This study was presented by Dr. Noora-Lisa Aberman (Country Program Manager, International Food Policy Research Institute) at the Agriculture nutrition event on " Improving Food Security, Diets and Nutrition through Multisectoral Action" on 30 May, 2017 at Capital Hotel, Lilongwe

1. Aulo Gelli, Noora-Lisa Aberman,
Amy Margolies, Marco Santacroce, Bob Baulch
and Ephraim Chirwa
The impact of lean season food transfers
on food security, diets and nutrition
status

2. Study objectives
• To estimate the impact and targeting of
(MVAC) lean season food transfers on
households’ food security and children’s diets
and nutrition
• To understand village-level norms on
allocation of food transfers and other
resources that may help explain those results

3. Study sites
• Data was collected
from 60 communities
randomly selected
among a set of
food-insecure villages
in MVAC targeted
region of Zomba
district in southern
Malawi

4. Study methods: Quantitative Data
• Longitudinal study based on two rounds of
surveys (as part of a cluster randomized
controlled trial of a pre-school based
agriculture and nutrition intervention):
– Baseline survey undertaken in the post-harvest
season (September 2015)
– Follow-up undertaken during the peak lean
season (February 2016) after scale-up of food
transfers
– Rich data set including ~1200 households, over
1,500 children

5. Study methods: Qualitative Data
• Qualitative data is made up of 45 in-depth
time-line interviews in the same communities
in Zomba, with women, men and adolescent
girls (March 2016)
– Translated and transcribed, then thematically
coded

6. Evaluation strategy
• First estimated a probit model to assess the
probability of targeting criteria to predict
program participation
– using range of household and community level
characteristics on sample of MVAC beneficiaries
and non-beneficiaries
• Then we evaluated the impact of MVAC by
combining propensity score matching and
difference in difference (DID) methods

7. MVAC programme characteristics
• Eligibility criteria for MVAC food assistance
included households headed by women, the
elderly or children, or households including
orphans, the chronically ill or households that
had lost their main source of income due to
chronic illness
• Household screening criteria also included asset
holdings (including livestock, land and small
durables) and participation in other social
assistance programs (including social cash
transfers, inputs subsidy programme and school
meals)

8. Food transfers
• Food rations were to be provided to households
on a monthly basis and included maize (50kg),
legumes (10kg) and fortified vegetable oil (1.84 kg)
• At endline, 175 (15%) out of 1,191 households
had received MVAC in the survey population
• Households consuming <1800 calories per capital
per day: 36% at baseline and 46% during lean
season

9. Quantitative Results

10. Effects of MVAC Food Transfer
• During the lean season, households in the
sample experienced substantive declines in
household food security
• Compared to control, MVAC food recipients
were better off:
– substantive positive impact on household food
consumption in 7 day recall period
– substantive positive impact on young children’s
diets and nutrition outcomes

11. Treatment effects: Household level
• Substantive positive impact on household
food consumption in 7 day recall period
– Per capita food expenditures + 19% / 35MK pppd
– Daily acquisition of iron +16% / 3.92mg pppd
** p<0.05.
MKw/day

12. Treatment effects: Child level
• Substantive positive impact on young
children’s diets (DDS +15% & FVS +13%)
• And nutrition outcomes: weight-for-height z-
scores (+14%)
Children 36-72m Children 6-59m
***
***
**
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05.

13. MVAC targeting
• Findings indicate that MVAC targeting criteria are
not good predictors of program participation
• Data on MVAC participation also suggests that
~20% of most food secure households (by
quintile) received transfers
• Positive effects on food expenditures and
children’s diets are concentrated among the
poorer households
• SCTP recipients appear to be excluded from
receiving MVAC food

14. MVAC participation by socioeconomic
and food security status

15. MVAC participation by official
poverty line
Household expenditures
poor non-poor
MVAC 10% 5%
no MVAC 55% 31%

16. Qualitative Results

17. Social norms, targeting & favoritism
• Village heads play a significant role in determining who
receives MVAC and other social support programs.
– Primarily through control over beneficiary selection, also
through directives about sharing
• Perceptions of extent of consultation in allocation process:
varies by village
• Perceptions of the extent of favoritism also varies
• Some complaints about chief intervention, e.g., inclusion
errors (favoritism) and forced sharing, but frequently this is
viewed as unavoidable and part of village norms
• Beyond some complaints about chief intervention, the
primary complaint about targeting is “not enough benefit”
related to feeling that “everyone should get something”

18. Social norms and sharing
• About half the time sharing is dictated by the chief. When
it’s not, HHs decide to share on their own due to kinship
obligations, social pressure, and hope for reciprocation
(often described as a moral or humanitarian requirement).
• Some people complained about forced sharing and
community pressure to share. No one complained about
sharing with relatives => social requirement.
• Sharing is required even if targeted recipient is objectively
poorer than those with whom they share (relative wealth
does not seem to be considered in sharing decisions)

19. Female MVAC recipient in Zomba in favor of forced sharing:
Interviewer: Did you think this sharing was beneficial?
Respondent 1: Yes, it was beneficial because it could be you
next year not in the program, and your friends would help
you. But the owners of the program say not to share, this
only happens in the village to just help each other.
Female MVAC recipients in Zomba unhappy with targeting and forced
sharing:
I: So what criteria were they using to select beneficiaries?
R: They were choosing people who had nothing to eat…But at times
they recorded names of people who had food but those who lacked
food were also being skipped…As per village level problems, the chief
said, “This maize should be shared amongst you. You will see how you
can share.” So people could share two [households] per bag…

20. Conclusions: Effects of MVAC
• Quantitative data suggests that MVAC food
transfers are effective in protecting short
term food security and nutrition status
during the lean season.
–Evidence of protective impact on household
food consumption, and on dietary diversity (of
3-6yr olds) and weight for height z-scores of
young children (0-5yrs)

21. Conclusions: Targeting and Coverage
• Targeting and coverage of MVAC:
– Overall coverage of transfers was low in the survey
population (~15% of HH)
– Data on targeting criteria are not good predictors of
program participation
– Evidence suggests that ~20% of the most food secure
households received transfers
• Effects on food expenditures and diets are greater
for poorer households (better targeting=>more
efficient)

22. Conclusions: Sharing and Favoritism
• Insufficient public social support reinforces high
dependence on kinship networks and community
support
• Favoritism in community-based targeting seen as
unavoidable (villagers cannot contest/ it’s chief’s
prerogative)
• A more objective targeting system could improve
targeting to some extent, but pressure to
reallocate once transfer arrive in the village is
likely to remain

23. Policy Implications
• Educating villagers on good local governance
practices, may slowly begin to alter norms that
yield exclusion and inclusion errors, but weak
social support system reinforces these practices.
• Most people face dietary shocks each year:
suggesting that other social support mechanisms
(productive and protective) must be scaled up to
meet the current need.
– NOTE: there is a significant challenge separating chronic
from acute food insecurity in this context…

24. Thank you!