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Crisis management case studies

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Crisis management case studies

  1. 1. ً‫مرحبا‬ً‫مرحبا‬ WelcomeWelcome
  2. 2. Crisis ManagementCrisis Management Khaled A. AnterKhaled A. Anter
  3. 3. Let’s start with gettingLet’s start with getting to know each otherto know each other
  4. 4. Ground rulesGround rules  Start at 9:00Start at 9:00  First break at 10:30 am (15 min.)First break at 10:30 am (15 min.)  Second break at 12:00 pm (45 min. include.Second break at 12:00 pm (45 min. include. Prayer)Prayer)  Finish at 2:00 pmFinish at 2:00 pm  Cell. Phones silent/no calls during sessionCell. Phones silent/no calls during session  Stop presenter & ask if you have a questionStop presenter & ask if you have a question  Relax & have funRelax & have fun
  5. 5. Henry FordHenry Ford (1863-1947(1863-1947(( ““you can not build a reputationyou can not build a reputation based on what you are going to dobased on what you are going to do””
  6. 6. What is a crisisWhat is a crisis?? A crisis (from the Greek κρίσις - krisis; plural: "crises"; adjectival form: "critical") is any event that is, or expected to lead to, an unstable and dangerous situation affecting an individual, group, community or whole society. More loosely, it is a term meaning 'a testing time' or an 'emergency event'.
  7. 7. Definition of a crisis Crisis is the situation of a complex system (family, economy, society) when the system functions poorly, an immediate decision is necessary, but the causes of the dysfunction are not known.
  8. 8. What is a crisis managementWhat is a crisis management?? Crisis management is the process by which an organization deals with a major event that threatens to harm the organization, its stakeholders, or the general public.
  9. 9. Three most common elements to crises  (a) a threat to the organization, (b) the element of surprise, (c) a short decision time.
  10. 10. Venette definition Argues that "crisis is a process of transformation where the old system can no longer be maintained.“ Therefore the fourth defining quality is the need for change. If change is not needed, the event could more accurately be described as a failure or incident
  11. 11. Risk assessment Vs. Crisis managementRisk assessment Vs. Crisis management Risk assessmentRisk assessment involves assessing potential threats and finding the best ways to avoid those threats, Crisis management involves dealing with threats before, during, and after they have occurred.
  12. 12. Crisis ManagementCrisis Management It is a discipline within the broader context of management consisting of skills and techniques required to identify, assess, understand, and cope with a serious situation, especially from the moment it first occurs to the point that recovery procedures start.
  13. 13. Management misconduct Deception Skewed Management values malevolence Confrontation Technological Natural Types of Crises
  14. 14. Phases of a CrisisPhases of a Crisis  Signal detectionSignal detection  Preparation and preventionPreparation and prevention  Containment and damage controlContainment and damage control  Business recoveryBusiness recovery  LearningLearning
  15. 15. Models and theories associated withModels and theories associated with crisis managementcrisis management  Management Crisis PlanningManagement Crisis Planning  Contingency planningContingency planning  Business continuity planningBusiness continuity planning  Structural-functional systems theoryStructural-functional systems theory  Diffusion of innovation theoryDiffusion of innovation theory  Role of apologies in crisis managementRole of apologies in crisis management  Crisis leadershipCrisis leadership  Unequal human capital theoryUnequal human capital theory
  16. 16. Case studiesCase studies ““1010casescases””
  17. 17. Case - ICase - I TylenolTylenol®® (J&J) - 1982(J&J) - 1982
  18. 18. IncidentIncident  Seven individuals diedSeven individuals died inin metropolitan Chicagometropolitan Chicago  65 milligrams of cyanide65 milligrams of cyanide
  19. 19. ApproachApproach  Recalled and destroyed 31 million capsulesRecalled and destroyed 31 million capsules  Cost of $100 millionCost of $100 million  CEO, James Burke, appeared in television adsCEO, James Burke, appeared in television ads  News conferences informing consumers of theNews conferences informing consumers of the company's actionscompany's actions  Tamper-resistant packaging was rapidlyTamper-resistant packaging was rapidly introducedintroduced  $100,000 reward offered by Johnson & Johnson$100,000 reward offered by Johnson & Johnson on murdereron murderer’’s heads head
  20. 20. ConclusionConclusion  Tylenol remains a top seller, controlling aboutTylenol remains a top seller, controlling about 35% of the pain killer market in North America35% of the pain killer market in North America
  21. 21. Case - IICase - II Odwalla FoodsOdwalla Foods - 1996- 1996
  22. 22. IncidentIncident  Apple juice causes anApple juice causes an outbreak ofoutbreak of E. coliE. coli infectioninfection  UnpasteurizedUnpasteurized  Forty-nine cases wereForty-nine cases were reportedreported  Death of a small childDeath of a small child  16 criminal counts of16 criminal counts of distributing adulterated juicedistributing adulterated juice  OdwallaOdwalla pled guiltypled guilty
  23. 23. ApproachApproach  Within 24 hours,Within 24 hours, OdwallaOdwalla conferred with the FDA andconferred with the FDA and Washington state health officialsWashington state health officials  Schedule of daily press briefingsSchedule of daily press briefings  Press releases which announced the recallPress releases which announced the recall  Expressed remorse, concern and apologyExpressed remorse, concern and apology  Detailed symptoms ofDetailed symptoms of E. coliE. coli poisoningpoisoning  Developed effective thermal processesDeveloped effective thermal processes  All of these steps were communicated through closeAll of these steps were communicated through close relations with the media and through full-pagerelations with the media and through full-page newspaper adsnewspaper ads
  24. 24. ConclusionConclusion  Despite a net loss for most of 1997, Odwalla worked toDespite a net loss for most of 1997, Odwalla worked to rehabilitate its brand name. In addition to advertising itsrehabilitate its brand name. In addition to advertising its new safety proceduresnew safety procedures, Odwalla released its line of food, Odwalla released its line of food bars (its first solid food product line) and entered thebars (its first solid food product line) and entered the $900$900  million fruit bar market.million fruit bar market.    Another new product was theAnother new product was the Future ShakeFuture Shake, a "liquid, a "liquid lunch" aimed at younger consumers. Because of theselunch" aimed at younger consumers. Because of these efforts, Odwalla was again profitable by the end ofefforts, Odwalla was again profitable by the end of 1997, reporting a profit of $140,000 for the third1997, reporting a profit of $140,000 for the third quarterquarter
  25. 25. Case - IIICase - III Pepsi -Pepsi - 19931993
  26. 26. IncidentIncident  Claims of syringes beingClaims of syringes being found in cans of dietfound in cans of diet PepsiPepsi  Pepsi urged stores not toPepsi urged stores not to remove the product fromremove the product from shelvesshelves  Situation investigatedSituation investigated  led to an arrestled to an arrest
  27. 27. ApproachApproach  Pepsi made public and then followed with their firstPepsi made public and then followed with their first video news releasevideo news release  First video showing the production process toFirst video showing the production process to demonstrate that such tampering was impossible withindemonstrate that such tampering was impossible within their factoriestheir factories  A second video news release displayed the man arrestedA second video news release displayed the man arrested  A third video news release showed surveillanceA third video news release showed surveillance  where awhere a woman was caught replicating the tampering incidentwoman was caught replicating the tampering incident
  28. 28. ApproachApproach  The company simultaneously publicly worked with theThe company simultaneously publicly worked with the FDA during the crisisFDA during the crisis  The corporation was completely open with the publicThe corporation was completely open with the public throughoutthroughout  Every employee of Pepsi was kept aware of the detailsEvery employee of Pepsi was kept aware of the details  After the crisis had been resolved, the corporation ran aAfter the crisis had been resolved, the corporation ran a series of special campaigns designed to thank the publicseries of special campaigns designed to thank the public for standing by the corporation, Coupons for furtherfor standing by the corporation, Coupons for further compensationcompensation
  29. 29. ConclusionConclusion  This case served as a model for how to handleThis case served as a model for how to handle other crisis situationsother crisis situations
  30. 30. Case - IVCase - IV BhopalBhopal disaster 1984disaster 1984
  31. 31. IncidentIncident  One of the world'sOne of the world's worstworst  industrial catastrophesindustrial catastrophes  A leak ofA leak of  methylmethyl isocyanateisocyanate  gas and othergas and other chemicals from the plantchemicals from the plant  Exposure of hundreds ofExposure of hundreds of thousands of peoplethousands of people  Confirmed a total of 3,787Confirmed a total of 3,787 deathsdeaths  leak caused 558,125 injuriesleak caused 558,125 injuries
  32. 32. ApproachApproach  Illustrates the importance of incorporatingIllustrates the importance of incorporating  cross-cross- cultural communicationcultural communication  in crisis management plansin crisis management plans  Operating manuals printed only in English is anOperating manuals printed only in English is an extreme example of mismanagementextreme example of mismanagement  Indicative of systemic barriers to information diffusionIndicative of systemic barriers to information diffusion  Symbolic intervention can be counter productive (Symbolic intervention can be counter productive (UnionUnion CarbideCarbide’’s upper management arrived in India but was unable to assist in thes upper management arrived in India but was unable to assist in the relief efforts because they were placed under house arrest by the Indianrelief efforts because they were placed under house arrest by the Indian governmentgovernment))
  33. 33. ConclusionConclusion  Seven ex-employees, including the former UCILSeven ex-employees, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causingchairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligencedeath by negligence and sentenced toand sentenced to two yearstwo years imprisonmentimprisonment and aand a fine of about $2,000fine of about $2,000 each,each, the maximum punishment allowed by law. Anthe maximum punishment allowed by law. An eighth former employee was also convicted, buteighth former employee was also convicted, but died before judgment was passeddied before judgment was passed
  34. 34. Case - VCase - V FordFord andand FirestoneFirestone Tire andTire and Rubber CompanyRubber Company 20002000  
  35. 35. IncidentIncident  15-inch Wilderness AT,15-inch Wilderness AT, radial ATX and ATX II tireradial ATX and ATX II tire treads were separatingtreads were separating from the tire corefrom the tire core  leading to grisly,leading to grisly, spectacular crashesspectacular crashes  These tires were mostlyThese tires were mostly used on the Ford Explorer,used on the Ford Explorer, the world's top-sellingthe world's top-selling (SUV)(SUV)
  36. 36. ApproachApproach  First, they blamed consumers for not inflatingFirst, they blamed consumers for not inflating their tires properlytheir tires properly  Then they blamed each other for faulty tires andThen they blamed each other for faulty tires and faulty vehicle designfaulty vehicle design  Then they said very little about what they wereThen they said very little about what they were doing to solve a problem that had caused moredoing to solve a problem that had caused more than 100 deathsthan 100 deaths  They got called to Washington to testify beforeThey got called to Washington to testify before CongressCongress
  37. 37. ConclusionConclusion  Bridgestone/Firestone recalled 6.5 million tiresBridgestone/Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires  Total cost = 1 Billion $Total cost = 1 Billion $
  38. 38. Case - VICase - VI   Exxon Valdez oil spillExxon Valdez oil spill 19891989  
  39. 39. IncidentIncident  Spilled millions ofSpilled millions of gallons of crude oil intogallons of crude oil into the waters off Valdezthe waters off Valdez –– AlaskaAlaska  The size of the spill isThe size of the spill is estimated at 40,900 toestimated at 40,900 to 120,000 m3120,000 m3  Hundreds of miles ofHundreds of miles of coastline were pollutedcoastline were polluted and salmon spawningand salmon spawning runs disruptedruns disrupted
  40. 40. ApproachApproach  Exxon, did not react quickly in terms of dealing withExxon, did not react quickly in terms of dealing with the media and the publicthe media and the public  The company had neither a communication plan nor aThe company had neither a communication plan nor a communication team in place to handle the eventcommunication team in place to handle the event  Exxon established its media center in Valdez, a locationExxon established its media center in Valdez, a location too small and too remote to handle the onslaught oftoo small and too remote to handle the onslaught of media attentionmedia attention  The company actedThe company acted defensivelydefensively in its response to itsin its response to its publicpublic  Even laying blame, at times, on other groups such asEven laying blame, at times, on other groups such as thethe Coast GuardCoast Guard
  41. 41. ConclusionConclusion  Litigation was filed on behalf of 38,000 litigantsLitigation was filed on behalf of 38,000 litigants  A jury awarded plaintiffs US$287 million inA jury awarded plaintiffs US$287 million in compensatory damages and US$5 billion incompensatory damages and US$5 billion in punitive damagespunitive damages  As of 2010 there are approximately 98As of 2010 there are approximately 98  cubiccubic metres (3,500metres (3,500  cucu  ft) or 26,000 gallons) of Valdezft) or 26,000 gallons) of Valdez crude oil still in Alaska's sand and soilcrude oil still in Alaska's sand and soil
  42. 42. Case - VIICase - VII TheThe  ChernobylChernobyl disasterdisaster 26 April 198626 April 1986
  43. 43. IncidentIncident  Reactor four suffered aReactor four suffered a catastrophic power increasecatastrophic power increase leading to explosions in itsleading to explosions in its corecore  This dispersed largeThis dispersed large quantities of radioactive fuelquantities of radioactive fuel and core materials into theand core materials into the atmosphereatmosphere  The accident occurred duringThe accident occurred during an experiment scheduled toan experiment scheduled to test a potential safetytest a potential safety
  44. 44. ApproachApproach  The reactor had not been encased by any kind ofThe reactor had not been encased by any kind of hardhard  containment vesselcontainment vessel  Because of the inaccurate low readings, theBecause of the inaccurate low readings, the reactor crew chiefreactor crew chief  assumed that the reactor wasassumed that the reactor was intactintact  The readings of another dosimeter brought in byThe readings of another dosimeter brought in by 04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that the new dosimeter must have been defectivethe new dosimeter must have been defective
  45. 45. ApproachApproach  "We didn't know it was the reactor. No one had"We didn't know it was the reactor. No one had told us.told us.““ LieutenantLieutenant  Volodymyr Pravik, who died on 9 May 1986 ofVolodymyr Pravik, who died on 9 May 1986 of  acuteacute radiation sicknessradiation sickness
  46. 46. ConclusionConclusion  TheThe distrustdistrust that many people (both within andthat many people (both within and outside theoutside the  USSR) had in theUSSR) had in the  SovietSoviet  authoritiesauthorities  Over 30 years is estimated at US$235Over 30 years is estimated at US$235  billion (inbillion (in 2005 dollars)2005 dollars)  5% - 7% of government spending in Ukraine5% - 7% of government spending in Ukraine still related to Chernobylstill related to Chernobyl
  47. 47. Case - VIIICase - VIII FukushimaFukushima I nuclear accidentsI nuclear accidents 20112011
  48. 48. IncidentIncident  Following the9.0Following the9.0 magnitudemagnitude  TōhokuTōhoku earthquake andearthquake and tsunamitsunami  on 11 Marchon 11 March 20112011  Experts consider it to beExperts consider it to be the second largestthe second largest nuclear accident afternuclear accident after thethe  Chernobyl disasterChernobyl disaster  More complex as allMore complex as all reactors are involvedreactors are involved
  49. 49. ApproachApproach  Tokyo drinking water exceeded the safe level forTokyo drinking water exceeded the safe level for infantsinfants  Prompting the government to distribute bottledPrompting the government to distribute bottled water to families with infantswater to families with infants  A nuclear emergency was declared by theA nuclear emergency was declared by the Government at 19:03 on 11 MarchGovernment at 19:03 on 11 March  Initially a 2Initially a 2  km, then 10km, then 10  kmkm  evacuation zone wasevacuation zone was orderedordered
  50. 50. ApproachApproach  Later Prime MinisterLater Prime Minister  issued instructions thatissued instructions that people within a 20people within a 20  km (12 mile) zone around thekm (12 mile) zone around the plant must leaveplant must leave  Urged that those living between 20Urged that those living between 20  km andkm and 3030  km from the site to stay indoorskm from the site to stay indoors  Six weeks after the crisis began, plans wereSix weeks after the crisis began, plans were announced for a large-scale study of theannounced for a large-scale study of the environmental and health effects of radioactiveenvironmental and health effects of radioactive contamination from the nuclear plantcontamination from the nuclear plant
  51. 51. ConclusionConclusion  A private report by journalists and academics as well as an investigation by TEPCO.  The panel said the government and TEPCO failed to prevent the disaster not because a large tsunami was unanticipated, but because they were reluctant to invest time, effort and money in protecting against a natural disaster considered unlikely.  "The utility and regulatory bodies were overly confident that events beyond the scope of their assumptions would not occur . . . and were not aware that measures to avoid the worst situation were actually full of holes," the government panel said in its final report.
  52. 52. Case-IX  ‫حادثة حريق قطار الصعيد‬ ‫العياط – مصر‬ 20‫ فبراير‬2002‫ م‬
  53. 53. ‫الدحداث‬‫الدحداث‬ ‫كان القطار رقم‬832 ‫ المتوجه من القاهرة إلي أسوان‏, قد اندلعت‬  ‫النيران في إحدي عرباته الساعة في الثانية من صباح يوم‬20   ‫فبراير‬2002.‫ م‏, عقب مغادرته مدينة العياط عند قرية ميت القائد‬  ,‫أكد الناجون أنهم شاهدوا ديخانا كثيفا ينبعث من العربة اليخيرة للقطار‏‬  ,‫ثم اندلعت النيران بها وامتدت بسرعة إلي باقي العربات اليخيرة‏‬  ‫والتي كانت مكدسة بالركاب المسافرين لقضاء عطلة عيد‬ .‫الحضحى في مراكزهم وقراهم في صعيد مصر‬  ‫وقام بعض الركاب بكسر النوافذ الزجاجية‏, وألقوا بأنفسهم يخارج‬  .‫القطار‏, مما تسبب في مصرعهم أو غرقهم في ترعة البراهيمية‬  ‫وقام قائد القطار بفصل العربات السبع المامية عن العربات‬  ‫المحترقة‏, وأيخطر الجهات المعنية بالحادث‏, ثم واصل رحلته يخشية‬ .‫توقفه وحدوث كارثة جديدة‬
  54. 54. ‫التناول‬‫التناول‬  ‫أكد الدكتور عاطف عبيد رئيس مجلس الوزراء ـ عقب زيارته‬  ‫مستشفي العياط المركزي للطمئنان علي المصابين ـ أن الحريق‬  ‫اشتعل بعربات القطار بسبب‬‫انفجار موقد بوتاجاز‬ ‫ في بوفيه إحدي‬  .‫العربات بالقطار‏, وامتدت النيران إلي باقي العربات‬  ‫تعد حادثة قطار الصعيد التي راح حضحيتها أكثر من ثلثمائة ويخمسين‬ ‫مسافرا السوأ من نوعها في تاريخ‬  ‫السكك الحديدية المصرية أي منذ‬ .‫أكثر من مئة ويخمسين عاما‬  ‫بدأت في القاهرة يوم‬27 ‫ إبريل‬2002 ‫ محاكمة‬11 ‫ مسؤول بهيئة‬  ‫السكك الحديدية في مصر إذ يواجهون اتهامات بالهمال في أسوأ‬  ‫حادث قطار مصري أودى بحياة‬361. ‫ شخصا‬ .‫أدت الكارثة إلى استقالة وزير النقل المصري إبراهيم الدميري‬
  55. 55. Case - XCase - X The Deepwater Horizon oil spillThe Deepwater Horizon oil spill –– 20102010 ““The Macondo incidentThe Macondo incident”” Gulf of MexicoGulf of Mexico
  56. 56. IncidentIncident  It is the largest accidental marine oilIt is the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleumspill in the history of the petroleum industryindustry  The spill stemmed from a sea-floorThe spill stemmed from a sea-floor  oiloil gushergusher  that resulted from the April 20,that resulted from the April 20, 2010,2010,  explosion ofexplosion of  DeepwaterDeepwater HorizonHorizon  BPBP released a 193-page report on itsreleased a 193-page report on its web site. The report saysweb site. The report says BPBP employees and those ofemployees and those of TransoceanTransocean did not correctly interpret a pressuredid not correctly interpret a pressure test, and both companies neglectedtest, and both companies neglected signs such as a pipe calledsigns such as a pipe called a risera riser  losinglosing fluid. It also says that while BP did notfluid. It also says that while BP did not listen to recommendationslisten to recommendations byby  HalliburtonHalliburton  for more centralizersfor more centralizers
  57. 57. ApproachApproach Short-term efforts:Short-term efforts:  Remotely operated underwaterRemotely operated underwater vehicles to close the blowoutvehicles to close the blowout preventerpreventer  valves on the well headvalves on the well head  Placing a 125-tonnePlacing a 125-tonne (280,000(280,000  lb)lb)  containmentcontainment domedome  (which had worked on leaks in(which had worked on leaks in shallower water) over the largest leakshallower water) over the largest leak and piping the oil to a storage vesseland piping the oil to a storage vessel on the surfaceon the surface  Positioning a riser insertion tube intoPositioning a riser insertion tube into the wide burst pipethe wide burst pipe
  58. 58. ApproachApproach  TransoceanTransocean's's  Development Driller IIIDevelopment Driller III  started drilling a firststarted drilling a first relief well,relief well,   GSF Development Driller IIGSF Development Driller II  started drilling astarted drilling a second reliefsecond relief  Each relief well is expected to cost about $100Each relief well is expected to cost about $100  millionmillion  BPBP began pumping cement from the top, sealing that partbegan pumping cement from the top, sealing that part of the flow channel permanentlyof the flow channel permanently  Two weeks later, it was uncertain when the well could beTwo weeks later, it was uncertain when the well could be declared completely sealeddeclared completely sealed  Even in properly sealed wells, the cementEven in properly sealed wells, the cement plugs can fail over the decades and metalplugs can fail over the decades and metal casings that line the wells can rustcasings that line the wells can rust
  59. 59. ConclusionConclusion  At first,At first, BPBP files a 52files a 52  pagepage exploration andexploration and environmental impact planenvironmental impact plan for thefor the  MacondoMacondo well. Thewell. The plan stated that it was "plan stated that it was "unlikely that an accidental surface orunlikely that an accidental surface or subsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activitiessubsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activities””  Mark E. HafleMark E. Hafle, a senior drilling engineer at BP, warns, a senior drilling engineer at BP, warns that the metal casing for thethat the metal casing for the  blowout preventerblowout preventer  mightmight collapse under high pressurecollapse under high pressure  TheThe  White HouseWhite House  oil spill commission released a finaloil spill commission released a final report detailing faults by the companies that led to thereport detailing faults by the companies that led to the spillspill  The panel found thatThe panel found that BPBP,, HalliburtonHalliburton, and, and TransoceanTransocean had attempted to workhad attempted to work more cheaplymore cheaply andand thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakagethus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage
  60. 60. ConclusionConclusion  BPBP released a statement in response to this, saying,released a statement in response to this, saying, ""Even priorEven prior to the conclusion of the commissionto the conclusion of the commission’’s investigation, BP instituteds investigation, BP instituted significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risksignificant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk management “management “  TransoceanTransocean, however, blamed, however, blamed BPBP for making the decisionsfor making the decisions before the actual explosion occurred and government officialsbefore the actual explosion occurred and government officials for permitting those decisionsfor permitting those decisions  HalliburtonHalliburton stated that it was acting only upon the orders ofstated that it was acting only upon the orders of BPBP when it injected the cement into the wall of the wellwhen it injected the cement into the wall of the well  HalliburtonHalliburton also blamed the governmental officials andalso blamed the governmental officials and BPBP. It. It criticizedcriticized BPBP for its failure to run afor its failure to run a  cement bond logcement bond log  testtest  In the report,In the report, BPBP was accused of nine faultswas accused of nine faults
  61. 61. ““Better management of decision-making processesBetter management of decision-making processes withinwithin BPBP and other companies, betterand other companies, better communication within and betweencommunication within and between BPBP and itsand its contractors and effective training of keycontractors and effective training of key engineering and rig personnel would haveengineering and rig personnel would have prevented theprevented the MacondoMacondo incidentincident”” TheThe White HouseWhite House oil spilloil spill commission panel final reportcommission panel final report
  62. 62. Lessons learned inLessons learned in Crisis ManagementCrisis Management
  63. 63. Lessons learned in CrisisLessons learned in Crisis ManagementManagement  A study identified organizations that recovered andA study identified organizations that recovered and eveneven exceededexceeded pre-catastrophe stock pricepre-catastrophe stock price  The average cumulative impact onThe average cumulative impact on  shareholdershareholder valuevalue  for thefor the recoverersrecoverers waswas 5% plus5% plus on their originalon their original stock valuestock value  TheThe non-recoverersnon-recoverers remained more or less unchangedremained more or less unchanged between days 5 and 50 after the catastrophe, butbetween days 5 and 50 after the catastrophe, but suffered a net negative cumulative impact of almostsuffered a net negative cumulative impact of almost 15%15% on their stock price up toon their stock price up to one yearone year afterwards.afterwards.
  64. 64. ImportantImportant ““It is highly recommended to those whoIt is highly recommended to those who wish to engage their senior management inwish to engage their senior management in the value of crisis managementthe value of crisis management””
  65. 65. Crisis as an OpportunityCrisis as an Opportunity
  66. 66. Crisis as an OpportunityCrisis as an Opportunity  Management must move from a mindset thatManagement must move from a mindset that manages crisis to one thatto one that generates crisis leadership  Most executives focus on communications andMost executives focus on communications and  publicpublic relationsrelations  as aas a reactive strategyreactive strategy  Potential damage to reputation can result from thePotential damage to reputation can result from the actual management of the crisis issueactual management of the crisis issue  Companies may stagnate as theirCompanies may stagnate as their  riskrisk managementmanagement  group identifies whether a crisis isgroup identifies whether a crisis is sufficientlysufficiently ““statistically significantstatistically significant””
  67. 67. Crisis leadershipCrisis leadership   ””Immediately addresses both the damageImmediately addresses both the damage and implications for the companyand implications for the company’’s presents present and future conditions, as well asand future conditions, as well as opportunities for improvementopportunities for improvement””  
  68. 68. Government and crisis managementGovernment and crisis management  United StatesUnited States National GuardNational Guard  at the federal levelat the federal level  U.S.U.S.  Federal Emergency ManagementFederal Emergency Management AgencyAgency  ((FEMAFEMA) within the) within the  Department ofDepartment of Homeland SecurityHomeland Security  administers theadministers the  NationalNational Response PlanResponse Plan  ((NRPNRP))  This plan is intended toThis plan is intended to integrate public andintegrate public and private responseprivate response by providing a commonby providing a common language and outlininglanguage and outlining
  69. 69. Government and crisis managementGovernment and crisis management  TheThe NRPNRP is a companion to theis a companion to the NationalNational Incidence Management SystemIncidence Management System  FEMAFEMA offers free web-based training on theoffers free web-based training on the National Response PlanNational Response Plan through the Emergencythrough the Emergency Management InstituteManagement Institute  Common Alerting ProtocolCommon Alerting Protocol  ((CAPCAP) is a relatively) is a relatively recent mechanism that facilitates crisisrecent mechanism that facilitates crisis communication across different mediums andcommunication across different mediums and systems “A consistent emergency alert format “
  70. 70. RememberRemember!!
  71. 71. The Crisis Management ToolboxThe Crisis Management Toolbox I. Individual Preparedness Plan Checklist II. Coordination Authority Public Checklist III. Command Centers IV. Incident Command System (Common Terminology) V. Designating a Spokesperson, backup spokesperson VI. Media Policies and Procedures (Practicing Tough Questions/Prepared Statements) VII. Drill, drill then drill !
  72. 72. Practice Model - IPractice Model - I
  73. 73. ‫اللهلية‬ ‫الغاز‬ ‫شركة‬‫اللهلية‬ ‫الغاز‬ ‫شركة‬  ‫أنت رئيس مجلس إدارة شركة الغاز اللهلية )غاز – مصر‬‫أنت رئيس مجلس إدارة شركة الغاز اللهلية )غاز – مصر‬))  ‫حضر إليك مسئول المان بالشركة يقترح عمل خطة مكافحة‬ ‫حضر إليك مسئول المان بالشركة يقترح عمل خطة مكافحة‬  ‫أزمات لحالة تسريب غاز من شبكة توزيع الغاز الخاصة‬ ‫أزمات لحالة تسريب غاز من شبكة توزيع الغاز الخاصة‬ ‫بشركتك‬‫بشركتك‬  ‫ماذا تفعل لمواجهة إحتمال لهذة الزمة؟‬‫ماذا تفعل لمواجهة إحتمال لهذة الزمة؟‬
  74. 74. Practice Model - IIPractice Model - II
  75. 75. ‫الوطنية‬ ‫السيارات‬ ‫صناعة‬ ‫شركة‬‫الوطنية‬ ‫السيارات‬ ‫صناعة‬ ‫شركة‬  ‫أنت مدير إدارة السلمة بشركة السيارات الوطنية )شاس‬‫أنت مدير إدارة السلمة بشركة السيارات الوطنية )شاس‬))  ‫بعد قراءتك لتفاصيل ما حدث من أزمة دواسات الوقود‬ ‫بعد قراءتك لتفاصيل ما حدث من أزمة دواسات الوقود‬  ‫المعيبة بشركة تويوتا العالمية قررت عمل خطة مواجهة‬ ‫المعيبة بشركة تويوتا العالمية قررت عمل خطة مواجهة‬ ‫ازمات التى قد تواجه صناعتك‬‫ازمات التى قد تواجه صناعتك‬  ‫ما لهى السيناريولهات التى سوف تفترضها و كيف تضع‬ ‫ما لهى السيناريولهات التى سوف تفترضها و كيف تضع‬ ‫خططها ؟‬‫خططها ؟‬
  76. 76. Practice Model - IIIPractice Model - III
  77. 77. ‫الشيخ‬ ‫شرم‬ – ‫الفيروز‬ ‫منتجع‬‫الشيخ‬ ‫شرم‬ – ‫الفيروز‬ ‫منتجع‬  ‫قمت بإفتتاح منتجع للسياحة بشرم الشيخ‬‫قمت بإفتتاح منتجع للسياحة بشرم الشيخ‬   ‫الستثمارات الكلية التى قمت بوضعها به تكلفت‬ ‫الستثمارات الكلية التى قمت بوضعها به تكلفت‬3030 ‫ مليون‬ ‫ مليون‬ ‫جنية مصرى من أموال القروض‬‫جنية مصرى من أموال القروض‬  ‫تريد أن تحمى إستثمارك من المفاجآت‬‫تريد أن تحمى إستثمارك من المفاجآت‬  ‫ماذا تفعل؟‬‫ماذا تفعل؟‬
  78. 78. Last wordsLast words
  79. 79. Thank youThank you ‫شكرا‬ ً‫شكرا‬ ً

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