group had to perform on the
theorizing by also teaching in professional social relations within the group. The first im-
schools at these universities. "Business stu- portant study, conducted among coal miners,
dents want to i{riou> what difference theory
showed that job simplification and specializa-
makes, and it is a salutory discipline jor the
sociologists," he notes. This resulted in a tion did not work under conditions of uncer-
book^ for business managers. Organizational tainty and nonroutine tasks.
Analysis: A Sociological View, in 1970. He
has published three other boo^s dealing with As this work flourished and spread,
organizations, as well as more than 20 schol- more adventurous theorists began to extend it
arly articles. The present article has grown out beyond work groups to organizations as a
of his recent volume. Complex Organizations; whole. We now knew that there were a num-
A Critical Essay (1972).
ber o£ things that were bad for the morale
He has consulted with business, got/- and loyalty of groups—routine tasks, submis-
einment and voluntary agencies {but very sion to authority, specialization of task, segre-
modestly), spent a year at the Industrial Re-
lations Institute in Berkeley and the Business gation of task sequence, ignorance of the goals
School there, in the year of the People's Parl^ of the firm, centralized decision making, and
and the Cleaver demonstrations. Currently he so on. If these were bad for groups, they were
IS spending this year at the London Business likely to be bad for groups of groups—i.e.,
School and is running two-day training ses- for organizations. So people like Warren
sions on the structural analysis of organiza-
tions for managers. He is also worthing with Bennis began talking about innovative, rap-
some groups on the social responsibilities of idly changing organizations that were made
business. Professor Perrow is on the editorial up of temporary groups, temporary authority
board of Administrative Science Quarterly systems, temporary leadership and role as-
and the American Sociological Review. His signments, and democratic access to the goals
other hookas are The Radical Attack on Busi-
ness, 1972, and Organization for Treatment, of the firm. If rapidly changing technologies
1966, with D. Street and R. Vinter. and unstable, turbulent environments were to
characterize industry, then the structure of 5

5. firms should be temporary and decentralized.
The forces of light, of freedom, autonomy,
change, humanity, creativity, and democracy
were winning. Scientific management sur-
vived only in outdated text books. If the evan-
gelizing of some of the human relations school
theorists was excessive, and if Likert's System
4 or MacGregor's Theory Y or Blake's 9 x 9
evaded us, at least there was a rationale for
confusion, disorganization, scrambling, and
stress: Systems should be temporary.
BUREAUCRACY'S COMEBACK
Meanwhile, in another part of the manage-
ment forest, the mechanistic school was
gathering its forces and preparing to outflank
the forces of light. First came the numbers
men—the linear programmers, the budget ex-
perts, and the financial analysts—with their
PERT systems and cost-benefit analyses. clear lines of communication, clear specifica-
From another world, unburdened by most of tions of authority and responsibility, and clear
the scientific management ideology and un- knowledge of whom they were responsible to.
touched by the human relations school, they They were as wont to say "there ought to be a
began to parcel things out and give some rule about this," as to say "there are too many
meaning to those truisms, "plan ahead" and rules around here," as wont to say "next week
"keep records." Armed with emerging sys- we've got to get organized," as to say "there is
tems concepts, they carried the "mechanistic" too much red tape." Gradually, studies began
analogy to its fullest—and it was very produc- to show that bureaucratic organizations could
tive. Their work still goes on, largely un- change faster than nonbureaucratic ones, and
troubled by organizational theory; the theory, that morale could be higher where there was
it seems clear, will have to adjust to them, clear evidence of bureaucracy.
rather than the other way around. What was this thing, thcn.^ Weber
Then the works of Max Weber, first had showed us, for example, that bureaucracy
translated from the German in the 1940s—he was the most effective way of ridding organ-
wrote around 1910, incredibly—began to find izations of favoritism, arbitrary authority, dis-
their way into social science thought. At first, crimination, payola and kick-backs, and yes,
with his celebration of the efficiency of bu- even incompetence. His model stressed ex-
reaucracy, he was received with only reluctant pertise, and the favorite or the boss' nephew
respect, and even with hostility. All writers or the guy who burned up resources to make
were against bureaucracy. But it turned out, his performance look good was not the one
surprisingly, that managers were not. When with expertise. Rules could be changed; they
asked, they acknowledged that they preferred could be dropped in exceptional circum-

6. stances; job security promoted more innova- (and what was left of the old scientific man-
tion. The sins of bureaucracy began to look agement school), for the impressive Weberian
like the sins of failing to follow its principles. principles were designed to settle questions of
power through organizational design and to
keep conflict out through reliance on rational-
ENTER POWER, CONFLICT, AND DECISIONS
legal authority and systems of careers, ex-
pertise, and hierarchy. But power was being
overtly contested and exercised in covert
But another discipline began to intrude upon
ways, and conflict was bursting out all over,
the confident work and increasingly elaborate
and even being creative.
models of the human relations theorists
(largely social psychologists) and the uneasy Gradually, in the second half of the
toying with bureaucracy of the "structional- 1950s and in the next decade, the political
ists" (largely sociologists). Both tended to science view infiltrated both schools. Conflict
study economic organizations. A few, like could be healthy, even in a cooperative sys-
Philip Selznick, were noting conflict and dif- tem, said the human relationists; it was the
ferences in goals (perhaps because he was mode of resolution that counted, rather than
studying a public agency, the Tennessee Valley prevention. Power became reconceptualized
Authority), but most ignored conflict or as "influence," and the distribution was less
treated it as a pathological manifestation of important, said Arnold Tannenbaum, than
breakdowns in communication or the ego the total amount. For the bureaucratic school
trips of unreconstructed managers. —never a clearly defined group of people, and
largely without any clear ideology—it was
But in the world of political parties,
easier to just absorb the new data and theories
pressure groups, and legislative bodies, con-
as something else to be thrown into the pot.
flict was not only rampant, but to be expected
That is to say, they floundered, writing books
—it was even functional. This was the do-
that went from topic to topic, without a clear
main of the political scientists. They kept talk-
view of organizations, or better yet, produc-
ing about power, making it a legitimate
ing "readers" and leaving students to sort it
concern for analysis. There was an open ac-
all out.
knowledgement of "manipulation." These
were political scientists who were "behavior- Buried in the political science view-
ally" inclined—studying and recording behav- point was a sleeper that only gradually began
ior rather than constitutions and formal sys- to undermine the dominant views. This was
tems of government—and they came to a much the idea, largely found in the work of Her-
more complex view of organized activity. It bert Simon and James March, that because
spilled over into the area of economic organ- man was so limited—in intelligence, reason-
izations, with the help of some economists ing powers, information at his disposal, time
like R. A. Gordon and some sociologists who available, and means of ordering his prefer-
were studying conflicting goals of treatment ences clearly—he generally seized on the first
and custody in prisons and mental hospitals. acceptable alternative when deciding, rather
The presence of legitimately conflict- than looking for the best; that he rarely
ing goals and techniques of preserving and changed things unless they really got bad, and
using power did not, of course, sit well with a even then he continued to try what had
cooperative systems view of organizations. worked before; that he limited his search for
But it also puzzled the bureaucratic school solutions to well-worn paths and traditional 7

7. sources of information and established ideas; ket changes, but engineering applications
that he was wont to remain preoccupied with should), you may have to promote mediocre
routine, thus preventing innovation. They people in the unrewarded function in order
called these characteristics "cognitive limits to signal to the good people in the rewarded
on rationality" and spoke of "satisficing" one that the game has changed. You cannot
rather than maximizing or optimizing. It is expect most people to make such decision on
now called the "decision making" school, and their own because of the cognitive limits on
is concerned with the basic question of how their rationality, nor will you succeed by giv-
people make decisions. ing direct orders, because you yourself proba-
This view had some rather unusual bly do not know whom to order where. You
implications. It suggested that if managers presume that once the signals are clear and
were so limited, then they could be easily con- the new sets of alternatives are manifest,
trolled. What was necessary was not to give they have enough ability to make the decision
direct orders (on the assumption that subor- but you have had to change the premises for
dinates were idiots without expertise) or to their decisions about their career lines.
leave them to their own devices (on the as- It would take too long to go through
sumption that they were supermen who the dozen or so devices, covering a range of
would somehow know what was best for the deciston areas (March and Simon are not that
organization, how to coordinate with all the clear or systematic about them, themselves, so
other supermen, how to anticipate market I have summarized them in my own book),
changes, etc.). It was necessary to control only but I think the message is clear.
the premises of their decisions. Left to them- It was becoming clear to the human
selves, with those premises set, they could be relations school, and to the bureaucratic
predicted to rely on precedent, keep things school. The human relationists had begun to
stable and smooth, and respond to signals that speak of changing stimuli rather than chang-
reinforce the behavior desired of them. ing personality. They had begun to see that
To control the premises of decision the rewards that can change behavior can well
making, March and Simon outline a variety be prestige, money, comfort, etc., rather than
of devices, all of which are familiar to you, trust, openness, self-insight, and so on. The
but some of which you may not have seen be- alternative to supportive relations need not
fore in quite this light. For example, organ- be punishment, since behavior can best be
izations develop vocabularies, and this means changed by rewarding approved behavior
that certain kinds of information are high- rather than by punishing disapproved behav-
lighted, and others are screened out—just as ior. They were finding that although leader- •
Eskimos (and skiers) distinguish many va- ship may be centralized, it can function best
rieties of snow, while Londoners see only one. through indirect and unobtrusive means such
This is a form of attention directing. Another as changing the premises on which decisions
is the reward system. Change the bonus for are made, thus giving the impression that the
salesmen and you can shift them from volume subordinate is actually making a decision
selling to steady-account selling, or to selling when he has only been switched to a differ-
quality products or new products. If you want ent set of alternatives. The implications of
to channel good people into a different func- this work were also beginning to filter into
tion (because, for example, sales should no the human relations school through an em-
8 longer be the critical function as the mar- phasis on behavioral psychology (the modern

8. version of the much maligned stimulus- and noon to about 4 AJ^^. and 8 A.M. But any
response school) that was supplanting per- convergence or resolution would have to be
sonality theory (Freudian in its roots, and on yet new terms, for soon after the political
drawing heavily, in the human relations science tradition had begun to infiltrate the
school, on Maslow). established schools, another blow struck both
For the bureaucratic school, this new of the major positions. Working quite inde-
line of thought reduced the heavy weight pendently of the Tavistock Group, with its
placed upon the bony structure of bureaucracy emphasis on sociotechnical systems, and be-
by highlighting the muscle and flesh that fore the work of Burns and Stalker on mech-
make these bones move. A single chain of anistic and organic firms, Joan Woodward
command, precise division of labor, and clear was trying to see whether the classical scien-
lines of communication are simply not tific principles of organization made any sense
enough in themselves. Control can be in her survey of 100 firms in South Essex. She
achieved by using alternative communication tripped and stumbled over a piece of gold in
channels, depending on the situation; by in- the process. She picked up the gold, labeled it
creasing or decreasing the static or "noise" in "technology," and made sense out of her
the system; by creating organizational myths otherwise hopeless data. Job-shop firms, mass-
and organizational vocabularies that allow production firms, and continuous-process
only selective bits of information to enter the firms all had quite different structures because
system; and through monitoring performance the type of tasks, or the "technology," was dif-
through indirect means rather than direct sur- ferent. Somewhat later, researchers in Amer-
veillance. Weber was all right for a starter, ica were coming to very similar conclusions
but organizations had changed vastly, and based on studies of hospitals, juvenile correc-
the leaders needed many more means of con- tional institutions, and industrial firms. Bu-
trol and more subtle means of manipulation reaucracy appeared to be the best form of or-
than they did at the turn of the century. ganization for routine operations; temporary
work groups, decentralization, and emphasis
on interpersonal processes appeared to work
best for nonroutine operations. A raft of stud-
T H E TECHNOLOGICAL QUALIFICATION
ies appeared and are still appearing, all trying
to show how the nature of the task aflects the
By now the forces of darkness and forces of
structure of the organization.
light had moved respectively from midnight
alternative to supportive relations need
not be punishment, since behavior can best be
changed by rewarding approved behavior rather
than by punishing disapproved behavior/'

9. This severely complicated tbings for
the human relations school, since it suggested
that openness and trust, while good things in
themselves, did not have much impact, or per-
haps were not even possible in some kinds of
work situations. The prescriptions tbat were
being handed out would have to be drastically
qualified. What might work for nonroutine,
high-status, interesting, and challenging jobs
performed by highly educated people might
not be relevant or even beneficial for the vast
majority of jobs and people.
It also forced the upholders of the
revised bureaucratic theory to qualify their
recommendations, since research and develop-
ment units should obviously be run differ-
ently from mass-production units, and the
difference between both of these and highly
programmed and highly sophisticated con-
tinuous-process firms was obscure in terms of
bureaucratic theory. But the bureaucratic
school perhaps came out on top, because tbe
forces o£ evil—authority, structure, division of reaucratic nor nonroutine. They also noted
labor, etc.—no longer looked evil, even i£ tbat attempts at participative management in
they were not applicable to a minority of in- routine situations were counterproductive,
dustrial units. that the environments of some kinds of or-
ganizations were far from turbulent and cus-
The emphasis on tecbnology raised tomers did not want innovations and changes,
otber questions, however. A can company that cost reduction, price, and efficiency were
might be quite routine, and a plastics division trivial considerations in some firms, and so on.
nonroutine, but there were both routine and The technological insight was demolishing
nonroutine units within each. How should our comfortable truths right and left. They
they be integrated if the prescription were were also being questioned from another
followed tbat, say, production sbould be bu- quarter.
reaucratized and R&D not? James Thompson
began spelling out different forms of interde-
pendence among units in organizations, and ENTER GOALS, ENVIRONMENTS, AND SYSTEMS
Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch looked closely
at the nature of integrating mechanisms. Law-
The final seam was being mined by the so-
rence and Lorsch found that firms performed
ciologists while all this went on. This was the
best when the differences between units were
concern with organizational goals and the en-
maximized (in contrast to both the human
vironment. Borrowing from the political
relations and the bureaucratic school), as long
scientists to some extent, but pushing ahead
as the integrating mechanisms stood half-way
on their own, this "institutional school" came
10 between the two—being neither strongly bu-
to sec that goals were not fixed; conflicting

10. goals could be pursued simultaneously, if goals, bargaining, and unofficial leadership
there were enough slack resources, or sequen- exists, where is the structure of Weberian
tially (growth for the next four years, then bones and Simonian muscle? To what extent
cost-cutting and profit-taking for the next are organizations tools, and to what extent are
four); that goals were up for grabs in organ- they products of the varied interests and
izations, and units fought over them. Goals group strivings of their members.' Does it
were, of course, not what they seemed to be, vary by organization, in terms of some typo-
the important ones were quite unofficial; his- logical alchemy we have not discovered.' We
tory played a big role; and assuming profit as don't know. But at any rate, the bureaucratic
the pre-eminent goal explained almost nothing model suffers again; it simply has not reck-
about a firm's behavior. oned on the role of the environment. There
They also did case studies that linked are enormous sources of variations that the
the organization to the web of influence of neat, though by now quite complex, neo-
the environment; that showed how unique or- Weberian model could not account for.
ganizations were in many respects (so that, Tbe human relations model has also
once again, there was no one best way to do been badly shaken by the findings of the in-
things for all organizations); how organiza- stitutional school, for it was wont to assume
tions were embedded in their own history, that goals were given and unproblematical,
making change difficult. Most striking of all, and that anything that promoted harmony
perhaps, the case studies revealed that the and efficiency for an organization also was
stated goals usually were not the real ones; good for society. Human relationists as-
the official leaders usually were not the power- sumed that the problems created by organiza-
ful ones; claims of effectiveness and efficiency tions were largely limited to the psychological
were deceptive or even untrue; the public in- consequences of poor interpersonal rela-
terest was not being served; political influ- tions within them, rather than their impact
ences were pervasive; favoritism, discrimina- on the environment. Could the organization
tion, and sheer corruption were commonplace. really promote the psychological health of its
The accumulation of these studies presented members when by necessity it had to define
quite a pill for either the forces of light or psychological health in terms of the goals of
darkness to swallow, since it was hard to see the organization itself.' The neo-Weberian
how training sessions or interpersonal skills model at least called manipulation "manipu-
were relevant to these problems, and it was lation" and was skeptical of claims about au-
also clear that the vaunted efficiency of bu- tonomy and self-realization.
reaucracy was hardly in evidence. What could
But on one thing all the varied
they make of this wad of case studies.'
schools of organizational analysis now seemed
We are still sorting it out. In one to be agreed: organizations are systems—in-
sense, the Weberian model is upheld because deed, they are open systems. As the growth
organizations are not, by nature, cooperative of the field has forced ever more variables
systems; top managers must exercise a great into our consciousness, flat claims of predic-
deal of effort to control them. But if organiza- tive power are beginning to decrease and re-
tions are tools in the hands of leaders, they search has become bewilderingly complex.
may be very recalcitrant ones. Like the broom Even consulting groups need more than one
in the story of the sorcerer's apprentice, they or two tools in their kit-bag as the software
occasionally get out of hand. If conflicting multiplies.

11. nebulous. But at least there is a model for call-
ing us to account and for stretching our
minds, our research tools, and our troubled
nostrums.
SOME CONCLUSIONS
Where does all this leave us} We might sum-
marize the prescriptions and proscriptions for
management very roughly as follows:
1. A great deal of the "variance" in a
firm's behavior depends on the environment.
We have become more realistic about the lim-
ited range of change that can be induced
through internal efforts. The goals of organi-
zations, including those of profit and effi-
ciency, vary greatly among industries and
vary systematically by industries. This sug-
The systems view is intuitively sim- gests that the impact of better management
ple. Everything is related to everything else, by itself will be limited, since so much will
though in uneven degrees of tension and depend on market forces, competition, legisla-
reciprocity. Every unit, organization, depart- tion, nature of the work force, available tech-
ment, or work group takes in resources, nologies and innovations, and so on. An-
transforms them, and sends them out, and other source of variation is, obviously, the
thus interacts with the larger system. The psy- history of the firm and its industry and its
chological, sociological, and cultural aspects of traditions.
units interact. The systems view was explicit 2. A fair amount of variation in both
in the institutional work, since they tried firms and industries is due to the type of work
to study whole organizations; it became ex- done in the organization—the technology.
plicit in the human relations school, because We are now fairly confident in recommend-
they were so concerned with the interactions ing that if work is predictable and routine,
of people. The political science and tech- the necessary arrangement for getting the
nology viewpoints also had to come to this work done can be highly structured, and one
realization, since they dealt with parts affect- can use a good deal of bureaucratic theory in
ing each other (sales affecting production; accomplishing this. If it is not predictable, if
technology affecting structure). it is nonroutinc and there is a good deal of un-
But as intuitively simple as it is, the certainty as to how to do a job, then one had
systems view has been difficult to put into better utilize the theories that emphasize
practical use. We still Hnd ourselves ignoring autonomy, temporary groups, multiple lines
the tenets of the open systems view, possibly of authority and communications, and so on.
because of the cognitive limits on our rational- We also know that this distinction is impor-
ity. General systems theory itself has not lived tant when organizing different parts of an or-
12 up to its heady predictions; it remains rather ganization.

12. We are also getting a grasp on the known that for some time now, and beyond a
question of what is the most critical function minimal threshold level, the payoff is hard to
in different types of organizations. For some measure. The various attempts to make work
organizations it is production; for others, and interpersonal relations more humane and
marketing; for still others, development. Fur- stimulating should be applauded, but we
thermore, firms go through phases whereby should not confuse this with solving problems
the initial development of a market or a prod- of structure, or as the equivalent of decentrali-
uct or manufacturing process or accounting zation or participatory democracy.
scheme may require a non-bureaucratic struc- 4. The burning cry in all organiza-
ture, but once it comes on stream, the struc- tions is for "good leadership," but we have
ture should change to reflect the changed learned that beyond a threshold level of ade-
character of the work. quacy it is extremely difficult to know what
3. In keeping with this, management good leadership is. The hundreds of scientific
should be advised that the attempt to produce studies of this phenomenon come to one gen-
change in an organization through manage- eral conclusion: Leadership is highly variable
rial grids, sensitivity training, and even job en- or "contingent" upon a large variety of im-
richment and job enlargement is likely to be portant variables such as nature of task, size
fairly ineffective for all but a few organiza- of the group, length of time the group has
tions. The critical reviews of research in all existed, type of personnel within the group
these fields show that there is no scientific and their relationships with each other, and
evidence to support the claims of the propo- amount of pressure the group is under. It docs
nents of these various methods; that research not seem likely that we'll be able to devise a
has told us a great deal about social psychol- way to select the best leader for a particular
ogy, but little about how to apply the highly situation. Even if we could, that situation
complex findings to actual situations. The key would probably change in a short time and
word is selectivity: We have no broad-spec- thus would require a somewhat different type
trum antibiotics for interpersonal relations. Of of leader.
course, managers should be sensitive, decent, Furthermore, we are beginning to
kind, courteous, and courageous, but we have realize that leadership involves more than
'The burning cry in all organizations is for
'good leadership/ but we have learned that
beyond a threshold level of adequacy it is
extremely difficult to know what good
leadership is/'
13

13. smoothing the paths of human interaction. dramatic as many of the solutions currently
What has rarely been studied in this area is being peddled, but I think the weight of or-
the wisdom or even the technical adequacy of ganizational theory is in its favor.
a leader's decision. A leader does more than We have probably learned more,
lead people; he also makes decisions about the over several decades of research and theory,
allocation of resources, type of technology to about the things that do not work (even
be used, the nature of the market, and so on. though some of them obviously should have
This aspect of leadership remains very ob- worked), than we have about things that do
scure, but it is obviously crucial. work. On balance, this is an important gain
5. If we cannot solve our problems and should not discourage us. As you know,
through good human relations or through organizations are extremely complicated. To
good leadership, what are we then left with? have as much knowledge as we do have in a
The literature suggests that changing the fledgling discipline that has had to borrow
structures of organizations might be the most from the diverse tools and concepts of psy-
effective and certainly the quickest and cheap- chology, sociology, economics, engineering,
est method. However, we are now sophisti- biology, history, and even anthropology is not
cated enough to know that changing the for- really so bad.
mal structure by itself is not likely to produce
the desired changes. In addition, one must be
aware of a large range of subtle, unobtrusive,
and even covert processes and change de-
vices that exist. If inspection procedures are
not working, we are now unlikely to rush in
with sensitivity training, nor would we send
down authoritative communications telling SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
people to do a better job. We are more likely
to find out where the authority really lies, This paper is an adaptation of the discussion to
whether the degree of specialization is ade- be found in Charles Perrow, Complex Organiza-
quate, what the rules and regulations are, and tions: A Critical Essay, Scott, Forcsman & Co.,
so on, but even this very likely will not be GlcnvJlle, Illinois, 1972. AU the points made in
enough. this paper are discussed thoroughly in that vol-
ume.
According to the neo-Weberian bu- The best overview and discussion of clas-
reaucratic model, as it has been influenced by sical management theory, and its changes over
work on decision making and behavioral psy- time is by Joseph Massie—"Management Theory"
chology, we should find out how to ma- in the Handbook^ of Organizations edited by
nipulate the reward structure, change the James March, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago,
premises of the decision-makers through finer 1965, pp.387-422.
controls on the information received and the The best discussion of the changing
expectations generated, search for interdepart- justifications for managerial rule and worker
mental conflicts that prevent better inspection obedience as they are related to changes in tech-
nology, etc., can be found in Reinhard Bendix's
procedures from being followed, and after
H^or^ and Authority in Industry, John Wiley &
manipulating these variables, sit back and
Sons, Inc., New York, 1956. See especially the
wait for two or three months for them to take chapter on the American experience.
14 hold. This is complicated and hardly as Some of the leading tights of the classi-

14. cal view—F. W. Taylor, Col. Urwick, and Henry Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963. All three of
Fayol—arc briefly discussed in Writers on Organi- tbese books arc fairly rougb going, tbougb
zations by D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson and C. R. cbapters 1, 2, 3, and 6 of tbe last volume are
Hinings, Penguin, 1971. This brief, readable, fairly sbort and accessible. A quite interesting
and useful book also contains selections from book in this tradition, tbougb somtwbat beavy-
many other schools that I discuss, including going, is Micbael Crozier's The Bureaucratic
Weber, Woodward, Cyert and March, Simon, Phenomenon, University of Cbicago, and Tavi-
the Hawthorne Investigations, and the Human stock Publications, 1964. Tbis is a striking de-
Relations Movement as represented by Argyris, scription of power in organizations, tbougb
Hcrzberg, Likcrt, McGregor, and Blake and tbere is a somewbat dubious attempt to link
Mouton. organization processes in France to tbe cultural
As good a place as any to start examin- traits of tbe Frcncb people.
ing the human relations tradition is Rensis Likert, Tbe book by Joan Woodward Industrial
The Human Organization, McGraw-Hill, New Organisation: Theory and Practice, Oxford Uni-
York, 1967. See also bis New Patterns of Man- versity Press, London, 1965, is still very mucb
agement, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New wortb reading. A fairly popular attempt to dis-
York, 1961. cuss the implications for tbis for management
The Buck Rogers scbool of organiza- can be found in my own book. Organizational
tional tbeory is best represented by Warren Bcn- Analysis: A Sociological View, Tavistock, 1970,
nis. See bis Changing Organizations, McGraw- Chapters 2 and 3. Tbe impact of tecbnology on
Hill Book Company, New York, 1966, and bis structure is still fairly controversial. A number of
book with Pbillp Slater, The Temporary Society, tecbnical studies bave found botb support and
Harper & Row, Inc., New York, 1968. Mucb nonsupport, largely because tbe concept is de-
o£ tbis work is linked into more general studies, fined so differently, but tbere is general agree-
e.g., Alvin TofHer's very popular paperback ment tbat different structures and leadership
Future Shoc, Random House, 1970, and Ban- tecbniques arc needed for different situations.
tam Paperbacks, or Zibigniew Brzezinsky's Be- For studies tbat support and document this view-
tween Two Ages: America's Role in the Techni- point sec James Tbompson, Organizations in
tronic Era, the Viking Press, New York, 1970. Action, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New
One of the first intimations of tbe new type of York, 1967, and Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorscb,
environment and firm and still perhaps tbe Organizations and Environment, Harvard Uni-
most perceptive is to be found in tbe volume versity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967.
by Tom Burns and G. Stalker, The Management Tbe best single work on tbe relation be-
of Innovation, Tavistock, London, 1961, wbere tween tbe organization and tbe environment and
they distinguished between "organic" and "mech- one of tbe most readable books in the field is
anistic" systems. Tbe introduction, wbicb is not Pbilip Selznick's sbort volume Leadership in Ad-
very long, is an excellent and very tight summary ministration, Row, Peterson, Evanston, Illinois,
of tbe book. 1957. But the large number of tbese studies are
Tbe political science tradition came in scattered about. I have summarized several in my
tbrougb tbree important works. First, Herbert Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay.
Simon's Administrative Behavior. Tbe MacMil- Lasdy, tbe most elaborate and persuasive
lan Co., New York, 1948, followed by tbe second argument for a systems view of organizations is
balf of James Marcb and Herbert Simon's Organi- found in tbe first 100 pages of tbe book by
zations, John Wiley 6t Sons, Inc., New York, Daniel Katz and Robert Kabn, The Social Psy-
1958, tben Ricbard M. Cyert and James Marcb's chology of Organizations, Jobn Wiley and Co.,
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, 1966. It is not easy reading, however.
15